Lectures
Global Diasporas. Cultures, Identities and Politics
2023-2024

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Global Diaspora 2023-24

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"Diaspora" as a concept has enabled an understanding of identities and cultures beyond national, ethnic or racial connotations. Diaspora functions as a vision to think of subjectivities and communities not as epiphenomena of nation-states but as springboard for de-territorialised and transnational cultural and political formations and political subjectivities. Central notions associated with diaspora are those of imagination, hybridity, double consciousness and resistance. In this light, this course explores African and Asian Diasporas in the contemporary world. The first part introduces students to anthropological and social theory of migration and looks at what Diaspora as a heuristic device has brought to studies and understandings of home, belonging, identities and political cultures. The second part will look at both historical and contemporary lived experiences of Diasporas in the global context, delving into specific studies and reflections on the Jewish diaspora, the Asian diaspora, the Palestinian diaspora as well as the African diaspora. In addition to this, we will pay some attention to the significance of the 'borderland' as a site of fugitive political and cultural formations in opposition to nationalist and exclusivist formations and rhetoric.

In the second part, the course focuses on how liberal states manage Diasporas through containment, confinement, disciplining and through a highly emotional politics of fear. Finally, we will analyse diasporas as "cultures of resistance" effecting a dissolution of borders and boundaries in their everyday aesthetic and performative practices.

The course is highly interdisciplinary but with a strong focus on ethnographic studies. Critical scholars whose work we will engage with for this course <u>include</u>: Stuart Hall on 'race' as a floating signifier, Paul Gilroy on the Black Atlantic, Saidiya Hartman on slavery and its after-live, Gloria Wekker and Fatima el Tayeb on queering diasporas, cultural archives and whiteness in Europe, Eduard Glissant on the righ to opacity, Ghassan Hage on the diasporic condition, Abdelmayak Sayyad on trauma and migration, Nadia Fadil Mayanthi Fernando and Annelies Moors on Islam in Europe and secular and religious affects.

Learning outcomes:

At the end of the course students will have a good knowledge of a portion of the vast field of diaspora studies. Students will learn about diasporic cultures, imaginaries, consciousness, subjectivities and practices across a variety of contexts and will be able to assess the stakes of 'diaspora' as an analytical concept and as lived experience. Students will also learn about the importance of intertwining critical race theory with ethnography in order to understand how diasporic subjectivities are racialised. The course will also equip students with decolonial approaches and methodologies to migration and diaspora studies. Finally, students will learn to critically engage with historical and contemporary debates around identity, nationalism, race, multiculturalism and difference.

MIGRATION AND DIASPORA. INTRO AND THEORETICAL APPROACHES

The first two sessions will involve a general introduction to the course ahead and will involve a discussion of the aims and objectives of the course. We will also start addressing questions such as: "What is migration?" by situating the course in a burgeoning global and interdisciplinary field. We will be going through an excursus of different approaches in migration studies and ask what can an anthropological lens add to these?

DIASPORA. CULTURES, IMAGINARIES AND POLITICS

We will be situating the course in the vast field of diaspora studies and related scholarship, and begin to explore the stakes of diaspora, discussing the various meanings associated with the notions of diasporic cultures, imaginaries, consciousness, subjectivities and practices.

Essential readings:

Gilroy, P. 1993. *The Black Atlantic. Modernity and Double Consciousness*, London, Verso. (Introduction)

Brah, A. 1996. 'Diaspora, border and transnational identities', in *Cartographies of diaspora: contesting identities.* London & New York; Routledge, pp. 178-210.

Gilroy, P. 1997.'Diaspora and the Detours of Identity', in Kathryn Woodward (ed.) *Identity & Difference*. London: Sage Publications in Association with Open University, pp. 299-343.

THE POLITICS AND SEMANTICS OF DISPLACEMENT. MIGRANTS, DIASPORAS AND REFUGEES

This lecture will introduce students to the different ways in which human voluntary or forced movements- as well as stasis- are categorised, constructed and defined. We will discuss the origin and limits of what has been termed as "categorical fetishism" on people's subjectivities but also the risks of jettisoning categories altogether. We will also discuss how the reification of "migrants" is premised on racialised constructions, particularly in Europe.

Essential Readings:

Nguyen, V. (2019). 'Refugeetude: When Does a Refugee Stop Being a Refugee'. Social Text 1; 37 (2): 109–131.

Peteet, J (2011). 'Cartographic violence, displacement and refugee camps: Palestine and Iraq' in Knusden and Hanafi (eds) *Palestinian refugees: identity, space and place in the Levant*. pp 13-29

El-Tayeb, F. (2008). 'The Birth of a European Public": Migration, Postnationality, and Race in the Uniting of Europe'. *American Quarterly*, 60(3), 649-670.

Activity:
Read this blog. Apostolova, R. 2015. "Of Refugees and Migrants: Stigma, Politics, and Boundary Work at the Borders of Europe." American Sociological Association Newsletter, September 14. https://asaculturesection.org/2015/09/14/of-refugees-and-migrants-stigma-politics-and-boundary-workat-the-borders-of-europe/.

Watch Nandita Sharma discuss her new book "Home Rule. National Sovereignty and the separation of Natives and Migrants" Duke University Press, 2020.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBChnzaT3zc&fbclid=IwAR2BVYd2G4pyXAhC69DP5INSqZPh2DqWZan75qvyoJEo6lmBVsXGmyjfGkk

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BETWEEN STUCKED-NESS AND HYPERMOBILITY. THE PROMISES AND PITFALLS OF TIME-SPACE COMPRESSION

Tuesday 13th February

This lecture will cover the emergence of two different and opposing ways of conceptualising migration. The concept of transnationalism against the novel paradigms of stucked-ness and waithood. Most writing on transnationalism emphasises the counter-hegemonic nature of transnational practices, by portraying them as acts of resistance and as signs of the decline of the modern nation-state and its apparatus of sovereignty. Reversely there is now a significant attention on stucked-ness and waithood, particularly in the anthropology of migration. In this lecture, we will explore the pitfalls and promises of both paradigms against the lived experience of women, me, youth, elites, racialized "others".

Essential readings:

Ong, A. (1999). 'The Pacific Shuttle: Family Citizenship, and Capital Circuits', in *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationalit*y. Durham: Duke University Press, pp. 110-136.

G. Hage (2015). On stuckedness. The critique of crisis and the crisis of critique. On stuckedness: critique of crisis and crisis of critique (Chapter Two in Alter-Politics: Critical Anthropology and the Radical Imagination, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 2015)

BODIES, BORDERS AND THE RACIAL NECRO-POLITICS OF IM/MOBILITY

Thursday 15th February

We explore the bio-politics and necropolitics of im/mobility: few people have the privilege of unhindered movement across borders and many migrant journeys never materialise - or, if they do, they may consist of protracted step-wise journeys, where people are often suspended *en route* and subject to stringent controls in the grey and border zones along the way. Other times moving *is* dying or living as bare lives. Through story- telling and readings we will examine the politics of life and death across borders. We will also consider whether the necropolitics of black bodies killed by state violence can be compared with the bare life of refugees, who are let die while crossing borders.

Essential Readings

PARIKH, S. and KWON, J.B. (2020). 'Crime seen', *American Ethnologist*, 47: 128-138. doi:10 .1111/amet.12887

De León, J., (2015). *The land of open graves: Living and dying on the migrant trail*. Oakland, California: University of California Press. (Introduction, chapter 1 and as much as you can of this ethnography)

Kovras, I. and Robins, S. (2016) 'Death as the Border. Managing Missing Migrants and Unidentified Bodies at the EU's Mediterranean Frontier', *Political Geography, Vol.55,* pp 40- 49.

Khosravi, S. (2007). "The 'illegal' traveller: an auto-ethnography of borders". *Social Anthropology/Anthropologie Sociale,* 15(3): 321–334.

DIASPORIC IMAGINATION AND TRADITIONAL FUTURES. ROOTS, ROUTES AND RITES OF RETURNS

Friday 16th February

What is the political and analytical work performed by "Diaspora"? Scholars of Diaspora have argued that Diaspora has enabled the conceptualisation of communities beyond reified and essentialist ethnic, territorial or racial configurations. Central notions associated with Diaspora are those of imagination, consciousness, subjectivity, recognition. Diaspora functions as a utopic/dystopic vision to think of political subjectivities and communities not as epiphenomena of nation-states but as springboard for de-territorialised formations. Yet, many diasporic communities are still trapped in (albeit ever transforming) colonial forms of power and material dispossession, not only of their identity and culture, but also of their land and resources. Others are turning to their origins and roots along the Atlantic slave routes. This session will focus on the tensions, possibilities and hindrances offered by diasporic imaginations across colonial and post-colonial conditions. It will do so by focusing on the role played by the trope of "return" on diasporic cultures and visions.

Essential Readings:

Hartman, S., 2008. *Lose your mother: A journey along the Atlantic slave route*. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux. (read as much as you can of this book which is written in a highly accessible style)

Abu-Lughod, L. 2011. Return to Half-Ruins: Fathers and Daughters, Memory and History in Palestine. In Hirsch M. & Miller N. (Eds.), *Rites of Return: Diaspora Poetics and the Politics of Memory* (pp. 124-136). New York: Columbia University Press. doi:10.7312/hirs15090.11

Boyarin, D., & Boyarin, J. 1993. Diaspora: Generation and the Ground of Jewish Identity. *Critical Inquiry*, 19(4): 693-725. (warning: this is a complex text, focus on the main argument about the formation of diasporic Jewish identity and return)

THE AFFECTIVE PRODUCTION OF OTHERNESS. EMOTIONAL ECONOMIES OF FEAR

Tuesday 20th February

Emotions and feelings in relation to migration (as well as perceptions of threats triggered by "politics of lying") seem to have been crucial in recent years particularly with Trump's election and Brexit. In this class, we reflect on how migration and diaspora as threats can be re-read through affect and economies of fear. These lenses help to complicate mainstream approaches to and debates around migration, which rely on cognitive and rational forms of deliberation and understanding. Instead, we explore the role of the uncanny and the visceral, feelings such as fears, desires, suffering and aspirations - as well as the ethical moral and political dimensions of emotions- to nuance our understanding of the contemporary politics and perceptions of selves and otherness.

Essential Readings:
Fassin, D. 2013, On Resentment and Ressentiment: The Politics and Ethics of Moral Emotions in *Current Anthropology* 54:3, 249-267.

Ioanide, P. (2015). *The emotional politics of racism: How feelings trump facts in an era of colorblindness*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

Ahmed, Sara. 2014. *The cultural politics of emotions* (Second edition.). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, Introduction. Feel your way.

THE PREDICAMENT OF "RACE" IN AND ACROSS DIASPORIC SPACES

Thursday 22nd February

In this session we explore the various understanding of 'race' as a system of meaning-making across diasporic spaces, places and historical times. Analysing the crucial ways in which 'race' and diasporic subjectivities intersect we engage with important work by scholars such as Wekker, Pierre, Hall.

Essential Readings:

Watch The 2019 Holberg Lecture by Paul Gilroy: "Never Again: Refusing Race and Salvaging the Human".
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ta6UkmlXtVo

Wekker, G. (2016) White innocence: Paradoxes of colonialism and race. Durham: Duke University Press. Introduction and Chapter 4

Hall, S. (1997). 'Race: the floating signifier' http://www.mediaed.org/transcripts/Stuart-Hall-Race-the-Floating-Signifier-Transcript.pdf

Activity:
Read this article on the Guardian
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/02/the-unwelcome-revival-of-race-science?fbclid=IwAR2PG_tEeJ_XHN_5FAH6KlmpmmmmKCEUBOYqnXfOg835RLwcs0U67H5Cg3s

==**23rd February: guest lecture Professor Peggy Levitt, Wellesley College, Harvard University**==

SECULAR AFFECTS AND DIASPORIC (EMBODIED) COUNTERPOLITICS

Tuesday 27th February 2023

Diasporic subjectivities are formed through gendered aesthetic practices and performances, which can take on and signify religious, cultural, political meanings, which are in turn constantly negotiated, hybridised and re-fashioned across bodies, times and spaces. Colonial, post-colonial and neo-colonial formations have all obsessed with hair and head covers as signifiers of modernity, backwardness, authenticity. Debates around the extent to which secularism (or laicite') can accommodate religious identities are racialised and gendered and more recently assumed nationalist contours. This week we critically scrutinise the "secular" and its underpinnings. We look at the secular as political practice and discourse, but also as embodied and affective site of production of particular types of sensibilities. We consider scholarship that theorises the secular as intertwined with the religious sphere, inspired by the tradition of Talal Asad and see what counterpolitics diasporic subjects enact to respond to the disciplining or exclusionary logics of secular normativities.

Essential Readings:
Bhandar, B. 2009. The Ties That Bind: Multiculturalism and Secularism Reconsidered. *Journal of Law and Society*, vol. 36, no. 3, 2009, pp. 301–326.

Fernando, M. 2019. State Sovereignty and the Politics of Indifference. PUBLIC CULTURE; 31 (2): 261–273. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/08992363-7286813

Fadil, N. 2009. Managing affects and sensibilities: The case of not-handshaking and not-fasting. *Social Anthropology* 17(4), 439–454.

1st March 2023

Guest Lecture Dr Ekin Bodur, University of Cambridge When Antigone is Muslim. About Kamila Shamsie's novel Homefire (TBC)

Nicholas De Genova, Sandro Mezzadra and John Pickles (editors)

NEW KEYWORDS: MIGRATION AND BORDERS

"New Keywords: Migration and Borders" is a collaborative writing project aimed at developing a nexus of terms and concepts that fill-out the contemporary problematic of migration. It moves beyond traditional and critical migration studies by building on cultural studies and post-colonial analyses, and by drawing on a diverse set of longstanding author engagements with migrant movements. The paper is organized in four parts (i) Introduction, (ii) Migration, Knowledge, Politics, (iii) Bordering, and (iv) Migrant Space/Times. The keywords on which we focus are: Migration/Migration Studies; Militant Investigation; Counter-mapping; Border Spectacle; Border Regime; Politics of Protection; Externalization; Migrant Labour; Differential inclusion/exclusion; Migrant struggles; and Subjectivity.

Introduction

It is remarkable that Raymond Williams, in his landmark work, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society* (1976), has no entry for either "Migration"/ "Immigration" or "Borders." Likewise, in the much more recent compilation on *New Keywords: A Revised Vocabulary of Culture and Society* (2005), edited by Tony Bennett, Lawrence Grossberg, and Meaghan Morris, "border" and "migration" seem to have once again eluded scrutiny. In their Introduction, Bennett, Grossberg, and Morris (2005, p. xxiii) indicate that they had planned to include an entry on "boundaries", but this did not happen. This is a pity, because boundary and border are words that perfectly meet the two basic criteria mentioned by Raymond Williams (1985, p.15) thirty years earlier: ''they are significant, binding words in certain activities and their interpretation; they are significant, indicative words in certain forms of thought.'' *New Keywords* did respond to a related set of concerns that are crucial to migration studies: sovereignty, diaspora, human rights, mobility, post-colonialism, and race, among others, but each of these keywords, we would argue, nevertheless defines a substantially different (if undoubtedly related) problem-space corresponding to a somewhat distinct sociocultural and historical conjuncture. Hence, the absence of the keywords that we propose here was equally a result of the fact that borders and migration had not yet fully emerged as a problem-space for cultural studies. This is not surprising. The discursive currency of these terms, and much of what has come to be commonplace in popular understandings about borders and

migration, is the product of a rather short (global) history. Of course, this is not to disregard the complex historical background for the contemporary prominence of these figures. It is, however, to signal the momentous *arrival* of *Migration* and *Borders* as indispensable conceptual categories for cultural studies today.

In the following pages, we propose to call critical attention to the ever increasing prominence of migration and borders as key figures for apprehending "culture and society" in our contemporary (global) present.

In his classic text, Williams opens his discussion with a reflection on how particular terms and phrases acquire quite discrepant and even contrary meanings over time and across space, such that the same words – and the conceptual categories that they index – can be so variously deployed, from one idiomatic usage to the next, as to appear to no longer refer to the same things. Williams (1985, p.11) remarks:

> "When we come to say 'we just don't speak the same language' we mean […] that we have different immediate values or different kinds of valuation, or that we are aware, often intangibly, of different formations and distributions of energy and interest."

It was of course part of Williams' larger project in his *Keywords* to supply a multi-layered exegesis for the numerous and subtly heterogeneous ways that the same words served a variety of often contradictory analytical purposes or epistemic ends. In this rather more modest endeavor, we will not pursue anything resembling that sort of hermeneutic enterprise. Nonetheless, we do want to affirm the existence here of a different formation and distribution of energy and interest around the thematic of Migration and Borders, distinguished by different immediate values and distinct kinds of valuation. If we appear to be no longer speaking the same language, this indeed is precisely the point.

Hence, we will boldly and unapologetically occupy the lexical and conceptual foreground where these "new" keywords can be established as vital and elementary figures for critical thought and action. Thus, we deliberately propose a variety of formulations of a series of concepts related to the larger thematic of migration and borders as tools for simultaneously deconstructing and reconstituting the very ways that cultural studies scholars can even begin to try to approach this topic. That is to say, we seek to de-sediment the already petrified and domesticated vocabulary that so pervasively circulates around these by-now already banal fixtures of popular discourse and public debate – "migration" and "borders" – in order to expose these keywords for all the unsettling dynamism that they intrinsically ought to convey.

What's "New" about Migration and Borders?

In the past decade, a new epistemic community working on migration and borders in many parts of the world has emerged. This loosely configured cross-section of

networks of migrants, activists, and scholars has become increasingly engaged in attempting to go beyond the established paradigms of both traditional and critical migration studies to create different relationships with migrants and migrants' struggles as well as a more open reading of border logics, technologies, and practices.

At the heart of these differences is the attempt to rework the by-now well-worn focus on the image of the border as "wall" and its corresponding concept of the "exclusion" of the migrant. Certainly, these groups do not dispute the stark fact that walls have and are proliferating in the contemporary world or that their effects are very often violent and exclusionary. Quite the opposite: they seek to situate the proliferation of such techniques and technologies of control within broader logics of governmentality and management, to understand the logics that drive states to erect walls in response to the mobility of the migrants who seek to pass through, around, over, or under them. But beyond this focus on governmentality and management, these new intellectual formations in migration and border studies – of which we are a part – see such a focus on the negative power of borders to be an important limit on how we can think and understand the broader political economy and cultural logics of bordering. By rethinking the logics of borders beyond their apparent role as tools of exclusion and violence, we intend to signal the more open and complex ways in which borders react to diverse kinds of migrant subjectivities and thereby operate to produce differentiated forms of access and "rights." Borders function to allow passage as much as they do to deny it, they work to increase or decelerate the speed of movement as much as they do to prevent or reverse it, and it is in the ways that borders multiply these kinds of subject positions and their corresponding tensions between access and denial, mobility and immobilization, discipline and punishment, freedom and control, that we locate the need for a series of *New Keywords of Migration and Borders*.

Thirty years ago, it was a similar focus on the changing structure and practices in the social regime of capital that led Stuart Hall and his colleagues to articulate a reading of the ways in which Thatcherism and neoliberalism was producing new spaces and subjectivities under the signs of privatization, entrepreneurialism, and individual responsibility. Today, globalization has both deepened and extended these dynamics and altered the effects they have. Far from flattening the world and reducing the significance of borders, the contemporary social regime of capital has *multiplied* borders and the rights they differentially allocate across populations.

As a result, these changing forms of regulation, management, and control have in turn generated new patterns of knowledge production which actively seek to destabilize the taxonomies and governmental partitions that regulate and delimit differential forms of mobility and inclusion, and which likewise open up the subject positions of theorist, practitioner, and migrant to more relational analysis and cross-cutting practices. Thus, today, in ways that were taken-for-granted

in the past, we must ask serious questions about the kinds of distinction that are being drawn between an "economic migrant" and an "asylum seeker," or between someone with papers and someone without them, as these identities are increasingly formalized but also plagued by ever greater incoherence, and as specific forms of mobility and juridical identities are assigned accordingly.

This transformation of practices and concepts has produced what Larry Grossberg (2010) has termed a new problem-space or problematic. Conjunctural analysis in cultural studies is above all about the analysis of historically specific sociocultural contexts and the political constitution of those contexts; it is always engaged with the ways in which particular social formations come into being. This is not a narrowly historicist concern with origins and development, but rather concerns a deep critical sensitivity to the conjunctural and contextual, concerned with the ways in which tensions, contradictions, and crises are negotiated in specific social formations.

As far as migration is concerned, a new problem-space or problematic began to emerge in the 1990s in many parts of the world in the framework of the critical debates surrounding "globalization" and of the multifarious social movements and struggles crisscrossing it. The formation of a new "gaze" and sensitivity on migration, as well as of a new epistemic community challenging the boundaries of established migration and border studies, was part and parcel of development of such movements and struggles, in which the involvement of migrants was a defining feature. The insurgence of the *sans papiers* in 1996 in France has an iconic significance in this regard, as well as – on a different level – the launch of the campaign *Kein Mensch ist illegal* ("No one is illegal") at the *Documenta* exhibition in Kassel one year later. More generally, the spread across continents of a "NoBorder" politics was an important laboratory for the formation of what we have called a new "gaze" on migration (Anderson, Sharma, and Wright 2009). Some of us first met at "NoBorder" camps and not in academic settings. It is from these meetings that such important research projects as "Transit Migration" (http://www.transitmigration.org/ 2007) or the innovative map of the Gibraltar Strait drawn by the *Hackitektura* collective in 2004 (http://www.antiatlas.net/en/2013/09/08/hackitectura-critical-carto graphy-of-gibraltar-2004-spain/) emerged, while other experiences of political activism and investigation, such as the "*Frassanito* Network" built the background of the intensification of older relations and the building up of new ones in Europe and beyond. The contestation of the 'Pacific solution', which involved an externalization of the Australian migration regime, took various forms including the Flotilla of 2004 in which activists sailed a yacht from the Australian mainland to the Pacific island of Nauru (Mitropoulos and Neilson 2006). Simultaneously, in the midst of the so-called War on Terror, the United States witnessed the utterly unprecedented nationwide mass mobilization of literally millions of migrants in 2006 to denounce their prospective

criminalization by what would have been the most punitive anti-immigrant legislation in U.S. history.

In the few intervening years, the conditions of capital, labour, and migrant lives have changed sufficiently to re-define the problematic in important ways. For example, the growing and widespread language of "invasion waves" in European border and migration management discourses was given added focus by the 2005 wall jumps in Ceuta, when hundreds of North and West Africa migrants frustrated by the increasingly rigid and draconian policing they were experiencing at the Moroccan border, jumped the wall. It was also in 2005 that the European Union formally signalled that border and migration management was to become a vital task for administration and management with the formation of FRONTEX, the European border and customs management authority.

We may identify at least three specific ways in which the figure of "crisis" has shaped or been mobilized by the techniques and practices of border and migration management. First, migration itself has been defined in terms of a crisis that needs to be managed. Second, the importance of migration in the contemporary world will not diminish. Because it is perceived as producing crises for something conventionally thought of as the 'normal' social fabric, the multiplication of the various legal statuses of migrants has generated new demands for administration and institutions of migration and border management. In their book *Border as Method* (2013), Mezzadra and Neilson have extended this analysis as a new critique of political economy which they refer to in terms of the "multiplication of labour." Third, the enduring depth of the 2007–08 financial crisis and the implementation of a battery of aggressive new austerity politics has had profound effects on the configuration of patterns of migration and the ways in which migrants are responding to the borders they face. These recent changes illustrate in even sharper ways the constructed nature of border regimes, as – for example – unemployed Spanish workers migrate to Morocco with an increasing number over-extending their visa stay there, while others become guest knowledge workers in the Ecuadorian university import regime.

In *New Keywords: Migration and Borders*, our focus is not on "migration and borders" writ large, but on the emergence of the problematic of migration and borders, along with the social mobilizations, interventions and concerns that have emerged around keywords such as "border regime," "border spectacle," "autonomy of migration," or "border as method." Our goal is to focus on critical concepts that deconstruct and transform the established repertoires of both traditional and critical migration studies in productive ways. We see the production and elaboration of new concepts as a crucial aspect of intellectual work and a necessary endeavour with which to enable new forms of politics that can be adequately targeted to the specificities of the historical conjuncture.

As militant researchers who are engaged with one or more migrant movements, we have also elected to compose this essay as a collective experiment, drawing on the collaborative writing of 17 activist scholars

working on migration and border studies. *Maribel Casas (MC), Sebastian Cobarrubias (SC), Nicholas De Genova (NDG), Glenda Garelli (GGa), Giorgio Grappi (GGr), Charles Heller (CH), Sabine Hess (SH), Bernd Kasparek (BK), Sandro Mezzadra (SM), Brett Neilson (BN), Irene Peano (IP), Lorenzo Pezzani (LP), John Pickles (JP), Federico Rahola (FR), Lisa Riedner (LR), Stephan Scheel (SS), and Martina Tazzioli (MT).* The authorship of specific keywords below is indicated by these initials. Writing this paper has thus been a collaborative effort, what we may describe as a fascinating and mad experiment in writing collectively. Specifically, *New Keywords: Migration and Borders* brings together 11 keywords that have come increasingly to define a new kind of problem-space around migration. The paper builds on and extends earlier discussions held in London (January/ February 2013) at the "Migration and Militant Research" Conference as well as the inaugural gathering of the research network on "The 'European' Question: Postcolonial Perspectives on Migration, Nation, and Race," both held at Goldsmiths, University of London.

Central to this endeavour is the need to be sensitive to the 'geographies' of the keywords that we develop. As our initial discussions in London indicated, it is important to challenge the Euro-Atlantic framework of (even 'critical') migration studies, and to engage with other migratory experiences and research. Admittedly, the New Keywords project first arose from discussions otherwise framed in terms of "the 'European' Question," but the real aim of that dialogue was precisely to disrupt the complacent conventions of a kind of residual Eurocentrism in the critical study of migration and borders in the specifically European context, beginning from the insistence on de-familiarizing and de-stabilizing our very preconceptions that we know what "Europe" is and who may be considered to be "European." Nevertheless, the *New Keywords: Migration and Borders* project is also distinct from that particularly "European" framework for dialogue and debate. Our focus here is not bounded by specific territorial boundaries, but aims to think beyond the Euro-Atlantic focus of (critical) migration studies to include examples such as 'internal migration' in China or the above mentioned Pacific solution to border externalization. With space available here for only rather short entries, we are not able to be fully "global" in the scope of our writing of these new keywords, but we aim nonetheless to repudiate a geographically restricted vision. The stakes of a new critical vocabulary in the study of migration and borders are truly global in scope, and planetary in scale.

NDG, SM, JP

References

Anderson, B., Sharma, N. & Wright, C. (2009) 'Editorial: why no borders?' *Refuge*, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 5–18.

Bennett, T., Grossberg, L. & Morris, M. (eds.) (2005) *New Keywords: A Revised Vocabulary of Culture and Society*. Oxford, Blackwell.

Grossberg, L. (2010) *Cultural Studies in the Future Tense*, Durham and London, Duke University Press.

Mitropoulos, A. & Neilson, B. (2006) Exceptional Times, Non-Governmental Spacings, and Impolitical Movements. *Vacarme*, 34 (http://www.vacarme.org/article484.html)

Williams, R. (1976) *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*, New York, Oxford University Press.

Williams, R. (1985) *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*. New York, Oxford University Press (revised edition).

Migration, Knowledge, Politics

(1) Migration/Migration Studies

What is migration? It is a truism to say that mobility has been a distinctive feature of human history, that human history is the history of human mobility. In this keyword we are interested in particular aspects of *modern* migration: the multifarious and heterogeneous practices of mobility within a field dominated by the state, empire, and capital. The modern state and its bounded discourse of citizenship, first in Europe and then globally, have produced the codes, institutions, and practices that continue to shape migratory policies and experiences across a wide range of geographical settings and scales. In recent years the codes that shape modern migration have been increasingly reworked as they are challenged by a multiplicity of new regional and global actors. Colonial expansion and imperial histories have forged a geography of migration whose effects continue, while modern capitalism has been structurally linked with labour mobility and faced with the problem of its control since its inception.

Migrations have shaped modern history at least since the Atlantic slave trade and the unruly dislocation, enclosure, and dispossession of the rural poor to populate the cities and fuel the booming labor needs of industry in England and other European countries. From historians of slavery in the Americas and critical investigations of the attempts to tame the "coolie beast" in Southeast Asia (Berman 1989), we have learned that these bodies in motion were never "docile." Practices of rebellion and resistance crisscross the history of even the most brutal forms of "forced" migration, a crucial lesson today when governmental as well as scholarly taxonomies and epistemic partitions that define migration confront radical challenges. These challenges are particularly evident in current debates about the "crisis of asylum" and the blurring of the border between "asylum seekers," "refugees," and "economic migrants."

What is called today "migration studies" has its historical roots in past "ages of migration," most prominently in the time of the great transatlantic migration at the end of the 19th century (just think of the Chicago School of sociology) and the "guest-worker regime" in West Germany and other European countries in

the 1950s and 1960s. It is important to begin with such "founding moments" of migration studies at least for three reasons. First, they point to the Euro-Atlantic scale of its development, a scale that continues to inform the concepts that are used nowadays to investigate migration across the world. Secondly, they point to the fact that migration studies emerged in the heyday of processes of mass industrialization in the early twentieth century, and particularly within the framework of what is usually called "Fordism". This framework continues to shape the paradigm of migration studies despite the fact that the economy has dramatically changed. Thirdly, a concern for the social and economic "integration" of the migrant has long dominated migration studies. The "point of view of the native", a specific form of "methodological nationalism" has consequently shaped (and very often continues to shape) theoretical frameworks and research projects (De Genova 2005). In these perspectives *doxa*, common-sense, and public discourses intermingle with "scientific" understandings.

Contemporary migration, at least since the crisis of the early 1970s, challenges all these points. It has become *global*, compelling us to come to terms with geographically heterogeneous experiences of migration. Even when connected to industrial labour (such as "internal" migration in China), its patterns are very different from classical "Fordist" ones. Moreover, migration has become "turbulent," leading to a multiplication of statuses, subjective positions and experiences within citizenship regimes and labour markets. This has occasioned the "explosion" of established models of "integration" in many parts of the world.

In recent decades, approaches linked to critical race theory, feminism, labour studies, and transnationalism have productively challenged the boundaries of migration studies. Scholars and activists have highlighted the roles played by race and sex in the shaping of processes of subjection within migratory experiences. At the same time, these approaches have shed light on multifarious practices of "subjectivation" through which migrants challenge these devices on a daily basis, giving rise to relations and practices that facilitate their mobility as well as often unstable ways of staying in place. The emergence of such concepts as "the right to escape" and "autonomy of migration" is part of this challenge to the boundaries of migration studies (Mezzadra 2006, 2011; Moulier Boutang 1998; Papadopoulos, Stephenson, and Tsianos 2008). Their most distinctive contribution lies in the emphasis they place on the "subjective" dimensions of migration, on the structural excess that characterizes it with regard both to the order of citizenship and to the interplay of supply and demand on the "labor market."

SM, BN, SS, FR

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(2) Militant Investigation

The production and circulation of knowledge around migrations has expanded rapidly in the past decade, resulting in a sort of *migration knowledge hype*: a multiplication of the types of knowledges being produced under the banner of 'migration' (scholarly contributions, policy dialogues and implementation reports, professional workshops, institutional surveys, advocacy discourses etc.) and the mushrooming of epistemic communities working on migration issues (academics, policy institutes, non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations, funding institutions, border enforcement apparatuses, etc.). This migration knowledge hype has been sustained by the development of what Sabine Hess (2010) has called "new soft" modes of migration "governance" rooted in knowledge production and working through formats such as migration narratives, policy mobility frameworks, and technical contributions. Deployed as migration knowledge, these governance practices claim to operate in politically neutral ways. They often result in unexamined discourses, architectures, and practices that in turn render knowledge of migration as an object of governmentality (Mezzadra and Ricciardi 2013). Through them research protocols in Migration Studies are standardized and reconstituted as objects of disciplinary investigation and the political and social stakes involved in migrant advocacy are 'professionalized' and diluted.

By contrast, by working towards a *political epistemology of migration*, militant investigation aims to make two main interventions. First, in contrast to the profiling of migrations as stable targets of research, a militant investigation aims to account for the turbulence of migration practices, the contested politics migrants encounter and produce, the contingent "existence strategies" (Sossi 2006) they mobilize in specific contexts, the varied social geographies of migrant experiences, and the intermittent process of becoming migrant and/or being labelled as such. This is not simply a matter of accounting for the instabilities of migration practices and migratory processes. Militant

investigation puts these instabilities to work analytically and politically (Colectivo Situaciones 2005).

Second, a militant investigation engages with the power asymmetries that make migrants into subjects of migration knowledge production. It does so by challenging the practices that fix migrants as objects of research, management, care, advocacy, etc. and researchers as subjects who are authors working in a knowledge market, scientists who maintain an impartial distance, advocates who speak for, or activist scholars and scholar activists who act on behalf. Militant investigation maps the distances these asymmetries produce and seeks to highlight the possible disjunctures that might be activated to counter-act these forms of capture. It attempts to destabilize the binaries of researcher and researched, focusing instead on the identification or creation of spaces of engagement and proximity, sites of shared struggle and precarity. And it highlights the diverse practices by which mobile subjects negotiate and contest shifting forms of domination and exploitation.

Such militant investigation and its attempt to create a new political epistemology of migrations takes place in distinct *venues*, including online networks and discussion platforms, radical academic workshops and conferences, activists' seminars and meetings, websites to circulate counter-knowledges, and collective discussions (e.g., storiemigranti.org, bordermonitoring. eu, watchthemed.net, kritnet.org, migreurop.org). It has also taken on different *styles*: documentation of experiences, trajectories, and barriers, monitoring and barometer-ing of migrant grassroot struggles, ir-representation, alter-visualization of counter-mapping, and the production of new concepts.

GGa, MT, SM, BK, IP

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(3) Counter-mapping

Monitoring, quantifying, mapping, and increasingly live surveillance imaging of illegalized migration are central to the practice of border control. Much of this mapping work charts migrant pathways and crossings to assess 'risks' and develop management strategies. At the same time, pro-migration and migration movements have begun to use mapping tools to navigate the changing spaces and practices of the new border management regime and to think through different ways of spatializing migrant movements and experiences. Such counter-mapping efforts re-situate the logics of borders in terms of barriers to the 'freedom of movement' attempting to create new spatial imaginaries of migrant spatial subjectivities, practices, and experiences (Casas and Cobarrubias 2007). Two recent counter-mapping projects illustrate these emerging practices.

Disobedient Gaze is a counter-cartographic response to the extension of the militarized border regime in the Mediterranean Sea which, in recent years, has become a highly surveilled and mapped space. Optical and thermal cameras, sea-, air- and land-borne radars, vessel tracking technologies and satellites constitute an expanding remote sensing apparatus that searches for '*illegalized*' activities. However, due to the vastness of the area to be covered and the high volume of commercial and private traffic at sea, the objective of providing full spectrum visibility remains elusive. Instead, more targeted forms of risk assessment to distinguish perceived "threats" such as migration from "normal" productive traffic have been mobilized. These sensing devices create new forms of bordering by filtering "acceptable" and "unacceptable" forms of movement. In recent years, a counter-mapping practice has emerged that challenges this regime of visibility and surveillance. For example, "Watch the Med" is an online mapping platform designed to map with precision violations of migrants' rights at sea and to determine which authorities have responsibility for them. WTM was launched in 2012 as a collaboration among activist groups, NGOs and researchers from the Mediterranean region and beyond. It operates in two ways. First, it creates a "disobedient gaze" that refuses to disclose what the border regime attempts to unveil - the patterns of "illegalized" migration – while focusing its attention on what the border regime attempts to hide; the systemic violence that has caused the deaths of many at the maritime borders of Europe (about 20,000 reported deaths since 1998 http://fortresseurope. blogspot.com/p/la-strage.html). Second, WTM turns surveillance mechanisms back on themselves by demarcating those areas that are being monitored by different technologies and agencies to show what could be "seen" by which border control agency in any particular case. This information allows those

struggling against border regimes to hold these agencies accountable for the fate of migrants at sea. That is, operating as a collective counter maritime traffic monitoring room, the project consciously repurposes surveillance maps and remotely sensed images as active sites of struggle (Heller and Pezzani 2014).

Spaces in Migration takes a different perspective. While migration governance typically maps the physical and political spaces of migration, certain migration struggles moving across borders are generating a series of counter-maps whose aim is to show spaces that are not stable, but open and un-stabilized. "Spaces in Migration" focuses on the codes of visibility through which migrations are charted to be governed and controlled, "ir-representing" the territory and territoriality of migrations by producing a cartography of 'invasions' (Farinelli 2009, p 14, Sossi 2006, p 60). Here counter-mapping focuses on the spaces migrants put in motion after the Tunisian revolution, mapping the contested movement across space and the spatial restructuring of migration governance as it struggles to catch up with these movements. Through these mappings, migrant practices and fields of struggle are articulated as space-making (Habans *et al.* 2013).

MC, SC, GGa, CH, LP, JP, MT

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Bordering

(4) Border Spectacle

Borders and boundaries have long figured prominently in the public's attention. Be it the Iron Curtain, the DMZ between North and South Korea, the Limes of the Roman Empire or the Western Frontier in the making of the U.S., borders

have often signified a more or less sharp division between here and there, inside and outside, us and them and they have served as a seemingly simple tool for demarcation and control. Even in Western Europe and North America, where boundaries are generally relatively weakly contested and (especially in Europe) are supposed to gradually fade from within, the border retains a clear and categorical function for the management of movement and regulation of migration.

How exactly does the border relate to migration? Nicholas De Genova (2002, 2013) highlighted one important aspect of the role of the border when he detailed how the border spectacle, i.e., the enactment of exclusion through the enforcement of the border produces (illegalized) migration as a category and literally and figuratively renders it visible. A representation of illegality is imprinted on selected migration streams and bodies, while other streams and bodies are marked as legal, professional, student, allowable. In the process, migration is made governable. In this regime of governmentality the border spectacle constitutes a performance where illegalization functions along with other devices (waiting, denial, missing paperwork, interview, etc.) to govern and manage migration, to operationalize policies of differential inclusion, and to manage the balance between the needs of labor markets, the demands for rights and in some cases citizenship, and the projection of securitization and humanitarianism on the figure of the border (Walters 2011). Images of crowded ships, documentation of deaths at the border, deployments of border guards in so called "hot spots" of border regions and the recourse to military imagery and language all serve to enact the spectacle of the border and deepen the architecture and practices of the border regime.

The spectacle of the border and its predominant representations are not the product of the state alone. This would be to suggest that there is a fixed dichotomy between state and migration. Instead, we prefer to think of the border spectacle as Guy Debord did more generally about spectacle when he suggested that "[t]he spectacle is not a collection of images, rather, it is a social relationship between people that is mediated by images" (1967/1995, p.19). In this sense, the border as social relationship mediated by images is a key site (but not the only one) in which contestation and struggle among a diverse range of actors produce particular forms of representational drift. These include the spectacle of illegality where clandestine crossings of the borders are facilitated by allegedly criminal networks. Illegality and connected forms of exploitation have long been a familiar representation of migration and experience for migrants crossing the border. Since the 1990s and especially since the events of September 11, 2001, the conjoining of migration and security has had a profound impact on migration and society. If social relations of border crossing were previously heavily inflected with a politics of labor or a language of rights, they have since been subordinated to a discourse of security, order and interdiction. This shift gave rise to a new border spectacle, dominated by ever

more technological conceptions of border enforcement, often involving remote imaging systems, surveillance videos, the development of large-scale databases, code breaking, and the entry of border and migration security surveillance techniques aimed at biopolitical management. New border agencies, such as FRONTEX (the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union) emerged in this conjuncture, rapidly becoming well-funded, powerful, and highly visible actors in this spectacle.

Beyond the state and its security agencies, other instances of the border spectacle have emerged emphasizing violence, suffering and death at the border. This is what William Walters has referred to as the "birth of the humanitarian border" (Walters 2011). The humanitarian border is less interested in military or political security concerns, and instead focuses on a perspective on migrants as victims, individual lost souls to be rescued and cared for. This particular spectacle gives rise to what Walters describes as neo-pastoral power exercised by NGOs and individuals not by state actors, but in most cases with an explicit reference to supra-state norms such as human rights or international law. In the process, its images are transmitted through media and campaigns, creating transnational networks of care. The effectiveness of the humanitarian border and its form of spectacularization in gaining the consent of the public contrasts with the tensions surrounding the state's management and securitization apparatuses, and it is not surprising that the two forms have increasingly been linked together in recent years with military practices of humanitarian aid and state building, and humanitarian agency engagements with securitization logics and practices.

Every form of border produces its own spectacle, its own representations. When we speak of the border spectacle, we emphasize the need to be aware of these various moments and forms of production and of the power-knowledge-networks that constitute the border regime and give rise to their public image.

BK, NDG, SH

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(5) Border Regime

Why do we speak of a border regime, as opposed to simply the border? By turning to 'border regime' we point to an epistemological, conceptual and methodological shift in the way we think about, how we envision, and how we research borders. As William Walters (2002) encouraged us to "de-naturalize" the border, the border regime symbolizes a radically constructivist approach to the studies of border. This involves not only governmental logics but also the production of borders from and with a perspective of migration.

It is certainly a commonplace in the interdisciplinary field of border studies that the border can only be conceptualized as being shaped and produced by a multiplicity of actors, movements and discourses. But most of these studies still perceive the practices of doing borderwork and making borders as acts and techniques of state and para-state institutions. In contrast, recent work on borders aims to reach beyond the underlying basic binary logic of structure/ agency in order to demonstrate how at the border there is no single, unitarian organizing logic at work. Instead, the border constitutes a site of constant encounter, tension, conflict and contestation. In this view, migration is a co-constituent of the border as a site of conflict and as a political space. It is the excess of these forces and movements of migration that challenge, cross, and reshape borders, and it is this generative excess that is subsequently stabilized, controlled, and managed by various state agencies and policy schemes as they seek to invoke the border as a stable, controllable and manageable tool of selective or differential inclusion. From this necessity arises a theoretical challenge not only to describe migration as an active force, but to also understand and accommodate how migration intervenes into the very centre of our production of theory (see autonomy of migration). To summarize with Giuseppe Sciortino's words, a regime is a "mix of rather implicit conceptual frames, generations of turf wars among bureaucracies and waves after waves of 'quick fix' to emergencies [… and] allows for gaps, ambiguities and outright strains: the life of a regime is a result of continuous repair work through practices," (2004, p. 32) or, in the words of the Transit Migration project, a regime is a "more or less ordered ensemble of practices and knowledge-power-complexes" (Karakayali and Tsianos 2007, p. 13; our translation).

Taking into account migration as a defining force in producing what the border is, and re-conceptualizing the border accordingly, requires a methodological shift. Foucault's work on governmentality, Poulantzas' analysis of the state as an aggregate of struggles and forces of society, or the fruitful use of the notion of assemblages in cultural anthropology, all propose to take a more fine-grained contextual perspective on power and encourage a particular sensitivity for unstable dynamics and emerging phenomena, all characteristics which the border exhibits. Each involves an implicit imperative and explicit call to embrace ethnographic methods and approaches to the study of border regimes.

Ethnographic border regime analysis starts from the perspective of the movements and trajectories of migration. It not only encourages a multi-sited approach common to many ethnographic research designs, but it reaches beyond a narrow understanding of site. The border regime constitutes a multi-dimensional multi-scalar space of conflict and negotiation and thus requires a multi-methods approach including not only the stock methods of ethnography such as participant observation and interviews, but extending to discourse and policy analysis and genealogical reconstructions of the contemporary while approaching the ever-shifting constellation of the aggregate of opposing forces which is the border through praxeographic research at the time and site of its very emergence. This mixed methods approach aims at an understanding of the transversal, micro-social and porous trajectories and practices of migration, facilitates a detailed analysis of discourses, rationales and programs, large-scale institutions and knowledge-power-complexes and maps their points of intersection, encounter and interpenetration.

While it certainly does not hold true for every border, borders today are one predominant technology of governing mobile populations and othering them as migration. But as the border constitutes a site of contestation and struggle, a perspective informed by regime analysis allows us to understand the social, economic, political and even cultural conditions of today's borders. Furthermore, it allows for a perspective of struggle and resistance and the implicit possibility that borders constitute a merely temporary feature of the contemporary world.

BK, NDG, SH

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(6) Politics of Protection

Politics of protection signals the attempt to make visible the politics at play in the existing refugee protection regime. While the latter tends to be presented as strictly humanitarian and apolitical, it is becoming increasingly clear that the provision of protection cannot be thought outside of the political sphere. For instance, the statute of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

(UNHCR) stipulates that its work "shall be of an entirely non-political character; it shall be humanitarian and social and shall relate, as a rule, to groups and categories of refugees […]." But the specified restriction of UNHCR's agenda indicates already that the provision of protection, the very essence of the humanitarian enterprise, can never be "entirely non-political" since it is interrelated with a set of highly political questions: Who can legitimately claim a need for protection? Against which dangers shall protection be offered? Who is supposed to do the protecting? What are the terms and conditions of the protection provided? And whose voice is heard in debates stirred by these questions? (Huysmans 2006).

These questions permit us to identify the present refugee protection regime as a partitioning instrument, which produces more *rejected* refugees than ones with 'status', and effectively intensifies the precarious existence for many while offering protection to a few (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2013; Tazzioli 2013). Those offered protection are in turn administered by a protection regime that deprives them of their political agency by portraying them as helpless victims and by reducing them to a bundle of material needs (Nyers 2006). The victimization of refugees, while legitimizing UNHCR and multiple other actors as their protectors, also explains the authoritarian dimension of the existing protection regime. We use this term –'authoritarian'– to highlight the fact that while the refugee protection regime is a humanitarian regime, it is only able to provide support to people if they obey and behave as demanded by the protection regime. This regime is full of prescriptions specifying how 'good' refugees should behave in order to be eligible for protection: flee to the nearest state, stay in camps, fully cooperate with authorities, accept their decisions irrespective of their outcomes, and leave voluntarily in case of a rejection of your claim.

The humanitarian framework, under which different practices of displacement are administered and varying forms of protection organized, obscures the political context that produces displaced people in the first place: the nation-state order and the violence its reproduction involves. The Geneva Convention defines the refugee in terms of a twofold lack in relation to the posited norm of the nation-state citizen: a lack of protection by a state order and a lack of political agency outside of a national community. Due to this methodological nationalism, the three "durable solutions" of the protection regime – repatriation to the country of origin, reintegration in the host society, or resettlement to a third country – all aim at transforming the 'anomaly' of refugees back into the 'normalcy' of nation-state citizens. It is through these *politics of protection* that the supposedly strictly humanitarian protection regime restores the "national order of things" (Malkki 1995), a national order which produces refugees in the first place.

The role of the refugee protection regime as a partitioning instrument points, in turn, to its binary logic, which is based on a distinction between

forced (political) and voluntary (economic) migrants. Yet, researchers have convincingly revealed this clear-cut distinction to be empirically untenable, as the motivations for movement are always mixed and in excess of such simple dichotomies. Hence, the academic division between Refugee, Migration and Forced Migration Studies along the narrow definition of the 'refugee' of the Geneva Convention has a crucial disciplining effect both epistemologically and politically. Moreover, by positing a 'well-founded fear of persecution' as a condition asylum seekers have to meet in order to be counted as legitimate, the refugee protection regime de-legitimizes the majority of migratory movements. This criminalizing effect of its binary logic manifests in refugee-status-determination procedures, which do not only certify some claimants as "genuine" refugees, but literally produce "illegal migrants" by officially indicating to rejected claimants that their presence is no longer authorized and is therefore "illegal" (Scheel and Ratfisch, 2014).

Finally, the policies of containment and deterrence (e.g., the interception of refugees, the outsourcing of protection to other countries, the proliferation of multiple short term and subsidiary forms of protection) signal an ongoing restructuring of the protection regime towards a sort of "protection-lite" regime (Gammeltoft-Hansen 2007). With the increasing reluctance of societies of the global North to admit and protect refugees, the recent focus on 'internal displacement' has also become a part of a larger project which seeks to transform the protection regime into one designed for the containment of those for whom there is no regime of social protection, what Duffield (2008, 145) has called the "world's non-insured". Yet, rather than calling for a return to the "true" protection regime of the Geneva Convention as a way to counter these developments, the authoritarian dimension, methodological nationalism and the violent effects of the binary logic of this *protection regime* compel us to look for alternative answers to the questions raised by the politics of protection.

SS, GGa, MT

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(7) Externalization

Border externalization refers to the process of territorial and administrative expansion of a given state's migration and border policy to third countries. The process is based on the direct involvement of the externalizing state's border authorities in other countries' sovereign territories, and the outsourcing of border control responsibilities to another country's national surveillance forces. Border externalization changes the understanding of the border by reworking who, where and how the border is practiced. By rethinking borders beyond the dividing line between nation-states and extending the idea of the border into forms of dispersed management practices across several states', externalization is an explicit effort to "stretch the border" in ways that multiply the institutions involved in border management and extend and rework sovereignties in new ways. In this way, the definition of the border increasingly refers not to the territorial limit of the state but to the management practices directed at 'where the migrant is'.

Several examples of externalization have become particularly significant in recent years. These include: EU Neighbourhood Policies and the Migration Routes Initiative under the framework of Global Approach to Migration signed in 2005; the historical antecedents of maritime interdiction and detention in the Caribbean; and the current policy of the Pacific Solution by the Australian government. Each raises a series of issues relating to sovereignty and territory, the blurring of inside-outside distinctions, the emergence of the humanitarian/securitarian border, and the question of the agency of the externalized state.

In border externalization management practices the idea of exteriority has been used to displace some sovereign responsibilities and technologies of border control beyond the legally defined boundaries of a given territorial state, increasingly refiguring "methodological nationalism." Their focus has increasingly been on following migrants as they move across different geographical and political spaces and attempting to govern their movement before, at and after the border. As a consequence, border regimes are being redefined in terms of

the movement of people and things, new technical apparatuses of surveillance, and new processes of sovereign and supranational government (Andersson 2014; Karakayali and Rigo 2010; Ticktin 2009). If borders are what we have come to assume as the limit of legal sovereignty in international law, we have to ask where state jurisdiction and sovereignty begins and ends in these new border regimes?

One of the main justifications for externalization emerges in the language of humanitarianism. Here externalization has become a fundamental strategy of what William Walters (2011) has been called the "humanitarian border." Such humanitarian actors and discourses play an increasingly important role in contemporary border regimes (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013). In the process, humanitarian and securitarian discourses are simultaneously mobilized to both protect the rights of migrants and to enforce border policing strategies and govern migration. The entanglement of humanitarian and securitarian agendas - a hallmark of the EU border regime – has recently been reinforced through the management of tragic events such as those that repeatedly happen around the island of Lampedusa, Italy. Migration management agencies and politicians increasingly respond to such events with calls to mobilize EU border management agencies to block migrants before they attempt to cross dangerous sea borders so that they do not risk their lives in perilous journeys.

Developing "neighbourhoods" for policy mobility has been one of the key instruments of the EU politics of externalization (Casas-Cortes, Cobarrubias and Pickles 2011). A "*Euro*-Med" and a "*Euro*-East" have been pursued and implemented in foreign countries restructured as regions of EU influence (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and, on the other hand, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine), in a process of "non-accession integration". Programs of selected mobility and joint patrolling of borderzones have been included as "clauses on migration" in economic agreements and investment rationales, dealing with visa permits on the one hand and border enforcement and repatriation agreements on the other. Further afield, in neighbours-of-neighbours, attempts to coordinate migration management strategies are articulated through experiments such as the *Migration Routes Initiative*, which re-orients border management away from a focus on defending a line (even, if it is a moving front-line) to establish border control as a series of points along an itinerary. It calls for transnational coordination between denominated "countries of origin, transit and destination" to intersect migrants in their journeys, kilometres further away from the target borders. In particular, West-African routes have been highly surveyed and closed-down by a series of experimental transnational police operations such as Operation Hera by FRONTEX and Operation Seahorse led by the Spanish government, and these are now being rolled-out across the wider Mediterranean region.

One of the main goals of EU border externalization throughout is "pre-frontier detection" referring to a type of overall intelligence picture of those

spaces through which migrant pass, whether they are within the EU or far beyond it. Pre-frontier detection is also one of the declared aims of EUROSUR, the new European external border surveillance system. While EUROSUR is set to be fully operational at the end of 2013, we are already observing the coupling of "pre-frontier detection" and "rescue" as a means of migration management at sea. While a constant aim of coastal states and the EU more broadly has been to make neighbouring states responsible for surveilling, intercepting, disembarking and managing illegalized migrants at sea, some of the most visibly violent strategies such as the push-backs between Italy and Libya have come under increasing criticism and the ECHR has recently reaffirmed the principle of *non-refoulement*. Faced with this situation, EU agencies and coastal states increasingly aim to detect illegalized migrants leaving the Southern coast of the Mediterranean before they enter the EU's Search and Rescue (SAR) areas. In these areas the corresponding states are responsible for coordinating rescues and disembarking the migrants. Once a vessel has been detected, authorities of the Southern shore are informed of the "distress" of the migrants and asked to coordinate rescue, and thereby to assume de facto responsibility for rescuing and disembarking to third countries. In this way, interception and rescue have become indiscernible practices, and when coupled with pre-frontier detection they constitute a new strategy in which de facto push-backs are operated without EU patrols ever entering into contact with the migrants.

Neighbouring states and neighbours of neighbours are also crucial actors in the process of border externalization. While EU policies encourage neighboring states to harmonize policies, to act in the place of EU border control agencies, and to ensure that national policies contribute directly to migration management, neighbouring and participating states pursue their own interests, both in multilevel negotiations with the EU over trade and visa preferences, or in domestic politics aimed at reinforcing domestic controls and policing (Cassarino, 2013).

An iconic site in the recent history of externalization is the US Navy base at Guantánamo Bay. Before it was a camp for "enemy combatants," this site was used to detain Haitian migrants who had fled the 1991 coup against the Aristide government and could not be accommodated under agreements with Honduras, Venezuela, Belize, and Trinidad/Tobago. Some 275 of these detainees had their asylum applications stalled on the basis that they were HIV-positive, making Guantánamo the world's first prison camp for HIV-positive people. In 1992, the US Coast Guard began to return migrants intercepted at sea directly to Haiti – a violation of *non-refoulement*[1] principles with precedent in Reagan's codification of interdiction policy in 1981. A decade later, this action would find a parallel in Australia's interdiction of migrants on the *MV Tampa* – a Norwegian tanker that rescued 438 migrants, predominantly Afghan Hazaras, from a sinking vessel in August 2001 (Neilson 2010). This was the beginning of the so-called 'Pacific solution', involving the establishment of offshore detention camps on the Pacific island of Nauru and New Guinea's Manus Island and the

excision of outlying islands from Australia's "migration zone" (meaning migrants arriving on these territories could not claim asylum). One of the world's most sustained efforts of externalization, the Pacific solution would mutate over the coming years, with openings and closings of the offshore camps, the establishment of a large detention facility on the excised Christmas Island, and botched attempts to broker refugee swap deals with Malaysia. In 2013, it would culminate with the Australian Senate's decision to excise the country's mainland from the "migration zone." With this act, which externalizes the entire national territory from itself, the logic of externalization reaches a limit where the distinction inside/outside is not only blurred but exploded.

SC, MC, GGa, CH, LP, JP, MT

Note

1   *Non-refoulement* refers to the protections against return or rendition from countries that are signatories to the 1951 Geneva Convention or the 1967 Protocol, which extended the Convention rights.

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Migrant Space/Times

(8) Migrant Labour

Approaching globalization as a 'real universal' means recognizing the extension of the social relation of capital at the world level (Balibar 2002, pp.146–76). This spatial extension does not imply the homogenization of capital's concrete forms, but the opposite. It is the intensiveness of capital's development that creates the heterogeneity of global space. This spatial re-organization of labour has multiplied and fragmented the forms of labour and has shown how the wage relation and nation-state have only ever been particular ways of restraining and containing labour power. Both capital and labour have become more mobile, but the forces that control their mobility are far from continuous. This means that the study of migrant labour cannot restrict itself to describing patterns of mobility or work conditions. It also means that the political regulation of migration requires a fundamental rethinking of the concept of migrant labour itself. Recent militant research on migration has attempted to account for the asymmetries and struggles that invest the practices and experiences of mobility by drawing on fields as diverse as global labour history, anticolonial and postcolonial theory, and border studies.

Migrant labour points to the transnational and political dimensions of migration in redefining the labour market (Bauder 2006). It encompasses a multiplicity of combinations of race, gender, life-paths, nationalities, legal status, educational level, and material experiences of work. These combinations create fields of tension crisscrossed by migrants' mobility, social power, and attempts to control mobility by employers, states, and governmental authorities. These fields of tension are discontinuous: from the enforcement of borders as boundaries to regulate and control the labour force to the production and reproduction of differences and "race management" as a way of optimizing capital's operations (Lowe 1996, Roediger & Esch 2012). Migrant labor describes a disjunction between the production and reproduction of the migrant labor force and reveals a general shift of responsibility that follows the capitalist dream of an available labor force disconnected from the need for its reproduction.

Migratory movements exceed attempts to govern, regulate and set fixed roads of mobility. They are a "total social fact" (Castles & Miller 2009) that constantly redefines the social and political spaces migrants move from, to, and through by means of struggles, experiences of organization, and autonomy. Attempts to grasp the inner and global nature of labour markets by means of

mechanistic or hydraulic representations fail for several reasons. The concrete conditions of migrant labour cut across its bureaucratic and legal statuses. Migrant labour highlights the political role of employers, management, and authorities that operate transnationally across political spaces. Global migration patterns reveal new geographies of power and production and provincialize the world: internal migration, so-called South-South migration, migration between bordering states, circular migration, regional migration, and transcontinental migration coexist, separate, and intertwine.

With its double face, the objective legal dimension and the subjective experiential dimension, migrant labour highlights the uneven role of states and other authorities in capitalist development. Paradoxically, it disrupts the transnational political space of capitalism by pointing to the ongoing existence of states and their significance for different subjects: the effective hierarchical nature of citizenship and rights, the redefinition of borders, and the use of legitimate force. Migrant labour also displays the changing political and economic geography of today's world: the erosion of the power and functions of the nation-state and the rise of a constellation of assemblages, authorities, agencies, lateral spaces, regions, zones, enclaves and corridors (Easterling 2012). On the whole, migrant labour is defined by the encounter of migrants with a complex set of power technologies that adapt to the need for creating labour power as a commodity, organizing production, opening new ways of accumulation and valorisation, turning ungovernable flows into mobile governable subjects, and negotiating the multiple concrete conditions of the postcolonial world. Being "in one's place out of place" and "out of place in one's place" is a general political dimension of migrant labour.

GGr, SM, BN

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(9) Differential inclusion/exclusion

Differential inclusion describes how inclusion in a sphere, society or realm can involve various degrees of subordination, rule, discrimination, racism, disenfranchisement, exploitation and segmentation. In feminism, it is associated with a theoretical emphasis on difference that prioritizes embodiment and relationality, and informs critical approaches to rights, equality, and power. In antiracist politics, it links to a concern with intersectional forms of discrimination and a questioning of the nation-state as the most strategic site in which to fight them. Stuart Hall (1986, p. 25) notes how "specific, differentiated forms of *incorporation* have consistently been associated with the appearance of racist, ethnically segmentary and other similar social features." Importantly, he links such processes to the "social regime of capital," providing a precedent for contemporary discussions of differential inclusion with respect to borders, migration, and subjectivity.

Current use of the concept in analysis of migration regimes draws attention to the effects of negotiations between governmental practices, sovereign gestures, the social relation of capital, and the subjective actions and desires of migrants. It differs from the concept of "differential exclusion" (Castles 1995), which describes the incorporation of migrants into some areas of national society (primarily the labour market) and exclusion from others (such as welfare or citizenship). Working in tension and continuity with concepts of exclusion and securitization, such as those associated with the simplistic notion of Fortress Europe, differential inclusion registers the multiplication of migration control devices within, at and beyond the borders of the nation-state (point systems, externalization, conditional freedom of movement, fast-tracked border crossing for elites, short-term labour contracts, etc.) and the multiplication of statuses they imply. It provides a handle for understanding the link between migration control and regimes of labour management that create different degrees of precarity, vulnerability and freedom by granting and closing access to resources and rights according to economic, individualizing, and racist rationales. The concept thus troubles the conflation of the realm of citizenship with national labour forces and territory, highlighting the ways in which new (internal) borders are policed and crossed by migrant subjectivities – e.g. those between skilled and unskilled labour, victim and agent, or legalized and illegalized. It also provides a means of critically analysing the rhetoric and practices of integration that have emerged in the wake of the crisis of multiculturalism.

Differential inclusion shines light on the *productive* aspects of the border and thus works in concert with discussions of illegalization and the temporal control of migrant passages through detention, banishment, the Chinese *hukou* system, and the like. Placing emphasis on the continuity of exclusion and inclusion, it draws attention to the violence that underlies both. It thus deeply questions

programs of social inclusion that imagine a seamless integration of different differences – race, gender, class – into unified political spaces. In differential inclusion, these differences intertwine and separate, sometimes subsuming each other, sometimes conflicting. This is a perspective that needs strongly to be separated from methodological nationalism, or indeed, any topography that assumes inclusion implies proximity to a centre and distance from the margins. Differential inclusion registers how the border has moved to the centre of political life. The concept is essentially paradoxical as it stages a conflict between the containing qualities of inclusion and the capacity of difference to explode notions of social unity or contract and highlight diverse moments of autonomy of migration. To this extent, it is dynamic, unstable, and resistant to reification. Often the rationale of migration control is reduced to a single logic – e.g. capital/labour, post-colonialism, or securitization. The concept of differential inclusion registers the multiplication of migrant statuses in ways that allow a more complex view of the conflictual interweaving of such ways of governing and the mutating sovereignties associated with them.

SM, BN, LR, SS, GGa, MT, FR

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(10) Migrant struggles

"Migrant struggles" encapsulates at least two distinct meanings and refers to an array of different migrant experiences. First, "migrant struggles" indicates more or less organized *struggles* in which migrants openly challenge, defeat, escape or trouble the dominant politics of mobility (including border control, detention, and deportation), or the regime of labour, or the space of citizenship (De Genova 2010; Squires 2011). Second, "migrant struggles" refers to the daily strategies, refusals, and resistances through which migrants enact their (contested) presence – even if they are not expressed or manifested as "political" battles demanding something in particular (Papadopoulos, Stephenson, and Tsianos 2008). These two meanings highlight the heterogeneity of migrant conditions and the diverse ways in which migrants are confronted with and struggle with power(s): struggles at the border, but also before and beyond the border line; struggles that are visible in the public arena or that remain relatively invisible. Thus, as a keyword, "migrant struggles" underscores that migration is itself a field of struggle, while it nonetheless pluralizes the very

category of migration. Hence, this concept also suggests that any possible common ground of struggles cannot be taken for granted, and must be actively elaborated, both conceptually and in practice, episodically reinventing new possibilities for alliance or coalition. At the same time, there is a need to recall that some of the most relevant labour struggles in various parts of the world have been at the same time migrant struggles (see for instance, the struggles of "internal migrant" workers in China, or the struggles of building cleaners, such as the Justice for Janitors campaign in the US or the Living Wage campaign in the UK).

While daily strategies and practices of resistance are an important component of migrant experiences, but the movements of migration in and of themselves should not be seen as deliberate or direct challenges to any given border regime. We are aware that migration plays a key role in the routine operations and reproduction of capitalism, indeed, that there is no capitalism without migration (Mezzadra 2006; Moulier Boutang 1998). At the same time, however, a complex alchemy of unchaining and taming, selecting and blocking, has always shaped and continues to shape capitalism's relationship with the mobility of labour and thus with migration. Attempts to combine the opening up of channels of officially authorized and accelerated mobility with processes of illegalization and the establishment of a "deportation regime" are clearly visible today. From this point of view, it is important to articulate what precisely can be discerned in these practices of migration that exceeds the strictly "economic" frame of labour recruitment and effective labour subordination. This moment of excess suggests that "migrant struggles" need to be framed also in a more constitutive way, beginning with the fact that every practice or experience of migration is situated within and grapples with a specific field of tensions and antagonisms. In this sense, migration is always crisscrossed by and involved in multiple and heterogeneous struggles. This structural relation between "migration" and "struggles" fundamentally derives from the fact that practices of mobility that are labelled as "migrations" are captured, filtered and managed by migration policies and techniques of bordering. Migrations are therefore eminently caught within relations of power. They are located within conflicting fields of force, which are also fields of struggle, within which modifying, challenging, or interrupting the configuration of power is always at stake. And at the same time, migration forces the border regime to continuously revise its strategies, working as a constitutive "troubling factor".

Considerable attention has been given over the last two decades to the organized and articulate struggles of the sans-papiers and other illegalized migrants within the spaces of migrant-"receiving" states, as well as the struggles of migrants involved in subverting or circumventing actual borders. Today a twofold shift is occurring, which takes into account forms of struggles which are not perceptible in the ordinary regime of visibility and do not fit into established

paradigms of political representation – which means that these struggles are not characterized by the emergence of their subjects on the "scene" of the political. In other words, the second meaning of "migrant struggles" (above) has become more prominent in critical analyses. More broadly, instead of encoding migrant struggles on the basis of the existing political landmarks, the opposite move should be envisaged: migrant struggles force us to question and rethink both the paradigm of political agency and the presumed temporality of political practices. Thus, rather than depicting (illegalized) migrants who mobilize politically as the paradoxically truest manifestation of "active citizenship," it may be more productive to reconceive the political in terms that are no longer reducible to citizenship as such (De Genova 2010). Similarly, the temporality of political practices is usually understood in terms of a process of claims-making, with its insurgent moments, followed by one or another (negative or positive) institutional resolution. Visibility, agency, and collective public mobilizations cannot be the yardsticks for assessing the political stakes of these struggles. In particular, the uneven visibility and fractured relation to time that undocumented migrants play with –due to their "irregular" presence in space – are two features that can facilitate a rethinking of migrant struggles. This conception of "migrant struggles" thus helps to unsettle the thresholds of perceptibility through which the politics of migration is approached and challenges the primacy of visibility as the decisive measure of the relevance or force of these struggles. Furthermore, considering the uneven and strategic (in)visibility of migrants, the goal is not to make invisible practices visible on the public stage of (official) Politics but rather to highlight their effective political force and the real impacts of such discordant practices of freedom and resistance.

Most of the time, migrant struggles are concerned with neither representation nor claims for rights nor border policies as such. Rather, they are struggles of (migrant) everyday life: they consist in the mere fact of persisting in a certain space, irrespective of law, rights and the pace of the politics of mobility. The issue of imperceptibility therefore helps to illuminate the more structural meaning of "migrant struggles" whereby migration always ultimately concerns the daily struggles in which migrants are involved, whether to stay someplace or to move on. However, if migration is assumed to be a practice always cross-cut by various struggles, this requires a reconsideration of any exclusive focus on undocumented (extra-legal, "unauthorized") migration, in favour of also interrogating other varieties of migration (including both skilled and unskilled, regular and irregular). If migration implies a struggle in itself, even when it complies with the terms and conditions of the dominant politics of mobility, then it is necessary to consider how the very existence of borders and immigration regimes always already constitute the conditions of

possibility, and therefore the conditionalities and intrinsic thresholds of precarity, for all forms of migration.

Finally, incorporating the "turbulences" produced by migrations into political cartography, we could reverse the meaning of this keyword by suggesting that migrants' struggles unsettle the space of the political, generating a "migration of struggles". Such a migration of struggles would force us to think both about the ways in which struggles migrate beyond the established borders of the political and about the ways in which they challenge established forms and practices of political struggle which in turn require a radical rethinking of political concepts and keywords.

MT, NDG, SM, GGa

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(11) Subjectivity

In calling for the investigation of migratory practices, experiences and struggles through the lens of subjectivity we first seek to overcome conceptions of migration as a derivative or dependent variable of 'objective' factors like wage differentials or 'structural' forces such as the destruction of subsistence economies through the expansion of capitalism. While these are important factors for explaining migratory movements, they do not account for the desires and aspirations, as well as the deceptions that inform and drive migratory projects. It is this subjective dimension of migration that we seek to highlight with the concept of 'subjectivity', which oscillates between the subject as subjected by power and the subject as imbued with the power to transcend the processes of subjection that have shaped it. Technologies of government and technologies of self-emerge as inseparably intertwined. This recognition of subjectivity avoids the voluntaristic and individualistic undertones that haunt the notion of agency. More precisely, it avoids the framing of migrants as atomized individual rational-choice actors confronting external structures. In other words, we want to begin

from the assumption that migrants' practices, experiences and struggles cannot be considered in isolation from the discourses, practices, devices, laws and institutions that constitute particular forms of human mobility as 'migration,' and thereby make 'migrants' out of some people who move but not others.

Second, the production of migrant subjectivities is implicated in the constitution of citizenship (Isin 2002). While migration studies often represent migrants in terms of paradigms of exclusion, critical scholarship has increasingly conceived of border and citizenship regimes as differentiation machines, which actively create a relational field of subject positions through processes of selective and differential inclusion (De Genova 2005; Mezzadra and Neilson 2013). In this view, citizenship emerges as a social relation that is as contingent as the "figures of migration and foreignness" against which it is defined. Migration legislation thus resembles a "magic mirror" that reflects not only relations between the citizen and its 'others', but also constructions of national subjectivity. Particular figures of migration like the 'refugee' or the 'illegal migrant' do not so much represent distinct social groups. Rather, the alternating currency of these figures is indicative of particular relations of migration that correlate to certain constellations of border and citizenship regimes (Karakayali and Rigo 2010). Instead of treating 'refugees', 'illegals', 'citizens', 'guest workers' etc. as naturally given phenomena, the lens of subjectivity brings out the *materiality* of the processes, by which these labels make these people intelligible as 'refugees', 'illegals', 'citizens', 'guest workers' and so forth.

Third, the performative dimension of border and citizenship regimes and the subjectivities they produce is, as a result, crucial. As any EU passport holder has felt viscerally when passing through passport control rooms of the Schengen area, the installation of separate lanes for "EU citizens" and "other passports" interpellates them to perform European citizenship and identify with the project of the European Union. Conversely, deportations are performances of sovereign state power as they enact the claimed prerogative of nation-states to control access to their territories. In this way, the deportation of non-citizens constitutes an important 'technology of citizenship', which also plays a key role in the subjectivation of illegalized migrants (Walters 2002). The deportation of some but not all illegalized migrants is also performative in that it disciplines the un-deported majority by investing illegalized migrants with the fear of being deported (De Genova 2010).

What this example highlights is fourth, that affective and emotional dimensions of processes of subjectivation play a key role in both the attempts to govern migration and migratory practices seeking to subvert these. For instance, the government of marriage migration through the scandalization of 'sham' and 'arranged marriages' rests on positing the Western fairy-tale of 'true' romantic love as devoid of any material interests (Muller Myrdhal 2010).

Hence, the 'management' of migration also involves the regulation of affects, emotions and desires as techniques of government. Yet, at the same time it is the multiplicity of subjective desires, hopes and aspirations that animate the projects migrants pursue with their migrations, which is always in excess of their regulation by governmental regimes. In contrast to conceptions of migration as a dependent variable of objective 'factors' or of migrants as rational-choice-actors, a focus on migrants' subjectivity underscores this subjective dimension of migration as one of the reasons explaining the persistence of moments of autonomy of migration within ever more pervasive regimes of border and migration control.

SS, NDG, GGa, MT, GGr, IP

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Lecture I

MIGRATION AND DIASPORA. INTRO AND THEORETICAL APPROACHES

The first two sessions will involve a general introduction to the course ahead and will involve a discussion of the aims and objectives of the course. We will also start addressing questions such as: "What is migration?" by situating the course in a burgeoning global and interdisciplinary field. We will be going through an excursus of different approaches in migration studies and ask what can an anthropological lens add to these?

Castels S. 2014. The Age of Migration. International Population Movements in the Modern World, pp. 1-25 (Introduction) and pp. 198-215 (Chapter 9)

The Age of Migration

**International Population Movements
in the Modern World**

Fifth Edition

Stephen Castles

Hein de Haas

and

Mark J. Miller

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Preface to the Fifth Edition

The Age of Migration was originally published in 1993, with the aim of providing an accessible introduction to the study of global migrations and their consequences for society. It was designed to combine theoretical knowledge with up-to-date information on migration flows and their implications for states as well as people everywhere. International migration has become a major theme for public debate, and *The Age of Migration* is widely used by policy-makers, scholars and journalists. It is recommended as a textbook in politics and social science all over the world.

For this new edition, Hein de Haas has joined Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller as an author. As with previous editions, the fifth edition is essentially a new book. It has been thoroughly revised and updated. Its revised structure now comprises three thematic clusters. After the introductory chapter, Chapters 2, 3 and 4 are concerned with theories as well as the history of migration and ethnic diversity. Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 then present overviews of migration in specific world regions. Chapters 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 are devoted to the effects of migration upon societies, especially in immigration countries.

The fifth edition provides a systematic and comprehensive discussion of migration theories. It also features in-depth analysis of two new issues. A major focus in Chapter 11, but also within each regional chapter, concerns the effects of the global economic crisis since 2008 for international migration. A second major innovation is the analysis of climate change and its effects upon migration and security. Although some have viewed climate change as having dire implications for international migration, we found no evidence of large-scale international migration as a result of climate change. Another key change already came with the fourth edition and the creation of a website. This is designed as a resource for students and other users. It contains internet links, and additional information and examples to complement the text of the book. (For more detail see the guide to further reading at the end of each chapter.)

The fifth edition examines recent events and emerging trends anew. Labour migration to new industrial economies is growing fast, while violent conflicts are leading to vast movements of displaced people, especially in less developed regions. Improvements in transport and communication facilitate temporary, circular and repeated movements. New types of mobility are emerging as increasing numbers of people move for education, marriage or retirement, or in search of new lifestyles.

The fifth edition analyses and updates the migration effects of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements of the European Union, and the role of migrant

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labour in the 'new economy' of highly developed countries. Demographic changes in immigration countries are raising awareness of future demand for migrant labour, while, at the same time, public concern about ethnic diversity is leading to measures to increase social cohesion, for instance through 'integration contracts' and citizenship tests.

Much has changed in the world since the publication of the first edition, yet the book's central argument remains the same. International population movements are reforging states and societies around the world in ways that affect bilateral and regional relations, economic restructuring, security, national identity and sovereignty. As a key dynamic within globalization, migration is an intrinsic part of broader economic and social change, and is contributing to a fundamental transformation of the international political order. However, what sovereign states do in the realm of migration policies continues to matter a great deal. The notion of open borders remains elusive even within regional integration frameworks, except for European citizens circulating within the European Union.

The authors thank the following for help in preparing the fifth edition. Several doctoral candidates at the University of Sydney provided expert research assistance to Stephen Castles. Magdalena Arias Cubas made a major contribution to Chapter 6, Migration in the Americas; Chulhyo Kim provided significant input to Chapter 7, Migration in the Asia–Pacific Region; Derya Ozkul, Elsa Koleth and Rebecca Williamson provided crucial assistance with the preparation of country studies for Chapter 12, New Ethnic Minorities and Society. All made important contributions to the *Age of Migration* website.

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Mark Miller is deeply indebted to James O'Neill Miller, not only for research and typing assistance, but also for his valuable editorial suggestions. He is also thankful for the assistance he received from Barbara Ford, Lynn Corbett, Cindy Waksmonski and Tony Valentine from the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Delaware.

We would like to thank our publisher, Steven Kennedy, above all for his patience, but also for his editorial and substantive advice. Stephen Wenham of Palgrave Macmillan has also given a great deal of support on the fifth edition, as on the fourth.

We are indebted to Oliver Bakewell, Robin Cohen, Jock Collins, Evelyn Ersanilli, Fred Halliday, Gunvor Jónsson, Thomas Lacroix, Sako Musterd,

Note on Migration Statistics

When studying migration and minorities it is vital to use statistical data, but it is also important to be aware of the limitations of such data. Statistics are collected in different ways, using different methods and different definitions by authorities of various countries. These can even vary between different agencies within a single country.

A key point is the difference between *flow* and *stock* figures. The ____ of migrants is the number of migrants who enter a country (*inflow, entries* or *immigration*) in a given period (usually a year), or who leave the country (*emigration, departures* or *outflow*). The balance between these figures is known as *net migration*. The ____ of migrants is the number present in a country on a specific date. Flow figures are useful for understanding trends in mobility, while stock figures help us to examine the long-term impact of migration on a given population.

Until recently, figures on immigrants in 'classical immigration countries' (the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) were mainly based on the criterion of a person being ____ (or *overseas-born*), while data for European immigration countries were mainly based on the criterion of a person being a ____ (or *foreign resident, foreign citizen, foreigner* or *alien*). The foreign-born include persons who have become *naturalized,* that is, who have taken on the nationality (or citizenship) of the receiving country. The category excludes children born to immigrants in the receiving country (the *second generation*) if they are citizens of that country. The term 'foreign nationals' excludes those who have taken on the nationality of the receiving country, but includes children born to immigrants who retain their parents' nationality (see OECD, 2006: 260–1).

The two ways of looking at the concept of immigrants reflect the perceptions and laws of different types of immigration countries. However, with longer settlement and recognition of the need to improve integration of long-term immigrants and their descendants, laws on nationality and ideas on its significance are changing. Many countries now provide figures for *both* the foreign-born and foreign nationals. These figures cannot be aggregated, so we will use both types in the book, as appropriate. In addition, some countries now provide data on children born to immigrant parents, or on ethnicity, or on race, or on combinations of these. For example, when using statistics it is therefore very important to be aware of the definition of terms (which should always be given clearly in presenting data), the significance of different concepts and the purpose of the specific statistics (for detailed discussion see OECD, 2006, Statistical Annexe).

The Age of Migration Website

There is an accompanying website – **www.age-of-migration.com** – for *The Age of Migration.* This is freely accessible and is designed as a resource for students and other users. It contains web links and additional case studies to expand the analysis of the book. It also includes a web-only chapter, The Migratory Process: A Comparison of Australia and Germany. The website will also contain updates to cover important developments that affect the text.

The guides to further reading at the end of most chapters draw attention to the specific case material relevant to each chapter on the AOM5 website. This material is numbered for ease of navigation, i.e. case material for Chapter 4 is called Case 4.1, Case 4.2, and so on.

List of Abbreviations

A10	The ten new member states that gained accession to the EU on 1 May 2004: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia
A8	The new Central and Eastern European member states (the A10 minus Cyprus and Malta)
ABS	Australian Bureau of Statistics
AFL-CIO	American Federation of Labor–Congress of Industrial Organizations
ALP	Australian Labor Party
ANC	African National Congress
AOM	Age of Migration
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
DHS	Department of Homeland Security (USA)
DIAC	Department of Immigration and Citizenship (Australia)
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EC	European Community
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
EU2	The two new member countries (Bulgaria and Romania) that joined the EU in January 2007
EU10	The 10 new member countries (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) that joined the EU in May 2004
EU15	The 15 member states of the EU up to April 2004
EU25	The 25 member states of the EU from May 2004 to December 2006
EU27	The 27 member states of the EU since January 2007
FN	Front National (National Front, France)
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
GEC	global economic crisis
GCIM	Global Commission on International Migration
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IDP	internally displaced person
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMI	International Migration Institute (University of Oxford)
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IRCA	Immigration Reform and Control Act 1986 (USA)

MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MERCOSUR	Latin American Southern Common Market
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NELM	New Economics of Labour Migration
NGO	non-governmental organization
NIC	newly industrializing country
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OMA	Office of Multicultural Affairs
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SGI	Société Générale d'Immigration (France)
TEU	Treaty on European Union
TFW	temporary foreign worker
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNPD	United Nations Population Division
WTO	World Trade Organization

Chapter 1

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Introduction

Migration and the resulting ethnic and racial diversity are amongst the most emotive subjects in contemporary societies. While global migration rates have remained relatively stable over the past half a century, the political salience of migration has strongly increased. For origin societies, the departure of people raises concern about the 'brain drain' on the one hand, but it also creates the hope that the money and knowledge migrants gather abroad can foster human and economic development. For receiving societies, the settlement of migrant groups and the formation of ethnic minorities can fundamentally change the social, cultural, economic and political fabric of societies, particularly in the longer run.

This became apparent during the USA presidential election in 2012. The burgeoning minority population of the USA voted overwhelmingly in favour of Obama whereas the Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney won most of the white non-Hispanic vote. According to analysis of exit polls, 71 per cent of Latino voters voted for President Obama compared to 27 per cent for Romney. Latinos comprised 10 per cent of the electorate, up from 9 per cent in 2008 and 8 per cent in 2004. Hispanics make up a growing share of voters in key battleground states such Florida, Nevada and Colorado (Lopez and Taylor, 2012). A recent study estimated that 40 million Latinos will be eligible to vote in 2030, up from 23.7 million in 2010 (Taylor *et al.*, 2012).

The magnitude of Obama's victory seemed to reflect the increasing estrangement of the Republican Party from the daily lives and concerns of many Latino voters. This particularly relates to the inability of President George W. Bush to secure immigration reforms and, more generally, strong Republican opposition with regard to immigration reform allowing the legalization of the approximately 11 million irregular migrants living in the USA, who are primarily of Mexican and Central American origin (see also Box 1.1).

Similarly in Europe, the political salience of migration has increased, which is reflected in the rise of extreme right-wing, anti-immigrant and anti-Islam parties and a subsequent move to the right of the entire political spectrum on migration and diversity issues (cf. Davis, 2012). Growing hostility towards immigration has sometimes engendered racist attacks. On 22 July 2011, Anders Breivik, a 32-year-old Norwegian far-right radical, attacked government buildings in Oslo, causing eight deaths, and then carried out a mass shooting at a youth camp of the Norwegian Labour Party on the island of Utøya, where he killed 69 people and wounded hundreds,

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mostly teenagers. His motive for the atrocities was to draw attention to his Islamophobic and anti-feminist manifesto *2083: A European Declaration of Independence*, which he published on the internet on the day of the attack. He regarded Islam as the enemy and advocated the deportation of all Muslims from Europe. He directed his attack against the Labour Party because he accused them of bearing responsibility for the deconstruction of Norwegian culture and the 'mass import' of Muslims. On 24 August 2012, Breivik was found guilty of mass murder and terrorism, and will probably remain in prison for life (*New York Times*, 24 August 2012).

A few months earlier, immigration had become a central issue in the French Presidential election. The incumbent centre-right president, Nicolas Sarkozy, called for a halving of immigration, saying that France could no longer integrate the many newcomers. This looked like a desperate ploy to play the 'race card' in an election in which the increasingly unpopular Sarkozy was being squeezed between a resurgent Socialist Party and the far right *Front National* (FN) candidate, Marine Le Pen. Then on 11 March 2012, a paratrooper was killed by a gunman in the city of Toulouse. Four days later two more paratroopers were shot dead, and on 19 March three children and a Rabbi were murdered at a Jewish school. The police identified the killer as Mohamed Merah, a French citizen of Algerian descent. Merah had visited Afghanistan and claimed to have received training from a group linked to al-Qaeda. In a siege at his apartment, Merah was shot dead on 21 March (BBC News, 22 March 2012). The presidential elections were thrown into turmoil, and Sarkozy was back in the spotlight, with his calls for tough new laws against terrorism. Throughout his political career, Sarkozy had campaigned for more immigration control and had portrayed the growing diversity of the French population as a security threat. Now he had a cause that he hoped would propel him back into office. Yet he failed: French voters put economic and social issues above fears about diversity and security, and the Socialist candidate François Hollande emerged as victor in the presidential election of May 2012 (France 24, 7 March 2012).

These are stark reminders of the continuing political salience of immi-   – but also of the political risks of playing the 'race card'. There are many other such reminders. After Spain and Italy introduced visa requirements for North Africans in the early 1990s, migration did not stop but became increasingly irregular in nature. Each year, tens of thousands of Africans attempt to make the dangerous crossing across the Mediterranean in small fishing boats, speedboats or hidden in vans and trucks on ferries. Although this frequently leads to public outcries about 'combating illegal migration', further border controls did not stop migration but rather reinforced its irregular character and diverted flows to other crossing points.

At the time of the onset of Arab Spring in 2011, some European politicians portrayed the flight of people from violence in Libya as an invasion. Most migrant workers in Libya returned to their African or Asian homelands,

and the numbers arriving in Italy remained relatively small. Nevertheless, the Berlusconi Government declared a state of emergency. Italy reached an agreement on temporary residence for Tunisians, sparking a public outcry amongst European leaders and fears that Tunisians could move on to other European Union (EU) countries. Contrary to the Schengen Agreement on free movement in Europe, France even temporarily introduced symbolical controls on its border with Italy.

While the USA remains deeply divided by race, immigration too, especially of Mexicans across the long southern border, remains controversial. The failure of Congress to pass a comprehensive immigration reform in 2006 opened the door for restrictive state legislation, with Arizona taking the lead in introducing strict controls. The USA, with over 11 million irregular immigrants, relies heavily on their labour in agriculture, construction and the services, yet has been unable to move towards legal forms of immigration and employment for this group, even though it also has the largest legal immigration programme in the world. At the same time, post-9/11 restrictions in immigration policies have made it increasingly difficult to obtain visas and residence permits (Green Cards) even for the high-skilled (see Box 1.1).

Divisive issues can be found in new immigration destinations too: In _____ in March 2006, foreign workers building the Burj Dubai, the world's tallest building, demonstrated against low wages, squalid dormitories and dangerous conditions. Their main grievance was that employers often simply refused to pay wages. Dubai is one of the oil-rich United Arab Emirates, where the migrant workforce – mainly from South and South-East Asia – far outnumbers the local population. Lack of worker rights, prohibition of unions and fear of deportation have forced migrant workers to accept exploitative conditions. Women migrants, who often work as domestic helpers, are especially vulnerable. In Japan and Korea too, politicians often express fears of loss of ethnic homogeneity through immigration. The government of multiracial Malaysia tends to blame immigrants for crime and other social problems, and introduces 'crack downs' against irregular migrants whenever there are economic slowdowns.

Indeed, economic woes often lead to anti-immigration politics. In the global economic crisis (GEC) which started in 2008, many states tightened up immigration control measures and sought to send migrants home. These measures had little impact on migrant stocks, but they did stir up popular resentment of immigrants. In fact, as will be discussed later in this book, the GEC has had only a limited structural effect on migration. Some rather surprising new trends have emerged, such as the new flows of young Europeans to older destination countries: Greeks, Italians and Irish to Germany and Australia; Portuguese to Brazil; Spaniards to Latin America; and all of these groups to the USA.

Quite literally, international migration has changed the face of societies. The commonality of the situations lies in the increasing ethnic and cultural diversity of many immigrant-receiving societies, and the dilemmas

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Box 1.1 How migration shaped US and Mexican politics in the twenty-first century

The elections of George W. Bush and Vicente Fox in 2000 appeared to augur well for US–Mexico relations. Both presidents wanted to improve relations, especially through closer cooperation on migration issues. President Bush's first foreign visit was to President Fox's ranch and the US–Mexico immigrant initiative topped the agenda. However, there was significant Congressional opposition. Then, after the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the migration initiative was put on the back-burner as securitization of US immigration policy ensued. With the re-election of President Bush in 2004, comprehensive immigration reform became a priority for the second term. But deep divisions between Republicans doomed reform in the Bush presidency with perhaps fateful long-term consequences for the Republican Party.

In 2008, newly elected Mexican President Calderón sought to de-emphasize the centrality of migration in US–Mexican relations whereas newly elected US President Barack Obama continued to support reform, albeit tepidly. In the absence of comprehensive immigration reform at the federal level, pro and anti-immigration activists launched initiatives at the state and municipal levels. Several states adopted restrictive measures which led to an important US Supreme Court ruling in 2012 that upheld the paramount prerogatives of the US federal government in determination of immigration law and policy. Nonetheless, the rules adopted in Arizona and other states led to many deportations of Mexican undocumented workers and contributed to a decline in Mexico–US migration.

President Obama too was unable to secure comprehensive immigration reform in his first term. However, he proclaimed it a principal goal of his second term after his re-election in 2012. The magnitude of his victory appeared to underscore the long-term significance of President Bush's inability to secure reform. The burgeoning minority population of the USA voted overwhelmingly in favour of Obama whereas the Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney won most of the white non-immigrant vote. Gender also played a key role: 55 per cent of all women voters chose Obama over Romney, while for black women the figure was a massive 96 per cent, and for Latino women 76 per cent. A key question for the future is: can the Republican Party increase its appeal to minority populations?

Sources: Calmes and Thee-Brenan, 2012; Lopez and Taylor, 2012; Suzanne, 2012.

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that arise for states and communities in finding ways to respond to these changes. Young people of immigrant background are protesting against their feeling of being excluded from the societies in which they had grown up (and often been born). By contrast, some politicians and elements of the media claim that immigrants are failing to integrate, deliberately maintaining distinct cultures and religions, and have become a threat to security and social cohesion.

The challenges of global migration

Migration has gained increasing political salience over the past decades. That is why we have called this book *The Age of Migration*. This does not imply that migration is something new – indeed, human beings have always moved in search of new opportunities, or to escape poverty, conflict or environmental degradation. However, migration took on a new character with the beginnings of European expansion from the sixteenth century (see Chapter 4), and the Industrial Revolution from the nineteenth century, which set in motion a massive transfer of population from rural to urban areas within and across borders.

A high point was the mass migrations from Europe to North America from the mid-nineteenth century until World War I. Between 1846 and 1939, some 59 million people left Europe, mainly for areas of settlement in North and South America, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa (Stalker, 2000: 9). Some scholars call this the 'age of mass migration' (Hatton and Williamson, 1998) and argue that these international movements were even bigger than today's.

The 1850–1914 period has been perceived (by Western scholars at least) as mainly one of transatlantic migration, while the long-distance movements that started after 1945 and expanded from the 1980s involve all regions of the world. Newer studies show great mobility in Asia, Africa and Latin America in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Nonetheless, mobility has become easier as a result of new transport and communication technologies. This has enabled migrants to remain in almost constant touch with family and friends in origin countries and to travel back and forth more often. International migration is thus a central dynamic within globalization.

A defining feature of the age of migration is the challenge that some politicians and analysts believe is posed by international migration to the sovereignty of states, specifically to their ability to regulate movements of people across their borders. The relatively unregulated migration prior to 1914 was generally not seen as a challenge to state sovereignty. This would change over the course of the twentieth century. Many migrants cross borders in an irregular (also called undocumented or illegal) way. Paradoxically, irregularity is often a result of tighter control measures, which have blocked earlier forms of spontaneous mobility. While most governments have abolished the exit controls of the past, efforts by governments to regulate *immigration* are at an all-time high and involve intensive bilateral, regional and international diplomacy. A second challenge is posed by 'transnationalism': as people become more mobile, many of them foster social and economic relationships in two or more societies at once. This is often seen as undermining the undivided loyalty some observers think crucial to sovereign nation-states.

While movements of people across borders have shaped states and societies since time immemorial, what is distinctive in recent years is their

global scope, their centrality to domestic and international politics and their considerable economic and social consequences. Migration processes may become so entrenched and resistant to governmental control that new international political forms may emerge, such as the attempts to regulate migration at the regional level by the EU and by regional bodies in other parts of the world. Novel forms of interdependence, transnational societies and international cooperation on migration issues are rapidly transforming the lives of millions of people and inextricably weaving together the fate of states and societies.

For the most part, the growth of diversity and transnationalism is seen as a beneficial process, because it can help overcome the violence and destructiveness that characterized the era of nationalism. But international migration is sometimes directly or indirectly linked to conflict. Events like 9/11 (the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, DC), and the attacks by Islamic radicals on trains, buses and airports in Spain in 2004 and in the UK in 2005 and 2007 involved immigrants or their offspring. Such events have given rise to perceptions that threats to security of states are somehow linked to international migration and to the problems of living together in one society for culturally and socially diverse ethnic groups. This has increased the political salience of issues like immigration, diversity and multiculturalism, and this partly explains the rise of anti-immigration and anti-Islam parties in Europe – whose main narrative is to represent immigrants as a security and cultural threat. It is in this political climate that extreme-right violence like the July 2011 killings in Norway could occur.

These developments in turn are related to fundamental economic, social and political transformations that shape today's world. Millions of people are seeking work, a new home or simply a safe place to live outside their countries of birth. For many less developed countries, emigration is one aspect of the social crisis which accompanies integration into the world market and modernization. Population growth and the 'green revolution' in rural areas lead to massive 'surplus populations'. People move to burgeoning cities, where employment opportunities are often inadequate and social conditions miserable. Violence, oppressive governments and denial of human rights can lead to forced migrations within states or across their borders. Massive urbanization outstrips the creation of jobs in the early stages of industrialization. Some of the previous rural–urban migrants embark on a second migration, seeking to improve their lives by moving to newly industrializing countries in the South or to highly developed countries in the North.

However, most migration is not driven by poverty and violence: international migration requires significant resources, and most 'South–North' migrants come neither from the poorest countries nor from the poorest social classes. Many migrants benefit from the opportunities of a globalized economy for mobility as highly qualified specialists or entrepreneurs. Class

plays an important role: destination countries compete to attract the highly skilled through privileged rules on entry and residence, while manual workers and refugees often experience exclusion and discrimination. New forms of mobility are emerging: retirement migration, mobility in search of better (or just different) lifestyles, repeated or circular movement. The barrier between migration and tourism is becoming blurred, as some people travel as tourists to check out potential migration destinations. Whether the initial intention is temporary or permanent movement, many migrants become settlers. Family reunion – the entry of dependent spouses, children and other relatives of previous primary migrants – remains the largest single entry category in many places. Migration networks develop, linking areas of origin and destination, and helping to bring about major changes in both. Migrations can change demographic, economic and social structures, and create a new cultural diversity, which often brings into question national identity.

This book is about contemporary international migrations, and the way they are changing societies. The perspective is international: large-scale movements of people arise from the process of global integration. Migrations are not isolated phenomena: movements of commodities, capital and ideas almost always give rise to movements of people, and vice versa. Global cultural interchange, facilitated by improved transport and the proliferation of print and electronic media, can also increase migration aspirations. International migration ranks as one of the most important factors in global change.

There are several reasons to expect the age of migration to endure: persistent inequalities in wealth between rich and poor countries will continue to impel large numbers of people to move in search of better living standards; political or ethnic conflict in a number of regions is likely to lead to future large-scale refugee movements; and the creation of new free trade areas will facilitate movements of labour, whether or not this is intended by the governments concerned. But migration is not just a reaction to difficult conditions at home: it is also motivated by the search for better opportunities and lifestyles elsewhere. Economic development of poorer countries generally leads to greater migration because it gives people the resources to move. Some migrants experience abuse or exploitation, but most benefit and are able to improve their lives through mobility. Conditions may be tough for migrants but are often preferable to poverty, insecurity and lack of opportunities at home – otherwise migration would not continue.

According to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), the world total stock of international migrants (defined as people living outside their country of birth for at least a year) grew from about 100 million in 1960 to 155 million in 2000 and then to 214 million in 2010. This sounds a lot, but is just 3.1 per cent of the world's 7 billion people (UN Population Division, 2010; see also Figure 1.2). The number of international migrants has grown only slightly more rapidly

than overall global population since 1960. Although international migration has thus not increased in relative terms, falling costs of travel and infrastructure improvements have rapidly increased non-migratory forms of mobility such as tourism, business trips and commuting. Most people remain in their countries of birth, while internal migration (often in the form or rural–urban movement) is far higher than international migration, especially in some of the world's population giants like China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, and Nigeria. It is impossible to know exact numbers of internal migrants, although the UN Development Program estimated some 740 million in 2009 (UNDP, 2009). Internal and international migration are closely linked and both are driven by the same transformation processes (DIAC, 2010a). However, this book focuses on international migration.

The illustrations that follow show some main characteristics of international migrant populations. Figure 1.1 traces how total international migration has evolved since 1990. It shows that international migrant populations have increasingly concentrated in wealthy, developed countries. Figure 1.2 shows that in 2010 international migrants represented over 10.3 per cent of highly developed receiving country populations on average, up from 7.2 in 1990. In developing countries, these shares are now well under 3 per cent and have been decreasing. The figure also shows that migrants represent about 3 per cent of the world population, and that this percentage has remained stable over the past decades.

Figure 1.3 shows the evolution of migrant stocks in the various continents from 1990–2010, revealing the large and fast-growing numbers in the industrial regions of Asia, Europe and North America. According to

Figure 1.1   *World immigrant populations, by levels of development*

Source: World Development Indicators database, based on United Nations Population Division data.

Figure 1.2 *International immigrants as a percentage of total population, by level of development*

Source: World Development Indicators database, based on United Nations Population Division data.

Figure 1.3 *Estimated population of international immigrants by continent, 1990–2010*

Source: World Development Indicators database, based on United Nations Population Division data.

these estimates, migrant populations have hardly been growing in Africa, Latin America and Oceania. Figure 1.4 examines migrant stocks as a percentage of the total population of the various continents. The population share of immigrants is highest in Oceania, mainly reflecting high immigration rates in Australia and New Zealand. Oceania is followed by North America and then Europe, where these rates have been increasing fast. By contrast, the population share is much lower and fairly stable in Asia, while it has actually declined in Africa and Latin America. Finally, Map 1.1 gives a very rough idea of the major migratory flows since 1973.

Some of those who move are 'forced migrants': people compelled to flee their homes and seek refuge elsewhere. The reasons for flight include political or ethnic violence or persecution, development projects like large dams, or natural disasters like the 2004 Asian Tsunami. According to UNDESA data, the total number of refugees was 16.3 million in 2010, which is an increase from the 15.6 million refugees in 2000, but still lower than the 1990 estimate of 18.4 million refugees worldwide. This figure includes the some 5 million Palestinian refugees worldwide (see Chapter 10), The decline after the early 1990s was partly due to a decline in the number of conflicts, and partly due to states' unwillingness to admit refugees. The number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) – forced migrants who remain in their country of origin because they find it impossible to cross an international border to seek refuge – grew to about 27.5 million in 2010 (see Chapter 10).

Figure 1.4   *International immigrants as a percentage of the population by continent, 1990–2010*

Source: World Development Indicators database, based on United Nations Population Division data.

Map 1.1 *International migratory movements from 1973*

Note: The size of the arrowheads gives an approximate indication of the volume of flows. Exact figures are often unavailable.

Figure 1.5   *Estimated number of refugees by major area, 1990–2010*

Note: Estimated refugee population as of mid-year, based on data from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).

Source: United Nations Population Division.

Figure 1.5 represents refugee data by continents. This data also includes the roughly 5 million Palestinian refugees, which are not covered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The distribution of refugees is quite different from that of other migrants: most refugees remain in the poorest areas of the world, while other migrants – especially high-skilled migrants – often go to the rich areas. While the numbers of refugees have considerably gone down in Africa partly due to a decreased level of conflict, they have recently increased in Asia. This partly reflects the consequences of the US-led invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. According to the UNDESA data represented in Figure 1.6, refugees represent 13.3 per cent of the total international migrant population in Africa, down from 33.5 per cent in 1990. In Asia, this share is 17.7 per cent and has remained more or less stable. Elsewhere, these shares are much lower. In 2010, refugees now represent an estimated 7.6 per cent of the global migrant population, down from 11.9 per cent in 1990.

The vast majority of people remain in their countries of birth. Yet the impact of international migration is considerably larger than such figures suggest. The departure of migrants has considerable consequences

Figure 1.6   *Refugees as a percentage of the international migrant population by major area, 1990–2010*

for areas of origin. Remittances (money sent home) and investments by migrants may improve living standards, encourage economic development and create employment, but can also undermine growth and fuel inflation in remittance-dependent, non-productive and migration-obsessed communities.

In the country of immigration, settlement is closely linked to employment opportunities and is mainly concentrated in industrial and urban areas, where the impact on receiving communities is considerable. Migration thus affects not only the migrants themselves but the sending and receiving societies as a whole. There can be few people in either industrial or less developed countries today who do not have personal experience of migration or its effects.

Contemporary migrations: general trends

International migration is part of a transnational shift that is reshaping societies and politics around the globe. The old dichotomy between migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries is being eroded – if this dichotomy was ever valid at all. Most countries experience

both emigration and immigration (although one or the other often predominates). The differing ways in which such trends have affected the worlds' regions is a major theme throughout this book. Areas such as the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand or Argentina are considered 'classical countries of immigration'. Their current people are the result of histories of large-scale immigration – to the detriment of indigenous populations. Today, migration continues in new forms. Virtually all of Northern and Western Europe became areas of labour immigration and subsequent settlement after 1945. Since the 1980s, Southern European states like Greece, Italy and Spain, which for a long time were zones of emigration, have also become immigration areas, although in recent years emigration has been increasing in response to the global economic crisis. Today Central and Eastern European states are experiencing both significant emigration and immigration.

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA), the vast area stretching from Morocco to Iran, is affected by complex population movements. Some countries, like Turkey, Jordan and Morocco, have been major sources of migrant labour, while Turkey is now also an immigration country. The Gulf oil states experience large, officially temporary, inflows of workers. Iran has been a major receiving country for refugees from Afghanistan, along with Pakistan. In Africa, colonialism and European settlement led to the establishment of migrant labour systems for plantations and mines. Decolonization since the 1950s has sustained old migratory patterns – such as the flow of mineworkers to South Africa and Maghrebis to France – and started new ones, such as movements to Kenya, Gabon, and Nigeria. Although economic migration predominates, Africa has more refugees and IDPs relative to population size than any other region of the world. Asia and Latin America have complicated migratory patterns within their regions, as well as increasing flows to the rest of the world. An example of recent developments is discussed in Box 1.2 to give an idea of the complex ramifications of migratory movements for both North and South.

Box 1.2 Migration and revolution: the Arab Spring

The wave of political unrest that began in Tunisia in December 2010 and spread throughout the Arab world has caused the deaths of thousands of people, while millions of others had been forced to leave their homes by mid-2012. While the violence in Tunisia and Egypt remained relatively limited, the violent conflicts in Libya and Syria generated large flows of refugees.

In early 2011, the violence in Libya led to large-scale outflows of Libyan citizens and of more than one million African, Asian and European migrant workers, most of whom moved back home or were hosted in neighbouring

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countries. The fate of hundreds of thousands of sub-Saharan workers in Libya exposed the scale of intra-African migration to the global public. Many African workers who lacked the means to return and feared attacks because of (largely false) accusations that they were 'mercenaries' working for the Gaddafi regime, became trapped in Libya.

The extremely violent conflict in Syria engendered an even bigger refugee crisis. In March 2013, according to the UNHCR, about four million Syrians were internally displaced and one million refugees had been registered in other countries. In the wake of the Arab Spring, European politicians sowed panic that these people would cross the Mediterranean to land on European shores in huge numbers. In 2011, the Italian government warned of an exodus of 'biblical proportions' from Libya while in 2012 Greek politicians announced that Greece should fortify itself against a massive wave of irregular migrants from Syria.

Such panic had no basis, as most people stayed within the region or returned home. Only 4 per cent of all people fleeing Libya (27,465 persons out of 790,000) ended up in Italy or Malta (Aghazarm *et al.*, 2012). The large majority of them found refuge in neighbouring Egypt and, particularly, Tunisia. UNHCR and IOM in collaboration with the Tunisian government helped hundreds of thousands of migrant workers to return home. After the death of Gaddafi in October 2011, most Libyans returned and migrant workers started to come back, although Africans migrants in particular continued to experience racist violence. The overwhelming majority of Syrian refugees have found refuge in Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Egypt, and other North African countries.

Eurocentric accounts of the Arab Spring ignore the profound impact of the crisis on countries of origin. This pertains not only to the role of returnees in political violence in countries like Mali but also to the fact that many families in extremely poor countries such as Chad and Niger were now deprived of vital remittance income since migrant workers returned home.

Nevertheless, the Arab Spring has not radically transformed long-term migration patterns in the Mediterranean. Mass flight has been largely confined to Libya and, particularly, Syria, and there has been no major increase of emigration from other North African or Middle East countries. The increase in Tunisian emigration to Lampedusa, an Italian island 113 km off the Tunisian coast, was stimulated by reduced policing in Tunisia during the revolution but stood in a long-standing tradition of irregular boat migration to Europe that has existed since southern European countries introduced visas for North Africans around 1991.

So, the idea that emigration will stop is as unlikely as the idea of a 'mass exodus' towards Europe. At the same time, the processes that created the conditions for revolutionary change are also conducive to emigration. The coming of age of a new, educated and aspiring generation, which is frustrated by mass unemployment, dictatorial rule and corruption, has increased both the emigration and revolutionary potential of Arab societies.

Source: de Haas and Sigona, 2012; Fargues and Fandrich, 2012.

   Throughout the world, long-standing migratory patterns are persisting in new forms, while new flows are developing in response to economic, political and cultural change, and violent conflicts. Yet, despite the diversity, it is possible to identify certain general tendencies:

1. The *globalization of migration*: the tendency for more and more countries to be significantly affected by international migration. Moreover, immigration countries tend to receive migrants from an increasingly diverse array of source countries, so that most countries of immigration have entrants from a broad spectrum of economic, social and cultural backgrounds.

2. The *changing direction of dominant migration flows*: while for centuries Europeans have been moving outward to conquer, colonize, and settle foreign lands elsewhere, these patterns were reversed after World War II. From a prime source of emigration, Europe has been transformed into a major global migration destination. As part of the same pattern, Europeans represent a declining share of immigrants in classical immigration countries such as the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, along with an increase of 'South–North' migration. This also coincided with the appearance of a new global pole of attraction for migrant workers in the Gulf region.

3. The *differentiation of migration*: most countries are not dominated by one type of migration, such as labour migration, family reunion, refugee movement or permanent settlement, but experience a whole range of types at once. Migratory chains which start with one type of movement often continue with other forms, despite (or often just because of) government efforts to stop or control the movement.

4. The *proliferation of migration transition*: this occurs when traditional lands of emigration become lands of immigration. Growing transit migration is often the prelude to becoming predominantly immigration lands. States as diverse as Poland, Spain, Morocco, Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Turkey and South Korea are experiencing various stages and forms of a migration transition. But other countries, for example in Latin America, have experienced reverse migration transitions as they changed from immigration to emigration countries.

5. The *feminization of labour migration*: in the past many labour migrations were male-dominated, and women were often dealt with under the category of family reunion, even if they did take up employment. Since the 1960s, women have not only played an increasing role in labour migration, but also the *awareness* of women's role in migration has grown. Today women workers form the majority in movements as diverse as those of Cape Verdeans to Italy, Filipinas to the Middle East and Thais to Japan.

6. The *growing politicization of migration*: domestic politics, bilateral and regional relationships and national security policies of states

around the world are increasingly affected by international migration. This growing political salience of this issue is a main reason for our argument that we live in an age of migration.

International migration in global governance

Globalization has challenged the sovereignty of national governments from above and below. The growth of transnational society has given rise to novel challenges and has blurred formerly distinctive spheres of decision-making. Trends are contradictory (see Castles, 2004b): on the one hand, politicians cling to national sovereignty, with such slogans as 'British jobs for British workers'. On the other hand the complexity and fragmentation of power and authority that have resulted from globalization typically require governments (whether national, regional or local) to cooperate with other organizations and institutions, both public and private, foreign and domestic. An important manifestation of global governance is the significant expansion of regional consultative processes within bodies like the EU or the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) focusing on international migration.

Until recently, governments generally did not see international migration as a central political issue. Rather, migrants were divided up into categories, such as permanent settlers, foreign workers or refugees, and dealt with by a variety of special agencies, such as immigration departments, labour offices, aliens police, welfare authorities and education ministries. This situation began to change in the mid-1980s. The Paris-based Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) convened the first international conference on international migration in 1986 (OECD, 1987). The OECD had found evidence of growing convergence in migration policy concerns and challenges faced by its member states. As most European Community (EC) countries started to remove their internal boundaries with the signature of the Schengen Agreement in 1985 and its full implementation in 1995, they became increasingly concerned about controlling external borders. By the 1990s, the mobilization of extreme-right groups in Europe over immigration helped bring these issues to the centre of the political stage. In the USA, the Clinton Administration ordered the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to include international migration in their assessments.

The adoption of the 1990 Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers and Their Families by the UN General Assembly brought into sharp relief global tensions and differences surrounding international migration. Immigration countries refused to sign the convention, and it did not come into force until 2003. By October 2012 it had been ratified by just 46 of the UN's 193 states – virtually all of them countries of emigration.

Globalization has coincided with the strengthening of global institutions: the World Trade Organization for trade, the International Monetary Fund

for finance, the World Bank for economic development, and so on. But the will to cooperate has not been as strong in the migration field. There are international bodies with specific tasks – such as the UNHCR for refugees and the International Labour Office (ILO) for migrant workers – but no institution with overall responsibility for global cooperation and for monitoring migrant rights. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) does have wider terms of reference, but it is a non-UN body and lacks the capacity to bring about significant change. The key issue is the unwillingness of labour-importing countries to enforce migrant rights and to adopt more liberal immigration regimes that might improve migrants' lives and outcomes for countries of origin.

In 2003, following consultation with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, a Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM), consisting of prominent people advised by migration experts, was set up. Its report (GCIM, 2005) emphasized the potential benefits of migration for development. The UN General Assembly held its first High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development in 2006. The Secretary General's report on this meeting recommended a forum for UN member states to discuss migration and development issues. The Global Forum on Migration and Development (GMFD) has met annually since, although its role has been purely advisory and it is hard to see concrete results of the dialogue (see Castles, 2011).

Ethnic diversity, racism and multiculturalism

Governance of international migration is one of the two central issues arising from the population movements of the current epoch. The other is the effect of growing ethnic diversity on the societies of immigration countries. Settlers are often distinct from the receiving populations: they may come from different types of societies (for example, agrarian-rural rather than urban-industrial) with different traditions, religions and political institutions. They often speak a different language and follow different cultural practices. They may be visibly different, through physical appearance (skin colour, features and hair type) or style of dress. Some migrant groups become concentrated in certain types of work (sometimes of low social status) and live segregated lives in low-income residential areas. The position of immigrants is often marked by a specific legal status: that of the foreigner or non-citizen.

The social meaning of ethnic diversity depends to a large extent on the significance attached to it by the populations and states of the receiving countries. The classic immigration countries have generally seen immigrants as permanent settlers who were to be assimilated or integrated. However, not all potential immigrants have been seen as suitable: the USA, Canada and Australia all had policies to keep out non-Europeans

and even some categories of Europeans until the 1960s. Countries which emphasized temporary labour recruitment – Western European countries in the 1960s and early 1970s, more recently the Gulf oil states and some of the fast-growing Asian economies – have tried (often unsuccessfully) to prevent family reunion and permanent settlement. Despite the emergence of permanent settler populations, such countries have declared themselves not to be countries of immigration, and have generally denied citizenship and other rights to settlers. Between these two extremes is a wealth of variations, which will be discussed in later chapters.

Culturally distinct settler groups often maintain their languages and some elements of their homeland cultures, at least for a few generations. Where governments have recognized permanent settlement, there has been a tendency to move from policies of individual assimilation to acceptance of some degree of long-term cultural difference. The result has been the granting of minority cultural and political rights, as embodied in the policies of multiculturalism introduced in Canada, Australia, the Netherlands and Sweden since the 1970s. However, the post-9/11 era has witnessed a retreat from multiculturalism in many democracies. Governments which reject the idea of permanent settlement often also oppose pluralism, which they see as a threat to national unity and identity.

Whatever the policies of the governments, immigration often leads to strong reactions from some sections of the population. Immigration sometimes takes place at the same time as economic restructuring and far-reaching social change. People whose conditions of life are already changing in an unpredictable way may see the newcomers as the cause of insecurity. One of the dominant, but empirically unjustified, images in highly developed countries today is that of masses of people flowing in from the poor South and the turbulent East, taking away jobs, pushing up housing prices and overloading social services. Similarly, in other immigration countries, such as Malaysia and South Africa, immigrants are blamed for crime, disease and unemployment. Extreme-right parties have grown and flourished through anti-immigrant campaigns. In fact, migrants are generally a symptom of change rather than its cause. For many people, immigration is the most concrete manifestation of rather intangible processes such as globalization and neoliberal economic policies. It should therefore not come as a surprise that the blame for social and economic problems is often shifted on to the shoulders of immigrants and ethnic minorities.

International migration does not always create diversity. Some migrants, such as Britons in Australia or Austrians in Germany, are virtually indistinguishable from the receiving population. Other groups, like Western Europeans in North America, are quickly assimilated. 'Professional transients' – that is, highly skilled personnel who move temporarily within specialized labour markets – are rarely seen as presenting an integration problem, although, ironically enough, such groups often hardly integrate.

More fundamental is the challenge that migration poses for national identity. The nation-state, as it has developed since the eighteenth century, is premised on the idea of cultural as well as political unity. In many countries, ethnic homogeneity, defined in terms of common language, culture, traditions and history, has been seen as the basis of the nation-state. This unity has often been fictitious – a construction of the ruling elite – but it has provided powerful national myths. Immigration and ethnic diversity threaten such ideas of the nation, because they create a people without common ethnic origins. The classical countries of immigration have been able to cope with this situation most easily, since absorption of immigrants has been part of their myth of nation-building. But countries which place common culture at the heart of their nation-building process have found it difficult to resolve the contradiction.

One of the central ways in which the link between the people and the state is expressed is through the rules governing citizenship and naturalization. States which readily grant citizenship to immigrants, without requiring common ethnicity or cultural assimilation, seem most able to cope with ethnic diversity. On the other hand, states which link citizenship to cultural belonging tend to have exclusionary policies which marginalize and disadvantage immigrants. It is one of the central themes of this book that continuing international population movements will increase the ethnic diversity of more and more countries. This has already called into question prevailing notions of the nation-state and citizenship. Debates over new approaches to diversity will shape the politics of many countries in coming decades.

Aims and structure of the book

The Age of Migration sets out to provide an understanding of the emerging global dynamics of migration and of the consequences for migrants and non-migrants everywhere. That is a task too big for a single book. Our accounts of the various migratory movements must inevitably be concise, but a global view of international migration is the precondition for understanding each specific flow. The central aim of this book is therefore to provide an introduction to the subject of international migration and the emergence of increasingly diverse societies, which will help readers to put more detailed accounts of specific migratory processes in context.

Our first specific objective is to describe and explain contemporary international migration. We set out to show its enormous complexity, and to communicate both the variations and the common factors in international population movements as they affect more and more parts of the world.

The second objective is to explain how migrant settlement is bringing about increased ethnic diversity in many societies and how it affects broader

social, cultural and political change in destination *and* origin societies. Understanding these changes is the precondition for political action to deal with problems and conflicts linked to migration and ethnic diversity.

The third objective is to link the two analyses, by examining the complex interactions between migration and broader processes of change in origin and destination societies. There are large bodies of empirical and theoretical work on both themes. However, the two are often inadequately linked. The linkages can best be understood by analysing the migratory process in its totality.

The Age of Migration is structured as follows. A first group of chapters (2–4) provides the theoretical and historical background necessary to understand contemporary global trends. Chapter 2 examines the theories and concepts used to explain migration and emphasizes the need to study the migratory process as a whole and to learn to understand migration as an intrinsic part of broader processes of change rather than a 'problem to be solved'. Chapter 3 focuses on how migration has fundamentally transformed societies in both destination and origin areas. In destination areas, we examine complex issues arising from ethnic and cultural diversity, in origin areas the debates on migration and development. Chapter 4 describes the history of international migration from early modern times until 1945.

A second group of chapters (5–8) provides descriptive accounts and data on contemporary migrations around the world. In this fifth edition we seek to provide a better overview of emerging migration processes by providing a chapter on movements within, to and from each of the world's main regions. Chapter 5 is concerned with migration to and from Europe. It examines the patterns of labour migration which developed during the post-1945 boom, and discusses changes in migratory patterns after the 'Oil Crisis' of 1973 and the 2004 and 2007 enlargements of the EU as well as the GEC since 2008. Chapter 6 examines the migratory patterns affecting the Americas, which includes both major immigration countries (USA, Canada), emigration areas like much of Central America, the Andean Region, and countries that combine the role of origin-, destination- and transit-areas for migrants, like Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and Chile. Chapter 7 deals with the Asia–Pacific region – home to 60 per cent of the world's population. It is hard to even summarize the immensely varied and complex migratory patterns rooted both in history and in the often breathtakingly rapid contemporary transformations taking place in Asia and Oceania. Chapter 8 addresses two other diverse, fast-changing and closely interlinked regions: Africa and the Middle East, where movements of people are linked to rapid transformations in economic and political conditions.

A third group of chapters (9–13) is concerned with the political, economic and social meaning of migration and ethnic diversity, especially for immigration countries. Chapter 9 examines migration and security. Such questions are not new but the 9/11 events in the USA and

subsequent attacks in Europe led to a securitization of migration which has had profound effects. The chapter also includes a section on the relationship between climate change and migration. It is often claimed that this has significant implications for the security of destination counties; we argue instead that climate change has a complex relationship with other factors in the migration process, and that migration may be a valuable adaptation to change. Chapter 10 assesses the capacity of industrial states to regulate international migration. It examines irregular migration, human trafficking and the policies designed to curb them. It also discusses regional integration frameworks (the EU and NAFTA) for control of migration. This chapter also discusses the various types of forced migration and how states respond to them.

Chapter 11 considers the economic position of migrant workers and the meaning of migration for the economies of destination countries. It goes on to discuss the key role of migration in labour market restructuring and the development of a 'new economy' based on employment practices such as sub-contracting, temporary employment and informal-sector work. Although the effects of the GEC are discussed in the regional chapters, a section of Chapter 11 provides an overarching analysis. Chapter 12 examines the social position of immigrants within the societies of highly developed immigration countries, looking at such factors as legal status, social policy, formation of ethnic communities, racism, citizenship and national identity. Boxes provide short country case-studies (for space reasons some of these are to be found on the Age of Migration website). Chapter 13 examines the political implications of growing ethnic diversity, looking both at the involvement of immigrants and minorities in politics, and at the way mainstream politics are changing in reaction to migrant settlement.

Chapter 14 sums up the arguments of the book, reviews current trends in global migration and speculates on possible migration futures. With new major migration destinations such as Brazil, Turkey and China appearing on the horizon, the global migration map is likely to witness fundamental changes over the next few years. Meanwhile, international mobility of people seems to imply greater ethnic diversity in many receiving countries, and new forms of transnational connectivity. We discuss the dilemmas faced by governments and people in attempting to find appropriate responses to the challenges of an increasingly mobile world, and point to some of the major obstacles blocking the way to better international cooperation.

Guide to further reading

Extra resources at www.age-of-migration.com

There are too many books on international migration to list here. Many important works are referred to in the guide to further reading for other chapters. A wide range of relevant literature is listed in the Bibliography.

Important information on all aspects of international migration is provided by several specialized journals, of which only a selection can be mentioned here. *International Migration Review* (New York: Center for Migration Studies) was established in 1964 and provides excellent comparative information. *International Migration* (IOM, Geneva) is also a valuable comparative source. *Population and Development Review* is a prominent journal on population studies with many contributions on migration. *Social Identities* started publication in 1995 and is concerned with the 'study of race, nation and culture'. A journal concerned with transnational issues is *Global Networks. Migration Studies* is a new journal focusing on the determinants, processes and outcomes of migration. Some journals, which formerly concentrated on Europe, are becoming more global in focus. These include the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, the *Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales, Race and Class* and *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. Important non-European or North American journals include: The *Journal of Intercultural Studies* (Melbourne: Swinburne University), the *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal* (Quezon City, Philippines: Scalabrini Migration Center). *Frontera Norte* (Mexico: El Colegio de la Frontera Norte) and *Migración y Desarrollo* (Autonomous University of Zacatecas) include articles in Spanish and English.

Several international organizations provide comparative information on migrations. The most useful is the OECD's annual *International Migration Outlook*. Earlier annual reports on international migration to OECD member states from 1973 to 1990 were known as SOPEMI reports. The IOM published its *World Migration Report* for the first time in 2000, and the latest appeared in 2011.

Many internet sites are concerned with issues of migration and ethnic diversity. A few of the most significant ones are listed here. These and others are also provided as hyperlinks on *The Age of Migration* fifth edition (AOM5) website. Since they are in turn linked with many others, this list should provide a starting point for further exploration:

Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, University of Oxford:
   http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/
Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES), Amsterdam:
   http://www.imes.uva.nl
International Migration Institute, University of Oxford:
   http://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/
International Network on Migration and Development, Autonomous University of Zacatecas, Mexico: http://www.migracionydesarrollo.org/
International Organization for Migration: http://www.iom.int/
Migration Information Source, Migration Policy Institute, Washington DC:
   http://www.migrationinformation.org/
Migration News: http://migration.ucdavis.edu/
Migration Observatory, University of Oxford:
   http://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/

Migration Policy Centre, European University Institute, Florence:
   http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/
Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford: http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/
Southern African Migration Project: http://www.queensu.ca/samp/
Sussex Centre for Migration Research:
   http://www.sussex.ac.uk/migration/
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR):
   http://www.unhcr.org

Chapter 9

Migration, Security and the Debate on Climate Change

One of the most important migration-related developments in the Age of Migration has been the linking of migration to security, a process of social construction termed *securitization*. This has not occurred everywhere and an important priority for future scholarship is to better elucidate why securitization takes place in some regions, contexts, and eras but not in others. The period between 1945 and roughly 1970 in Western Europe was notable for the prevalent pattern of migration not being viewed as germane to security. International migration into and from most Latin American and Iberian countries generally has not been viewed as an important national security concern, save for the exceptional cases of Haiti–Dominican Republic, Cuba and several cases of Central American refugee flows.

The outpouring of scholarship about migration and security, particularly since 2001, has advanced understanding of how securitization, and its opposite, *desecuritization*, take place. Key actors include government employees, political leaders, reporters, editors, migrants and their allies, and the general public as well. In many instances, the role of media coverage of migration appears crucial to outcomes. It follows that there are varying degrees of securitization and diverse processes of social construction of securitization and desecuritization.

Securitization has a mass psychological dimension. Securitization connects migration to meta-issues that comprise symbolic politics. Migration is well-suited for meta-politics, 'because multitudinous phenomena connect to physical mobility of persons'. 'Demonizing the migrant' as a potential 'terrorist' creates fear and a perception of threat to ontological security far exceeding actual developments' (Faist, 2006: 613).

This chapter will feature an overview of the securitization of migration policies in the OECD area between 1970 and 2012. Since its origins in the Allied cooperation during World War II, this assemblage of the world's richer states has become deeply interdependent through trade and joint membership in security alliances and international organizations. The contemporary states comprising this area confront similar challenges in regulation of international migration.

The following three sections provide an overview of the key dimensions of the migration and security nexus, an assessment of migration and

security in the transatlantic area and an analysis of the War on Terrorism and its aftermath. The focus will be on the putative security threat arising from the growing presence of Muslims, most of whom are of immigrant background or are the offspring of post-1945 migrants to the West. Subsequent sections will examine several significant cases of diasporas influencing the foreign policy of Middle East and North African states (MENA) states embroiled in geo-strategically significant conflicts and the growing concern over the implications of climate change for migration.

Key dimensions of the international migration and security nexus

Traditionally, security has been viewed through the prism of state security. As a result, relatively few scholars have sought to conceptualize what may be termed the migration and security nexus (Miller, 2000; Tirman, 2004). However, the scope of security concerns is much broader than state security, and is inclusive of human security (Poku and Graham, 1998). Human security is defined in a UNDP report as:

> an analytical tool that focuses on ensuring security for the individual, not the state... In line with the expanded definition of human security, the causes of insecurity are subsequently broadened to include threats to socio-economic and political conditions, food, health, and environmental, community and personal safety … Human security is therefore: people-centred, multidimensional, interconnected, universal. (Jolly and Ray, 2006: 5)

Much migration from poorer countries is driven by the lack of human security that finds expression in impoverishment, inequality, violence, lack of human rights and weak states. Such political, social and economic underdevelopment is linked to histories of colonialism and the present condition of global inequality (see Chapters 2 and 4). Where states are unable to create legal migration systems for necessary labour, many migrants are also forced to move under conditions of considerable insecurity. Smuggling, trafficking, bonded labour and lack of human and worker rights are the fate of millions of migrants. Even legal migrants may have an insecure residence status and be vulnerable to economic exploitation, discrimination and racist violence. Sometimes legal changes can push migrants into irregularity, as happened to the *sans papiers* (undocumented migrants) in France in the 1990s. The frequent insecurity of the people of poorer countries is often forgotten in discussions of state security, yet the two phenomena are closely linked.

Frequently, such migrant insecurity is linked to perceived threats, an aspect of the aforementioned mass psychological dimension, which can be divided into three categories: cultural, socio-economic and political

(Lucassen, 2005). The first perceived threat, the perception of migrant and migrant-background populations as challenging the cultural status quo, may contribute most to migrant insecurity. Such perceptions have been commonplace in Europe since the 1980s. Mexican and other 'Hispanic' migrants to the USA have also been viewed as posing a cultural threat (Huntington, 2004). Often, the religious identity and linguistic practices of migrants loom large in perceived threats. In recent years, Muslims have come to be regarded as a cultural threat in many Western countries.

Examples of the second perceived threat – migrant populations as socio-economic threats – include Italians in Third Republic France, ethnic Chinese diasporas in much of South-East Asia, Syro-Lebanese communities in West Africa, and Chechen and other populations from the Caucasus in the post-Soviet Russian Federation.

The third perceived threat – migrants as potentially politically disloyal or subversive – includes migrant populations such as Palestinians residing in Kuwait prior to the first Gulf War, Yemenites living in Saudi Arabia at the same juncture, ethnic Chinese in Indonesia suspected of political subversion on behalf of Communist China in the 1960s and ethnic Russian populations stranded in Baltic Republics after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The perceived threats of international migration to national identity and the maintenance of cultural cohesiveness are important aspects of the challenges posed by international migration to the sovereign state (Adamson, 2006). But sometimes international migration is seen as increasing state power. It can facilitate economic growth and is frequently viewed as indispensable to a state's economic wellbeing. Additionally, many immigrants serve as soldiers, and intelligence services can tap immigrant expertise and knowledge of languages. If effective public policies are pursued, international migration can enhance rather than detract from state power (Adamson, 2006: 185).

A state's immigration policies can also contribute to its 'soft power', its ability to achieve foreign policy and security objectives through political and cultural relations without recourse to military or economic coercion. The large body of foreign students studying in the USA can be seen as an important source of soft power, because they help build positive long-term linkages (Nye, 2004). Similarly, treatment of immigrants can affect a state's reputation abroad, a not inconsequential matter for diplomacy and 'smart power', influence that arises from investing in global goods that better enable states to address global issues (Graham and Poku, 2000; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004)

International migration has also had a significant impact on violent conflicts. Migration flows can interact with other factors to foment violent conflict in several ways such as by providing resources that fuel internal conflicts or by facilitating networks of organized crime (Adamson, 2006: 190–1). Migrant and diasporic communities often provide financial aid and recruits to groups engaged in conflicts in origin states. Kosovar Albanian

communities in Western Europe and North America, for instance, provided much of the financing and many recruits for the Kosovo Liberation Army which, in the late 1990s, engaged in heavy fighting with Serbian forces in the former Serbian republic. Similarly, Tamil Sri Lankans in Europe, Canada, India and elsewhere have aided the Tamil Tigers' insurrection in Sri Lanka, an insurgency crushed in 2009. In some instances, organizations viewed by states as engaging in terrorism, such as the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), have simultaneously been involved in human trafficking and drugs and arms smuggling.

From a non-problem to an obsession: migration and security in the OECD area, 1945–2012

The end of World War II witnessed mass population movements in Central and Eastern Europe and elsewhere which generally fell under the rubrics of forced migration and ethnic cleansing (Snyder, 2010: 313–37). It has been estimated that 18.5 million persons were displaced, not including the five million Jews deported to concentration camps (Kulischer, 1948). All of these developments involved massive suffering and loss of life. This underscores the observation that mass human displacements constitute a characteristic outcome of warfare. Nevertheless, the revulsion against Nazi war crimes served to delegitimize extreme right parties and other radical movements that typically view immigration and foreigners as threatening to security.

The Cold War soon ensued and with it a perception of the threat of nuclear warfare. Mainstream study of security largely reflected the tenets of *realism*, a school of thought about international relations that traditionally assumed that only sovereign states were germane to analysis of questions of war and peace. In this perspective, migration seemed of marginal significance for security. In Western Europe, the prevalent assumption characterizing the guest-worker era that post-war migrations would be mainly temporary in nature also contributed to this perception.

The status quo that prevailed after 1945 endured until 1970. A harbinger of change came with the politicization of migration policies that generally took place in the 1970s and 1980s, although in some national contexts earlier. Politicization need not engender securitization, which is the linking of migration to perceptions of existential threats to society. However, politicization brings migration issues into the public arena and thereby increases the likelihood of broader involvement of political agents including those hostile to prevailing policies. The 'hyper-securitization' of migration after 9/11 resulted from incremental processes of increasing securitization of migration that had already evolved in the 1980s and 1990s (Chebel d'Appollonia, 2012: 49–76). A key dynamic involved a blurring of counter-terrorism measures with immigration policy measures.

The construction of an Islamic 'threat'

While there were Islamic fundamentalist movements active in Western Europe in the 1970s, they were not seen as posing much of a threat. The success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 began to change that perception. In many Arab states and Turkey, secular-oriented governments felt threatened by Islamic fundamentalist movements. Such governments came to be viewed by some of the more radical Islamic fundamentalists as the 'near enemy' that had to be overthrown and replaced with truly Islamic governance (Gerges, 2005).

Thus, by the 1980s, the growth of Islamic fundamentalism came to affect the transatlantic area in a variety of ways. A massacre of Syrian army cadets led to the brutal repression of Syrian fundamentalists. Many of the survivors ended up as refugees in Germany. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 prompted Iranian intervention in the conflict and the creation of Hezbollah, the Party of God. American and French troops deployed to the Beirut area as part of the Multinational Force in 1982 suffered grievous losses in suicide bomb attacks thought to have been perpetrated by Hezbollah or its allies. The war in Afghanistan between the Soviet Union and its Afghan allies and the Mujahadeen, Afghans who fought the Soviets, began to attract non-Afghan Muslim volunteers, some of whom came from Europe and North America. This marked the genesis of what would later become Al-Qaeda (Roy, 2003). A US-led coalition of states, including Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, armed and aided the Mujahideen. Following the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence agency helped create the Taliban, which recruited heavily amongst the Afghan refugees in Pakistan, another case of refugee-soldiers. By 1996, the Taliban had seized control of most of Afghanistan.

The 1993 attack on the World Trade Center in New York City underscored the vulnerability of the United States even as it demonstrated the efficacy of existing law enforcement arrangements in punishing the individuals involved in the attack. The adoption of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Individual Responsibility Act in 1996 were complementary and reflected a significant hardening of US Federal Government anti-terrorism and anti-irregular migration policies as well as the issue linkage between migration and terrorism. Yet such measures were not sufficient to prevent the later escalation of violence through the attacks of 11 September 2001, which led to the Bush Administration's 'War on Terrorism' (see below).

There are strong parallels between migration and security developments on both sides of the Atlantic in the 1980s and 1990s. The 1985 signature of the Schengen Agreement can be seen as the birthdate of a European policy on migration and security (White, 2011: 66). By the 1990s, there were growing concerns over the political activities of Islamic and other Middle Eastern radicals on West European soil. The spill over of Algerian violence

Box 9.1 Spillover of insurgency in Algeria to France

In 1992, an offshoot of the Islamic Salvation Front, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), pursued an insurgency against the Algerian government. Tens of thousands died in a war of terrorism and counterterrorism. France provided military and economic support to the Algerian government, which led to the extension of GIA operations to French soil. A network of militants waged a bombing campaign, principally in the Paris region in 1995, before being dismantled. Some French journalists and scholars believed that the GIA had been penetrated by Algerian agents who then manipulated GIA militants into attacking targets in France in order to bolster French support for the Algerian government (Aggoun and Rivoire, 2004) .

French authorities undertook numerous steps to prevent bombings and to capture the bombers. Persons of North African appearance were routinely subjected to identity checks. Most French citizens and resident aliens of North African background accepted such checks as a necessary inconvenience. Indeed, information supplied by such individuals greatly aided in the neutralization of the terrorist group, several of whom were killed in shootouts with French police. Nevertheless, French police rounded up scores of suspected GIA sympathizers on several occasions as nervousness over attacks remained high.

Such fears appeared warranted in the aftermath of 11 September 2001. Scores of GIA and Al-Qaida-linked individuals, mainly of North African background, were detained for involvement in various plots, including one to attack the US embassy in Paris. Several of those arrested were French citizens of North African background, like Zacarias Moussaoui, who was accused of plotting with the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks. Algerians and other individuals of North African Muslim background with links to the GIA figured prominently in the hundreds of arrests in the transatlantic area. The anti-Western resentment of some of those arrested was linked to perceived injustices endured by migrants and their families. Despite increased vigilance, several French citizens were involved in a series of suicide bombings of Western targets in Casablanca in 2003. Several of the bombers had been recruited into a fundamentalist network in the Parisian suburbs and their involvement was deeply disturbing to the French population, including most of the Islamic community.

Despite an amnesty offer from the Algerian government to Islamic militants who laid down their arms in 2006, some continued to fight. In 2007, these militants renamed themselves Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb and launched a murderous bombing campaign in Algiers. French and other European intelligence officials continue to worry about the potential for spillovers to Europe (see also Chapter 1). The meagre participation in the 2012 national elections in Algeria reflected widespread disaffection and alienation. Yet, as attested by the Arab Spring of 2011 in nearby states, aspirations for reforms and democratic governance suggest that Al-Qaida-style politics holds scant appeal among the Arab masses.

to mainland France and of Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) protests and other political activities to Germany became central national security preoccupations of the respective states. Box 9.1 and AOM Website Text 9.1 provide greater detail.

Following the 1993 attacks in Manhattan, a succession of Federal commissions in the USA investigating terrorism warned that additional countermeasures were needed, but the warnings were largely not heeded (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). By 2001, a number of US officials feared a catastrophic attack by Al-Qaida upon a target or targets in the USA, but failed to prevent the attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 (Shenon, 2008). Perhaps the focus on 'terrorism' as 'irrational violence' hindered understanding of the deep-rooted resentment of many Muslims, in the light of Western support for authoritarian regimes in their own countries (such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia). Moreover, many Muslims perceived Israeli actions (supported by US military aid), such as air raids and arbitrary imprisonment of Palestinians, as forms of state terrorism that could legitimately be resisted. The subsequent difficulties of the US-led interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan illustrate the Western failure to understand the sources of malaise in the Muslim world.

Following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, some European Muslims volunteered to fight the USA in Iraq and many died or were captured. Thousands of European Muslims received military training in camps in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and subsequently returned to Europe (Scheuer, 2008). The terrorist attacks in Madrid and London and the numerous planned attacks thwarted by European police and security agencies increased public concern about Muslims in Europe.

Assessing the threat posed by Islamic radicals in the West

The profiles and histories of Islamic populations in North America and Europe are quite divergent. Muslims living in North America are generally more prosperous and well educated than Muslims in Europe, many of whom were recruited as unskilled labour (CSIS, 2006). However, even within Western Europe, Muslim populations are highly heterogeneous. For example, among Muslims of Turkish background, there are Sunnis and Alevis (orthodox Muslims and a non-orthodox Shíite offshoot respectively), as well as ethnic Arabs, Kurds and Turks.

It is important to stress that religious extremism has only appealed to a minority of migrants from the Middle East and North Africa, and that many are quite secular in orientation. It is true that many Muslim immigrants and their descendants confront incorporation barriers in housing, education and employment and endure prejudice and racism. However, the gist of the huge body of social science research on the incorporation of Muslim immigrants and their offspring suggests that most are slowly but

steadily incorporating, much like previous waves of immigration in the transatlantic space that have been viewed as problematic or threatening in the past (Lucassen, 2005).

In France, for instance, empirical evidence reveals the widespread use of French in migrant households and decreasing use of Arabic and other mother tongues (Tribalat, 1995). Furthermore, the evidence showed a decline in traditional arranged marriages and a rising intermarriage rate with French citizens and adoption of French social practices. The major problem areas were high unemployment, perceived discrimination and educational problems. However, Tribalat (1995) found that some communities did not fit the general pattern. Persons of Algerian background tended to be less religious and more secular than persons of Moroccan background. Furthermore, the Turkish community in France exhibited a lower proclivity to French usage at home, interacted less with French society and rarely intermarried with French citizens.

The key insight of Tribalat's study is that France's Muslims were incorporating and becoming French like earlier waves of immigrants to France. France's top experts on radical Islam, Gilles Kepel (2002; 2005) and Olivier Roy (2003), doubted that extremists would find much support in immigrant-background populations in Europe. Their assessments appear borne out by research on public opinion in the Middle East and North Africa and other predominantly Muslim areas of the world, which evidence scant support for terrorism (Esposito and Mogahed, 2007).

The attacks of 9/11 as well as those in Madrid and London transformed the decades-old, indeed centuries-old, question of migrant incorporation in Western countries into an acute security issue, not only in Europe but also in North America and Australia. In recent years much has been written about the susceptibility of migrant-background Muslims to mobilization into terrorist movements. For the most part, such articles and books appear inadequately based upon social scientific insights on migrant incorporation. Greatly exaggerated perceptions of the threat posed by Muslim immigrants in the West became commonplace.

The utterances and political beliefs of a relatively small coterie of radical Islamists attracted inordinate attention, especially in the media. Hence it was that extremely marginal parties such as Hizb ut-Tahrir in Great Britain could provoke such a moral panic, way out of proportion to the real threat posed (Husain, 2009). The origin society-oriented preoccupations that prevailed amongst the Islamist radicals profoundly reflected their socialization and upbringing in Europe's Islamic periphery. Nevertheless, their political orientations were taken to reflect profound dysfunctions and failures of immigrant incorporation in West Europe. In fact, their presence was largely due to the existence of refugee and asylum-seeking policies that afforded residency and protection.

Pargenter (2008) stresses the widespread revulsion felt by most Muslims, including those in the West, for the wanton violence against innocent civilians exercised by Al-Qaeda itself or confederates like the late

Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi's group in Iraq and the Armed Islamic Group in Algeria. Numerous credible sources concur that the vast majority of Muslims worldwide view Al-Qaida with contempt and utterly reject its politics and goals (Esposito and Mogahed, 2007; Kepel, 2002; 2004). A study in 2009 found that only 15 per cent of people killed in Al-Qaida attacks between 2004 and 2008 were Westerners and that the vast majority of victims were Muslims (Schmidt and Shanker, 2011: 155).

Public opinion research consistently reveals that European Muslims support and respect European democracies (Boswell and Geddes, 2011: 38; Jackson and Doerschler, 2012). Unfortunately, public opinion surveys also reveal growing negative opinion and prejudice against Muslims and Islam, particularly in the US (Gerges, 2011: 20–2). There subsists an egregious disconnect between perceptions of Muslims and Islam and the values, ideals and aspirations of most Muslims. This state of affairs suggests an urgent need for better education about world affairs and Islam.

Migration, security and the 'War on Terrorism'

What was termed the 'War on Terrorism' by the George W. Bush Administration involved calculated exaggeration and misleading simplification. After largely ignoring the threat posed by Al-Qaida in its first months in office, the Administration then declared a war and likened it to World War II (Clarke, 2004; Shenon, 2008). In doing so, the Administration exaggerated the threat posed by radical Muslims at a time when overall support for achievement of Islamic fundamentalist goals through political violence had declined significantly and mainstream Islamic fundamentalist movements had rejected violence while embracing incremental reform (Gerges, 2005; Roy, 1994). It then compounded the error by linking the government of Iraq to Al-Qaeda and then using that and an unwarranted claim concerning weapons of mass destruction as a pretext to invade Iraq.

The invasion of Iraq proved counterproductive to the campaign against Al-Qaeda and its allies, like the Taliban in Afghanistan, since it increased support for them among some Muslims (Ricks, 2007). Nevertheless, the US-led attack on Afghanistan, later supported by a NATO deployment, badly damaged Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan without eliminating them (Miller, 2007). With the killing of Osama Bin Laden in 2011, perhaps a remnant of only several hundred militants remained (Schmidt and Shanker, 2011: 242–5).

Al-Qaeda probably played some role in the mounting of the attack in Madrid in 2004 and the attacks in London in 2005 and 2007, although these attacks were initially viewed as home-grown but inspired by Al-Qaeda (Benjamin and Simon, 2005). In early 2008, French and Spanish authorities thwarted a planned series of attacks in Western Europe, apparently timed again to precede general elections in Spain. Most of the suspects were Pakistani migrants, several of whom had recently arrived from

the frontier area of Waziristan in Pakistan. Hence, the US Secretary of Defence claimed that the outcome of the war in Afghanistan directly affected European security (Shanker and Kulish, 2008).

Soon after entering office in 2009, US President Obama declared the end of the War on Terrorism. By 2012, US forces in Iraq had been greatly reduced and those remaining were mostly deployed in non-combat missions. Meanwhile, in Afghanistan, US and NATO troop levels were also being drawn down with an endpoint for US and NATO combat missions foreseen for July 2014. Prospects for both Iraq and Afghanistan did not bode well and fears over possible future civil wars appeared warranted. One much discussed scenario foresaw a Taliban role in a future Afghan coalition government (and perhaps) federal state (Green, 2012).

Migration and security in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)

Comparisons to other areas of the world reveal important contrasts with the dominant pattern of what might be termed hyper-securitization in the transatlantic area since the 1990s. Nevertheless, migration and security represents a salient concern in many areas outside the OECD. Instead of comprehensive examination of all such areas, only a handful of country and regional cases can be considered here.

Geo-strategically, due to its proximity to Europe in the transatlantic space, the MENA assumes enormous significance. The analysis in previous sections revealed important connections between migration and security in the transatlantic area and the MENA. The origin country-orientation of many MENA-background migrants in the West attests to the enduring significance of migration and security-related developments in the MENA for the transatlantic area. A related concern arises from the growing significance of diasporas to understanding of migration and security, particularly in the MENA.

Diaspora refers to a transnational population linked by ethnicity to a traditional, symbolic or historic origin country (see Chapter 2). Diasporas constitute non-state actors although states increasingly promote ties to diasporic populations abroad, especially to spur economic development. Such populations increasingly loom large in all regions of the world, but particularly so in the MENA with its many conflicts. An important analytical question arises about the role of diasporas in conflicts and their settlement or non-resolution. Studies suggest that diasporas can either contribute to democratization and stability or exacerbate or perpetuate conflicts as witnessed in the Azeri–Armenia conflict (Shain and Barth, 2003: 449–50). Box 9.2 analyses the role of the Armenian diaspora in the strife over Nagorno-Karabakh. AOM Website Text 9.2 considers the role played by diaspora Jewry in the Arab–Israeli conflict.

Box 9.2 The Armenian diaspora and the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh

The Armenian diaspora comprises communities around the world. The two largest ethnic Armenian populations are found in the USA, where an estimated one million Armenians reside, principally in California, New Jersey, and Massachusetts, and in France, where an estimated 500,000 Armenians live, principally in the Marseille and Paris areas (Shain and Barth, 2003: 468).

Soon after the implosion of the Soviet Union, the area of the former semi-autonomous Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic, became an independent state in 1991. Similarly, the neighbouring former Soviet area became the internationally recognized state of Azerbaijan. The territory of the new Azeri state encompassed an area with mixed populations of ethnic Armenians and Azeris called Nagorno-Karabakh. A conflict ensued and Armenian forces seized Nagorno-Karabakh and other Azeri territories. Volunteers from the Armenian diaspora played a key role in the fighting which resulted in the creation of hundreds of thousands of Azeri refugees, most of whom lost their homes and livelihoods and subsist as IDPs in areas still controlled by the Azeri government or found safe haven in neighbouring Iran which has a large ethnic Azeri minority population.

The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh and other Azeri territories now under Armenian military occupation has largely remained frozen since the early 1990s. However, the first democratically elected president of the new Armenia, Ter-Petrossian, opposed recognition of the self-declared Karabakh. This put Ter-Petrossian at odds with influential elements of the Armenian diaspora which favoured both recognition and annexation and generally a hard line towards both Azerbaijan and Turkey.

Ter-Petrossian's disfavour increased with Armenia's economic collapse. The downturn made Armenians all the more dependent on assistance from the Armenian diaspora. In the USA, the pro-Armenian lobby succeeded in increasing US foreign assistance to Armenia and in instituting a ban on aid to Azerbaijan (Shain and Barth, 2003: 471). The recovery of Armenia's sovereignty and independence led to significant inflows of ethnic Armenians from the diaspora who established political parties in Armenia. Among these was the Dashnak Armenia Revolutionary Federation which fiercely criticized Ter-Petrossian's policies. Eventually, by 1998, Ter-Petrossan was forced to resign and diasporic opposition figured centrally in this outcome. His successor Kocharian embraced an Armenian foreign policy orientation which was much more pleasing to hard-line elements in the Armenian diaspora. According to Shain and Barth (2003: 472), the weight of the diaspora '…manifests itself most powerfully regarding the possibility of a peace settlement with Azerbaijan'.

Both the behaviour of the Armenian and Jewish diasporas may be viewed as a challenge to state-centric analysis and, in a sense, to the state itself. However, comparison of the Israeli and Armenian cases suggests that the abilities of diaspora populations to influence politics and policies in

homelands vary a great deal. The economic plight of Armenia compared to that of Israel, meant that the Armenian diaspora was much more influential than the Jewish diaspora in the formulation of Armenia's and Israel's respective foreign policies (Shain and Barth, 2003). The two cases also differ in that Israel long enjoyed an aura bordering on deference amongst Jews that Armenia lacks among Armenians. However, the Israeli–Jewish diaspora relationship may be evolving as emigration of Israel's Jews, particularly its most affluent and well-educated citizens, increases and prospects for a two-state solution to the Arab–Israeli conflict fade (Lustik, 2011).

A growing concern: environment, climate change and migration

In Chapter 2, we drew attention to push–pull models that assume that population growth and environmental degradation directly cause migration. We showed that such deterministic approaches ignore the interaction between these and the many other factors that influence decisions to migrate or to stay put. We stressed the need for a multi-pronged understanding of migration that takes account of the many aspects of change that affect societies and communities, as well as the role of individual and collective agency in shaping migratory behaviour.

In recent years, increasing attention has been paid to the relationship between climate change and migration. This can be seen as a special case of environmental drivers of migration, but as one of growing current significance. Concerns about climate change-induced migration have emerged in the context of debates on global warming and the inability of states to take effective action to mitigate it through regulation of carbon emissions. Environmentalists have claimed that the effects of global warming, especially on sea-levels and rainfall patterns, will lead directly to massive population displacements. They call for action to prevent such migrations as well for the broadening of the definition of refugees to include people displaced by climate change. The underlying assumption seems to be that migration is intrinsically negative and should be stopped where possible.

Migration scholars, by contrast, have pointed out that migration is driven by many interacting factors, and can rarely be reduced to the effects of just one form of change, such as climate change. Moreover, they have argued that migration itself can be one of the most effective ways of responding to change and building better livelihoods.

The state of knowledge on climate change and migration

In the 1980s and 1990s, some environmentalists claimed that predicted climate-change-induced developments (such as sea-level rise, drought or desertification) could be mapped onto settlement patterns to predict future

human displacement. In other words, if climate change models predicted a sea-level rise of (say) 50 centimetres, it would be possible to map all coastal areas affected by this and work out how many people lived in such areas. The assumption then was that all these people would have to move (for an example of this approach see Myers and Kent, 1995). No consideration was given to possible adaptation strategies, such as flood defences, changes in livelihood patterns or short-distance mobility. Others put forward scenarios of mass displacements as a cause of future global insecurity (Homer-Dixon and Percival, 1996), while certain NGOs even escalated forecasts of future population displacements up to one billion by 2050 (Christian Aid, 2007).

By contrast, migration and refugee scholars argued that climate change in itself was not a major cause of migration, and that people's decisions to move were always shaped by multiple factors (Black, 2001; Castles, 2002). They therefore called for micro-level research on actual experiences of how communities coped with modifications in their living conditions and economic opportunities resulting from climate change.

The knowledge base has since developed a great deal. Researchers have begun to carry out studies at the local and regional levels, and the empirical basis for understanding the relationship between climate change and migration is much enhanced. Findings of studies have been published in books which cover a range of conceptual, normative and descriptive topics (for example see McAdam, 2010; Piguet and de Guchteneire, 2011). Information and research centres have issued reports and working papers analysing experiences of climate change and the strategies adopted by affected populations (e.g. Hugo, 2008; Massey *et al.*, 1998; Piore, 1979). Important debates on methodology are taking place (Kniveton *et al.*, 2008), and significant empirical studies are beginning to appear in scientific journals (e.g. Pratikshya and Massey, 2009). A doctoral thesis has analysed the politicization of the climate change displacement debate (Gemenne, 2009).

The current state-of-the-art in understanding the climate-change-migration nexus is summed up in a study published by the Foresight programme of the British Government Office for Science (Foresight, 2011) The *Foresight Report* focuses on the environmental effects of climate change resulting from human activity – notably the global warming caused by increased use of fossil fuels. The Government Chief Scientist commissioned over 80 reports and papers covering drivers of migration, the state of science, case studies of relevant experiences, models for analysing change and policy development. The authors include migration researchers, economists, demographers, geographers, environmentalists and social scientists from 30 countries worldwide. The *Foresight Report* starts by arguing that estimates of the numbers of environmental/climate change migrants are:

> Methodologically unsound, as migration is a multi-causal phenomenon and it is problematic to assign a proportion of the actual or predicted

number of migrants as moving as a direct result of environmental change. A deterministic approach that assumes that all or a proportion of people living in an 'at risk' zone in a low-income country will migrate neglects the pivotal role that humans take in dealing with environmental change and also ignores other constraining factors which influence migration outcomes. (Foresight, 2011: 11)

It is impossible to summarize the many important findings of the *Foresight Report* here. Attention may be drawn to some key points. First, migration is likely to continue regardless of environmental change, because it is driven by powerful economic, political and social processes. Many people will migrate into areas of greater environmental vulnerability, such as cities built on floodplains in Asia and Africa. Second, environmental change is equally likely to make migration less possible as more probable. Where people are impoverished by such factors as drought or desertification, they may lack the resources to move, and may have to stay in situations of extreme vulnerability. Third, attempts at preventing migration may lead to increased impoverishment, displacement and irregular migration in the long run. Migration can represent a transformational adaptation to environmental change, and may be an effective way to build resilience.

Finally, and perhaps most important, environmental change will influence the volume, directions and characteristics of migration in the future – even if it is not possible to disentangle environmental and other drivers. This means that: 'Giving urgent policy attention to migration in the context of environmental change now will prevent a much worse and more costly situation in the future' (Foresight, 2011: 10).

As a result of the Foresight project and the other studies carried out in recent years, it is now possible to go beyond some of the simplistic statements of the past. It is still too early to speak of scientific consensus about the causes, extent and impacts of climate change, but certain ideas seem to be gaining acceptance as pointers for further research and action.

To start with, climate-change-induced migration should not be analysed in isolation from other forms of movement – especially economic migration and forced migration. Forced migration results from conflicts, persecution and the effects of development projects (such as dams, airports, industrial areas and middle-class housing complexes). Such development-induced displacement is actually the largest single form of forced migration, predominantly leading to internal displacement of 10–15 million people per year, and mainly affecting disempowered groups such as indigenous peoples, other ethnic minorities and slum-dwellers (Cernea and McDowell, 2000).

Possible climate-change-related migration is often closely linked to other aspects of environmental change. The effects of changing farming practices (e.g. mechanization, use of fertilizers and pesticides, mono-cultures, irrigation, concentration of land ownership) on the environment may be hard to distinguish from cyclical weather variations

and long-term climate change. Rural–urban migration and the growth of cities are key social-change processes of our times. All too often, this means that people leaving the land end up in urban slums (Davis, 2006) that are highly vulnerable to disasters and climatic factors, such as storms, landslides, water insecurity and flooding. Migration scholars now recognize that environmental factors have been significant in driving migration throughout history and have often been neglected in the past. In other words, we should generally look for *multiple and interacting causes* when studying migration and include climate change as one of the factors to be analysed.

Further, recent research indicates that there is little evidence that climate change will cause massive migration movement. It is very difficult to identify groups of people already displaced by climate change alone. There are certainly groups which have been affected by climatic (or broader environmental) *variability*, but these need to be distinguished from long-term climate change. In addition, other economic, political, social and cultural factors are also at work. Even the cases portrayed in the media as most clear-cut become more complex when looked at closely. For instance, Bangladesh is often seen as an 'obvious example' of mass displacement due to sea-level rise, but an analysis by Findlay and Geddes (2011) questions this conventional view, showing that longer-term migration is related to differential patterns of poverty, access to social networks, and household and community structures.

But the absence of the displaced millions predicted by Myers and others just a few years ago should not be taken as a reason for complacency. It seems probable that the forecast acceleration of climate change over the next few decades will have major effects on production, livelihoods and human security. A study of the Asia–Pacific region identifies a number of 'hot spot areas which will experience the greatest impact': these include densely settled delta areas, low-lying coastal areas, low-lying atolls and coral islands, some river valleys, and semi-arid low-humidity areas. The largest populations likely to be affected are in mega-cities built on average only a few metres above sea-level, like Shanghai, Tianjin, Tokyo, Osaka and Guangzhou (Hugo, 2010a). It has been estimated that the number of people living in floodplains of urban areas in East Asia may rise from 18 million in 2000 to 45–67 million by 2060 (Foresight, 2011: 13). Such areas are experiencing massive growth through rural–urban migration. Significant changes in peoples' ability to earn a livelihood in specific locations will lead to a range of adaption strategies, many of which will not involve migration. However, certain families and communities are likely to adapt through temporary or permanent migration of some of their members, while in extreme cases it may become impossible to remain in current home areas, so that forced displacement will ensue.

To sum up: migration is not an inevitable result of climate change, but one possible adaptation strategy out of many. It is crucial to understand the factors that lead to differing strategies and varying degrees of

vulnerability and resilience in individuals and communities. Moreover, migration should not generally be seen as negative: people have always moved in search of better livelihoods, and this can bring benefits both for origin and destination areas (UNDP, 2009). Migrants should not be seen as passive victims; they have some degree of *agency*, even under the most difficult conditions. Strategies that treat them as passive victims are counterproductive, and protection of rights should also be about giving people the chance to deploy their agency. The objective of public policy should not be to prevent migration, but rather to ensure that it can take place in appropriate ways and under conditions of safety, security and legality (Zetter, 2010).

Conclusions

The post-9/11 period witnessed a reinforcement of the securitization of migration policies that had developed from the 1980s, particularly after the end of the Cold War, and the emergence of a new security agenda. Analysis of climate change and its implications for security occupies a key place on that agenda. There has been a parallel proliferation of books about securitization of migration, but mainly about the transatlantic space. A scholarly consensus has emerged that migrant populations were the most adversely affected by the pattern of securitization.

Nevertheless, migrant populations have proven resilient in the face of adversity. Radical Islam has elicited scant support in the transatlantic zone and political incorporation of growing Muslim populations is ongoing. Securitization of migration has not taken place in some regions such as most of Latin America and Iberia. Important priorities for future scholarship are to better understand the implications of non-state actors like diasporas for security matters and to compare securitization processes in the transatlantic region with security in other regions.

Guide to further reading

Extra resources at www.age-of-migration.com

The Age of Migration website includes additional Text 9.1 'Spillover of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) Insurgency to Germany' and Text 9.2 'The Role of Diaspora Jewry in the Arab–Israeli Conflict'.

There has been a remarkable outpouring of scholarship about migration and security since 1990. To a certain extent, this evolution parallels the expansion of terrorism research, a social science growth industry well analysed by Jackson, Jarvis, Gunning and Smyth (2011) who provide an important critique of what may be termed the terrorism industry that has

propagated undue fear and vastly exaggerated the threat posed by terrorism. A number of books and articles about Muslims in the West appear skewed by related biases and exaggerations (Vaisse, 2010).

Notable more recent contributions about migration and security include Paoletti (2011), Dancygier (2010), Greenhill (2010), Bourbeau (2011) and Chebel d'Appollonia (2012). On Muslims in Europe, see Glazer (2009), Laurence (2012), Pargenter (2008), Gerges (2011), Kurzman (2011) and Jackson and Doerschler (2012). On the complex security and theoretical implications of transnational and diasporic populations, see Adamson and Demetriou (2007) and Shain and Barth (2003).

For climate change, the key reading is the Foresight Report. All the papers along with the main report are available for free download at http://www.bis.gov.uk/foresight.

Lecture II

DIASPORA. CULTURES, IMAGINARIES AND POLITICS

We will be situating the course in the vast field of diaspora studies and related scholarship, and begin to explore the stakes of diaspora, discussing the various meanings associated with the notions of diasporic cultures, imaginaries, consciousness, subjectivities and practices.

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The Black Atlantic

Modernity and Double Consciousness

◆

PAUL GILROY

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Preface

THIS BOOK WAS FIRST CONCEIVED while I was working at South Bank Polytechnic in London's Elephant and Castle. It grew from a difficult period when I was lecturing on the history of sociology to a large group of second-year students who had opted not to study that subject as a major part of their degree. The flight from sociology was, for many of them, a deliberate sign of their disengagement from the life of the mind. To make things worse, these lectures were very early in the morning. With the help of writers like Michel Foucault, Marshall Berman, Richard Sennett, Fredric Jameson, Jurgen Habermas, Stuart Hall, Cornel West, Jane Flax, bell hooks, Donna Haraway, Nancy Hartsock, Sandra Harding, Janet Wolff, Seyla Benhabib, and Zygmunt Bauman, as well as a good dose of the classics, I would try to persuade them that the history and the legacy of the Enlightenment were worth understanding and arguing about. I worked hard to punctuate the flow of the Europe-centred material with observations drawn from the dissonant contributions of black writers to Enlightenment and counter-Enlightenment concerns.

The Black Atlantic developed from my uneven attempts to show these students that the experiences of black people were part of the abstract modernity they found so puzzling and to produce as evidence some of the things that black intellectuals had said—sometimes as defenders of the West, sometimes as its sharpest critics—about their sense of embeddedness in the modern world.

Chapter 1 sets out the dimensions of the polemical arguments that are developed in more detail later. It shows how different nationalist paradigms for thinking about cultural history fail when confronted by the intercultural and transnational formation that I call the black Atlantic. It makes some political and philosophical claims for black vernacular culture and casts a fresh eye on the history of black nationalist thought that has had to repress its own ambivalence about exile from Africa.

Chapter 2 was prompted by the absence of a concern with "race" or ethnicity from most contemporary writings about modernity. It argues that

racial slavery was integral to western civilisation and looks in detail at the master/mistress/slave relationship which is foundational to both black critiques and affirmations of modernity. It argues that the literary and philosophical modernisms of the black Atlantic have their origins in a well-developed sense of the complicity of racialised reason and white supremacist terror.

Chapter 3 pursues these themes in conjunction with a historical commentary on aspects of black music. It offers an inventory of queries about the ideas of ethnic authenticity that are routinely constructed through discussions of that music, the gender identities it celebrates, and the images of "race" as family that have become an important part of both producing and interpreting it. The chapter tries to demonstrate why the polarisation between essentialist and anti-essentialist theories of black identity has become unhelpful. It proposes that analyzing the history of black Atlantic music might play a useful role in constructing a more satisfactory set of anti-anti-essentialist arguments.

Chapter 4 examines a small part of the work of W. E. B. Du Bois, whose stimulating theory of "double consciousness" provides one of the central organising themes of my own work. It questions the location of his work in the emergent canon of African-American cultural history and explores the impact of his Pan-Africanism and anti-imperialism on the elements of his thinking that were configured by a belief in African-American exceptionalism. This chapter is intended to show how black Atlantic political culture changed as it moved out of the early phases that had been dominated by the need to escape slavery and various attempts to acquire meaningful citizenship in post-emancipation societies. I suggest that Du Bois's travels and studentship in Europe transformed his understanding of "race" and its place in the modern world.

Chapter 5 continues this line of argument with a parallel discussion of Richard Wright's work and critical responses to it. In his case, black Atlantic politics is re-examined against the backgrounds of European fascism and the construction of post-colonial, independent nation states in Africa and elsewhere. Wright is defended against those tendencies in African-American literary criticism which argue that the work he produced while living in Europe was worthless when compared to his supposedly authentic earlier writings. He is applauded for his attempts to link the plight of black Americans with the experiences of other colonised peoples and to build a theory of racial subordination that included a psychology.

The book concludes with a critical discussion of Africentrism and the way it has understood the idea of tradition as invariant repetition rather than a stimulus toward innovation and change. This chapter includes a

meditation on the diaspora concept which was imported into Pan-African politics and black history from unacknowledged Jewish sources. I suggest that this concept should be cherished for its ability to pose the relationship between ethnic sameness and differentiation: a *changing* same. I also argue that exchanges between blacks and Jews are important for the future of black Atlantic cultural politics as well as for its history.

It is essential to emphasise that there is nothing definitive here. Black Atlantic culture is so massive and its history so little known that I have done scarcely more than put down some preliminary markers for more detailed future investigations. My concerns are heuristic and my conclusions are strictly provisional. There are also many obvious omissions. I have said virtually nothing about the lives, theories, and political activities of Frantz Fanon and C. L. R. James, the two best-known black Atlantic thinkers. Their lives fit readily into the pattern of movement, transformation, and relocation that I have described. But they are already well known if not as widely read as they should be, and other people have begun the labour of introducing their writings into contemporary critical theory.

There are two aspirations that I would like to share with readers before they embark on the sea voyage that I would like reading this book to represent. Neither aspiration is restricted by the racialised examples I have used to give them substance. The first is my hope that the contents of this book are unified by a concern to repudiate the dangerous obsessions with "racial" purity which are circulating inside and outside black politics. It is, after all, essentially an essay about the inescapable hybridity and intermixture of ideas. The second is my desire that the book's heartfelt plea against the closure of the categories with which we conduct our political lives will not go unheard. The history of the black Atlantic yields a course of lessons as to the instability and mutability of identities which are always unfinished, always being remade.

What matters for the dialectician is having the wind of world history in his sails. Thinking for him means: to set the sails. It is the way they are set that matters. Words are his sails. The way they are set turns them into concepts.

Walter Benjamin

We have left the land and have embarked. We have burned our bridges behind us— indeed, we have gone farther and destroyed the land behind us. Now, little ship, look out! Beside you is the ocean: to be sure, it does not always roar, and at times it lies spread out like silk and gold and reveries of graciousness. But hours will come when you realize that it is infinite and that there is nothing more awesome than infinity. Oh, the poor bird that felt free now strikes the walls of this cage! Woe, when you feel homesick for the land as if it had offered more *freedom*—and there is no longer any "land."

Nietzsche

In my clothing I was rigged out in sailor style. I had on a red shirt and a tarpaulin hat and black cravat, tied in sailor fashion, carelessly and loosely about my neck. My knowledge of ships and sailors' talk came much to my assistance, for I knew a ship from stem to stern, and from keelson to crosstrees, and could talk sailor like an "old salt."

Frederick Douglass

1

The Black Atlantic as a Counterculture of Modernity

We who are homeless,—Among Europeans today there is no lack of those who are entitled to call themselves homeless in a distinctive and honourable sense .. We children of the future, how could we be at home in this today? We feel disfavour for all ideals that might lead one to feel at home even in this fragile, broken time of transition; as for "realities," we do not believe that they will last. The ice that still supports people today has become very thin; the wind that brings the thaw is blowing; we ourselves who are homeless constitute a force that breaks open ice and other all too thin "realities."

  Nietzsche

On the notion of modernity. It is a vexed question. Is not every era "modern" in relation to the preceding one? It seems that at least one of the components of "our" modernity is the spread of the awareness we have of it. The awareness of our awareness (the double, the second degree) is our source of strength and our torment.

  Edouard Glissant

STRIVING TO BE both European and black requires some specific forms of double consciousness. By saying this I do not mean to suggest that taking on either or both of these unfinished identities necessarily exhausts the subjective resources of any particular individual. However, where racist, nationalist, or ethnically absolutist discourses orchestrate political relationships so that these identities appear to be mutually exclusive, occupying the space between them or trying to demonstrate their continuity has been viewed as a provocative and even oppositional act of political insubordination.

The contemporary black English, like the Anglo-Africans of earlier generations and perhaps, like all blacks in the West, stand between (at least) two great cultural assemblages, both of which have mutated through the course of the modern world that formed them and assumed new configurations. At present, they remain locked symbiotically in an antagonistic relationship marked out by the symbolism of colours which adds to the conspicuous cultural power of their central Manichean dynamic—black and

white. These colours support a special rhetoric that has grown to be associated with a language of nationality and national belonging as well as the languages of "race" and ethnic identity.

Though largely ignored by recent debates over modernity and its discontents, these ideas about nationality, ethnicity, authenticity, and cultural integrity are characteristically modern phenomena that have profound implications for cultural criticism and cultural history. They crystallised with the revolutionary transformations of the West at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries and involved novel typologies and modes of identification. Any shift towards a postmodern condition should not, however, mean that the conspicuous power of these modern subjectivities and the movements they articulated has been left behind. Their power has, if anything, grown, and their ubiquity as a means to make political sense of the world is currently unparalleled by the languages of class and socialism by which they once appeared to have been surpassed. My concern here is less with explaining their longevity and enduring appeal than with exploring some of the special political problems that arise from the fatal junction of the concept of nationality with the concept of culture and the affinities and affiliations which link the blacks of the West to one of their adoptive, parental cultures: the intellectual heritage of the West since the Enlightenment. I have become fascinated with how successive generations of black intellectuals have understood this connection and how they have projected it in their writing and speaking in pursuit of freedom, citizenship, and social and political autonomy.

If this appears to be little more than a roundabout way of saying that the reflexive cultures and consciousness of the European settlers and those of the Africans they enslaved, the "Indians" they slaughtered, and the Asians they indentured were not, even in situations of the most extreme brutality, sealed off hermetically from each other, then so be it. This seems as though it ought to be an obvious and self-evident observation, but its stark character has been systematically obscured by commentators from all sides of political opinion. Regardless of their affiliation to the right, left, or centre, groups have fallen back on the idea of cultural nationalism, on the overintegrated conceptions of culture which present immutable, ethnic differences as an absolute break in the histories and experiences of "black" and "white" people. Against this choice stands another, more difficult option: the theorisation of creolisation, métissage, mestizaje, and hybridity. From the viewpoint of ethnic absolutism, this would be a litany of pollution and impurity. These terms are rather unsatisfactory ways of naming the processes of cultural mutation and restless (dis)continuity that exceed racial discourse and avoid capture by its agents.

This book addresses one small area in the grand consequence of this historical conjunction—the stereophonic, bilingual, or bifocal cultural forms originated by, but no longer the exclusive property of, blacks dispersed within the structures of feeling, producing, communicating, and remembering that I have heuristically called the black Atlantic world. This chapter is therefore rooted in and routed through the special stress that grows with the effort involved in trying to face (at least) two ways at once.

My concerns at this stage are primarily conceptual: I have tried to address the continuing lure of ethnic absolutisms in cultural criticism produced both by blacks and by whites. In particular, this chapter seeks to explore the special relationships between "race," culture, nationality, and ethnicity which have a bearing on the histories and political cultures of Britain's black citizens. I have argued elsewhere that the cultures of this group have been produced in a syncretic pattern in which the styles and forms of the Caribbean, the United States, and Africa have been reworked and reinscribed in the novel context of modern Britain's own untidy ensemble of regional and class-oriented conflicts. Rather than make the invigorating flux of those mongrel cultural forms my focal concern here, I want instead to look at broader questions of ethnic identity that have contributed to the scholarship and the political strategies that Britain's black settlers have generated and to the underlying sense of England as a cohesive cultural community against which their self-conception has so often been defined. Here the ideas of nation, nationality, national belonging, and nationalism are paramount. They are extensively supported by a clutch of rhetorical strategies that can be named "cultural insiderism."[1] The essential trademark of cultural insiderism which also supplies the key to its popularity is an absolute sense of ethnic difference. This is maximised so that it distinguishes people from one another and at the same time acquires an incontestable priority over all other dimensions of their social and historical experience, cultures, and identities. Characteristically, these claims are associated with the idea of national belonging or the aspiration to nationality and other more local but equivalent forms of cultural kinship. The range and complexity of these ideas in English cultural life defies simple summary or exposition. However, the forms of cultural insiderism they sanction typically construct the nation as an ethnically homogeneous object and invoke ethnicity a second time in the hermeneutic procedures deployed to make sense of its distinctive cultural content.

The intellectual seam in which English cultural studies has positioned itself—through innovative work in the fields of social history and literary criticism—can be indicted here. The statist modalities of Marxist analysis that view modes of material production and political domination as exclu-

sively *national* entities are only one source of this problem. Another factor, more evasive but nonetheless potent for its intangible ubiquity, is a quiet cultural nationalism which pervades the work of some radical thinkers. This crypto-nationalism means that they are often disinclined to consider the cross catalytic or transverse dynamics of racial politics as a significant element in the formation and reproduction of English national identities. These formations are treated as if they spring, fully formed, from their own special viscera.

My search for resources with which to comprehend the doubleness and cultural intermixture that distinguish the experience of black Britons in contemporary Europe required me to seek inspiration from other sources and, in effect, to make an intellectual journey across the Atlantic. In black America's histories of cultural and political debate and organisation I found another, second perspective with which to orient my own position. Here too the lure of ethnic particularism and nationalism has provided an ever-present danger. But that narrowness of vision which is content with the merely national has also been challenged from within that black community by thinkers who were prepared to renounce the easy claims of African-American exceptionalism in favour of a global, coalitional politics in which anti-imperialism and anti-racism might be seen to interact if not to fuse. The work of some of those thinkers will be examined in subsequent chapters.

This chapter also proposes some new chronotopes[2] that might fit with a theory that was less intimidated by and respectful of the boundaries and integrity of modern nation states than either English or African-American cultural studies have so far been. I have settled on the image of ships in motion across the spaces between Europe, America, Africa, and the Caribbean as a central organising symbol for this enterprise and as my starting point. The image of the ship—a living, micro-cultural, micro-political system in motion—is especially important for historical and theoretical reasons that I hope will become clearer below. Ships immediately focus attention on the middle passage, on the various projects for redemptive return to an African homeland, on the circulation of ideas and activists as well as the movement of key cultural and political artefacts: tracts, books, gramophone records, and choirs.

The rest of this chapter falls into three sections. The first part addresses some conceptual problems common to English and African-American versions of cultural studies which, I argue, share a nationalistic focus that is antithetical to the rhizomorphic, fractal structure of the transcultural, international formation I call the black Atlantic. The second section uses the life and writings of Martin Robison Delany, an early architect of black

nationalism whose influence still registers in contemporary political movements, to bring the black Atlantic to life and to extend the general arguments by introducing a number of key themes that will be used to map the responses to modernity's promises and failures produced by later thinkers. The final section explores the specific counterculture of modernity produced by black intellectuals and makes some preliminary points about the internality of blacks to the West. It initiates a polemic which runs through the rest of the book against the ethnic absolutism that currently dominates black political culture.

Cultural Studies in Black and White

Any satisfaction to be experienced from the recent spectacular growth of cultural studies as an academic project should not obscure its conspicuous problems with ethnocentrism and nationalism. Understanding these difficulties might commence with a critical evaluation of the ways in which notions of ethnicity have been mobilised, often by default rather than design, as part of the distinctive hermeneutics of cultural studies or with the unthinking assumption that cultures always flow into patterns congruent with the borders of essentially homogeneous nation states. The marketing and inevitable reification of cultural studies as a discrete academic subject also has what might be called a secondary ethnic aspect. The project of cultural studies is a more or less attractive candidate for institutionalisation according to the ethnic garb in which it appears. The question of whose cultures are being studied is therefore an important one, as is the issue of where the instruments which will make that study possible are going to come from. In these circumstances it is hard not to wonder how much of the recent international enthusiasm for cultural studies is generated by its profound associations with England and ideas of Englishness. This possibility can be used as a point of entry into consideration of the ethnohistorical specificity of the discourse of cultural studies itself.

Looking at cultural studies from an ethnohistorical perspective requires more than just noting its association with English literature, history, and New Left politics. It necessitates constructing an account of the borrowings made by these English initiatives from wider, modern, European traditions of thinking about culture, and at every stage examining the place which these cultural perspectives provide for the images of their racialised[3] others as objects of knowledge, power, and cultural criticism. It is imperative, though very hard, to combine thinking about these issues with consideration of the pressing need to get black cultural expressions, analyses, and histories taken seriously in academic circles rather than assigned via

the idea of "race relations" to sociology and thence abandoned to the elephants' graveyard to which intractable policy issues go to await their expiry. These two important conversations pull in different directions and sometimes threaten to cancel each other out, but it is the struggle to have blacks perceived as agents, as people with cognitive capacities and even with an intellectual history—attributes denied by modern racism—that is for me the primary reason for writing this book. It provides a valuable warrant for questioning some of the ways in which ethnicity is appealed to in the English idioms of cultural theory and history, and in the scholarly productions of black America. Understanding the political culture of blacks in Britain demands close attention to both these traditions. This book is situated on their cusp.

Histories of cultural studies seldom acknowledge how the politically radical and openly interventionist aspirations found in the best of its scholarship are already articulated to black cultural history and theory. These links are rarely seen or accorded any significance. In England, the work of figures like C. L. R. James and Stuart Hall offers a wealth of both symbols and concrete evidence for the practical links between these critical political projects. In the United States the work of interventionist scholars like bell hooks and Cornel West as well as that of more orthodox academics like Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Houston A. Baker, Jr., Anthony Appiah, and Hazel Carby, points to similar convergences. The position of these thinkers in the contested "contact zones"[4] between cultures and histories is not, however, as exceptional as it might appear at first. We shall see below that successive generations of black intellectuals (especially those whose lives, like James's, crisscrossed the Atlantic Ocean) noted this intercultural positionality and accorded it a special significance before launching their distinct modes of cultural and political critique. They were often urged on in their labour by the brutal absurdity of racial classification that derives from and also celebrates racially exclusive conceptions of national identity from which blacks were excluded as either non-humans or non-citizens. I shall try to show that their marginal endeavours point to some new analytic possibilities with a general significance far beyond the well-policed borders of black particularity. For example, this body of work offers intermediate concepts, lodged between the local and the global, which have a wider applicability in cultural history and politics precisely because they offer an alternative to the nationalist focus which dominates cultural criticism. These intermediate concepts, especially the undertheorised idea of diaspora examined in Chapter 6, are exemplary precisely because they break the dogmatic focus on discrete *national* dynamics which has characterised so much modern Euro-American cultural thought.

Getting beyond these national and nationalistic perspectives has become essential for two additional reasons. The first arises from the urgent obligation to reevaluate the significance of the modern nation state as a political, economic, and cultural unit. Neither political nor economic structures of domination are still simply co-extensive with national borders. This has a special significance in contemporary Europe, where new political and economic relations are being created seemingly day by day, but it is a worldwide phenomenon with significant consequences for the relationship between the politics of information and the practices of capital accumulation. Its effects underpin more recognisably political changes like the growing centrality of transnational ecological movements which, through their insistence on the association of sustainability and justice, do so much to shift the moral and scientific precepts on which the modern separation of politics and ethics was built. The second reason relates to the tragic popularity of ideas about the integrity and purity of cultures. In particular, it concerns the relationship between nationality and ethnicity. This too currently has a special force in Europe, but it is also reflected directly in the post-colonial histories and complex, transcultural, political trajectories of Britain's black settlers.

What might be called the peculiarity of the black English requires attention to the intermixture of a variety of distinct cultural forms. Previously separated political and intellectual traditions converged and, in their coming together, overdetermined the process of black Britain's social and historical formation. This blending is misunderstood if it is conceived in simple ethnic terms, but right and left, racist and anti-racist, black and white tacitly share a view of it as little more than a collision between fully formed and mutually exclusive cultural communities. This has become the dominant view where black history and culture are perceived, like black settlers themselves, as an illegitimate intrusion into a vision of authentic British national life that, prior to their arrival, was as stable and as peaceful as it was ethnically undifferentiated. Considering this history points to issues of power and knowledge that are beyond the scope of this book. However, though it arises from present rather than past conditions, contemporary British racism bears the imprint of the past in many ways. The especially crude and reductive notions of culture that form the substance of racial politics today are clearly associated with an older discourse of racial and ethnic difference which is everywhere entangled in the history of the idea of culture in the modern West. This history has itself become hotly contested since debates about multiculturalism, cultural pluralism, and the responses to them that are sometimes dismissively called "political correctness" arrived to query the ease and speed with which European partic-

ularisms are still being translated into absolute, universal standards for hu-
man achievement, norms, and aspirations.

It is significant that prior to the consolidation of scientific racism in the
nineteenth century,[5] the term "race" was used very much in the way that
the word "culture" is used today. But in the attempts to differentiate the
true, the good, and the beautiful which characterise the junction point of
capitalism, industrialisation, and political democracy and give substance to
the discourse of western modernity, it is important to appreciate that scien-
tists did not monopolise either the image of the black or the emergent
concept of biologically based racial difference. As far as the future of cul-
tural studies is concerned, it should be equally important that both were
centrally employed in those European attempts to think through beauty,
taste, and aesthetic judgement that are the precursors of contemporary cul-
tural criticism.

Tracing the racial signs from which the discourse of cultural value was
constructed and their conditions of existence in relation to European aes-
thetics and philosophy as well as European science can contribute much
to an ethnohistorical reading of the aspirations of western modernity as a
whole and to the critique of Enlightenment assumptions in particular. It is
certainly the case that ideas about "race," ethnicity, and nationality form
an important seam of continuity linking English cultural studies with one
of its sources of inspiration—the doctrines of modern European aesthetics
that are consistently configured by the appeal to national and often racial
particularity.[6]

This is not the place to go deeply into the broader dimensions of this
intellectual inheritance. Valuable work has already been done by Sander
Gilman,[7] Henry Louis Gates, Jr.,[8] and others on the history and role of the
image of the black in the discussions which found modern cultural axiol-
ogy. Gilman points out usefully that the figure of the black appears in dif-
ferent forms in the aesthetics of Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche
(among others) as a marker for moments of cultural relativism and to sup-
port the production of aesthetic judgements of a supposedly universal
character to differentiate, for example, between authentic music and, as
Hegel puts it, "the most detestable noise." Gates emphasises a complex
genealogy in which ambiguities in Montesquieu's discussion of slavery
prompt responses in Hume that can be related, in turn, to philosophical
debates over the nature of beauty and sublimity found in the work of Burke
and Kant. Critical evaluation of these representations of blackness might
also be connected to the controversies over the place of racism and anti-
Semitism in the work of Enlightenment figures like Kant and Voltaire.[9]
These issues deserve an extended treatment that cannot be provided here.
What is essential for the purposes of this opening chapter is that debates

of this sort should not be brought to an end simply by denouncing those who raise awkward or embarrassing issues as totalitarian forces working to legitimate their own political line. Nor should important enquiries into the contiguity of racialised reason and unreasonable racism be dismissed as trivial matters. These issues go to the heart of contemporary debates about what constitutes the canon of western civilisation and how this precious legacy should be taught.

In these embattled circumstances, it is regrettable that questions of "race" and representation have been so regularly banished from orthodox histories of western aesthetic judgement, taste, and cultural value.[10] There is a plea here that further enquiries should be made into precisely how discussions of "race," beauty, ethnicity, and culture have contributed to the critical thinking that eventually gave rise to cultural studies. The use of the concept of fetishism in Marxism and psychoanalytic studies is one obvious means to open up this problem.[11] The emphatically national character ascribed to the concept of modes of production (cultural and otherwise) is another fundamental question which demonstrates the ethnohistorical specificity of dominant approaches to cultural politics, social movements, and oppositional consciousnesses.

These general issues appear in a specific form in the distinctive English idioms of cultural reflection. Here too, the moral and political problem of slavery loomed large not least because it was once recognised as *internal* to the structure of western civilisation and appeared as a central political and philosophical concept in the emergent discourse of modern English cultural uniqueness.[12] Notions of the primitive and the civilised which had been integral to pre-modern understanding of "ethnic" differences became fundamental cognitive and aesthetic markers in the processes which generated a constellation of subject positions in which Englishness, Christianity, and other ethnic and racialised attributes would finally give way to the dislocating dazzle of "whiteness."[13] A small but telling insight into this can be found in Edmund Burke's discussion of the sublime, which has achieved a certain currency lately. He makes elaborate use of the association of darkness with blackness, linking them to the skin of a real, live black woman. Seeing her produces a sublime feeling of terror in a boy whose sight has been restored to him by a surgical operation.

> Perhaps it may appear on enquiry, that blackness and darkness are in some degree painful by their natural operation, independent of any associations whatever. I must observe that the ideas of blackness and darkness are much the same; and they differ only in this, that blackness is a more confined idea.
>
> Mr Cheselden has given us a very curious story of a boy who had

been born blind, and continued so until he was thirteen or fourteen years old; he was then couched for a cataract, by which operation he received his sight . . . Cheselden tells us that the first time the boy saw a black object, it gave him great uneasiness; and that some time after, upon accidentally seeing a negro woman, he was struck with great horror at the sight.[14]

Burke, who opposed slavery and argued for its gradual abolition, stands at the doorway of the tradition of enquiry mapped by Raymond Williams which is also the infrastructure on which much of English cultural studies came to be founded. This origin is part of the explanation of how some of the contemporary manifestations of this tradition lapse into what can only be called a morbid celebration of England and Englishness. These modes of subjectivity and identification acquire a renewed political charge in the post-imperial history that saw black settlers from Britain's colonies take up their citizenship rights as subjects in the United Kingdom. The entry of blacks into national life was itself a powerful factor contributing to the circumstances in which the formation of both cultural studies and New Left politics became possible. It indexes the profound transformations of British social and cultural life in the 1950s and stands, again usually unacknowledged, at the heart of laments for a more human scale of social living that seemed no longer practicable after the 1939–45 war.

The convoluted history of black settlement need not be recapitulated here. One recent fragment from it, the struggle over Salman Rushdie's book *The Satanic Verses,* is sufficient to demonstrate that racialised conflict over the meaning of English culture is still very much alive and to show that these antagonisms have become enmeshed in a second series of struggles in which Enlightenment assumptions about culture, cultural value, and aesthetics go on being tested by those who do not accept them as universal moral standards. These conflicts are, in a sense, the outcome of a distinct historical period in which a new, ethnically absolute and culturalist racism was produced. It would explain the burning of books on English streets as manifestations of irreducible cultural differences that signposted the path to domestic racial catastrophe. This new racism was generated in part by the move towards a political discourse which aligned "race" closely with the idea of national belonging and which stressed complex cultural difference rather than simple biological hierarchy. These strange conflicts emerged in circumstances where blackness and Englishness appeared suddenly to be mutually exclusive attributes and where the conspicuous antagonism between them proceeded on the terrain of culture, not that of politics. Whatever view of Rushdie one holds, his fate

offers another small, but significant, omen of the extent to which the al-
most metaphysical values of England and Englishness are currently being
contested through their connection to "race" and ethnicity. His experi-
ences are also a reminder of the difficulties involved in attempts to con-
struct a more pluralistic, post-colonial sense of British culture and national
identity. In this context, locating and answering the nationalism if not the
racism and ethnocentrism of English cultural studies has itself become a
directly political issue.

Returning to the imperial figures who supplied Raymond Williams with
the raw material for his own brilliant critical reconstruction of English in-
tellectual life is instructive. Apart from Burke, Thomas Carlyle, John Rus-
kin, Charles Kingsley, and the rest of Williams's cast of worthy characters
can become valuable not simply in attempts to purge cultural studies of its
doggedly ethnocentric focus but in the more ambitious and more useful
task of actively reshaping contemporary England by reinterpreting the cul-
tural core of its supposedly authentic national life. In the work of reinter-
pretation and reconstruction, reinscription and relocation required to
transform England and Englishness, discussion of the cleavage in the Vic-
torian intelligentsia around the response to Governor Eyre's handling of
the Morant Bay Rebellion in Jamaica in 1865 is likely to be prominent.[15]
Like the English responses to the 1857 uprising in India examined by
Jenny Sharpe,[16] it may well turn out to be a much more formative moment
than has so far been appreciated. Morant Bay is doubly significant because
it represents an instance of metropolitan, internal conflict that emanates
directly from an external colonial experience. These crises in imperial
power demonstrate their continuity. It is part of my argument that this
inside/outside relationship should be recognised as a more powerful, more
complex, and more contested element in the historical, social, and cultural
memory of our glorious nation than has previously been supposed.

I am suggesting that even the laudable, radical varieties of English cul-
tural sensibility examined by Williams and celebrated by Edward Thomp-
son and others were not produced spontaneously from their own internal
and intrinsic dynamics. The fact that some of the most potent conceptions
of Englishness have been constructed by alien outsiders like Carlyle, Swift,
Scott, or Eliot should augment the note of caution sounded here. The
most heroic, subaltern English nationalisms and countercultural patrio-
tisms are perhaps better understood as having been generated in a complex
pattern of antagonistic relationships with the supra-national and imperial
world for which the ideas of "race," nationality, and national culture pro-
vide the primary (though not the only) indices. This approach would obvi-
ously bring William Blake's work into a rather different focus from that

supplied by orthodox cultural history, and, as Peter Linebaugh has sug-
gested, this overdue reassessment can be readily complemented by chart-
ing the long-neglected involvement of black slaves and their descendants
in the radical history of our country in general and its working-class move-
ments in particular.[17] Oluadah Equiano, whose involvement in the begin-
nings of organised working-class politics is now being widely recognised;
the anarchist, Jacobin, ultra-radical, and Methodist heretic Robert Wed-
derburn; William Davidson, son of Jamaica's attorney general, hanged for
his role in the Cato Street conspiracy to blow up the British cabinet in
1819;[18] and the Chartist William Cuffay are only the most urgent, obvious
candidates for rehabilitation. Their lives offer invaluable means of seeing
how thinking with and through the discourses and the imagery of "race"
appears in the core rather than at the fringes of English political life. David-
son's speech from the scaffold before being subject to the last public decap-
itation in England is, for example, one moving appropriation of the rights
of dissident freeborn Englishmen that is not widely read today.

Of this infamous trio, Wedderburn is perhaps the best known, thanks to
the efforts of Peter Linebaugh and Iain McCalman.[19] The child of a slave
dealer, James Wedderburn, and a slave woman, Robert was brought up by
a Kingston conjure woman who acted as an agent for smugglers. He mi-
grated to London at the age of seventeen in 1778. There, having published
a number of disreputable ultra-radical tracts as part of his subversive politi-
cal labours, he presented himself as a living embodiment of the horrors of
slavery in a debating chapel in Hopkins Street near the Haymarket, where
he preached a version of chiliastic anarchism based on the teachings of
Thomas Spence and infused with deliberate blasphemy. In one of the de-
bates held in his "ruinous hayloft with 200 persons of the lowest descrip-
tion," Wedderburn defended the inherent rights of the Caribbean slave to
slay his master, promising to write home and "tell them to murder their
masters as soon as they please." After this occasion he was tried and acquit-
ted on a charge of blasphemy after persuading the jury that he had not
been uttering sedition but merely practising the "true and infallible genius
of prophetic skill."[20]

It is particularly significant for the direction of my overall argument that
both Wedderburn and his sometime associate Davidson had been sailors,
moving to and fro between nations, crossing borders in modern machines
that were themselves micro-systems of linguistic and political hybridity.
Their relationship to the sea may turn out to be especially important for
both the early politics and poetics of the black Atlantic world that I wish
to counterpose against the narrow nationalism of so much English histori-
ography. Wedderburn served in the Royal Navy and as a privateer, while

Davidson, who ran away to sea instead of studying law, was pressed into naval service on two subsequent occasions. Davidson inhabited the same ultra-radical subculture as Wedderburn and was an active participant in the Marylebone Reading Society, a radical body formed in 1819 after the Peterloo massacre. He is known to have acted as the custodian of their black flag, which significantly bore a skull and crossbones with the legend "Let us die like men and not be sold as slaves," at an open air meeting in Smithfield later that year.[21] The precise details of how radical ideologies articulated the culture of the London poor before the institution of the factory system to the insubordinate maritime culture of pirates and other pre-industrial workers of the world will have to await the innovative labours of Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker.[22] However, it has been estimated that at the end of the eighteenth century a quarter of the British navy was composed of Africans for whom the experience of slavery was a powerful orientation to the ideologies of liberty and justice. Looking for similar patterns on the other side of the Atlantic network we can locate Crispus Attucks at the head of his "motley rabble of saucy boys, negroes, mulattoes, Irish teagues and outlandish jack tars"[23] and can track Denmark Vesey sailing the Caribbean and picking up inspirational stories of the Haitian revolution (one of his co-conspirators testified that he had said they would "not spare one white skin alive for this was the plan they pursued in San Domingo").[24] There is also the shining example of Frederick Douglass, whose autobiographies reveal that he learnt of freedom in the North from Irish sailors while working as a ship's caulker in Baltimore. He had less to say about the embarrassing fact that the vessels he readied for the ocean— Baltimore Clippers—were slavers, the fastest ships in the world and the only craft capable of outrunning the British blockade. Douglass, who played a neglected role in English anti-slavery activity, escaped from bondage disguised as a sailor and put this success down to his ability to "talk sailor like an old salt."[25] These are only a few of the nineteenth-century examples. The involvement of Marcus Garvey, George Padmore, Claude McKay, and Langston Hughes with ships and sailors lends additional support to Linebaugh's prescient suggestion that "the ship remained perhaps the most important conduit of Pan-African communication before the appearance of the long-playing record."[26]

Ships and other maritime scenes have a special place in the work of J. M. W. Turner, an artist whose pictures represent, in the view of many contemporary critics, the pinnacle of achievement in the English school in painting. Any visitor to London will testify to the importance of the Clore Gallery as a national institution and of the place of Turner's art as an enduring expression of the very essence of English civilisation. Turner was se-

cured on the summit of critical appreciation by John Ruskin, who, as we have seen, occupies a special place in Williams's constellation of great Englishmen. Turner's celebrated picture of a slave ship[27] throwing overboard its dead and dying as a storm comes on was exhibited at the Royal Academy to coincide with the world anti-slavery convention held in London in 1840. The picture, owned by Ruskin for some twenty-eight years, was rather more than an answer to the absentee Caribbean landlords who had commissioned its creator to record the tainted splendour of their country houses, which, as Patrick Wright has eloquently demonstrated, became an important signifier of the contemporary, ruralist distillate of national life.[28] It offered a powerful protest against the direction and moral tone of English politics. This was made explicit in an epigraph Turner took from his own poetry and which has itself retained a political inflection: "Hope, hope, fallacious hope where is thy market now?" Three years after his extensive involvement in the campaign to defend Governor Eyre,[29] Ruskin put the slave ship painting up for sale at Christie's. It is said that he had begun to find it too painful to live with. No buyer was found at that time, and he sold the picture to an American three years later. The painting has remained in the United States ever since. Its exile in Boston is yet another pointer towards the shape of the Atlantic as a system of cultural exchanges. It is more important, though, to draw attention to Ruskin's inability to discuss the picture except in terms of what it revealed about the aesthetics of painting water. He relegated the information that the vessel was a slave ship to a footnote in the first volume of *Modern Painters*.[30]

In spite of lapses like this, the New Left heirs to the aesthetic and cultural tradition in which Turner and Ruskin stand compounded and reproduced its nationalism and its ethnocentrism by denying imaginary, invented Englishness any external referents whatsoever. England ceaselessly gives birth to itself, seemingly from Britannia's head. The political affiliations and cultural preferences of this New Left group amplified these problems. They are most visible and most intense in the radical historiography that supplied a counterpart to Williams's subtle literary reflections. For all their enthusiasm for the work of C. L. R. James, the influential British Communist Party's historians' group[31] is culpable here. Their predilections for the image of the freeborn Englishman and the dream of socialism in one country that framed their work are both to be found wanting when it comes to nationalism. This uncomfortable pairing can be traced through the work of Edward Thompson and Eric Hobsbawm, visionary writers who contributed so much to the strong foundations of English cultural studies and who share a non-reductive Marxian approach to economic, social, and cultural history in which the nation—understood as a stable receptacle for

counter-hegemonic class struggle—is the primary focus. These problems within English cultural studies form at its junction point with practical politics and instantiate wider difficulties with nationalism and with the discursive slippage or connotative resonance between "race," ethnicity, and nation.

Similar problems appear in rather different form in African-American letters where an equally volkish popular cultural nationalism is featured in the work of several generations of radical scholars and an equal number of not so radical ones. We will see below that absolutist conceptions of cultural difference allied to a culturalist understanding of "race" and ethnicity can be found in this location too.

In opposition to both of these nationalist or ethnically absolute approaches, I want to develop the suggestion that cultural historians could take the Atlantic as one single, complex unit of analysis in their discussions of the modern world and use it to produce an explicitly transnational and intercultural perspective.[32] Apart from the confrontation with English historiography and literary history this entails a challenge to the ways in which black American cultural and political histories have so far been conceived. I want to suggest that much of the precious intellectual legacy claimed by African-American intellectuals as the substance of their particularity is in fact only partly their absolute ethnic property. No less than in the case of the English New Left, the idea of the black Atlantic can be used to show that there are other claims to it which can be based on the structure of the African diaspora into the western hemisphere. A concern with the Atlantic as a cultural and political system has been forced on black historiography and intellectual history by the economic and historical matrix in which plantation slavery—"capitalism with its clothes off"—was one special moment. The fractal patterns of cultural and political exchange and transformation that we try and specify through manifestly inadequate theoretical terms like creolisation and syncretism indicate how both ethnicities and political cultures have been made anew in ways that are significant not simply for the peoples of the Caribbean but for Europe, for Africa, especially Liberia and Sierra Leone, and of course, for black America.

It bears repetition that Britain's black settler communities have forged a compound culture from disparate sources. Elements of political sensibility and cultural expression transmitted from black America over a long period of time have been reaccentuated in Britain. They are central, though no longer dominant, within the increasingly novel configurations that characterise another newer black vernacular culture. This is not content to be either dependent upon or simply imitative of the African diaspora cultures of America and the Caribbean. The rise and rise of Jazzie B and Soul II

Soul at the turn of the last decade constituted one valuable sign of this new assertive mood. North London's Funki Dreds, whose name itself projects a newly hybridised identity, have projected the distinct culture and rhythm of life of black Britain outwards into the world. Their song "Keep On Moving" was notable for having been produced in England by the children of Caribbean settlers and then re-mixed in a (Jamaican) dub format in the United States by Teddy Riley, an African-American. It included segments or samples of music taken from American and Jamaican records by the JBs and Mikey Dread respectively. This formal unity of diverse cultural elements was more than just a powerful symbol. It encapsulated the playful diasporic intimacy that has been a marked feature of transnational black Atlantic creativity. The record and its extraordinary popularity enacted the ties of affiliation and affect which articulated the discontinuous histories of black settlers in the new world. The fundamental injunction to "Keep On Moving" also expressed the restlessness of spirit which makes that diaspora culture vital. The contemporary black arts movement in film, visual arts, and theatre as well as music, which provided the background to this musical release, have created a new topography of loyalty and identity in which the structures and presuppositions of the nation state have been left behind because they are seen to be outmoded. It is important to remember that these recent black Atlantic phenomena may not be as novel as their digital encoding via the transnational force of north London's Soul II Soul suggests. Columbus's pilot, Pedro Nino, was also an African. The history of the black Atlantic since then, continually crisscrossed by the movements of black people—not only as commodities but engaged in various struggles towards emancipation, autonomy, and citizenship—provides a means to reexamine the problems of nationality, location, identity, and historical memory. They all emerge from it with special clarity if we contrast the national, nationalistic, and ethnically absolute paradigms of cultural criticism to be found in England and America with those hidden expressions, both residual and emergent, that attempt to be global or outer-national in nature. These traditions have supported countercultures of modernity that touched the workers' movement but are not reducible to it. They supplied important foundations on which it could build.

Turner's extraordinary painting of the slave ship remains a useful image not only for its self-conscious moral power and the striking way that it aims directly for the sublime in its invocation of racial terror, commerce, and England's ethico-political degeneration. It should be emphasised that ships were the living means by which the points within that Atlantic world were joined. They were mobile elements that stood for the shifting spaces in between the fixed places that they connected.[33] Accordingly they need

to be thought of as cultural and political units rather than abstract embodiments of the triangular trade. They were something more—a means to conduct political dissent and possibly a distinct mode of cultural production. The ship provides a chance to explore the articulations between the discontinuous histories of England's ports, its interfaces with the wider world.[34] Ships also refer us back to the middle passage, to the half-remembered micro-politics of the slave trade and its relationship to both industrialisation and modernisation. As it were, getting on board promises a means to reconceptualise the orthodox relationship between modernity and what passes for its prehistory. It provides a different sense of where modernity might itself be thought to begin in the constitutive relationships with outsiders that both found and temper a self-conscious sense of western civilisation.[35] For all these reasons, the ship is the first of the novel chronotopes presupposed by my attempts to rethink modernity via the history of the black Atlantic and the African diaspora into the western hemisphere.

In the venturesome spirit proposed by James Clifford in his influential work on travelling culture,[36] I want to consider the impact that this outernational, transcultural reconceptualisation might have on the political and cultural history of black Americans and that of blacks in Europe. In recent history, this will certainly mean reevaluating Garvey and Garveyism, pan-Africanism, and Black Power as hemispheric if not global phenomena. In periodising modern black politics it will require fresh thinking about the importance of Haiti and its revolution for the development of African-American political thought and movements of resistance. From the European side, it will no doubt be necessary to reconsider Frederick Douglass's relationship to English and Scottish radicalisms and to meditate on the significance of William Wells Brown's five years in Europe as a fugitive slave, on Alexander Crummell's living and studying in Cambridge, and upon Martin Delany's experiences at the London congress of the International Statistical Congress in 1860.[37] It will require comprehension of such difficult and complex questions as W. E. B. Du Bois's childhood interest in Bismarck, his investment in modelling his dress and moustache on that of Kaiser Wilhelm II, his likely thoughts while sitting in Heinrich Von Treitschke's seminars,[38] and the use his tragic heroes make of European culture.

Notable black American travellers, from the poet Phyllis Wheatley onwards, went to Europe and had their perceptions of America and racial domination shifted as a result of their experiences there. This had important consequences for their understanding of racial identities. The radical journalist and political organiser Ida B. Wells is typical, describing her

productive times in England as like "being born again in a new condition."[39] Lucy Parsons is a more problematic figure in the political history of black America,[40] but how might her encounters with William Morris, Annie Besant, and Peter Kropotkin impact upon a rewriting of the history of English radicalism? What of Nella Larsen's relationship to Denmark, where George Padmore was held in jail during the early 1930s and which was also the home base of his banned paper the *Negro Worker*, circulated across the world by its supporters in the Colonial Seamen's Association?[41] What of Sarah Parker Remond's work as a medical practitioner in Italy and the life of Edmonia Lewis,[42] the sculptor, who made her home in Rome? What effects did living in Paris have upon Anna Cooper, Jessie Fauset, Gwendolyn Bennett,[43] and Lois Maillou Jones?

It would appear that there are large questions raised about the direction and character of black culture and art if we take the powerful effects of even temporary experiences of exile, relocation, and displacement into account. How, for example, was the course of the black vernacular art of jazz changed by what happened to Quincy Jones in Sweden and Donald Byrd in Paris? This is especially interesting because both men played powerful roles in the remaking of jazz as a popular form in the early 1970s. Byrd describes his sense of Europe's appeal as something that grew out of the view of Canada he developed as a young man growing up in Detroit:

> That's why Europe was so important to me. Living across the river from Canada as a kid, I used to go down and sit and look at Windsor, Ontario. Windsor represented Europe to me. That was the rest of the world that was foreign to me. So I always had a feeling for the foreign, the European thing, because Canada was right there. We used to go to Canada. For black people, you see, Canada was a place that treated you better than America, the North. For my father Detroit was better than the South, to me born in the North, Canada was better. At least that was what I thought. Later on I found out otherwise, but anyway, Canada represented for me something foreign, exotic, that was not the United States.[44]

Richard Wright's life in exile, which has been written off as a betrayal of his authenticity and as a process of seduction by philosophical traditions supposedly outside his narrow ethnic compass,[45] will be explored below as an exemplary instance of how the politics of location and the politics of identity get inscribed in analyses of black culture. Many of the figures listed here will be dealt with in later chapters. They are all potential candidates for inclusion in the latest African-American cultural canon, a canon that is conditional on and possibly required by the academic packaging of black cultural studies.[46] Chapter 4 will discuss what version of the politics and

philosophy of W. E. B. Du Bois will be constructed for that canon from the rich transnational textures of his long and nomadic life. Du Bois's travel experiences raise in the sharpest possible form a question common to the lives of almost all these figures who begin as African-Americans or Caribbean people and are then changed into something else which evades those specific labels and with them all fixed notions of nationality and national identity. Whether their experience of exile is enforced or chosen, temporary or permanent, these intellectuals and activists, writers, speakers, poets, and artists repeatedly articulate a desire to escape the restrictive bonds of ethnicity, national identification, and sometimes even "race" itself. Some speak, like Wells and Wright, in terms of the rebirth that Europe offered them. Whether they dissolved their African-American sensibility into an explicitly pan-Africanist discourse or political commitment, their relationship to the land of their birth and their ethnic political constituency was absolutely transformed. The specificity of the modern political and cultural formation I want to call the black Atlantic can be defined, on one level, through this desire to transcend both the structures of the nation state and the constraints of ethnicity and national particularity. These desires are relevant to understanding political organising and cultural criticism. They have always sat uneasily alongside the strategic choices forced on black movements and individuals embedded in national political cultures and nation states in America, the Caribbean, and Europe.

Martin Delany and the Institution of the Fatherland

The powerful and important figure of Martin Robison Delany—journalist, editor, doctor, scientist, judge, soldier, inventor, customs inspector, orator, politician, and novelist—provides an opportunity to examine the distinctive effects produced where the black Atlantic politics of location frames the doorway of double consciousness. His life also offers an invaluable opportunity to consider some of the issues raised within the histories of black culture and politics by travel and voluntary relocation. Marked by its European origins, modern black political culture has always been more interested in the relationship of identity to roots and rootedness than in seeing identity as a process of movement and mediation that is more appropriately approached via the homonym routes. Focusing on a figure like Delany demands careful attention to the interplay between these two dimensions of racial ontology. His life reveals a confrontation between his nationalism and the experiences of travel that have been largely ignored by historians except where they can be read as Ethiopianist or emigrationist gestures against American racism. This is no longer sufficient.

Delany is vital to the concerns of this book for several other reasons. He

is still regularly hailed as the principal progenitor of black nationalism in America. Though he introduced his 1879 *Principia of Ethnology* with a fawning dedication to the Earl of Shaftesbury which would not find favour among Africentrists these days, his arguments in this final publication do prefigure the tone and content of contemporary Africalogical thought in an uncanny manner. Delany has been identified by Molefi Kete Asante as a pioneer in this field[47] and makes an attractive ancestor for Africentrists thanks to endearing traits like his willingness to don his dashiki while delivering lectures on Africa in the Town Hall, the Baptist church, and "the colored school" in Chatham, Ontario, where he made his home in exile. Apart from his sartorial and ideological proclivities, the proximity to Africa in Delany's family history has the effect of making his political choices look stark and vivid. They are far less ambiguous, for example, than those of his sometime associate Frederick Douglass, who had been sired by a white man, taught to read by a white woman, and had his freedom bought by two more. This much is clear from the closing passage of Delany's first book, *The Condition, Elevation, Emigration and Destiny of the Colored People of the United States Politically Considered* (1852). Though its assertive Christianity strikes a somewhat discordant note, the work ends movingly with a recognisably pan-African flourish that places the forces of science, Enlightenment, and progress in concert with the project of racial regeneration in the period after slavery:

> "Princes shall come forth out of Egypt; Ethiopia shall soon stretch forth her hands unto God" Ps.lxviii.31. With faith in this blessed promise, thank God; in this our grand advent into Africa, we want "No kettle drums nor flageolets, Bag pipes, trombones, nor bayonets" but with an abiding trust in God our heavenly king, we shall boldly advance, singing sweet songs of redemption, in the regeneration of our race and restoration of our father-land from the gloom and darkness of our superstition and ignorance, to the glorious light of a more pristine brightness—the light of the highest godly civilization.[48]

Delany is a figure of extraordinary complexity whose political trajectory through abolitionisms and emigrationisms, from Republicans to Democrats,[49] dissolves any simple attempts to fix him as consistently either conservative or radical. Thirdly, Delany's life is valuable because of his seven-month spell in England,[50] his exile in Chatham, his travels in the South and in Africa, as well as his dreams of autonomous black settlement in Central and South America. He is justly renowned for having organised and led the first scientific expedition to Africa from the western hemisphere:

the 1859 Niger Valley Exploring Party marshalled by Delany in conjunc-
tion with Robert Campbell, a Jamaican naturalist who had been head of
the science department at the Institute for Colored Youth in Philadelphia.
These peregrinations are re-coded in the wanderings of Henrico Blacus/
Henry Holland, the eponymous hero of Delany's novel *Blake; or, the Huts
of America,* his single venture into fiction, serialised in the *Anglo African
Magazine* during 1859 and the *Weekly Anglo-African* in 1861. Delany is
also interesting because he thought of himself as a man of science.[51] His
idea of himself as a polymath aspired to and indeed expressed a competence
across disciplines that distinguishes him as an exceptional intellect. He
modelled his career on standards of appropriately manly achievement set
in the eighteenth century by savants and philosophes whose legacy, as we
shall see, was readily appropriated for his theories of racial integrity and
citizenship. He was, like William Wells Brown, Sarah Parker Remond, and
others, a black person studying and practising medicine in a period when
slaves' desires to run away from bondage were still sometimes being ration-
alised by medical opinion as an illness—drapetomania or dysaesthesia Ae-
theopis[52]—and when J. Marion Sims was perfecting the procedures of gyn-
aecological surgery on the women he held in bondage.[53] Quite apart from
his more practically oriented medical studies, Delany is known to have
taken up phrenology in pursuit of answers to the arguments of racist eth-
nology. His work in this area could be used to initiate some interesting
inquiries into the relationship between scientific reason and racial domina-
tion. We will see below that his aspirations as a cultivated man of science
were intertwined with his political radicalisation in complex ways. Both
were given an additional spur by Delany's bitter reaction to being denied
the right to patent his 1852 invention for transporting locomotives over
mountainous terrain because, though free, he was not formally a citizen of
the United States.[54]

Delany was born in Charlestown, Virginia, in May 1812. He was the
son of a slave father and a free mother who had both apparently enjoyed
the benefits of African blood which was not only pure but royal too. Dela-
ny's Mandingo grandfather had returned to Africa after being manumitted
and his father, Samuel, had purchased his own freedom in the early 1820s.
The family made their home in Chambersburg, Pennsylvania. Active in ab-
olitionist circles as a speaker, journalist, and writer, Delany published the
Mystery in 1843 and became co-editor with Douglass of the *North Star*
(1847). He came under the spell of Garrisonian abolitionism[55] at an early
age and complemented his work in the anti-slavery cause with his medical
activities as a cupper, leecher, and bleeder.[56] In 1850, having studied medi-
cine under a number of different practitioners, he applied to Harvard to

train in medicine there and was accepted along with two other black students, Isaac Snowden and Daniel Hunt, on the condition that they were sponsored by the American Colonisation Society and would only practice their medical skills outside the United States in Liberia after graduation.[57] A white female student, Harriot K. Hunt, who had been admitted at the same time as the three black men, was persuaded to withdraw after private meetings with members of the faculty. Delany, Snowden, and David Hunt began to attend lectures in November of that year but were asked to withdraw from the college by the Dean—Oliver Wendell Holmes, a celebrated admirer of Samuel Morton's *Crania Americana*—at the end of the winter term after protests from angry white students who felt that their presence would lower educational standards. The bitterness and righteous anger that had been compounded in Delany by a fruitless legal battle to claim his wife's inheritance were elaborated further as a result of this additional humiliation at the hands of Harvard. He returned to Philadelphia eager to make the clarion call for American citizenship *and* in favour of a plan for black emigration to Central or South America that would be announced by his first book.

Published on Delany's fortieth birthday, *The Condition* tempered its emigrationist proposals with a polemic against the American Colonisation Society and its plans for Liberian settlement. The book is notable for the elaborate theories of nationality and citizenship it derived from a reading of European history and perhaps most of all for its outspoken advocacy of a strong state that could focus the zionist aspirations of American blacks and aid in building their political counter-power against the white supremacist state. It began by comparing the lot of blacks in America to that of the disenfranchised minority nations found in Europe.

> That there have [*sic*] in all ages, in almost every nation, existed a nation within a nation—a people who although forming a part and parcel of the population, yet were from force of circumstances, known by the peculiar position they occupied, forming in fact, by deprivation of political equality with others, no part, and if any, but a restricted part of the body politics of such nations, is also true. Such then are the Poles in Russia, the Hungarians in Austria, the Scotch, Irish and Welsh in the United Kingdom, *and such also are the Jews scattered throughout not only the length and breadth of Europe but almost the habitable globe, maintaining their national characteristics, and looking forward in high hopes of seeing the day when they may return to their former national position of self-government and independence let that be in whatever part of the habitable world it may* . . Such then is the condition of various classes in Europe; yes, nations, for centuries within

nations, even without the hope of redemption among those who oppress them. And however unfavourable their condition, there is none more so than that of the coloured people of the United States.[58] (emphasis added)

From the point of view of the history of the diaspora concept explored in Chapter 6, it is especially interesting that though he does not use that pivotal term Delany looks immediately to Jewish experiences of dispersal as a model for comprehending the history of black Americans and, more significantly still, cites this history as a means to focus his own zionist proposals for black American colonisation of Nicaragua[59] and elsewhere. The acquisition of a powerful fatherland that could guarantee and champion the rights of slaves was, for Delany, far more significant than petty details like a geographical location within what his collaborator, Robert Campbell, called in his own report of their Niger Expedition the African *mother* land. Delany's primary concern was not with Africa as such but rather with the forms of citizenship and belonging that arose from the (re)generation of modern nationality in the form of an autonomous, black nation state. Liberia was rejected in this role because it was not an adequate or sufficiently serious vehicle for the hopes and dreams of black soldier citizens and their families. Its geography was one factor in its disfavour, but its centrality to the "deep laid scheme" of American slaveholders proved to be a more substantial disadvantage.[60] With his appeals to gain American citizenship looking increasingly fruitless, Delany left America in 1856. However, he went north not east, not to Africa but to Canada.[61] It was from this new location that he planned his trip to Africa and to Europe. He left the new world for the old in 1859, arriving in Monrovia, the Liberian capital, on July 12th. There he met with Alexander Crummell and other dignitaries.

Delany's 1859 report of his trip, the *Official Report of the Niger Valley Exploring Party*,[62] is an interesting document that outlines his vision of a dynamic alliance, both commercial and civilising, between English capital, black American intellect, and African labour power. These disparate forces were to collaborate to their mutual benefit in the export of African cotton to England for processing. The *Report* is more interesting in the context of this chapter for the insights it provides into those structures of feeling that might be termed the inner dialectics of diaspora identification. Delany, ever the doctor and rationalist, described in detail the sequence of clinical symptoms he experienced as his initial elation at arriving in Africa gave way to a special and characteristic form of melancholy:

The first sight and impressions of the coast of Africa are always inspiring, producing the most pleasant emotions. These pleasing sensations continue for several days, more or less until they merge into feelings

of almost intense excitement   a hilarity of feeling almost akin to
approaching intoxication   . like the sensation produced by the bev-
erage of champagne wine   The first symptoms are succeeded by a
relaxity of feelings in which there is a disposition to stretch, gape and
yawn with fatigue. The second may or may not be succeeded by actual
febrile attacks .   but whether or not such symptoms ensue, there is
one most remarkable . . . A feeling of regret that you left your native
country for a strange one; an almost frantic desire to see friends and
nativity; a despondency and loss of the hope of ever seeing those you
love at home again. These feelings, of course, must be resisted and
regarded as a mere morbid affection [*sic*] of the mind   When an
entire recovery takes place, the love of the country is most ardent
and abiding.[63]

The ambivalence over exile and homecoming conveyed by these remarks
has a history that is probably as long as the presence of African slaves in
the west. At this point, it is necessary to appreciate that any discomfort at
the prospect of fissures and fault lines in the topography of affiliation that
made pan-Africanism such a powerful discourse was not eased by refer-
ences to some African essence that could magically connect all blacks to-
gether. Nowadays, this potent idea is frequently wheeled in when it is nec-
essary to appreciate the things that (potentially) connect black people to
one another rather than think seriously about divisions in the imagined
community of the race and the means to comprehend or overcome them, if
indeed that is possible. Delany's African tour confirmed the dissimilarities
between African-American ideologues and the Africans with whom they
treated. Thus it is not surprising that though at the end of his account of
his adventures in Africa Delany promised to return to Africa with his family,
he never did so.

More than anything produced by Edward Wilmot Blyden, Alexander
Crummell, and his other proto-nationalist peers, Delany's writings regis-
tered contradictory responses toward Africa. The ancient, ancestral home
simply would not do as it was. He was acutely aware that it needed to be
remade wholesale. In part, this was to be accomplished through grandiose
modernisation schemes like the trans-African commercial railway link he
had first proposed in an extraordinary appendix to *The Condition*. Africa's
superstition and its heathen culture were to be swept away. These plans
revealed that the proposed mission to elevate the black American racial
self was inseparable from a second mission to elevate and enlighten the
uncultured Africans by offering them the benefits of civilised life: cess-
pools, furniture, cutlery, missionaries, and "Some sort of a garment to

cover the entire person above the knees, should it be but a single shirt or chemise, instead of a loose native cloth thrown around them, to be dropped at pleasure, at any moment exposing the entire upper part of the person as in Liberia, where that part of the person is entirely uncovered— I am certain that it would go far towards impressing them with some of the habits of civilised life."[64] If this statement can be read as a small sign of Delany's practical commitment to the fruits of Euro-American modernity, it is less surprising that his political positions could shift once more in later life and blend his nationalism anew with a decidedly America-centric brand of patriotism. The civil war was the catalyst for this process. It rekindled his enthusiasm for an American future for American blacks. Delany was commissioned as a major in the Union army, proudly assuming the regalia of the first black field officer in the history of the United States. The publication that had serialised *Blake* now offered its readers glorious photographic postcards of Delany in his dark blue uniform for twenty-five cents.

His decision to remain inside the shell of that patriotism after the war was over was facilitated by the same resolutely elitist version of black nationalism that had animated his earlier projects. It stressed the obligation of blacks to better themselves through the universal values of thrift, temperance, and hard work. This brand of black nationalism had also proved extremely popular with English anti-slavery audiences whose movement Delany's visit had helped to revitalise. He arrived in London from Africa during the spring of 1860 in search of backing for the enterprising colonial schemes: "fearless, bold and adventurous deeds of daring"[65] which were integral to realising the special respect that followed from the possession of national status.

I have already pointed out that the contrasting accounts that Delany and Campbell provided of the Niger Valley experiences are at variance over the gendering of their African homeland. Campbell saw Africa as his motherland while Delany, even when he refered to Africa with the female pronoun, persisted in calling the continent the fatherland. I want to suggest that this obstinacy expresses something profound and characteristic about Delany's sense of the necessary relationship between nationality, citizenship, and masculinity. He was probably the first black thinker to make the argument that the integrity of the race is primarily the integrity of its male heads of household and secondarily the integrity of the families over which they preside. The model he proposed aligned the power of the male head of household in the private sphere with the noble status of the soldier-citizen which complemented it in the public realm. Delany's appeal today is that of a supreme patriarch. He sought a variety of power for the black man in the white world that could only be built on the foundations which

the roles of husband and father provided. There is something of the same attitude conveyed in the way that he named his seven children after famous figures of African descent: Alexandre Dumas, Toussaint L'Ouverture, Rameses Placido, St. Cyprian, Faustin Soulouque, Charles Lenox Remond, Ethiopia Halle. In a section on the education of girls in *The Condition* Delany made his views on the proper relationship between the sexes clearer still.

> Let our young women have an education; let their minds be well informed; well stored with useful information and practical proficiency, rather than the light, superficial acquirements, popularly and fashionably called accomplishments. We desire accomplishments, but they must be useful.
>
> Our females must be qualified, because they are to be the mothers of our children. As mothers are the first nurses and instructors of children; from them children consequently get their first impressions, which being always the most lasting should be the most correct.[66]

Women were to be educated but only for motherhood. The public sphere was to be the sole province of an enlightened male citizenry who seem to have taken their cues from Rousseau's conception of civic life in Sparta. Delany can now be recognised as the progenitor of black Atlantic patriarchy.

With the fundamental question of gender roles and relations still in mind, I want briefly to examine his novel *Blake; or, The Huts of America* as a narrative of familial reconstruction. The momentum of the book is supplied by the zeal with which its hero strives to reconstruct and regenerate his family life. This struggle is presented as absolutely homologous with both the liberation of slaves and the regeneration of Africa which Delany had described thus in the Niger Valley report:

> Africa is our fatherland and we its legitimate descendants   . I have outgrown, long since, the boundaries of North America, and with them have also outgrown the boundaries of their claims .   . Africa, to be regenerated must have a national character, and her position among the existing nations of the earth will depend mainly upon the high standard she may gain compared with them in all her relations, morally, religiously, socially, politically and commercially.
>
> I have determined to leave to my children the inheritance of a country, the possession of territorial domain, the blessings of a national education, and the indisputable right of self-government; that they may not succeed to the servility and degradation bequeathed to us by

our fathers. If we have not been born to fortunes, we should impart
the seeds which shall germinate and give birth to fortunes for them.[67]

Blake was the fourth novel written by a black American and certainly a
more radical work than the other comparable early attempts at fiction. The
book took its epigraph from Harriet Beecher Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin*
and was, as Delany's domiciliary title implies, an explicit, intertextual re-
sponse to that work. Both the structure of the book and its geographical
compass confirm Delany's claim to have outgrown the boundaries of
North America. *Blake* was written in Canada and concerns a Cuban who,
after travelling to Africa as a sailor on a slave ship, is himself enslaved in the
United States. He escapes to Canada, but then returns to the United States
in order to find the wife who has been unjustly parted from him by an evil
slave master and to lead slave resistance there. He discovers her in Cuba
and secures her freedom. He then visits Africa again, this time as a senior
crewman on a second slaver. This journey, across the Atlantic from west to
east—a middle passage in reverse—is undertaken as part of a grand plan
to lead a revolutionary slave revolt in Cuba which is at that moment in
danger of being annexed by the southern American states. The topography
of the black Atlantic world is directly incorporated into Delany's tale. His
travelling hero, Blake, assumes various names in the different locations he
visits, but his English appellation is surely significant in that it offers an
echo of an earlier, explicitly Atlanticist radicalism.

Ships occupy a primary symbolic and political place in the work. One
chapter is called "Transatlantic" and another, chapter 52, is entitled "The
Middle Passage" and includes a harrowing scene of a slaver throwing over-
board the dead and dying just as Turner had depicted it: amidst the rage
of nature itself. Delany's use of music is complex and bold and has been
understood as further evidence of his deeply contradictory relationship to
America and its culture. The sharp parodies of patriotic songs and popular
material by Stephen Foster that he has his characters sing can be inter-
preted as illustrations of the dense cultural syncretisms that double con-
sciousness can generate.[68]

Blake includes some strikingly sympathetic portraits of black women and
offers one of the few presentations of the middle passage and life in the
barracoons to be found in nineteenth-century black writing. It makes
African-American experience visible within a hemispheric order of racial
domination. The version of black solidarity *Blake* advances is explicitly anti-
ethnic and opposes narrow African-American exceptionalism in the name
of a truly pan-African, diaspora sensibility. This makes blackness a matter
of politics rather than a common cultural condition. The terror of slavery

is powerfully invoked, only partly from within the conventions of an aboli-
tionist literary genre that exhibits an intense fascination with the image of
divided families. Slavery is seen in an ethical light but is primarily presented
as an exploitative economic system of an international nature. Delany was
a member of the African Methodist Episcopal church, but he used his hero
Blake to convey criticisms of religion in general and Christianity in particu-
lar. It is this representation of religious belief which supplies the key to the
book's anti-ethnic, pan-African stance. Blake refused to "stand still and see
salvation" wherever it was offered to him: by the rituals of the white church
on the plantation, in the Catholic church or in the superstitions of the
conjurers he interacts with during a visit to the Dismal Swamp. His
scepticism and strictly instrumental orientation towards religion, which he
saw as a valuable tool for the political project he sought to advance, are
important because African-American religion is so often the central sign
for the folk-cultural, narrowly ethnic definition of racial authenticity that
is being challenged here in the name of rhizomorphic,[69] routed, diaspora
cultures.

Both Delany and his hero boast of their rational principles. Stealing
from the master was rationalised in terms derived from a labour theory of
value and, from this rationalist stance, blacks were rebuked for confusing
spiritual means with moral ends. Black Americans were not uniquely op-
pressed, and if they were to be free, they must contribute to the establish-
ment of the strong and completely synthetic supra-ethnic nation state that
Delany saw as indispensable to the ongoing struggle to defeat racial op-
pression everywhere in the new world and to the longer-term project of
African regeneration. This anti-mystical racial rationalism required that
blacks of all shades, classes, and ethnic groups give up the merely accidental
differences that served only to mask the deeper unity waiting to be con-
structed not so much from their African heritage as from the common
orientation to the future produced by their militant struggles against slav-
ery. Ethnic and religious differences symbolise intraracial divisions in the
book. Black survival depends upon forging a new means to build alliances
above and beyond petty issues like language, religion, skin colour, and to
a lesser extent gender. The best way to create the new metacultural identity
which the new black citizenship demands was provided by the abject con-
dition of the slaves and ironically facilitated by the transnational structure
of the slave trade itself. Abyssa, a Soudanese slave and former textile mer-
chant, brought from Africa on Blake's second transatlantic trip; Placido, a
Cuban revolutionary poet who is also Blake's cousin; Gofer Gondolier, a
West Indian cook who has attended a Spanish grandee in Genoa; the
wealthy quadroons and octoroons of Cuba; Blake himself; and indeed their

white revolutionary supporters constitute something like a rainbow army for the emancipation of the oppressed men and women of the new world. Because religion marks these petty ethnic differences with special clarity, its overcoming signifies the utopian move beyond ethnicity and the establishment of a new basis for community, mutuality and reciprocity:

> I first a catholic and my wife bred as such are both Baptists; Abyssa Soudan once a pagan was in her own native land converted to the Methodist or Wesleyan belief; Madame Sabastina and family are Episcopalians; Camina from long residence in the colony a Presbyterian and Placido is a believer in the Swedenborgian doctrines. We have all agreed to know no sects, no denomination and but one religion for the sake of our redemption from Bondage and degradation　　No religion but that which brings us liberty will we know; no God but he who owns us as his children will we serve. The whites accept nothing but that which promotes their interests and happiness, socially politically and religiously. They would discard a religion, tear down a church, overthrow a government or desert a country which did not enhance their freedom. In God's great and righteous name are we not willing to do the same?[70]

Blake is useful to this chapter's argument against ethnic absolutisms because its affirmation of the intercultural and transnational is more than enough to move discussion of black political culture beyond the binary opposition between national and diaspora perspectives. The suggestive way that it locates the black Atlantic world in a webbed network, between the local and the global, challenges the coherence of all narrow nationalist perspectives and points to the spurious invocation of ethnic particularity to enforce them and to ensure the tidy flow of cultural output into neat, symmetrical units. I should add that this applies whether this impulse comes from the oppressors or the oppressed.

Black Politics and Modernity

Rereading *Blake* in this way and looking at the routes of its nationalist author leads us back to the question of whether nationalist perspectives are an adequate means to understand the forms of resistance and accommodation intrinsic to modern black political culture. The recent history of blacks, as people in but not necessarily of the modern, western world, a history which involves processes of political organisation that are explicitly transnational and international in nature, demands that this question is considered very carefully. What, after all, is being opposed by the move-

ments of slaves and their descendants: slavery? capitalism? coerced industri-
alisation? racial terror? or the ethnocentrism and European solipsism that
these processes help to reproduce? How are the discontinuous histories of
diaspora resistance raised in fictional form by *Blake* and lived by figures like
its creator to be *thought*? How have they been theorised by those who have
experienced the consequences of racial domination?

In the final part of this chapter, I want to look more specifically at the
positions of the nation state, and the idea of nationality in accounts of
black opposition and expressive culture, particularly music. I will also use
a brief discussion of black music that anticipates a more extensive treat-
ment of these themes in Chapter 3 to ask implicit questions about the
tendencies towards ethnocentrism and ethnic absolutism of black cultural
theory.

The problem of weighing the claims of national identity against other
contrasting varieties of subjectivity and identification has a special place in
the intellectual history of blacks in the west. Du Bois's concept of double
consciousness has been referred to already and will be explored in greater
detail in Chapter 4. It is only the best-known resolution of a familiar prob-
lem which points towards the core dynamic of racial oppression as well as
the fundamental antinomy of diaspora blacks. How has this doubleness,
what Richard Wright calls the dreadful objectivity[71] which follows from
being both inside and outside the West, affected the conduct of political
movements against racial oppression and towards black autonomy? Are the
inescapable pluralities involved in the movements of black peoples, in Af-
rica and in exile, ever to be synchronised? How would these struggles be
periodised in relation to modernity: the fatal intermediation of capitalism,
industrialisation, and a new conception of political democracy? Does pos-
ing these questions in this way signify anything more than the reluctant
intellectual affiliation of diaspora blacks to an approach which mistakenly
attempts a premature totalisation of infinite struggles, an approach which
itself has deep and problematic roots within the ambiguous intellectual
traditions of the European Enlightenment which have, at different mo-
ments, been both a lifeline and a fetter?

Delany's work has provided some powerful evidence to show that the
intellectual heritage of Euro-American modernity determined and possibly
still determines the manner in which nationality is understood within black
political discourse. In particular, this legacy conditions the continuing aspi-
ration to acquire a supposedly authentic, natural, and stable "rooted"
identity. This invariant identity is in turn the premise of a thinking "racial"
self that is both socialised and unified by its connection with other kindred
souls encountered usually, though not always, within the fortified frontiers

of those discrete ethnic cultures which also happen to coincide with the contours of a sovereign nation state that guarantees their continuity.

Consider for a moment the looseness with which the term "black nationalism" is used both by its advocates and by sceptics. Why is a more refined political language for dealing with these crucial issues of identity, kinship, generation, affect, and affiliation such a long time coming? A small but telling example can be drawn from the case of Edouard Glissant, who has contributed so much to the emergence of a creole counter-discourse that can answer the alchemy of nationalisms. Discussion of these problems suffers when his translator excises Glissant's references to the work of Deleuze and Guattari from the English edition of his 1981 book *Le discours antillais,*[72] presumably because to acknowledge this exchange would somehow violate the aura of Caribbean authenticity that is a desirable frame around the work. This typical refusal to accept the complicity and syncretic interdependency of black and white thinkers has recently become associated with a second difficulty: the overintegrated conceptions of pure and homogeneous culture which mean that black political struggles are construed as somehow automatically *expressive* of the national or ethnic differences with which they are associated.

This overintegrated sense of cultural and ethnic particularity is very popular today, and blacks do not monopolise it. It masks the arbitrariness of its own political choices in the morally charged language of ethnic absolutism and this poses additional dangers because it overlooks the development and change of black political ideologies and ignores the restless, recombinant qualities of the black Atlantic's affirmative political cultures. The political project forged by thinkers like Delany in the difficult journey from slave ship to citizenship is in danger of being wrecked by the seemingly insoluble conflict between two distinct but currently symbiotic perspectives. They can be loosely identified as the essentialist and the pluralist standpoints though they are in fact two different varieties of essentialism: one ontological, the other strategic. The antagonistic relationship between these two outlooks has been especially intense in discussions of black art and cultural criticism. The ontological essentialist view has often been characterised by a brute pan-Africanism. It has proved unable to specify precisely where the highly prized but doggedly evasive essence of black artistic and political sensibility is currently located, but that is no obstacle to its popular circulation. This perspective sees the black intellectual and artist as a leader. Where it pronounces on cultural matters, it is often allied to a realist approach to aesthetic value that minimises the substantive political and philosophical issues involved in the processes of artistic representation. Its absolutist conception of ethnic cultures can be identified by the way in which

it registers incomprehending disappointment with the actual cultural choices and patterns of the mass of black people. It has little to say about the profane, contaminated world of black popular culture and looks instead for an artistic practice that can disabuse the mass of black people of the illusions into which they have been seduced by their condition of exile and unthinking consumption of inappropriate cultural objects like the wrong hair care products, pop music, and western clothing. The community is felt to be on the wrong road, and it is the intellectual's job to give them a new direction, firstly by recovering and then by donating the racial awareness that the masses seem to lack.

This perspective currently confronts a pluralistic position which affirms blackness as an open signifier and seeks to celebrate complex representations of a black particularity that is *internally* divided: by class, sexuality, gender, age, ethnicity, economics, and political consciousness. There is no unitary idea of black community here, and the authoritarian tendencies of those who would police black cultural expression in the name of their own particular history or priorities are rightly repudiated. The ontologically grounded essentialism is replaced by a libertarian, strategic alternative: the cultural saturnalia which attends the end of innocent notions of the essential black subject.[73] Here, the polyphonic qualities of black cultural expression form the main aesthetic consideration and there is often an uneasy but exhilarating fusion of modernist and populist techniques and styles. From this perspective, the achievements of popular black cultural forms like music are a constant source of inspiration. They are prized for their implicit warning against the pitfalls of artistic conceit. The difficulty with this second tendency is that in leaving racial essentialism behind by viewing "race" itself as a social and cultural construction, it has been insufficiently alive to the lingering power of specifically racialised forms of power and subordination.

Each outlook compensates for the obvious weaknesses in the other camp, but so far there has been little open and explicit debate between them. Their conflict, initially formulated in debates over black aesthetics and cultural production,[74] is valuable as a preliminary guide to some of the dilemmas faced by cultural and intellectual *historians* of the modern, western, African diaspora. The problems it raises become acute, particularly for those who seek to comprehend cultural developments and political resistances which have had scant regard for either modern borders or premodern frontiers. At its worst, the lazy, casual invocation of cultural insiderism which frequently characterises the ontological essentialist view is nothing more than a symptom of the growing cleavages *within* the black communities. There, uneasy spokespeople of the black elite—some of

them professional cultural commentators, artists, writers, painters, and film makers as well as political leaders—have fabricated a volkish outlook as an expression of their own contradictory position. This neo-nationalism seems out of tune with the spirit of the novel Africentric garb in which it appears before us today. It incorporates commentary on the special needs and desires of the relatively privileged castes within black communities, but its most consistent trademark is the persistent mystification of that group's increasingly problematic relationships with the black poor, who, after all, supply the elite with a dubious entitlement to speak on behalf of the phantom constituency of black people in general. The idea of blacks as a national or proto-national group with its own hermetically enclosed culture plays a key role in this mystification, and, though seldom overtly named, the misplaced idea of a national interest gets invoked as a means to silence dissent and censor political debate when the incoherences and inconsistencies of Africalogical discourse are put on display.

These problems take on a specific aspect in Britain, which currently lacks anything that can be credibly called a black bourgeoisie. However, they are not confined to this country and they cannot be overlooked. The idea of nationality and the assumptions of cultural absolutism come together in other ways.[75] It should be emphasised that, where the archaeology of black critical knowledges enters the academy, it currently involves the construction of canons which seems to be proceeding on an exclusively *national* basis—African-American, Anglophone Caribbean, and so on. This is not an oblique plea for the legitimacy of an equally distinctive black English or British cultural inventory. If it seems indelicate to ask who the formation of such canons might serve, then the related question of where the impulse to formalise and codify elements of our cultural heritage in this particular pattern comes from may be a better one to pursue. Is this impulse towards cultural protectionism the most cruel trick which the west can play upon its dissident affiliates? The same problem of the status enjoyed by national boundaries in the writing of cultural history is evident in recent debates over hip hop culture, the powerful expressive medium of America's urban black poor which has created a global youth movement of considerable significance. The musical components of hip hop are a hybrid form nurtured by the social relations of the South Bronx where Jamaican sound system culture was transplanted during the 1970s and put down new roots. In conjunction with specific technological innovations, this routed and re-rooted Caribbean culture set in train a process that was to transform black America's sense of itself and a large portion of the popular music industry as well. Here we have to ask how a form which flaunts and glories in its own malleability as well as its transnational character becomes inter-

preted as an expression of some authentic African-American essence? How can rap be discussed as if it sprang intact from the entrails of the blues?[76] Another way of approaching this would be to ask what is it about black America's writing elite which means that they need to claim this diasporic cultural form in such an assertively nationalist way?[77]

An additional, and possibly more profound, area of political difficulty comes into view when the voguish language of absolute cultural difference associated with the ontological essentialist standpoint provides an embarrassing link between the practice of blacks who comprehend racial politics through it and the activities of their foresworn opponents—the ethnic absolutists of the racist right—who approach the complex dynamics of race, nationality, and ethnicity through a similar set of pseudo-precise, culturalist equations. This unlikely convergence is part of the history of hip hop because black music is so often the principal symbol of racial authenticity. Analysing it leads rapidly and directly back to the status of nationality and national cultures in a post-modern world where nation states are being eclipsed by a new economy of power that accords national citizenship and national boundaries a new significance. In seeking to account for the controversy over hip hop's origins we also have to explore how the absolutist and exclusivist approach to the relationship between "race," ethnicity, and culture places those who claim to be able to resolve the relationship between the supposedly incommensurable discourses characteristic of different racial groups, in command of the cultural resources of their own group as a whole. Intellectuals can claim this vanguard position by virtue of an ability to translate from one culture to another, mediating decisive oppositions along the way. It matters little whether the the black communities involved are conceived as entire and self-sustaining nations or as proto-national collectivities.

No less than their predecessor Martin Delany, today's black intellectuals have persistently succumbed to the lure of those romantic conceptions of "race," "people," and "nation" which place themselves, rather than the people they supposedly represent, in charge of the strategies for nation building, state formation, and racial uplift. This point underscores the fact that the status of nationality and the precise weight we should attach to the conspicuous differences of language, culture, and identity which divide the blacks of the diaspora from one another, let alone from Africans, are unresolved within the political culture that promises to bring the disparate peoples of the black Atlantic world together one day. Furthermore, the dependence of those black intellectuals who have tried to deal with these matters on theoretical reflections derived from the canon of occidental modernity—from Herder to Von Trietschke and beyond—is surely salient.

W. E. B. Du Bois's work will be explored below as a site of this affiliation. The case of his 1888 Fisk graduation address on Bismarck provides a preliminary example. Reflecting on it some years later in *Dusk of Dawn* he wrote, "Bismarck was my hero. He made a nation out of a mass of bickering peoples. He had dominated the whole development with his strength until he crowned an emperor at Versailles. This foreshadowed in my mind the kind of thing that American Negroes must do, marching forward with strength and determination under trained leadership."[78] This model of national development has a special appeal to the bickering peoples of the black Atlantic diaspora. It is an integral component of their responses to modern racism and directly inspired their efforts to construct nation states on African soil and elsewhere. The idea of nationality occupies a central, if shifting place in the work of Alexander Crummell, Edward Blyden, Martin Delany, and Frederick Douglass. This important group of post-Enlightenment men, whose lives and political sensibilities can ironically be defined through the persistent crisscrossing of national boundaries, often seem to share the decidedly Hegelian belief that the combination of Christianity and a nation state represents the overcoming of all antinomies.

The themes of nationality, exile, and cultural affiliation accentuate the inescapable fragmentation and differentiation of the black subject. This fragmentation has recently been compounded further by the questions of gender, sexuality, and male domination which have been made unavoidable by the struggles of black women and the voices of black gay men and lesbians. I cannot attempt to resolve these tensions here, but the dimension of social and political differentiation to which they refer provides a frame for what follows. As indices of differentiation, they are especially important because the intracommunal antagonisms which appear between the local and immediate levels of our struggles and their hemispheric and global dynamics can only grow. Black voices from within the overdeveloped countries may be able to go on resonating in harmony with those produced from inside Africa or they may, with varying degrees of reluctance, turn away from the global project of black advancement once the symbolic and political, if not the material and economic, liberation of Southern Africa is completed.

I want to make these abstract and difficult points more concrete and more accessible by constructing a conclusion for this chapter out of some of the lessons waiting to be learned from considering elements of the musical output of blacks in the West which will be explored in more detail in Chapter 3. The history and significance of these musics are consistently overlooked by black writers for two reasons: because they exceed the frameworks of national or ethnocentric analysis with which we have been

too easily satisfied, and because talking seriously about the politics and aesthetics of black vernacular cultures demands an embarrassing confrontation with substantive intraracial differences that make the easy essentialism from which most critical judgements are constructed simply untenable. As these internal divisions have grown, the price of that embarrassment has been an aching silence.

To break that silence, I want to argue that black musical expression has played a role in reproducing what Zygmunt Bauman has called a distinctive counterculture of modernity.[79] I will use a brief consideration of black musical development to move beyond an understanding of cultural processes which, as I have already suggested, is currently torn between seeing them either as the expression of an essential, unchanging, sovereign racial self or as the effluent from a constituted subjectivity that emerges contingently from the endless play of racial signification. This is usually conceived solely in terms of the inappropriate model which *textuality* provides. The vitality and complexity of this musical culture offers a means to get beyond the related oppositions between essentialists and pseudo-pluralists on the one hand and between totalising conceptions of tradition, modernity, and postmodernity on the other. It also provides a model of performance which can supplement and partially displace concern with textuality.

Black music's obstinate and consistent commitment to the idea of a better future is a puzzle to which the enforced separation of slaves from literacy and their compensatory refinement of musical art supplies less than half an answer. The power of music in developing black struggles by communicating information, organising consciousness, and testing out or deploying the forms of subjectivity which are required by political agency, whether individual or collective, defensive or transformational, demands attention to both the formal attributes of this expressive culture and its distinctive *moral* basis. The formal qualities of this music are becoming better known,[80] and I want to concentrate instead on the moral aspects and in particular on the disjunction between the ethical value of the music and its status as an ethnic sign.

In the simplest possible terms, by posing the world as it is against the world as the racially subordinated would like it to be, this musical culture supplies a great deal of the courage required to go on living in the present. It is both produced by and expressive of that "transvaluation of all values" precipitated by the history of racial terror in the new world. It contains a theodicy but moves beyond it because the profane dimensions of that racial terror made theodicy impossible.[81] I have considered its distinctive critique of capitalist social relations elsewhere.[82] Here, because I want to show that its critical edge includes but also surpasses anti-capitalism, it is necessary to

draw out some of the inner philosophical dynamics of this counterculture and to explore the connection between its normative character and its utopian aspirations. These are interrelated and even inseparable from each other and from the critique of racial capitalism[83] that these expressive cultures construct but also surpass. Comprehending them necessitates an analysis of the lyrical content and the forms of musical expression as well as the often hidden social relations in which these deeply encoded oppositional practices are created and consumed. The issue of normative content focuses attention on what might be called the politics of fulfilment:[84] the notion that a future society will be able to realise the social and political promise that present society has left unaccomplished. Reflecting the foundational semantic position of the Bible, this is a discursive mode of communication. Though by no means literal, it can be grasped through what is said, shouted, screamed, or sung. The politics of fulfilment practised by the descendants of slaves demands, as Delany did, that bourgeois civil society live up to the promises of its own rhetoric. It creates a medium in which demands for goals like non-racialised justice and rational organisation of the productive processes can be expressed. It is immanent within modernity and is no less a valuable element of modernity's counter-discourse for being consistently ignored.

The issue of how utopias are conceived is more complex not least because they strive continually to move beyond the grasp of the merely linguistic, textual, and discursive. The invocation of utopia references what, following Seyla Benhabib's suggestive lead, I propose to call the politics of transfiguration. This emphasises the emergence of qualitatively new desires, social relations, and modes of association within the racial community of interpretation and resistance *and* between that group and its erstwhile oppressors. It points specifically to the formation of a community of needs and solidarity which is magically made audible in the music itself and palpable in the social relations of its cultural utility and reproduction. Created under the very nose of the overseers, the utopian desires which fuel the complementary politics of transfiguration must be invoked by other, more deliberately opaque means. This politics exists on a lower frequency where it is played, danced, and acted, as well as sung and sung about, because words, even words stretched by melisma and supplemented or mutated by the screams which still index the conspicuous power of the slave sublime, will never be enough to communicate its unsayable claims to truth. The wilfully damaged signs which betray the resolutely utopian politics of transfiguration therefore partially transcend modernity, constructing both an imaginary anti-modern past and a postmodern yet-to-come. This is not a counter-discourse but a counterculture that defiantly

reconstructs its own critical, intellectual, and moral genealogy in a partially hidden public sphere of its own. The politics of transfiguration therefore reveals the hidden internal fissures in the concept of modernity. The bounds of politics are extended precisely because this tradition of expression refuses to accept that the political is a readily separable domain. Its basic desire is to conjure up and enact the new modes of friendship, happiness, and solidarity that are consequent on the overcoming of the racial oppression on which modernity and its antinomy of rational, western progress as excessive barbarity relied. Thus the vernacular arts of the children of slaves give rise to a verdict on the role of art which is strikingly in harmony with Adorno's reflections on the dynamics of European artistic expression in the wake of Auschwitz: "Art's Utopia, the counterfactual yet-to-come, is draped in black. It goes on being a recollection of the possible with a critical edge against the real; it is a kind of imaginary restitution of that catastrophe, which is world history; it is a freedom which did not pass under the spell of necessity and which may well not come to pass ever at all."[85] These sibling dimensions of black sensibility, the politics of fulfilment and the politics of transfiguration, are not co-extensive. There are significant tensions between them but they are closely associated in the vernacular cultures of the black Atlantic diaspora. They can also be used to reflect the idea of doubleness with which this chapter began and which is often argued to be the constitutive force giving rise to black experience in the modern world. The politics of fulfilment is mostly content to play occidental rationality at its own game. It necessitates a hermeneutic orientation that can assimilate the semiotic, verbal, and textual. The politics of transfiguration strives in pursuit of the sublime, struggling to repeat the unrepeatable, to present the unpresentable. Its rather different hermeneutic focus pushes towards the mimetic, dramatic, and performative.

It seems especially significant that the cultural expressions which these musics allow us to map out do not seek to exclude problems of inequality or to make the achievement of racial justice an exclusively abstract matter. Their grounded ethics offers, among other things, a continuous commentary on the systematic and pervasive relations of domination that supply its conditions of existence. Their grounded aesthetics is never separated off into an autonomous realm where familiar political rules cannot be applied and where, as Salman Rushdie memorably puts it, "the little room of literature"[86] can continue to enjoy its special privileges as a heroic resource for the well-heeled adversaries of liberal capitalism.

I am proposing, then, that we reread and rethink this expressive counterculture not simply as a succession of literary tropes and genres but as a philosophical discourse which refuses the modern, occidental separation of

ethics and aesthetics, culture and politics. The traditional teaching of ethics and politics—practical philosophy—came to an end some time ago, even if its death agonies were prolonged. This tradition had maintained the idea that a good life for the individual and the problem of the best social and political order for the collectivity could be discerned by rational means. Though it is seldom acknowledged even now, this tradition lost its exclusive claim to rationality partly through the way that slavery became internal to western civilisation and through the obvious complicity which both plantation slavery and colonial regimes revealed between rationality and the practice of racial terror. Not perceiving its residual condition, blacks in the west eavesdropped on and then took over a fundamental question from the intellectual obsessions of their enlightened rulers. Their progress from the status of slaves to the status of citizens led them to enquire into what the best possible forms of social and political existence might be. The memory of slavery, actively preserved as a living intellectual resource in their expressive political culture, helped them to generate a new set of answers to this enquiry. They had to fight—often through their spirituality—to hold on to the unity of ethics and politics sundered from each other by modernity's insistence that the true, the good, and the beautiful had distinct origins and belong to different domains of knowledge. First slavery itself and then their memory of it induced many of them to query the foundational moves of modern philosophy and social thought, whether they came from the natural rights theorists who sought to distinguish between the spheres of morality and legality, the idealists who wanted to emancipate politics from morals so that it could become a sphere of strategic action, or the political economists of the bourgeoisie who first formulated the separation of economic activity from both ethics and politics. The brutal excesses of the slave plantation supplied a set of moral and political responses to each of these attempts. The history and utility of black music discussed in Chapter 3 enable us to trace something of the means through which the unity of ethics and politics has been reproduced as a form of folk knowledge. This subculture often appears to be the intuitive expression of some racial essence but is in fact an elementary historical acquisition produced from the viscera of an alternative body of cultural and political expression that considers the world critically from the point of view of its emancipatory transformation. In the future, it will become a place which is capable of satisfying the (redefined) needs of human beings that will emerge once the violence—epistemic and concrete—of racial typology is at an end. Reason is thus reunited with the happiness and freedom of individuals and the reign of justice within the collectivity.

I have already implied that there is a degree of convergence here with

other projects towards a critical theory of society, particularly Marxism. However, where lived crisis and systemic crisis come together, Marxism allocates priority to the latter while the memory of slavery insists on the priority of the former. Their convergence is also undercut by the simple fact that in the critical thought of blacks in the West, social self-creation through labour is not the centre-piece of emancipatory hopes. For the descendants of slaves, work signifies only servitude, misery, and subordination. Artistic expression, expanded beyond recognition from the grudging gifts offered by the masters as a token substitute for freedom from bondage, therefore becomes the means towards both individual self-fashioning and communal liberation. Poiesis and poetics begin to coexist in novel forms—autobiographical writing, special and uniquely creative ways of manipulating spoken language, and, above all, the music. All three have overflowed from the containers that the modern nation state provides for them.

Cartographies of Diaspora

Contesting identities

Avtar Brah

Ek Onkar Sat Nam

For my mother, Dhan K. Brah, and in the memory of my father, Bachan S. Brah, and my nephew, Harjinder (Bhola) Grewal

Contents

Chapter 8

Diaspora, border and transnational identities

As we approach the beginning of the twenty-first century we witness a new phase of mass population movements. There has been a rapid increase in migrations across the globe since the 1980s. These mass movements are taking place in all directions. The volume of migration has increased to Australia, North America and Western Europe. Similarly, large-scale population movements have taken place within and between countries of the 'South'. More recently, events in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have provided impetus for mass movements of people. Some regions previously thought of as areas of emigration are now considered as areas of immigration. Economic inequalities within and between regions, expanding mobility of capital, people's desire to pursue opportunities that might improve their life chances, political strife, wars, and famine are some of the factors that remain at the heart of the impetus behind these migrations. People on the move may be labour migrants (both 'documented' and 'undocumented'), highly-qualified specialists, entrepreneurs, students, refugees and asylum seekers, or the household members of previous migrants. In 1990, the International Organisation for Migration estimated that there were over 80 million such 'migrants'. Of these, approximately 30 million were said to be in 'irregular situations' and another 15 million were refugees or asylum seekers. By 1992, some estimates put the total number of migrants at 100 million, of whom 20 million were refugees and asylum seekers (Castles and Miller 1993). The notion of 'economic migrant' as referring primarily to labour migrants was always problematic, not least because it served to conceal the economic proclivities of those who were likely to be placed outside such a definition, for example industrialists or commercial entrepreneurs. However, these new migrations call this construct even more seriously into question, as

global events increasingly render untenable such distinctions as those held between the so called 'political' and 'economic' refugees.

These population movements are set against major re-alignments in the world political order. As I have already noted in previous chapters, new transnational configurations of power articulate with fundamental transformations in the political economy of late twentieth-century capitalism. Globalising tendencies set in motion centuries ago acquire new meanings in a world characterised by the increasing dominance of multinational capital; the flexible specialisation of labour and products; and the revolutionising impact of new technologies in production, distribution, and communication. The emergent new international division of labour depends quite crucially upon women workers. Indeed, whether working in electronics factories, textile sweatshops, performing outwork from their homes, or (rather more untypically) holding jobs in the commanding heights of the economy – women have become emblematic figures of contemporary regimes of accumulation. It is not surprising, therefore, that women comprise a growing segment of migrations in all regions and all types of migrations. This feminisation of migration is especially noticeable in particular instances. For example, women form the majority of Cape Verdian workers migrating to Italy, Filipinos to the Middle East, or Thais to Japan. Similarly, women predominate in a number of refugee movements (Castles and Miller 1993) .

These recent migrations are creating new displacements, new diasporas. In the context of a proliferation of new border crossings the language of 'borders' and of 'diaspora' acquires a new currency. A variety of new scholarly journals have one or the other of these terms in their titles. Yet, surprisingly, there have been relatively few attempts made to theorise these terms. This is partly because, as James Clifford (1994) rightly observes, it is not easy to avoid the slippage between diaspora as a theoretical concept, diasporic 'discourses', and distinct historical 'experiences' of diaspora. They seem to invite a kind of 'theorising', Clifford continues, that is always embedded in particular maps and histories. Yet, perhaps this embeddedness is precisely why it becomes necessary to mark out the conceptual terrain that these words construct and traverse if they are to serve as theoretical tools.

This chapter is just such an attempt to explore the analytical purchase of these terms. It delineates specific features which may serve to distinguish diaspora as a theoretical concept from the historical 'experiences' of diaspora. *Inter alia* I suggest that the concept of

diaspora should be understood in terms of historically contingent 'genealogies' in the Foucauldian sense; that is, as an ensemble of investigative technologies that historicise trajectories of different diasporas, and analyse their relationality across fields of social relations, subjectivity and identity. I argue that the concept of diaspora offers a critique of discourses of fixed origins, while taking account of a homing desire which is not the same thing as desire for a 'homeland'. This distinction is important, not least because not all diasporas sustain an ideology of 'return'. In examining the subtext of 'home' which the concept of diaspora embodies, I analyse the problematic of the 'indigene' subject position and its precarious relationship to 'nativist' discourses.

Inscribed within the idea of diaspora is the notion of 'border'. The second part of this chapter is organised around the theme of borders. I address border as a political construct as well as an analytical category, and explore some of the strengths and limitations of the idea of 'border theory', especially as it has been mobilised via Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's concept of 'deterritorialisation' and applied to the analysis of literary texts.

The concepts of border and diaspora together reference the theme of location. This point warrants emphasis because the very strong association of notions of diaspora with displacement and dislocation means that the experience of *location* can easily dissolve out of focus. The third section of the chapter is centred on this topic and explores the contradictions of and between location and dislocation. As a point of departure, I use the long-standing feminist debate around issues of home, location, displacement and dislocation which came up with the concept of a *'politics of location'* as locationality in contradiction . Self-reflexive autobiographical accounts often provide critical insights into the politics of location. I use two such accounts – an essay by Minnie Bruce Pratt and the autobiography of Angela Davis – as narratives enunciating a white and a black woman's feminist subject position. They do so through an intricate unravelling of those manifold operations of power which have the effect of naturalising identities, and the different costs involved in maintaining or relinquishing lived certainties attendant upon such identities. What is also crucially important for the discussion at hand is the way in which these autobiographical accounts demonstrate how the same geographical and psychic space comes to articulate different 'histories' and how 'home' can simultaneously be a place of safety and of terror.

The concepts of *diaspora*, *border*, and *politics of location* together offer a conceptual grid for historicised analyses of contemporary trans/national movements of people, information, cultures, commodities and capital. The three concepts are immanent. Part four of the chapter discusses a new concept that I wish to propose, namely that of *diaspora space*, as the site of this immanence. Diaspora space is the intersectionality of diaspora, border, and dis/location as a point of confluence of economic, political, cultural and psychic processes. It addresses the global condition of culture, economics and politics as a site of 'migrancy' and 'travel' which seriously problematises the subject position of the 'native'. My central argument is that diaspora space as a conceptual category is 'inhabited' not only by those who have migrated and their descendants but equally by those who are constructed and represented as indigenous. In other words, the concept of *diaspora space* (as opposed to that of diaspora) includes the entanglement of genealogies of dispersion with those of 'staying put'.

Throughout the chapter I have emphasised power relations embedded within discourses, institutions, and practices. In so doing I have mobilised a multi-axial performative conception of power. The chapter concludes with the idea of 'creolised theory' which is central to the kind of analysis I have been developing in this book.

THINKING THROUGH THE CONCEPT OF DIASPORA

First, a note about the term 'diaspora'. The word derives from the Greek – *dia*, 'through', and *speirein*, 'to scatter'. According to Webster's Dictionary in the United States, diaspora refers to a 'dispersion from'. Hence the word embodies a notion of a centre, a locus, a 'home' from where the dispersion occurs. It invokes images of multiple journeys. The dictionary also highlights the word's association with the dispersion of the Jews after the Babylonian exile. Here, then, is an evocation of a diaspora with a particular resonance within European cartographies of displacement; one that occupies a particular space in the European psyche, and is emblematically situated within Western iconography as the diaspora *par excellence*. Yet, to speak of late twentieth-century diasporas is to take such ancient diasporas as a point of departure rather than necessarily as 'models', or as what Safran (1991) describes as the 'ideal type'. The dictionary juxtaposition of what the concept signifies in general as against one of its particular referents, highlights the need

to subject the concept to scrutiny, to consider the ramifications of what it connotes or denotes, and to consider its analytical value.

At the heart of the notion of diaspora is the image of a journey. Yet not every journey can be understood as diaspora. Diasporas are clearly not the same as casual travel. Nor do they normatively refer to temporary sojourns. Paradoxically, diasporic journeys are essentially about settling down, about putting roots 'elsewhere'. These journeys must be historicised if the concept of diaspora is to serve as a useful heuristic device. The question is not simply about *who travels* but *when, how, and under what circumstances*? What socio-economic, political, and cultural conditions mark the trajectories of these journeys? What regimes of power inscribe the formation of a specific diaspora? In other words, it is necessary to analyse what makes one diasporic formation similar to or different from another: whether, for instance, the diaspora in question was constituted through conquest and colonisation as has been the case with several European diasporas. Or it might have resulted from the capture or removal of a group through slavery or systems of indentured labour, as, for example, in the formation respectively of African and Asian diasporas in the Caribbean. Alternatively, people may have had to desert their home as a result of expulsion and persecution, as has been the fate of a number of Jewish groups at various points in history. Or they may have been forced to flee in the wake of political strife, as has been the experience of many contemporary groups of refugees such as the Sri Lankans, Somalis and Bosnian Muslims. Perhaps the dispersion occurred as a result of conflict and war, resulting in the creation of a new nation state on the territory previously occupied by another, as has been the experience of Palestinians since the formation of Israel. On the other hand, a population movement could have been induced as part of global flows of labour, the trajectory of many, for example African-Caribbeans, Asians, Cypriots, or Irish people in Britain.

If the circumstances of leaving are important, so, too, are those of arrival and settling down. How and in what ways do these journeys conclude, and intersect in specific places, specific spaces, and specific historical conjunctures? How and in what ways is a group inserted within the social relations of class, gender, racism, sexuality, or other axes of differentiation in the country to which it migrates? The manner in which a group comes to be 'situated' in and through a wide variety of discourses, economic processes, state policies and institutional practices is critical to its future. This 'situatedness' is central to how different groups come to be relationally positioned in a given

context. I emphasise the question of relational positioning for it enables us to begin to deconstruct the regimes of power which operate to differentiate one group from another; to represent them as similar or different; to include or exclude them from constructions of the 'nation' and the body politic; and which inscribe them as juridical, political, and psychic subjects. It is axiomatic that each empirical diaspora must be analysed in its historical specificity. But the issue is not one that is simply about the need for historicising or addressing the specificity of a particular diasporic experience, important though this is.

Rather, the *concept* of diaspora concerns the historically variable forms of *relationality* within and between diasporic formations. It is about relations of power that similarise and differentiate between and across changing diasporic constellations. In other words, the concept of diaspora centres on the *configurations of power which differentiate diasporas internally as well as situate them in relation to one another.*

Diasporas, in the sense of distinctive historical experiences, are often composite formations made up of many journeys to different parts of the globe, each with its own history, its own particularities. Each such diaspora is an interweaving of multiple travelling; a text of many distinctive and, perhaps, even disparate narratives. This is true, among others, of the African, Chinese, Irish, Jewish, Palestinian and South Asian diasporas. For example, South Asians in Britain have a different, albeit related, history to South Asians in Africa, the Caribbean, Fiji, South East Asia, or the USA. Given these differences, can we speak of a 'South Asian diaspora' other than as a mode of description of a particular cluster of migrations? The answer depends crucially upon how the relationship between these various components of the cluster is conceptualised.

I would suggest that it is the *economic, political and cultural specificities linking these components that the concept of diaspora signifies.* This means that these multiple journeys may configure into one journey via a *confluence of narratives* as it is lived and re-lived, produced, reproduced and transformed through individual as well as collective memory and re-memory. It is within this confluence of narrativity that 'diasporic community' is differently imagined under different historical circumstances. By this I mean that the identity of the diasporic imagined community is far from fixed or pre-given. It is constituted within the crucible of the materiality of everyday life; in the everyday stories we tell ourselves individually and collectively.

All diasporic journeys are composite in another sense too. They

are embarked upon, lived and re-lived through multiple modalities: modalities, for example, of gender, 'race', class, religion, language and generation. As such, all diasporas are differentiated, heterogeneous, contested spaces, even as they are implicated in the construction of a common 'we'. It is important, therefore, to be attentive to the nature and type of processes in and through which the collective 'we' is constituted. Who is empowered and who is disempowered in a specific construction of the 'we'? How are social divisions negotiated in the construction of the 'we'? What is the relationship of this 'we' to its 'others'? Who are these others? This is a critical question. It is generally assumed that there is a single dominant Other whose overarching omnipresence circumscribes constructions of the 'we'. Hence, there tends to be an emphasis on bipolar oppositions: black/white; Jew/Gentile; Arab/Jew; English/Irish; Hindu/Muslim. The centrality of a particular binary opposition as the basis of political cleavage and social division in a given situation may make it necessary, even imperative, to foreground it. The problem remains, however, as to how such binaries should be analysed. Binaries can all too readily be assumed to represent ahistorical, universal constructs. This may help to conceal the workings of historically specific socio-economic, political and cultural circumstances that mark the terrain on which a given binary comes to assume its particular significance. That is, what are actually the effects of institutions, discourses and practices may come to be represented as immutable, trans-historical divisions. As a consequence, a binary that should properly be an object of deconstruction may gain acceptance as an unproblematic given.

It is especially necessary to guard against such tendencies at the present moment when the surfacing of old and new racisms, violent religious conflicts and the horrors of 'ethnic cleansing' make it all too easy to slide into an acceptance of contexually variable phenomena as trans-historical universalisms that are then presumed to be an inevitable part of human nature. On the contrary, the binary is a socially constructed category whose trajectory warrants investigation in terms of how it was constituted, regulated, embodied and contested, rather than taken as always already present. A bipolar construction might be addressed fruitfully and productively as an object of analysis and a tool of deconstruction; that is, as a means of investigating the conditions of its formation, its implication in the inscription of hierarchies, and its power to mobilise collectivities.

The point is that there are multiple others embedded within and

across binaries, albeit one or more may be accorded priority within a given discursive formation. For instance, a discourse may be primarily about gender and, as such, it may centre upon gender-based binaries (although, of course, a binarised construction is not always inevitable). But this discourse will not exist in isolation from others, such as those signifying class, 'race', religion or generation. The specificity of each is framed in and through fields of representation of the other. What is at stake, then, is not simply a question of some generalised notion of, say, masculinity and femininity, but whether or not these representations of masculinity and femininity are racialised; how and in what ways they inflect class; whether they reference lesbian, gay, heterosexual or some other sexualities; how they feature age and generation; how and if they invoke religious authority. Binaries, thus, are intrinsically differentiated and unstable. What matters most is how and why, in a given context, a specific binary – e.g. black/white – takes shape, acquires a seeming coherence and stability, and configures with other constructions, such as Jew/Gentile or male/female. In other words, *how these signifiers slide into one another in the articulation of power.*

We may elaborate the above point with reference to racialised discourses and practices. The question then reformulates itself in terms of the relationship at a specific moment between different forms of racism. Attention is shifted to the forms in which class, gender, sexuality or religion, for instance, might figure within these racisms, and· to the specific signifier(s) – colour, physiognomy, religion, culture, etc. – around which these differing racisms are constituted. An important aspect of the problematic will be the relational positioning of groups by virtue of these racisms. How, for instance, are African, Caribbean, South Asian and white Muslims differentially constructed within anti-Muslim racism in present-day Britain? Similarly, how are blacks, Chicanos, Chinese, Japanese, or South Koreans in the USA differentiated within its racialised formations? What are the economic, political, cultural and psychic effects of these differential racialisations on the lives of these groups? What are the implications of these effects in terms of how members of one racialised group might relate to those of another? Do these effects produce conditions that foster sympathetic identification and solidarity across groups, or do they create divisions? Of central concern in addressing such questions are the power dynamics which usher racialised social relations and inscribe racialised modes of subjectivity and identity. My argument, as stated in preceding

chapters, is that these racisms are not simply parallel racisms but are intersecting modalities of *differential racialisations marking position-ality across articulating fields of power*. It is important to note that my use of the term 'differential racialisation' differs from Balibar's use of *'differentialist* racism'. Following P. A. Taguieff, Balibar describes 'differentialist racism' as 'a racism whose dominant theme is not biological heredity but the insurmountability of cultural differences, a racism which, at first sight, does not postulate the superiority of certain groups or peoples in relation to others but only the harmfulness of abolishing frontiers, the incompatibility of life-styles and traditions'(Balibar 1991: 21). Balibar's definition is close to what Barker (1982) describes as the 'new racism'. I, on the other hand, wish to use *differential racialisation* as a concept for analysing processes of *relational multi-locationality within and across forma-tions of power marked by the articulation of one form of racism with another, and with other modes of differentiation*. In my schema, 'new racism' would feature as but one instance of a historically specific racism (see previous chapter).

If, as Khachig Tölölian (1991) suggests, contemporary diasporas are the 'exemplary communities of the transnational moment', and the term now overlaps and resonates with meanings of words such as migrant, immigrant, expatriate, refugee, guest worker or exile, then the *concept* of diaspora that I am seeking to elaborate is *an interpretive frame referencing the economic, political and cultural dimensions of these contemporary forms of migrancy*. As such, it interrogates other discourses surrounding the social relations of migrancies in this phase of late twentieth-century capitalism. I now briefly consider how the debate over the construct 'minority' pans out in relation to the concept of diaspora.

DIASPORA AND MINORITY

In Britain there has been a tendency to discuss diaspora primarily along a 'majority/minority' axis. This dichotomy surfaced in post-war Britain as an element underpinning the processes of racialisation. The term 'minority' was applied primarily to British citizens of African, Caribbean and Asian descent – a postcolonial code that operated as a polite substitute for 'coloured people'. The elaboration of the discourse of 'minorities' marks the fraught histories, now widely documented, of immigration control, policing, racial violence, infer-iorisation and discrimination that has become the hallmark of daily

life of these groups. This discourse also resonates with older connotations of the term in classical liberal political theory, where women, subjugated colonial peoples and working classes tend to be associated with the status of being a 'minor in tutelage' (Spelman 1988; Lloyd 1990; Phillips 1991). Even when the majority/minority dichotomy is mobilised in order to signal unequal power relations, as is the case in studies that document discrimination against 'minorities', its usage remains problematic. This is partly because the numerical referent of this dichotomy encourages a literal reading, reducing the problem of power relations to one of numbers, with the result that the repeated circulation of the discourse has the effect of naturalising rather than challenging the power differential. Moreover, conceptualising social relations primarily in terms of dichotomous oppositions, as I have pointed out above, fails to take full account of the multidimensionality of power.

In the USA, there has been a degree of serious and sustained attempt by some scholars to re-valorise the term from a different perspective. Since I am broadly in agreement with their arguments but also hold some reservations, it is, perhaps, necessary to ask where my argument situates itself with respect to the concept of 'minority discourse' which they offer. This concept was first proposed by JanMohammed and Lloyd in 1986, at a conference entitled 'The Nature and Context of Minority Discourse', held at the University of California, Berkeley. The papers presented at this conference were published in an edited collection of the same title (JanMohammed and Lloyd 1990). This is a theoretically and politically engaged volume whose influence in the USA in sanctioning the concept of 'minority discourse' has been far reaching. The editors define 'minority discourse' as follows:

> By 'minority discourse' we mean a theoretical articulation of the political and cultural structures that connect different minority cultures in their subjugation and opposition to the dominant culture.
>
> (JanMohammed and Lloyd 1990: ix)

One of the stated aims of the conference was 'to define a field of discourse among various minority cultures'. The project was conceived as a means of 'marginalising the center' and displacing the 'core-periphery model'. As Barbara Christian, invoking the works of other black women such as June Jordan and Audre Lorde, argues in the same volume, it is crucial to 'distinguish the desire for power from

the need to become empowered' (ibid.: 47), and hence to critique any moves to want to be at the centre. JanMohammed is careful to point out that a minority location is 'not a question of essence (as the stereotypes of minorities in dominant ideologies would want us to believe) but a question of position, subject position that in the final analysis can be defined only in "political" terms – that is, in terms of the effects of economic exploitation, political disenfranchisement, social manipulation, and ideological domination on the cultural formation of minority subjects and discourses' (ibid.: 9). Similarly, David Lloyd's contribution to the collection addresses *inter alia* the interplay of 'race', gender and class in the construction of minorities as political and cultural categories within the liberal theory of political representation. Pointing to an inextricable linkage of aesthetic and political concepts of representation in ' . . . a western discourse of "the human" conceived as universally valid but effectively ethnocentric' (ibid.: 379), Lloyd examines the challenge posed to such hegemonic exercises of power when, as in the works of Jean Genet, there is a refusal of these modes of 'subjection'.

My overall sympathy for this project will be evident from what I have argued so far, not least because JanMohammed and Lloyd are far from endorsing a conception of 'minorities' that does not foreground socio-economic and cultural relations of power. Yet I am less than convinced about the use of the concept of '*minority* discourse'. I have already expressed my concern with respect to the more literal readings that the word minority tends to engender, as well as the related issue to which David Lloyd also draws attention, namely the association in classical liberal political theory of certain categories of 'minorities' with the status of being a 'minor in tutelage'. These connotations have yet to disappear. Moreover, there is a tendency to use the term 'minority' primarily to refer to racialised or ethnicised groups, and I believe that this tendency is not confined to Britain. The discourse then becomes an alibi for pathologised representations of these groups. In other words, given the genealogy of signifying practices centred around the idea of 'minority', the continuing use of the term is less likely to undermine than to reiterate this nexus of meanings.

I am aware that it is possible to turn a term on its head and imbue it with new meanings, and that the construction of this new discourse of 'minority discourse' is intended as just such a project. Nevertheless, in the absence of a political movement such as the Black Power Movement which successfully dislodged the negative associations of

black in racist representations, I presently remain sceptical that, irrespective of intent, any moves that perpetuate the circulation of the minority/majority dichotomy will not serve to reinforce the hegemonic relations that inscribe this dichotomy. What category of person is 'minoritised' in a specific discourse? Are dominant classes a 'minority' since, numerically, they are almost always in the minority? If the aim is to use the term as a synonym for subordination and thereby to become all-inclusive by bringing all subordinate classes, genders, ethnicities or sexualities within its orbit, then there would seem to be even less to gain by jettisoning the language of subordination which, at the very least, signals inequities of power. As an alternative, I do not wish to offer some all-embracing panacea, but rather to insist that, in so far as it is possible, the conceptual categories we employ should be able to resist hegemonic cooptation.

The concept of diaspora that I wish to propose here is embedded within a multi-axial understanding of power; one that problematises the notion of 'minority/majority'. A multi-axial performative conception of power highlights the ways in which a group constituted as a 'minority' along one dimension of differentiation may be constructed as a 'majority' along another. And since all these markers of 'difference' represent articulating and performative facets of power, the 'fixing' of collectivities along any singular axis is called seriously into question. In other words, 'minorities' are positioned in relation not only to 'majorities' but also with respect to one another, and vice versa. Moreover, individual subjects may occupy 'minority' and 'majority' positions simultaneously, and this has important implications for the formation of subjectivity.

What this means is that where several diasporas intersect – African, Jewish, Irish, South Asian, and so on – it becomes necessary to examine how these groups are similarly or differently constructed *vis-à-vis* one another. Such relational positioning will, in part, be structured with reference to the main dominant group. But, there are aspects of the relationship between these diasporic trajectories that are irreducible to mediation via metropolitan discourse. India and Africa, for instance, have connections that pre-date by many centuries those initiated via British colonialism. In contemporary Britain, too, the act of conversion to Islam by people of African-Caribbean descent, for instance, cannot be understood exclusively as a reaction to British racism, any more than the positionality of an African, Arab or South Asian Jew in Britain can be encapsulated solely within the European discourse of anti-semitism. There are

other transnational histories, diasporic connections – where Europe is not at 'the centre' – which retain a critical bearing on understanding contemporary diasporic formations and their inter-relationships.

By this I do not mean to refer only to those social formations which came under direct European colonial rule. The reconfiguration in modern times of the ancient link between China and Japan, for instance, has not been refracted entirely through the 'Western prism', although the global expansion of both capitalist relations and Western imperialism have, of course, played their part. Chinese and Japanese diasporas in America, therefore, are the bearers of these already entangled histories reconstituted in the modalities of labour migrations to the USA, the politics of World War II (when, for instance, American citizens of Japanese descent were rounded up and interned), the Cold War that followed, in which China was demonised as a communist country, and the present conjuncture when both Japan and China assume, albeit in different ways, a central position in the global social order. The heterogeneity, multiplicity and hybridity of this Asian–American experience, insightfully theorised by Lowe (1991b), articulates these many and varied similarities and differences. What I wish to stress is that the study of diasporic formations in the late twentieth century – as in the case of Chinese and Japanese diasporas in the California of the 1990s – calls for a concept of diaspora in which different historical and contemporary elements are understood, not in tandem, but *in their dia-synchronic relationality.* Such analyses entail engagement with complex arrays of contiguities and contradictions; of changing multilocationality across time and space.

THE HOMING OF DIASPORA, THE DIASPORISING OF HOME

As we noted earlier, the concept of diaspora embodies a subtext of 'home'. What are the implications of this subtext? First, it references another – that of the people who are presumed to be indigenous to a territory. The ways in which indigenous peoples are discursively constituted is, of course, highly variable and context-specific. During imperial conquests the term 'native' came to be associated with pejorative connotations. In the British Empire the transformation of the colonised from native peoples into 'the Native' implicated a variety of structural, political and cultural processes of domination, with the effect that the word Native became a code for subordina-

tion. The British diasporas in the colonies were internally differentiated by class, gender, ethnicity (English, Irish, Scottish, Welsh) and so on, but discourses of Britishness subsumed these differences as the term 'British' assumed a positionality of superiority with respect to the Native. The Native became the Other. In the colonies, the Natives were excluded from 'Britishness' by being subjected as natives. But how does this particular nativist discourse reconfigure in present-day Britain? Of course, there is no overt evocation of the term 'native' but it remains an underlying thematic of racialised conceptions of Britishness. According to racialised imagination, the former colonial Natives and their descendants settled in Britain are not British precisely because they are not seen as being native to Britain: they can be 'in' Britain but not 'of' Britain. The term 'native' is now turned on its head. Whereas in the colonies the 'colonial Native' was inferiorised, in Britain the 'metropolitan Native' is constructed as superior. That is, nativist discourse is mobilised in both cases, but with opposite evaluation of the group constructed as the 'native'.

The invocation of native or indigenous status, however, is not confined to discourses of nationalism. Oppressed peoples such as Native Americans or Native Australians may also mobilise a concept of the positionality of the indigenous, but with quite a different aim. Here, the native positionality becomes the means of struggle against centuries of exploitation, dispossession and marginality. This native subject position articulates a subaltern location. It is important, therefore, to distinguish these claims from those that go into the constitution of structures of dominance. However, it does not always follow that this subaltern location will provide automatic guarantees against essentialist claims of belonging. It cannot be assumed in advance that the hegemonic processes of subordination will invariably be resisted without recourse to the indigene subject position as *the* privileged space of legitimate claims of belonging. What is at stake here is the way in which the indigene subject position is constructed, represented and mobilised. Oppositional politics from a subaltern location must contend with all manner of contradictions. Can 'first nationhood' be asserted as a 'native' identity while renouncing nativism? How precisely is the 'first nationhood' of subaltern groups to be distinguished from the claims to this status by groups in positions of dominance? How do subaltern indigenous peoples place themselves *vis-à-vis* other subordinate groups in a locale? For instance, how do the claims for social justice by Native Americans

articulate with and become 'situated' in relation to those made by black Americans? Are such claims marked by a politics of solidarity or competitive antagonism and tension? In one sense, the problematic can only be fully addressed by studying particular cases. But the answer will depend, at least in part, upon the way that the question of 'origins' is treated – in naturalised and essentialist terms, or as historically constituted (dis)placements?

Where is home? On the one hand, 'home' is a mythic place of desire in the diasporic imagination. In this sense it is a place of no return, even if it is possible to visit the geographical territory that is seen as the place of 'origin'. On the other hand, home is also the lived experience of a locality. Its sounds and smells, its heat and dust, balmy summer evenings, or the excitement of the first snowfall, shivering winter evenings, sombre grey skies in the middle of the day... all this, as mediated by the historically specific everyday of social relations. In other words, the varying experience of the pains and pleasures, the terrors and contentments, or the highs and humdrum of everyday lived culture that marks how, for example, a cold winter night might be differently experienced sitting by a crackling fireside in a mansion as compared with standing huddled around a makeshift fire on the streets of nineteenth-century England.

If, as is quite possible, the reader pictured the subjects of this cold winter scenario as white English men and women, it bears reminding that this would not invariably be the case. The group huddled on the street might easily have included men and women brought over to England as servants from Africa and India; the descendants of Africans taken as slaves to the Americas; as well as Irish, Jewish and other immigrants. What effects might this type of intra-class differentiation have in the marking of affinities and antagonisms *amongst* those on the street and *between* the street and the mansion? What range of subjectivities and subject positions would have been produced in this crucible? What are the implications for late twentieth-century Britain of certain ways of imaging 'Englishness' that erases such nineteenth-century, and indeed earlier, 'multiculturalisms'? The question of home, therefore, is intrinsically linked with the the way in which processes of inclusion or exclusion operate and are subjectively experienced under given circumstances. It is centrally about our political and personal struggles over the social regulation of 'belonging'. As Gilroy (1993) suggests, it is simultaneously about roots and routes.

The *concept* of diaspora places the discourse of 'home' and

'dispersion' in creative tension, *inscribing a homing desire while simultaneously critiquing discourses of fixed origins.*

The problematic of 'home' and belonging may be integral to the diasporic condition, but how, when, and in what form questions surface, or how they are addressed, is specific to the history of a particular diaspora. Not all diasporas inscribe homing desire through a wish to return to a place of 'origin'. For some, such as the South Asian groups in Trinidad, cultural identification with the Asian sub-continent might be by far the most important element.

We noted earlier that diasporas are not synonymous with casual temporary travel. Nor is diaspora a metaphor for individual exile but, rather, diasporas emerge out of migrations of collectivities, whether or not members of the collectivity travel as individuals, as households or in various other combinations . Diasporas are places of long-term, if not permanent, community formations, even if some households or members move on elsewhere. The word diaspora often invokes the imagery of traumas of separation and dislocation, and this is certainly a very important aspect of the migratory experience. But diasporas are also potentially the sites of hope and new beginnings. They are contested cultural and political terrains where individual and collective memories collide, reassemble and reconfigure.

When does a location *become* home? What is the difference between 'feeling at home' and staking claim to a place as one's own? It is quite possible to feel at home in a place and, yet, the experience of social exclusions may inhibit public proclamations of the place as home (Brah 1979; Cohen 1992; Bhavnani 1991; Tizzard and Phoenix 1993). A black British young woman of Jamaican parentage may well be far more at home in London than in Kingston, Jamaica, but she may insist upon defining herself as Jamaican and/or Caribbean as a way of affirming an identity which she perceives is being denigrated when racism represents black people as being outside 'Britishness'. Alternatively, another young woman with a similar background might seek to repudiate the same process of exclusion by asserting a black British identity. The subjectivity of the two women is inscribed within differing political practices and they occupy different subject positions. They articulate different political positions on the question of 'home', although both are likely to be steeped in the highly mixed diasporic cultures of Britain. On the other hand, each woman may embody both of these positions at different moments, and the circumstances of the moment at which such 'choices' are made by the same person are equally critical.

Clearly, the relationship of the first generation to the place of migration is different from that of subsequent generations, mediated as it is by memories of what was recently left behind, and by the experiences of disruption and displacement as one tries to re-orientate, to form new social networks, and learns to negotiate new economic, political and cultural realities. Within each generation the experiences of men and women will also be differently shaped by gender relations. The reconfigurations of these social relations will not be a matter of direct superimposition of patriarchal forms deriving from the country of emigration over those that obtain in the country to which migration has occurred. Rather, both elements will undergo transformations as they articulate in and through specific policies, institutions and modes of signification.

The *concept* of diaspora signals these processes of *multi-location-ality across geographical, cultural and psychic boundaries.*

It bears repeating that the double, triple, or multi-placedness of 'home' in the imaginary of people in the diaspora does not mean that such groups do not feel anchored in the place of settlement. When a British politician such as Norman Tebbit, the former Conservative Cabinet Minister, argues that young British Asians cannot feel allegiance to Britain if they support a visiting cricket team from India or Pakistan, his 'cricket test' is more a reflection of the politics of 'race' in Britain than an indicator of British Asians' subjective sense of their own 'Britishness'. It is unlikely that Tebbit would question the allegiance of populations of European origin in the Americas, Australia, Canada or New Zealand to their countries of adoption. Or that he would consider them less rooted in those places for having ancestors that came there from Europe. It would be interesting to see if Tebbit would describe Irish Americans or Italian Americans as less committed to the USA because they had enthusiastically supported Irish or Italian football teams in the 1994 World Cup. Paradoxically, racialised forms of nationalism which discourses such as that initiated by Tebbit inhabit are precisely the ones which might engender responses whereby to call oneself Bangladeshi, Indian, Pakistani, or Sri Lankan becomes a mode of resistance against racist definitions of 'Asian-ness'. But the assertion of such 'identity' cannot be taken as a measure of the processes of 'identification' operating among these collectivities. Norman Tebbit's restricted vision of Britishness is seriously inter-rogated and called into question by all kinds of old and new diasporic identities in Britain. These identity formations challenge

the idea of a continuous, uninterrupted, unchanging, homogeneous and stable British identity; instead, they highlight the point that identity is always plural and in process, even when it might be construed or represented as fixed.

THE LOCAL AND THE GLOBAL OF DIASPORA

A combination of the local and the global is always an important aspect of diasporic identities. But the relationship between these elements varies. The diasporas proliferating at the end of the twentieth century will be experienced quite differently, in some respects, in this age of new technologies and rapid communications compared with the time when it took months to travel or communicate across the seas. The impact of electronic media, together with growing opportunities for fast travel, invests Marshall McLuhan's idea of 'the global village' with new meanings. Simultaneous transmission to countries linked by satellite means that an event happening in one part of the world can be 'watched together' by people in different parts of the globe. Electronic information 'super-highways' usher new forms of communication unimaginable only two decades ago. These developments have important implications for the construction of new and varied 'imagined communities'. Having said this, it does not necessarily follow that there will be a single overarching one-way process of cultural homogenisation, not least because global consumption of visual or other forms of culture is mediated in complex ways (Hall *et al.* 1992)

The effects are not totally predictable, for there can be many and varied readings of the same image. The same image can elicit a diversity of meanings, signalling the effects of personal biography and cultural context on processes of meaning production. In other words, the compression of time and space and the consequent 'shrinking' of the world can have contradictory outcomes. There are, on the one hand, possibilities for greater awareness of global inequalities leading to transnational modes of cooperation in the development of strategies to combat such inequalities. New forms of political solidarity and activism could emerge to meet the challenges of this era. There could be the release of much creative energy, resulting in transformation in politics, art, music, literature and other forms of cultural production. On the other hand, globalism today is the very means of encoding the changing post-Cold War world order. It is the vehicle for securing cultural hegemony in the age of 'G-Eightism' now

that, as of July 1994, Russia has been admitted to the political, if not yet the economic, inner sanctum of the Group of Seven. This globalism of late capitalism inscribes the economic and political terrain against which the new migrations are taking place, a terrain with which both the old and new diasporas must contend, a point I develop further in the next section.

Diasporic identities are at once local and global. They are networks of transnational identifications encompassing 'imagined' and 'encountered' communities.

WHITHER DIASPORA?

The term diaspora can be very general and all-embracing. This is both its strength and its weakness. Its purchase as a theoretical construct rests largely on its analytical reach; its explanatory power in dealing with the specific problematics associated with transnational movements of people, capital, commodities and cultural iconographies. I have argued that diasporas ought not to be theorised as transhistorical codifications of eternal migrations, or conceptualised as the embodiment of some transcendental diasporic consciousness. Rather, the concept of diaspora should be seen to refer to historically contingent 'genealogies', in the Foucauldian sense of the word. That is to say that the term should be seen as conceptual mapping which defies the search for originary absolutes, or genuine and authentic manifestations of a stable, pre-given, unchanging identity; for pristine, pure customs and traditions or unsullied glorious pasts.

I have indicated that diasporas are composite formations with members of a single diaspora likely to be spread across several different parts of the world. What enables us to mobilise the word diaspora as a conceptual category in analysing these composite formations, as opposed to using it simply as a description of different migrations, is that the concept of diaspora specifies a matrix of economic, political and cultural inter-relationships which construct the commonalty between the various components of a dispersed group. The concept of diaspora delineates a field of identifications where 'imagined communities' are forged within and out of a confluence of narratives from annals of collective memory and rememory. It is important to stress that diaspora is a pan-*ic* concept.

As a description of distinct historical experiences diaspora represents a heterogeneous category differentiated along the lines of class, gender, and so on. I have argued that the concept of diaspora

addresses this internal differentiation as much as the one which exists across globally scattered parts of a particular diasporic population. Throughout the discussion I have emphasised circuits of power embedded within discourses, institutions and practices that inscribe diasporic experiences. In so doing I have mobilised a multi-axial performative conception of power: power is understood as relational, coming into play within multiple sites across micro and macro fields.

Following Tölöian, I understand contemporary diasporas as 'exemplary communities' of late twentieth-century forms of migrancy. They resonate with the meaning of words such as immigrant, migrant, refugee and asylum-seeker. This does not mean that the term diaspora is a substitute for these varying conditions underlying population movements. Not at all. Rather, the concept of diaspora signals the similarity and difference of precisely these conditions. I have stressed that the study of diasporas calls for a concept of diaspora in which historical and contemporary elements are understood in their *diachronic relationality.*

In examining the subtext of 'home' which the concept of diaspora embodies I have analysed the problematic of the indigene subject position and its precarious relationship to nativist discourses. A key issue here is whether the question of 'origins' is treated in essentialist terms or as a matter of historical displacements. I argue that the concept of diaspora offers a critique of discourses of fixed origins, while taking account of a homing desire. The homing desire, however, is not the same as the desire for a 'homeland'. Contrary to general belief, not all diasporas sustain an ideology of return. Moreover, the multi-placedness of home in the diasporic imaginary does not mean that diasporian subjectivity is 'rootless'. I argue for a distinction between 'feeling at home' and declaring a place as home. Processes of diasporic identity formation are exemplars *par excellence* of the claim that identity is always plural, and in process. The relationship between the two is subject to the politics in play under given sets of circumstances. In other words, the concept of diaspora refers to *multi-locationality* within and across territorial, cultural and psychic boundaries.

The concept of diaspora then emerges as an *ensemble of investigative technologies* that historicise trajectories of different diasporas, map their relationality, and interrogate, for example, what the search for origins signifies in the history of a particular diaspora; *how* and *why* originary absolutes are imagined; how the materiality of economic, political and signifying practices is experienced; what new

subject positions are created and assumed; how particular fields of power articulate in the construction of hierarchies of domination and subordination in a given context; why certain *conceptions of identity* come into play in a given situation, and whether or not these conceptions are reinforced or challenged and contested by the *play of identities.*

THINKING THROUGH BORDERS

Embedded within the concept of diaspora is the notion of the border, and, indeed, it is not possible to address the concept of diaspora without considering its relationship to the idea of borders. It is to this construct that I now turn.

Borders: arbitrary dividing lines that are simultaneously social, cultural and psychic; territories to be patrolled against those whom they construct as outsiders, aliens, the Others; forms of demarcation where the very act of prohibition inscribes transgression; zones where fear of the Other is the fear of the self; places where claims to ownership – claims to 'mine', 'yours' and 'theirs' – are staked out, contested, defended, and fought over.

Gloria Anzaldua's theorisation of border and borderlands provides important insights. Two are especially important for my purposes here. First, she uses these terms as a means to reflect upon social conditions of life at the Texas–US Southwest/Mexican border where, as she says, 'the Third World grates against the first and bleeds' (Anzaldua 1987: 3). She invokes the concept of the border also as a metaphor for psychological, sexual, spiritual, cultural, class and racialised boundaries. If understood in terms of my discussion of 'difference' in Chapter Five, the Anzaldua text speaks of borders simultaneously as social relation, the everyday lived experience, and subjectivity/identity. Borders are arbitrary constructions. Hence, in a sense, they are always metaphors. But, far from being mere abstractions of a concrete reality, metaphors are part of the discursive materiality of power relations. Metaphors can serve as powerful inscriptions of the effects of political borders.

Each border embodies a unique narrative, even while it resonates with common themes with other borders. Such metaphoric materiality of each border calls attention to its specific features: to the geographical and/or psychic territories demarcated; to the experiences of particular groups of people who are sundered apart or affected in other ways by the creation of a certain border zone; or to

the old and new states which may be abolished or installed by the drawing of particular boundaries. How is a border regulated or policed? Who is kept out and why? What are the realities for those stigmatised as *undesirable* border-crossers? The realities, for instance, of proclaiming a gay or lesbian identity in a social context saturated with homophobia and heterosexism, as Anzaldua shows. Or the realities of present-day labour migrants negotiating the immigration apparatus of the state: difficulties of gaining visas, confronting immigration checks, detentions and deportations, and even facing the possibility in some circumstances of losing one's life.

The USA/Mexico border typifies the conditions of contemporary migrancy. It encapsulates certain common thematics which frequently come into play whenever the 'overdeveloped' countries institute measures to control selectively the entry of peoples from economically 'underdeveloped' segments of the globe. This border speaks the fate of formerly colonised people presently caught up in the workings of a global economy dominated by transnational capital and mediated by politics of 'G-Sevenism' or 'G-Eightism'. These new regimes of accumulation are characterised by 'flexibility' (or what perhaps will increasingly be referred to as 'adaptability', the term favoured by the G7 summit of 10 July 1994) in labour processes, labour markets, commodities, and in patterns of consumption. There is an intensification in the segmentation of the labour market into a comparatively small sector of highly skilled core staff at managerial and professional level, and a much larger group of employees who are often called 'peripheral' workers but whose labour is in fact central to the functioning of the global economy. The core staff hold well-paid full-time permanent jobs with good promotion and re-training prospects. They are expected to be flexible and adaptable and, when required, geographically mobile, but any inconvenience that this may generate is offset by the security of entitlement to pensions, insurance and other benefits. The so-called 'peripheral' employees working in the 'secondary labour market' are generally low paid, and they comprise two distinct sub-groups. The first of these consists of full-time employees performing skilled or semi-skilled jobs. High turnover rates are fairly typical of this type of employment. Providing an even greater level of flexibility is the second group that includes a wide variety of part-timers, temporary staff, fixed-term contract holders, job sharers, and homeworkers. Not surprisingly, as we noted in the last chapter, there is a predominance of women, immigrant and migrant workers (both male and female) and their descendants, as

well as other low-paid categories of worker in this secondary labour market.

The late twentieth-century forms of transnational movement of capital and people usher new kinds of diasporic formations. The rapid rate of technological, commercial, and organisational innovation is accompanied by a proliferation of new methods of production, new markets, new products and services, and new systems of financing. The accelerated mobility of capital to wherever profitability can be maximised within domestic boundaries or overseas has a particular bearing on population movements. A combination of offshore and onshore relocation of jobs, alongside a continuing demand for migrant labour for certain kinds of low-paid work in the economically advanced 'cores', is resulting in an eruption of new borders, while the old borders are subjected to processes of entrenchment or erosion (Sassen 1988; Rouse 1991; Miles 1993).

Roger Rouse, for example, provides a telling example of the shifting nature of such borders in the face of 'late' capitalism. Using as a case in point his study of US-bound migration since the early 1940s from a rural *municipio* of Aguilla in Mexico, he shows how these migrants have increasingly become part of a transnational network of settlements. By the early 1980s, almost every family in the *municipio* had a member who had worked abroad, and the local economy was heavily dependent on migrant remittances. In time these migrants have established several outposts in the United States, working largely in the service sector as cleaners, dishwashers, gardeners, hotel workers, housekeepers and child care workers. There is frequent traffic and communication between these outposts in the USA and Aguilla, with 'homes' dispersed in several places. In a sense they are *simultaneously migrants and settlers*, negotiating their personal agendas in a political context in which the demand for their labour has been set against increasing political pressure for tighter immigration controls.

The growing polarisation of the labour market in the United States has increased demand for Mexican workers to fill the lowest layers of jobs, in agriculture, on the assembly line and in the service sector. At the same time, new legal restrictions designed to regulate the flow of migrants have been imposed in the face of intensification of racism and growing political pressure against a background of job losses in certain sectors of the economy. Racism is fuelled also by the fact that certain elements of capital find it increasingly more lucrative to locate some aspects of the labour process in Mexico. Mexican workers now suffer resentment for 'taking our jobs' in the USA *and* in Mexico.

These tropes of resentment construct the worker as an embodiment of capital rather than its contradiction. Thus there emerges the paradox of the *'undocumented worker' – needed to service lower rungs of the economy, but criminalised, forced to go underground, rendered invisible; that is, cast as a phantom, an absent presence that shadows the nooks and crannies wherever low-paid work is performed.*

The contradictions surrounding 'undocumented workers' within racialised patriarchal formations in the heart of advanced economies was brought into sharp focus by the controversy that became known as the 'Nannygate Scandal' (*Newsweek*: 1 Feb. 1993) over the employment of an 'undocumented' Peruvian couple by President Clinton's nominee for Attorney-General, Zoe Baird. When the news about this employment practice broke out, Zoe Baird, the first female nominee for the position of Attorney-General, a corporate lawyer with a reported annual salary of $500,000 and a stately home, used the difficulties of finding good child care as an explanation of why she hired a Peruvian couple who were illegally resident in the USA. She paid the couple $500 a week to take care of her child and to provide other household help. Her appeals for sympathy on the grounds of the dilemma facing 'working mothers' did little to advance her case with her male colleagues. Arrangements for child care – a rather mundane issue for many of them – could hardly compete in the league table of importance with 'matters of state'. This is not surprising, of course, given that child care is globally still perceived primarily as the responsibility of women. Women's groups in the USA, such as the National Organisation for Women, pointed to a double standard working against women in public office. As the editorial of the *New York Times* (9 Feb. 1993) argued, a male senator whose wife had employed workers without legal rights of residence would be unlikely to have been disqualified from office.

On the other hand, opposition to Zoe Baird was not confined to men. Women with incomes much lower than Baird's pointed to her class privilege, arguing that they could not accept her explanation since she had all the financial and other resources at her command to employ a nanny without breaking the law. There was some comment in the print and visual media about the problems of child care faced by households in which both parents are employed. However, public opinion seemed to have been far more strongly galvanised against Baird's evasion of tax laws due to her failure to pay social security taxes for her employees. The general view seemed to hold that someone with her income and legal background who

can readily afford to pay taxes should not breach her legal obligations.

The debate centred mainly on the question of the employment of 'illegal immigrants' and the non-payment of social security taxes by a prospective minister of the state who would be responsible for administering the Immigration and Naturalisaton laws. Baird's testimony generated very little comment or discussion on the subject of the exploitation of migrant workers in low-wage sectors of the economy, despite the presentation of a variety of statistics in the media that clearly demonstrated this aspect. The *Newsweek* article cited above pointed out that violation of the 1986 law prohibiting employment of illegal immigrants was common at all levels of society. The employment of such workers was not confined to upper-class American households. The article referred to a survey conducted by the Families and Work Institute in New York that showed how assembly-line workers in Texas hire Mexican women coming across the border as domestic workers at ten dollars a day. In Chicago a child care placement firm, Nannies Midwest, claimed that 60–70 per cent of the nannies in the area were 'undocumented' workers. A majority of them are likely to work very long hours cooking, cleaning and taking care of the children. Some of them hold university degrees or professional qualifications. They come not only from the Caribbean, Central and South America and the Pacific Rim countries but also from Eastern Europe.

According to the US Internal Revenue Service, of the two million households in the USA that employ domestic help, only one quarter pay social security taxes for them. Following the uproar over the case of Zoe Baird, the Clinton administration introduced screening procedures in order to discover if potential candidates for presidential appointments had been culpable of employing 'illegal aliens' (*New York Times*: 9 Feb. 1993). This incident served to bring into the public domain the complicity of public and private institutions and people in all walks of life in the maintenance of an informal economy embedded within the interstices of local and global inequalities. But, far from challenging the discourse of the 'undocumented worker', this public furore re-inscribed it, pathologising the migrant workers as *the* problem. *In other words the exclusionary practices that underlie constructions of the 'undocumented worker' as a juridical subject were naturalised alongside a simultaneous legitimation of the very legal processes that had produced the juridical category in the first place.*

Immigration policies such as the employer sanctions contained in

US immigration law and equivalent measures operated by immigration control agencies in Britain and elsewhere create border zones not only at the port of entry but also internally. In Britain, business premises are known to have been raided by immigration agencies in search of suspected 'illegal immigrants'. There are cases when all those *assumed* by the immigration officers to be 'immigrant' workers – that is, someone not white, or seeming as if they were from an 'underdeveloped' country – were questioned during these 'fishing raids', even if they were legally settled in Britain (Gordon 1985).

In these situations, colour or 'looks' often serve as the racialised signifier in and through which economic inequalities and state policies articulate. There are no such barriers to the mobility of capital. Rather, multinational companies receive special dispensations for offshore production in countries with low-wage economies. The new intersections between global flows of capital and transnational circuits of migrations interrogate the boundaries presupposed by such concepts as core and periphery, centre and margin, rural and urban, or First and Third World, even as the inequities that these concepts were presumed to signal persist on a wide scale. This is part of the terrain on which contemporary diasporic social relations are constituted and lived.

The idea of 'border theory'

Increasingly, ·the idea of 'border theory' is invoked to refer to scholarship that addresses 'borders' both in their geographical and analytical sense. The concept of 'deterritorialisation' proposed by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari has been used in a number of analyses of literary texts presumed to constitute 'border writing' (Lloyd 1990; Hicks 1991; Calderon and Salvidar 1991). Deleuze and Guattari have identified 'deterritorialisation' as a distinctive feature of what they call 'minor literature' – that is, literature with its primary characteristics defined in opposition to canonical writing. Minor literature, they contend, is marked by 'the deterritorialisation of language, the connection of the individual to a political immediacy, and the collective assemblage of enunciation' (Deleuze and Guattari 1986 [1975]: 13). The concept of deterritorialisation is understood as describing the displacement and dislocation of identities, persons and meanings, with the moment of alienation and exile located in language and literature. It refers to the effects of a rupture between signifier and signified, so that 'all forms come undone, as do all the

significations, signifiers, and signifieds to the benefit of an unformed matter of deterritorialised flux, of nonsignifying signs' (ibid.).

While the attraction of such a term in analysing literary texts is understandable, its generalised applicability is much more problematic. The literary trope of 'border writing' can be important in elucidating certain aspects of border encounters. As Emily Hicks suggests, border writing articulates a textual strategy of translation as opposed to representation. She argues that it enacts non-synchronous memory and offers the reader the possibility of practising multi-dimensional perception. The reader enters a multi-layered semiotic matrix, and experiences multi-lingual, cross-cultural realities. I agree with Hicks that 'border writing' offers a rich, multi-faceted and nuanced depiction of border histories. My cautionary note here is aimed at the tendency to conflate 'border theory' with analysis of 'border writing', especially when the latter is used as a synonym for literary texts. Literary texts constitute but one element of border textualities. The concept of 'territory' as well as its signifieds and significations is a contested site in diaspora and border positionalities, where the issue of territorialisation, deterritorialisation or reterritorialisation is a matter of political struggle. The outcomes of these contestations cannot be predicted in advance. *In other words, the move from a literary text to 'world as text' is much more fraught, contradictory, complex and problematic than is often acknowledged.*

BORDER, DIASPORA AND THE POLITICS OF LOCATION

Together, the concepts of border and diaspora reference a politics of location. This point warrants emphasis, especially because the very strong association of notions of diaspora with displacement and dislocation means that the experience of *location* can easily dissolve out of focus. Indeed, it is the contradictions of and between location and dislocation that are a regular feature of diasporic positioning. Feminist politics have constituted an important site where issues of home, location, displacement and dislocation have long been a subject of contention and debate. Out of these debates emerges the notion of a 'politics of location' as *locationality in contradiction* -- that is, a positionality of dispersal; of simultaneous situatedness within gendered spaces of class, racism, ethnicity, sexuality, age; of movement across shifting cultural, religious and linguistic boundaries; of journeys across geographical and psychic borders. Following a strand

of the discussion in earlier parts of this chapter I would describe the politics of location *as a position of multi-axial locationality.* But politics is the operative word here, for multi-axial locationality does not predetermine what kind of subject positions will be constructed or assumed, and with what effects.

Self-reflexive autobiographical accounts often provide critical insights into political ramifications of border crossings across multiple positioning. One such account, an essay by Minnie Bruce Pratt entitled 'Identity: Skin, Blood, Heart' (Pratt 1984), has attracted attention in feminist analysis for its commitment to unravelling operations of power that naturalise identities inscribed in positions of privilege, and the different costs involved in maintaining or relinquishing lived certainties attendant upon such positions. This text reveals what is to be gained when a narrative about identity continuously interrogates and problematises the very notion of a stable and essential identity by deconstructing the narrator's own position, in this case that of a white, middle-class, lesbian feminist raised as a Christian in the southern United States. Pratt is able to hold her various 'homes' and 'identities' in perpetual suspension even as she tries to recapture them in re-memory. She enacts her locationality from different subject positions, picking apart her position of racialised class privilege simultaneously as she works through her own experiences of coming out as a lesbian and confronting heterosexism in its many and varied manifestations. A critical strategy that enables this narrative to refuse reductive impulses is that it works at a number of different levels, addressing *the linked materiality of the social, the cultural, and the subjective.* As Biddy Martin and Chandra Talpade Mohanty point out:

> the narrative politicises the geography, demography, and architecture of these communities – Pratt's homes at various times of her history – by discovering local histories of exploitation and struggle. These histories are quite unlike the ones she is familiar with, the ones she grew up with. Pratt problematises her ideas about herself by juxtaposing the assumed histories of her family and childhood, predicated on the invisibility of the histories of people unlike her, to whom these geographical sites were also home.
>
> (Martin and Mohanty 1986: 195)

Pratt examines how her sense of safety in the world was largely related to her unquestioning acceptance of the normative codes of her social milieu, and the structures of legitimation that underpinned

these norms. She is particularly attentive to the workings of racism as one of the central dynamics binding this Southern community together. The tenuous nature of her security and sense of belonging is revealed to her when, as a lesbian mother fighting for the custody of her children, she comes face-to-face with the heterosexism embedded not only in state structures but also in the everyday cultural practices taken for granted by her family, friends and the people she had considered as her 'community'. The withdrawal of emotional support by those whom she had previously loved throws into total disarray the concept of home and community which she had hitherto envisioned. Engulfed by a sense of dislocation and loss, Pratt 'moves home', and she chooses this moment of cultural and psychic journeying to learn about the processes which sustain social relations and subjectivities that had been at the centre of the world she had taken for granted.

While Pratt's narrative addresses the social universe of a white woman growing up in Alabama during the civil rights struggles, Angela Davis's autobiography articulates the positionality of a black woman growing up in Alabama at about the same time. A juxtaposition of these two narratives is helpful in offering related accounts of the operations of racism and class in the constitution of gendered forms of white and black subjectivity against the backdrop of a turbulent period in recent American history. Both women invoke the segregated South of their childhood, but their memories construct an experiential landscape charted from opposite sides of the racial divide. Pratt speaks of the terror endemic in the racist cultural formations of the South. Angela Davis recounts how this terror was unleashed on the black people in her hometown. She relates how she felt when, at the age of four, her family moved into an all-white area:

> Almost immediately after we moved there the white people got together and decided on a borderline between them and us. Center street became the line of demarcation. Provided we stayed on 'our' side of the line (the east side) they let it be known we would be left in peace. If we ever crossed over to their side, war would be declared. Guns were hidden in our house and vigilance was constant.
>
> (Davis 1974 [1990]: 78)

Racism was experienced by this four-year-old in the form of hostility from the white elderly couple who now became their neighbours:

> the way they stood a hundred feet away and glared at us, their refusal to speak when we said 'Good Afternoon' . . . sat on the

porch all the time, their eyes heavy with belligerence.... When a black minister and his wife transgressed the racial border and bought the house next door to the white elderly couple, the minister's house was bombed. As more black families continued to move in the bombings were such a constant response that soon our neighborhood became known as Dynamite Hill.

(ibid.: 79)

Davis draws attention to class and gender differences both amongst and between black and white people, and to the conditions under which solidarities across these differentiations are made possible. One of the most poignant moments in the text is when, as a student in France, Davis reads a newspaper report about the racist bombing of a church in Birmingham, Alabama, and realises that the four girls named as killed are her friends. Her fellow students show sympathy but fail to grasp the systematic impact of racism as an institutional and cultural phenomenon underlying such violence, and instead treat the incident as one would a sudden 'accident' – 'as if my friends had just been killed in a crash'. Davis's account, quite rightly, does not ascribe this lack of understanding to their being white, but rather to the absence of an awareness on their part of the history of racism in the USA. Yet, awareness alone might still not have produced an understanding of this history. A deeper engagement with this history would inevitably call for a radical shift in subject position, of the kind that Pratt's narrative demonstrates. The point is that the issue is not simply one of acquiring knowledge but of deconstructing 'whiteness' as a social relation, as well as an experiential modality of subjectivity and identity (see Chapter Five on 'difference'; also Breines 1992; Ware 1992; Hall 1992; Frankenberg 1993).

What is especially important for the present discussion about these autobiographical accounts is the way in which they reveal how the same geographical space comes to articulate different histories and meanings, such that 'home' can simultaneously be a place of safety and terror. They also underscore what I have suggested before, namely that diasporic or border positionality does not *in itself* assure a vantage point of privileged insight into and understanding of relations of power, although it does create a space in which experiential mediations may intersect in ways that render such understandings more readily accessible. It is essentially a question of politics. Diasporic identities cannot be read off in a one-to-one fashion straightforwardly from a border positionality, in the same

way that a feminist subject position cannot be deduced from the category 'woman'. This point deserves emphasis especially because the proliferation of discourses about 'border crossings' and 'diasporic identities' might be taken to imply a common standpoint or a universalised notion of 'border consciousness'. Rather, there are multiple semiotic spaces at diasporic borders, and the probability of certain forms of consciousness emerging are subject to the play of political power and psychic investments in the maintenance or erosion of the status quo.

DIASPORA SPACE AND THE CREOLISATION OF THEORY

The concepts of diaspora, borders, and multi-axial locationality together offer a conceptual grid for historicised analyses of contemporary trans/national movements of people, information, cultures, commodities and capital. The concept of diasporas presupposes the idea of borders. Correspondingly, the concept of border encapsulates the idea of diasporising processes. The two are closely intertwined with the notion of the politics of location or dislocation. The three concepts are immanent. I wish to propose the concept of *diaspora space* as the site of this immanence. Diaspora space is the intersectionality of diaspora, border, and dis/location as a point of confluence of economic, political, cultural, and psychic processes. It is where multiple subject positions are juxtaposed, contested, proclaimed or disavowed; where the permitted and the prohibited perpetually interrogate; and where the accepted and the transgressive imperceptibly mingle even while these syncretic forms may be disclaimed in the name of purity and tradition. Here, tradition is itself continually invented even as it may be hailed as originating from the mists of time. What is at stake is the infinite experientiality, the myriad processes of cultural fissure and fusion that underwrite contemporary forms of transcultural identities. These emergent identities may only be surreptitiously avowed. Indeed, they may even be disclaimed or suppressed in the face of constructed imperatives of 'purity'. But they are inscribed in the late twentieth-century forms of syncretism at the core of culture and subjectivity (Hall 1990; Coombes 1992).

The concept of diaspora space references the global condition of 'culture as a site of travel' (Clifford 1992) which seriously problematises the subject position of the 'native'. Diaspora space is the point

at which boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, of belonging and otherness, of 'us' and 'them', are contested. My argument is that diaspora space as a conceptual category is 'inhabited', not only by those who have migrated and their descendants, but equally by those who are constructed and represented as indigenous. In other words, the concept of *diaspora space* (as opposed to that of diaspora) includes the entanglement, the intertwining of the genealogies of dispersion with those of 'staying put'. The diaspora space is the site where *the native is as much a diasporian as the diasporian is the native*. However, by this I do not mean to suggest an undifferentiated relativism. Rather, I see the conceptual category of diaspora space in articulation with the four modes of theorising of difference that I have proposed in Chapter Five, where 'difference' of social relation, experience, subjectivity and identity are relational categories situated within multiaxial fields of power relations. The similarities and differences across the different axes of differentiation – class, racism, gender, sexuality, and so on – articulate and disarticulate in the diaspora space, marking as well as being marked by the complex web of power.

In the diaspora space called 'England', for example, African-Caribbean, Irish, Asian, Jewish and other diasporas intersect among themselves as well as with the entity constructed as 'Englishness', thoroughly re-inscribing it in the process. Englishness has been formed in the crucible of the internal colonial encounter with Ireland, Scotland and Wales; imperial rivalries with other European countries; and imperial conquests abroad. In the post-war period this Englishness is continually reconstituted via a multitude of border crossings in and through other diasporic formations. These border crossings are territorial, political, economic, cultural and psychological. This Englishness is a new ensemble that both appropriates and is in turn appropriated by British-based African-Caribbean-ness, Asian-ness, Irishness and so on. Each of these formations has its own specificity, but it is an ever-changing specificity that adds to as well as imbues elements of the other. What I am proposing here is that border crossings do not occur only across the dominant/dominated dichotomy, but that, equally, there is traffic within cultural formations of the subordinated groups, and that these journeys are not *always* mediated through the dominant culture(s). In my schema such cultural ensembles as British Asian-ness, British Caribbean-ness, or British Cypriot-ness are cross-cutting rather than mutually exclusive configurations. The interesting question, then, is how these British identities take shape; how they are internally differentiated; how they

interrelate with one another and with other British identities; and how they mutually reconfigure and decentre received notions of Englishness, Scottishness, Welshness, or Britishness. *My argument is that they are not 'minority' identities, nor are they at the periphery of something that sees itself as located at the centre, although they may be represented as such.* Rather, through processes of decentring, these new political and cultural formations continually challenge the minoritising and peripheralising impulses of the cultures of dominance. Indeed, it is in this sense that Catherine Hall (1992) makes the important claim that Englishness is just another ethnicity.

I have argued that feminist theorisation of the politics of location is of critical relevance to understanding border positionalities. This, however, is not to minimise the importance of other theoretical and political strands in illuminating diasporising border processes. Insights drawn from analyses of colonialism, imperialism, class, and gay and lesbian politics, for instance, are equally indispensable. Earlier, we noted the growing currency of the term 'border theory' to reference analytical perspectives that, *inter alia*, address some of these aspects. This term jostles with others, such as 'post-colonial theory' and 'diaspora theory'. Here, I am less concerned about the overlaps or differences between and across these conceptual terrains. The point I wish to stress is that these theoretical constructs are best understood as constituting *a point of confluence and intersectionality* where insights emerging from these fields inhere in the production of analytical frames capable of addressing multiple, intersecting, axes of differentiation. In other words, it is a space of/for theoretical crossovers that foreground processes of power inscribing these inter-relationalities; a kind of *theoretical creolisation*. Such creolised envisioning is crucial, in my view, if we are to address fully the contradictions of modalities of enunciation, identities, positionalities and standpoints that are simultaneously 'inside' and 'outside'. It is necessary in order to decode the polymorphous compoundedness of social relations and subjectivity. The concept of diaspora space which I have attempted to elaborate here, and my analysis of 'difference' in a previous chapter, are firmly embedded in a theoretical creolisation of the type described above.

Lecture III

THE POLITICS AND SEMANTICS OF DISPLACEMENT. MIGRANTS , DIASPORAS AND REFUGEES

This lecture will introduce students to the different ways in which human voluntary or forced movements- as well as stasis- are categorised, constructed and defined. We will discuss theorigin and limits of what has been termed as "categorical fetishism" on people's subjectivities but also the risks of jettisoning categories altogether. We will also discuss how the reification of "migrants" is premised on racialised constructions, particularly in Europe.

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Read this blog. Apostolova, R. 2015. "Of Refugees and Migrants: Stigma, Politics, and Boundary Work at the Borders of Europe." American Sociological Association Newsletter,September 14.
https://asaculturesection.org/2015/09/14/of-refugees-and-migrants-stigma-politics-and-boundary-workat-the-borders-of-europe/

Watch Nandita Sharma discuss her new book "Home Rule. National Sovereignty and the separation of Natives and Migrants" Duke University Press, 2020.
https://youtu.be/MBChnzaT3zc?feature=shared

Lived Refuge

Gratitude, Resentment, Resilience

———

Vinh Nguyen

中

CONTENTS

Conclusion

*Refugeetude: When Does a Refugee Stop
Being a Refugee?*

> *I wasn't rich in America. I was a coolie just like anybody else. . . . Perhaps I
> returned not only because I wanted to see my parents for the last time, but
> also because in Vietnam, people could make me feel like I was somebody.
> They treated me like a foreigner who had money. Didn't everybody want to
> be somebody? I didn't have an education or any skills, but I had the hope
> that my children would do better than me.* I was a boat person, a refu-
> gee, and I was still on the boat. Sometimes I wondered where I would be
> anchored.[1]
>
> —NHAN T. LE

Nhan T. Le, a former "boat person" who now lives in Manchester, New Hampshire,
and works as a board tester for an electronics company, conceives of her life in the
United States as a continuation of her asylum-seeking boat journey. Le's impulse
to understand her post-refugee life in this way illuminates for us the structural
workings of refuge as it lingers and continues well beyond a moment of arrival. In
identifying how others might misinterpret her return to Vietnam as triumphant—
indeed, the very fact that she left the country and can make a return trip is, for
many who stayed behind, evidence that she has "made it"—Le is forced to reflect
on the reality of her racialized, working-class situation in the United States, lead-
ing her to make the powerful confession that, despite having attained a seemingly
comfortable life in the world's richest and, presumably, most powerful democracy,
she is unanchored, is on the rickety boat, is *still a refugee*.

In this moment, the refugee past punctures the resident present. The privileges
of national belonging—such as an American passport, money, and transnational
mobility—ostensibly preclude Le from the purview of "refugee," but her existence
within a capitalist wage labor system—which she compares to indentureship
("coolie")—as a consequence of American "refuge" leads her to *feel* like a refugee

and to conceive of her life in the United States as an extension of the refugee experience. The shock of returning to Vietnam reminds Le that she is still a refugee because she has not yet "settled" into American capitalist success. Refuge in the United States, Le's narrative shows, is deeply structured by capitalism, which functions, in conjunction with other forces like race and gender, to fasten refugee subjects to a neoliberal economy that prolongs their search for asylum and settlement. The work of seeking refuge does not end when refugees are granted political asylum; what begins instead is a life of low-wage labor, with few opportunities for upward mobility, despite the prevalent discourses of "refugee exceptionalism," whereby the refugee's struggle and suffering are cast as provisional, with deliverance into freedom always just ahead on the horizon.[2]

Through refuge, Le and other refugees like her come to share in the common but incommensurate situations of socioeconomic marginalization that many racialized, (im)migrant, and undocumented individuals face in the United States. While refugees may seem exceptional, the protagonists of spectacular stories of success, there is nothing singular or unique about the ways in which the state attempts to assimilate them into the nation's capitalist "melting pot." Le's incredible reveal, in its metaphorical turn and literal implications, is fascinating not only because it zeros in on the enduring quality of refugee experience, but also because it points to the fragility of refuge's capitalist promise of a "good" life.

By way of concluding this book, I extend its insights on refuge to a consideration of refugee subjectivity and the possibilities of relational politics. While my analyses of gratitude, resentment, and resilience have been concerned primarily with describing the experiential structure of refuge, they have also been about refugee subjects and their multiple ways of being, of feeling and acting, thinking and inventing. In this conclusion, I more explicitly, and with the same theoretical impulse, reflect on the question of subjectivity—how its politicized and relational forms come into being, and what they might look like or make possible.

What emerges from experiences of refuge? If, as the book's central argument claims, refuge has a long duration and does not end, then refugee subjectivity is similarly not fixed in position or time, but endures and transforms as ongoing consciousness and relationality. *Lived Refuge* began with a simple question about how refuge is experienced and then proceeded to describe its long and unfinished duration. In showing that refuge might productively be conceptualized through lived experiences, which are experiments in meaning making—to live, be, and relate—I offer an alternative framing to the dominant juridical-political definition. Continuing this exploration, I "end" with a cognate question about time and experience: When does a refugee stop being a refugee?

I take Nhan T. Le's narrative as a point of departure to address and engage a host of larger concerns surrounding refugee temporality and subjectivity. Exemplified in Le's narrative is a continued state of being and a mode of relationality that I call *refugeetude*. Broadly, the term describes a coming into consciousness of

the forces that produce and structure "refuge" and "refugee." It names the forms of recognition, articulation, and relation that emerge from experiences of refuge(e), as well as attempts to redefine and live those experiences differently from what the legal framework allows for.[3]

My conceptualization builds upon Khatharya Um's foundational term *refugitude*, which provides a rubric for framing refugee agential presence through memory, cultural, and activist work. In the aftermath of revolutionary violence, or more specifically genocide, the often difficult and contradictory process of recounting can enable "every refugee" to "participate in the shaping and memorializing of a collective history, and in so doing find comfort in the assurance of a shared identity."[4] While memory reveals the "psychic flux" of refugee-survivors, it also provides a path toward recovering humanity, subjective coherence, and the possibility of justice.[5] As counter-memories and counter-narratives to the state's enactment of biopolitics—the practices and discourses of violence that fracture the individual and the social—refugitude underscores the richness and "heroism" of the refugee's historical, social, and political life.[6]

My discussion of refugeetude takes a cue from and develops Um's concern with refugee consciousness and agency, and then extends that subjective ontology toward the possibility of relationality and relational politics. While refugitude is a recovery of refugee subjectivity, one that does not follow state definitions and timelines, refugeetude furthers this formation of subjective consciousness to explore the possibilities of affective connections with marginalized others. Although both refugitude and refugeetude zero in on questions of subjectivity, consciousness, and temporality, they do so through different methods and have different aims. That is, refugitude primarily frames the refugee-survivor's fortitude, the "ability to retain one's dignity and humanity in the moral abyss" and the capacity for hope via cultural and political enactments, while refugeetude seeks to expand the category "refugee" into a wider social body and a political orientation that might open up participation in the ongoing goal of relational decolonization.[7] Refugeetude does this through its elaboration of the notions of refugee memory and politics that refugitude makes possible. That is, refugeetude is a relational term firmly situated in the political, one that allows us to contemplate the possibilities of refugeeness as a living and being with others.

By affixing the suffix *-tude* to the word *refugee*, I invoke past projects of political recuperation—namely Négritude, coolitude, and migritude—that take social experiences of marginalization and oppression and recast them as states of being or agency.[8] Refugeetude marks a critical reorientation, an epistemological shift, in how we think about and understand the category "refugee." Redirecting dominant perception of this category away from a temporary legal designation and a condition of social abjection and toward an enduring creative force, refugeetude opens up new ways of conceptualizing refugee subjects and the relationalities that extend beyond the parameters of refugeeness, generating connections to past, present, and future forms of displacement.

In this way, refugeetude takes up refugitude's focus on expanding the time and space of refugeeness. Um, via the Critical Refugee Studies Collective website, writes that the "conditions and consciousness of being a refugee . . . often outlast the expiration of the politico-legal status; that very expiration itself is a denial of the persisting challenges facing the refugee individual, families, and communities. Whereas the term 'refugee' has been made synonymous with needs, refugitude rescues it from reductionist pejorative connotations with equal attention to hope and futurity."[9] A rethinking of the refugee category challenges conventional understandings that confine *refugee* to a legal definition, a short time frame, and a pitiful existence.

Such explorations of consciousness point to how *refugee* might signify differently for the contemporary moment, one that has thus far failed to seriously engage refugees as more than a "problem." Following Um, refugeetude clarifies how refugeeness—the psychic quality or condition of embodiment that results from seeking refuge and/or coming into contact with the bureaucratic processes laid out by legal instruments such as the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and other (inter)national refugee policies—is difficult to jettison from the self. We can thus comprehend refugeetude not as an irregularity or disruption of political subjecthood—a "crisis" to be resolved—but as an experiential resource for developing significant and durable ways of being in, and moving through, the world.

Reading Nhan T. Le's story as a particular expression of refugeetude, as well as an experience common to many "boat people" refugees of the Vietnam War, I explore interlinked questions about the temporality of experience, psychic formation, and political possibility. While my elucidation of refugeetude is anchored primarily in the historical context of the global wars in Southeast Asia, it seeks to engage with issues that are immediate and urgent to contemporary politics. To understand, in the concept of refugeetude, that refugeeness is not a cloak that can easily be shed with the coming of refuge, but might instead be a catalyst for thinking, feeling, and doing with others—for imagining justice—is politically crucial to the present moment of intensified production and criminalization of refugees.

Refugeetude turns away from readily available discourses of victimhood and commonplace knowledge of refugees to highlight how refugee subjects gain awareness, create meaning, and imagine futures. It signifies critical impulses to see, know, and act—ways of being political, even when politics varies in degree and form. This is where refugeetude expands on Um's concept of refugitude. In addition to framing the possibility of refugee presence or survival, refugeetude explores the connections and actions that constellate refugees in a wider social and political existence. The concept is thus not simply a new name for an old condition or a humanist move to redeem an abject position. Refugeetude, as shown below, begins with but significantly moves beyond refugee. It is to look at refugeeness anew and ask how it can give rise to being and politics.

Le's story is a spark for my thinking, and I employ its details as apertures through which to offer suppositions on what refugeetude is, could be, or makes possible. I first establish that lived experiences of refuge(e) constitute a form of subjectivity, and propose that we expand the boundaries of refugeeness beyond the legal definition to include a range of times, places, and subjects. I then explore how refugee and refugeeness shift toward refugeetude, a means by which refugee subjects—people who have been shaped by the processes of violent displacement and border control—come to understand, articulate, and resist their conditions. As such, and most importantly, refugeetude is a politics, a kind of anti-assimilationist truth telling that Hannah Arendt invests in the vanguard figure of the refugee.

Le's insightful description of her life under capitalist refuge, and its links to other histories of racialized labor, particularly in the coolie, animates my discussion, but as the narrative reaches its signifying limit, I turn briefly to the story of another refugee from another, more contemporary war—Fadia Jouny, a refugee of the Syrian conflict—in order to think through intergroup solidarities that refugeetude might enable. Jouny's relations with Indigenous peoples highlight the difficult position that the displaced settler occupies within the context of ongoing settler colonialism. Her recognition that safe arrival in Canada is predicated on the genocide and continued dispossession of Indigenous peoples represents an acknowledgment of violent entanglements, as well as an inchoate relationality that has the potential, without guarantees, to reach for justice.[10] The coming into consciousness that refugeetude pinpoints is crucially tied to relational politics—ways of knowing and being with others—that might emerge within and against a global refugee regime that continually produces, manages, and purports to solve the "problem" of forced migration.

BEING IN THE WORLD

When does a refugee stop being a refugee? This is a question about the duration of the refugee category, one that is deemed an anomaly in a world system organized around the nation-state and citizenship. The temporality of the refugee is conventionally short and finite, an aberration in the otherwise consistent experience of nationality and political rights. Such a condition is not sustainable in the long term, for without protection from a sovereign state, refugees are reduced to what Giorgio Agamben calls "naked" or "bare" life, marked for social and literal death.[11] In this framework, the refugee is not a viable political subject. "Unable" or "unwilling," due to fear of persecution, to "avail himself of protection" by the "country of his nationality" and seeking to acquire protection elsewhere, the refugee occupies the space of in-between, an ontology of interstitiality, where "he" has a breathing body, but that body is without the political markers of the "human."[12] This ontological precarity explains why refugees continue to be persistently represented and

understood as figures of lack—homeless specters, abject outsiders, identity-less mass, or wastes of globalization. Whether through a politics of humanitarian pity, a theoretical gesture of reclamation, or a point of political critique, refugees are reified as not quite human, and the condition of refugeeness is not quite tenable as a life to be lived.

At the end of the Second World War, institutions established to address the millions of displaced Europeans in a shifting postwar milieu regarded refugees as a momentary problem, to which a solution would be achieved in a matter of years. These institutions—the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and the International Refugee Organization, which culminated in the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)—were themselves meant to be provisional, dissolved when the final refugees were resettled. The contemporary prominence of the UNHCR as a regime of refugee management, and the record-breaking number of refugees in the world each year, is incontrovertible evidence that refugee displacement is a permanent, constitutive element of late-capitalist modernity, even though, of course, there have always been people fleeing violence and seeking asylum throughout recorded history, before the refugee category was codified in international law. This should mark for us that the UN model, with its legal implications, is not the only framework for understanding the experience of people seeking refuge; historically, it is relatively nascent.[13]

At the same time, many refugees experience the condition not as an exception, but as a rule of existence. As the prolonged nature of refugee situations in the late twentieth and twenty-first centuries has shown us, the condition of refugee has been and continues to be a way of life for millions of people. In *The State of the World's Refugees: In Search of Solidarity*, published by the office of the UNHCR in 2012, the authors point out that two-thirds of the world's refugees currently live in protracted situations of "long-term exile."[14] Some have been refugees for two or three decades, and many have given birth to and raised children who know no way of life other than that inside refugee camps. This telling statistic demonstrates the material reality of refugee experiences and the limits of internationally agreed-upon "solutions" (refoulement, local integration, and resettlement) to forced migration—solutions that rely upon state-protected rights as political teleology.

The majority of refugees in the world experience their condition as refugees indefinitely, sometimes for an entire lifetime. There is thus nothing temporary or short about either the legal designation or the subjective experience of the refugee. Moreover, as Eric Tang argues, refuge is a "fiction" for many refugees who are resettled in neoliberal, late-capitalist Western nations—particularly in the poorest areas, targeted for social death—as they continue to exist in a "cycle of uprooting, displacement, and captivity."[15] This recognition that refugeeness is not a transitory experience and that refuge might remain elusive compels me to inquire into how those who have seemingly acquired asylum continue to relate to the category, and

how the experience of refuge(e) continues to stay with an individual, shaping consciousness, cultural identity, and forms of politics.

Below, I more thoroughly develop a sense of refugee subjectivity, one that coalesces beyond the temporal and spatial confines of the juridical-political definition of refuge. Le's assertion that she still *feels like* a refugee—that her life in the United States is not a break from, but is contiguous with, refugeeness—cannot be accounted for in any bureaucratic definition. That the condition of refugee might be long term or long lasting brings into sharp relief the epistemological gap between a legal definition and how it is experienced. Le's repeated attempts to escape Vietnam—to become a refugee—and her continued search for settlement in the United States demonstrate how the category of refugee is an immediate shaping force for subjects living within its capacious reach.

Working with and expanding on the ground that Um's discussion of refugitude opens up, the concept of refugeetude allows us to see that refugeeness is an experience, consciousness, and knowledge that lingers even when the legal designation is lifted, or one that might be present before the designation comes into effect.[16] This quality of refugeeness is not temporally constrained to singular events such as displacement, asylum seeking, and resettlement; is not spatially tied to specific locations like the boat, the border, or the camp; and is not bound to the letter of the law. Instead, it is psychic and affective, enduring in time and space, adhering itself in various ways to the bodies, hearts, and minds of refugees, former refugees, and subsequent generations. Where refugeeness will flare up (as a flash in a moment of danger, to return to Walter Benjamin's metaphor), how and when it will declare its presence, cannot be known in advance.[17]

REFUGEE SUBJECTS

Le was a "refugee" before she arrived at a camp, before the UN interviewed her, before the United States granted her entry—or rather she *experienced* refugeeness well before any form of institutional or legal processing. A motivating factor for Le's refuge seeking was her immersion in a postwar social field in which friends and family were becoming refugees every day, as a result of the untenability of life at home. She existed in a world where daily reality forced one to contemplate finding refuge, to "look for a way out."[18] Political repression, economic insecurity, and social instability drove many to seek asylum elsewhere. It took Le and her husband three failed escape attempts before they successfully arrived at Pulau Bidong, a refugee camp in Malaysia, on their fourth try in 1987. After Vietnamese authorities arrested them during their third attempt, Le and her husband were sent to labor camps that resembled military barracks, where they were indoctrinated in communist ideologies, made to confess their "crimes," and forced to work. Le would not see her husband again for two years, and one of her relatives would die in

the camp. Chased by the police while at sea on another escape attempt, Le had to hide, disguise herself, and move stealthily to evade capture, effectively becoming a fugitive—a figure that shares a long historical and ontological genealogy with the refugee.[19]

Ironically, persecution arising from a failed quest for refuge further exacerbated the refugee's urgent need to flee; the struggle to acquire refuge is itself central to refugee experience, and contributes to the making of the refugee subject. Le's experience of failed escape, capture, and imprisonment before she gains the refugee designation already configures her as a refugee. That is to say, Le was a refugee before she became a legal refugee, and she remains, as she tells us, a refugee after gaining legal asylum. The porous temporality of Le's experience shows how difficult it is to determine when refugeeness begins and when it ends. It is perhaps useful to consider the "before" and "after" of legal status as inextricably part of our conceptualization of the refugee, and to expand the experiential purview of refugeeness.

We might thus orient our thinking around the idea of "refugee subjects" as opposed to the more commonly used term *refugees*. Taking a cue from Le's particular experience but moving beyond it to contemplate a more general problematic, I muse here on the meanings of *refugee* that are possible but as yet unacceptable, even unthinkable, within the existing juridical-political framework, and, by extension, on the dominant social and cultural understandings. The idea of refugee subjects is a new one, something not yet here, and it is difficult to concretize, but it may yet surface at a future point in time. As I see it, refugee subjects can be a more capacious concept, encompassing those who are legal refugees; those who were at one point in time refugees; those who sought, or are seeking, refuge; those who have been persecuted and forcibly displaced from their homes but did not (or could not) acquire official refugee status; those who are culturally understood as refugees even though they were never legally refugees; and those who are at the threshold of resident and refugee, living with the imminent threat of being "refugeed" by the forces of war, capitalism, and globalization.

To think through refugeetude in this way is not to flatten the term *refugee* into a catchall phrase for migrants living in a transnational, globalized world, in which it loses all specificity of meaning; rather, it attempts to reflect the complex and contingent nature of migration, whereby the realities of how and why people move exceed the classifications available to comprehend and manage them. The institutionalized term and legal category *refugee*, with its emphasis on legally recognized persecution and operating under the rubric of human rights, fails to name the diversity of the actual experiences of those ushered (or targeted for ushering) into the refugee framework.

Turning to refugee subjects is a strategic obfuscation of the distinctiveness of *refugee*. The goal is not to offer a better or replacement definition, but rather to highlight that what makes refugees distinct from other migrants under the eyes of

the law might also be what constrains them ideologically, and what is used to deny many people the right of movement and asylum. I do not wish to do away with the legal definition; I recognize its value for many stakeholders working to address refugee situations, and for the people seeking asylum themselves. I wish, however, to consider what is distinctive about *refugee* without automatically referring back to the parameters of the legal definition or juridical-political form. In doing this, what we might find is that it is difficult to distinguish between refugee subjects and other transnational migrants, diasporic individuals, or forcibly displaced groups.

Rather than making legal refugees less unique or obsolete, this definitional imprecision points to a dimension of deep arbitrariness in the system: some individuals escaping political turmoil and forms of violence are deemed refugees and others are just migrants, even when there is much experiential overlap. Destabilizing the category of refugee allows us to think differently about the temporality of refugee experiences, and about the different subjectivities or psychic states that might fall under or relate to them. While this expansion of *refugee* may not be acceptable to policymakers or immigration boards, tasked with positivistic, juridical determinations, it could aid cultural critics, artists, and activists in comprehending refugees more broadly, and perhaps differently, in the social, cultural, and political realms.

Through the blurring of boundaries between refugees and other migrants, the notion of refugee subjects attempts to circumvent the primacy of the UN refugee category, as an instrument of the international refugee regime, to determine who is or is not a "genuine" refugee. Of course, such determinations are of utmost and critical importance—they are matters of life and death for so many—but they do not provide the definitive, complete, or most illuminating picture of what a refugee is or could be. What the UN definition gives us is a very historically specific concept that is rooted in the geopolitics of Europe after the Second World War. Moreover, as scholars have pointed out, the definition's narrow conception, and its fractioning into labels such as *asylum seeker, bogus refugees*, and *illegal migrant*, functions to contain migration from the Global South and to advance the interests of Western hegemonic states.[20] It is also the ideological grounding, and legal instrument, for the criminalization of refugees. To insist on thinking about refugees primarily through this lens of legal and state-sanctioned definitions, even though they have very real effects and consequences for people, is to limit the epistemological, political, and imaginative breadth of the refugee concept.

Refugee subjects allows for a discussion of refugees that is not circumscribed by legal status; what we know of as *refugees* can be more ontologically fluid, referring not only to subjects who have been accorded official refugee status by either national or international law, but also to a range of subjects affected by refugee-making processes and forces. In this way, for example, a descendant of refugees, who has never been displaced, can come to inherit refugeeness through immersion in a social field, through stories, memories, and exchange.[21] An individual packing

her suitcase in anticipation of fleeing her home because of encroaching violence enters the structure of feeling—that which has not yet solidified, but can be felt—of refugeeness.[22] Or a former refugee who has become a citizen of a nation-state can yet retain traces—consciousness, knowledge, and feeling—of refugeeness, traces that are foundational to a present and future conception of the self.

To be clear, in claiming that a kind of refugeeness sticks with certain refugee bodies or communities, I do not wish to reiterate dominant discourses that mark individuals and groups as perpetually foreign to a national body. Nor is refugeeness an essence or quality intrinsic to refugee subjects. Rather, I suggest that refugeeness is a substantial experience that can be the basis for the formation and development of subjectivity, or "a certain affective attitude towards the world."[23] Such serious considerations of subjectivity have not traditionally been accorded to refugees. While other categories of displacement, such as "exile," have been imagined as viable, even honorable, identities, the category of refugee has not yet gained such status. Edward Said, for example, writes: "The word 'refugee' has become a political one, suggesting large herds of innocent and bewildered people requiring urgent international assistance, whereas 'exile' carries with it, I think, a touch of solitude and spirituality."[24] Revealed in Said's distinction between *refugee* and *exile* is a deeply entrenched and pervasive assumption about refugee lack—here a lack of the romantic quality of deep interiority that is a cornerstone of Western, liberal subjecthood. In viewing *refugee* in this way, Said reproduces a depoliticization of refugees by characterizing them as an undifferentiated mass of passive and pitiful objects requiring rescue. This understanding underlies much of popular, and objectifying, conceptions of refugees.

THE POLITICS OF REFUGEETUDE

Refugeetude shifts critical focus to the issue of refugee subjectivity, taking refugees not as "objects of investigation" but as historical beings living in the midst of geopolitical forces. Yet refugeetude is not a transhistorical identity that can be ascribed to all refugee subjects. Liisa H. Malkki warns against the intellectual compulsion to make abstract and essentialize the diverse historical and political contexts of refugee migrations in order to produce a universal "refugee condition." She writes that the "quest for *the* refugee experience . . . reflects a tendency, in many disciplines, to seize upon political or historical processes and then to inscribe aspects of these processes in the bodies and psyches of the people who are undergoing them. In this way, very mobile, unstable social phenomena may be imagined as essential 'traits' and 'characteristics' attached to, or emanating from, individual persons."[25] Instead of a stable internal identity, refugeetude is a politics—it is not *in* a subject, even if it might eventually become experienced as internalized.

That is, refugeetude is not a preexisting quality or ideology that refugee subjects acquire after experiencing some specific event or upon meeting some set criteria

(from outside to inside). It is not an interiority that is possessed and sedimented as subjectivity, an inner characteristic that motivates thought and external action. Thus, it is not simply that refugee subjects produce refugeetude (from inside to outside), but that both refugee subjects and refugeetude come into being through contacts, attachments, and investments within everyday social and political inter-actions; they take form in encounters with power that might prescribe and delimit, as well as in moments of clarity and communion that might inspire and broaden.

Refugeetude is a coming into consciousness of the social, political, and histori-cal forces that situate refugee subjects, and the acts that attempt to know, impact, and transcend this situation. It can be grasped, for example, when refugee sub-jects participate in hunger strikes and practice "self-mutilation"—the stitching together of lips, eyes, and ears—in order to make state violence visible and protest inhumane detention and deportation policies.[26] It can be perceived in a public art installation—a blue billboard with the text "refugees run the seas / cause we own our own votes"—inviting "viewers to imagine an incalculable future where justice for migrants exists."[27] It is narrated in a short story about smuggled refugees who perish in the back of a truck, a fiction that blurs truth and reality.[28] It is visualized in a hip-hop music video in which refugees move freely, unobstructed by walls, fences, and borders.[29] It is present when a new refugee recognizes that settler-colonial violence toward Indigenous peoples undergirds her safe arrival. I provide these little glimmers of refugeetude here, in addition to a more sustained analysis of how it manifests for Nhan T. Le, in order to capture the wide-ranging breadth of refugeetude, and the various forms that a coming into consciousness may take.

Khatharya Um's work is again instructive here. She notes that discourses of trauma elide how refugee-survivors "have lived with, transmitted, and even trans-formed their history of victimization into that of resilience and fortitude."[30] As such, "the different and multiple registers of agency that refugees and refugee com-munities exhibit, including their political and philanthropic lives, are unnoted."[31] This explains why examinations of agency, via refugitude, are socially and politi-cally crucial. However, while refugeetude can be taken to mean agency, it resonates more like a way of being (an *ethos*) that does not acquiesce to the entrenched global order structured by forms of racial, capital, and mobile inequality. An agential subject may be one actualization of refugeetude, but it is not the only or primary one. Rather, *refugeetude* describes a consciousness that may lead to a range of expressions. Consciousness here is not an unequivocal, categorical, or fully formed understanding or position. Instead, consciousness can range from an inchoate thought or recognition to forms of purposeful, physical protest. It is, at the core, to see one's situation, and identify sources of violence and injustice that have shaped one's (as well as others') coming into being.

For Le, refugeetude takes shape most strikingly in an anticapitalist critique of American society.[32] It is consciousness of the material life that the refugee is deliv-ered into, and how capitalist refuge has structured her ability to live. In the late

twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, refuge in the Global North is deeply tied to economic calculations; in particular, the possibility of a "new beginning" for refugees is determined, in large part, by opportunities for work and capital accumulation. When Le tells us that she is "still on a boat," is still a refugee in the United States, she specifically means that she must move from one unstable, low-paying job to another in a process of unsettlement marked by economic precarity, labor exploitation, and alienation. It is not simply that Le cannot find a "good" permanent job, but more importantly it is how this lack of material stability prevents her from gaining a sense of belonging, agency, and settledness. Refuge as freedom from oppression and persecution in Vietnam does not mean freedom to attain opportunity, equity, or justice in the United States.

Describing her first few years in the states, Le says, "This period was the most unproductive, and I changed jobs more than in my whole life in Vietnam."[33] Arriving in the late 1980s, she entered a struggling economy that saw her skills—she was trained as a medical lab technician—as inconsequential and her labor as dispensable. After a brief stint at a garment factory, Le quickly realized her place as a worker: "I learned the first lesson in America: no company wanted to care for their workers. It was just a job."[34] Such clarity about how capitalism functions is also precise understanding of how refuge creates the situation in which the refugee must struggle and compete in order to eke out a living in the free market. Le further explains: "We made the minimum wage, $4.25 an hour. . . . I worked for a few days, then they laid me off. Then they called me back when they had orders. It wasn't stable, and I didn't like it because I felt that I had been used. Since they needed me to work for only a few days, when they ran out of things to do they sent me home. I was a call girl. I felt cheap and cheated."[35] The feeling of being "cheap and cheated" is far from the expected emotion of gratitude that refuge is supposed to inspire in refugees. A condition of disposability awaits the recipient of humanitarian care, and this is what refuge actually looks like for people like Le. Here, an analysis of refuge in the United States is performed through a critique of its neoliberal economy's dehumanizing practices. If refuge cannot be directly criticized for fear that the refugee seems ungrateful—the most despicable response to a received benefit—then it is forcefully articulated in the working and living conditions that the refugee faces: "Life in America is too stressful and isolated, although material goods are always plentiful."[36]

Importantly, Le invokes the word *coolie* to characterize the refugee's struggle with labor in the United States, and in doing so constellates disparate historical experiences of Asian racialization in the Americas.[37] The word refers to a specific form of migrant laborer—namely Chinese and Indian—during the expansion of colonialism and capitalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and coolies are often understood as lowly workers who were "cast adrift from place, skill and purpose."[38] Entering into forms of indenture, bondage, and indebtedness with employers, coolies became an underclass of cheap and dispensable

human resource for driving colonial economies. Although coolie labor was crucial to colonial capitalism and various nation-building projects in the "New World," coolies were also perceived as threats and targeted for exclusion.[39]

While Le is obviously not a coolie, her invocation of this classed and racialized figure from the past yokes together the categories of coolie and refugee in the present, connecting similar but incommensurate experiences of marginalization brought about by difficult migrations. Such connections make clear that the refugee is first and foremost another wage-laborer in the free market, a cog in the capitalist machine, as opposed to a unique recipient of humanitarian aid. To see the continuity between coolie and refugee is to see the forces of colonialism, capitalism, and racialization at play in displacing migrant subjects across time and space. The Vietnamese refugee who is a human remainder of neo-imperialist wars that the United States waged in Southeast Asia during the second half of the twentieth century shares a common trajectory, an experience of forced movement and economic exploitation, with workers in an earlier context of colonial governmentality. In expressing that refuge does not unfold according to the script of American exceptionalism, Le is not dismissing refuge as a valuable mechanism for those fleeing violence. She does, however, explain what humanitarian benevolence offers to some refugees, what the material consequence of refuge entails, and what freedom looks like on a concrete, everyday level. Le's refugeetude—a making sense of her own experience—points to the failure of the neoliberal nation-state to provide "refugeed" individuals like her a form of livable refuge.

FALSE OPTIMISM

The politics of refugeetude challenges prevalent objectifications of refugees as abject figures who are "invisible, speechless, and, above all, nonpolitical."[40] It is the counterpart to what Mimi Thi Nguyen calls the "refugee condition," a "discursive, medico-juridical disposition" of "arrested affect or potentiality."[41] Such a condition names the pathological incapacity and anachronistic temporality of refugees, marking their need for rehabilitation and biopolitical governmentality. If refugeeness is often understood as an aberrant condition, then refugeetude is a condition of possibility, a method of knowing and affecting the world that holds on to the critical potential of refugeeness. As such, there is no natural alignment between refugees and refugeetude. The experience of asylum seeking and refuge does not automatically transform into refugeetude; it is not a politics that can be ascribed to any and all refugees. Indeed, many refugee subjects desire assimilation, and they endeavor to fold themselves into the fabric of citizenship and civil society. Yet to covet the privileges and rights associated with national protection when one's life has been upturned, when one faces danger and death, when one languishes in camps, is not a yearning to be dismissed as uncritical or politically naive. To want

to leave a refugee past behind is not always a betrayal. Such orientations, however, might be better described as a politics of citizenship.

Refugeetude, on the other hand, does not subscribe to what Hannah Arendt calls a "false" or "insane" optimism, in which refugees hold out hope for total assimilation into a national body politic. In a contemporary context, Lauren Berlant might describe this attachment to national belonging—especially amid the resurgence of fascism and nationalist populism—as cruelly optimistic.[42] Writing about Jewish refugees of the Second World War, Arendt explains that to assimilate, through recourse to extreme forms of patriotism, is to "adjust in principle to everything and everybody," and in the process to lose a sense of self.[43] She writes: "A man who wants to lose his self discovers, indeed, the possibilities of human existence, which are infinite, as infinite as is creation. But the recovering of a new personality is as difficult—and as hopeless—as a new creation of the world. . . . We don't succeed and we can't succeed; under the cover of our 'optimism' you can easily detect the hopeless sadness of assimilationists."[44] For Arendt, the work of shedding history and identity—here refugeeness and Jewishness—in order to assume nationality is ultimately a futile aspiration, for the refugee comes up against a system that has the power to reverse the "recovering" of self, to repeat the search for belonging and repeal nationality. This does not mean that self-reinvention is not possible, but that such acts are subject to the inevitable capriciousness and contingencies of history and, importantly, the will of the state, as contemporary practices of denaturalization and deportation make clear.

This leads Arendt to make her often-quoted claim that "those few refugees who insist upon telling the truth, even to the point of 'indecency,' get in exchange for their unpopularity one priceless advantage: history is no longer a closed book to them and politics is no longer the privilege of the Gentiles. . . . Refugees driven from country to country represent the vanguard of their peoples—if they keep their identity."[45] The conditional "if they keep their identity" is key to the possibilities of history and politics being available to refugees, to their potential to be at the forefront of forging new formations of political existence and community.[46] The "keeping of identity" she refers to is not so much a holding on to an immutable identity, but rather a refusal to exchange the past for acceptance into a "topsy-turvy world" that allows "its weakest member to be excluded and persecuted." To keep an identity is to embrace the role of the pariah, whose presence throws into sharp relief the crises that mark our categories of political organization.[47]

Le's narrative details how difficult it is to "recover the self" (assimilate) or to "keep identity" (resist) in the wake of forced migration, when refuge is still yet to come—if it ever will. After a return trip to Vietnam, Le suffers a crisis of both conscience and identity, unable to reconcile who she has become with who her kin are, who she used to be, and who she could have been. It is as if her new "American" self—the self of refuge—crumbles when confronted with a past life, one that is

also someone else's present. Le poignantly reflects that "my heart was lost. My heart was not the only thing that was lost. I also lost myself somewhere between Vietnam and America."[48] This "somewhere between" is the passage, both physical and psychic, that the refugee is in the midst of navigating, that is not yet over and done with. A sense of being "lost" means that she cannot settle, but is somehow still caught in the search for a place to arrive and call home. Recounting the birth of her second child, Le ends her narrative with these lines: "I asked myself, where is my boy coming from and where is he going? Home, I guess. But is it really his or is it really mine? Where is home?"[49]

This simple and powerful question—where is home?—unravels the force of false optimism, revealing that there is ultimately no home in the national community of the United States, which still views refugees as undesirable or relegates them to the working poor. Thus, there is little false optimism in Le's story, and no blind faith in the nation's interest or ability to uplift the refugee; it is clear that absorption into nationality has no guarantees. The absence of false optimism does not mean that the refugee is hopeless, however. Indeed, she wants more for herself, and particularly for her children to "do better than me."[50] What she gives us instead is "indecency," the hard truths that underlie the humanitarian virtue of refuge—the feeling and material condition of not being at home and of socioeconomic and affective precarity. A refugee story like Le's, which is not one of successful integration and gratefulness toward the nation-state, is indecent because it is incongruent with discourses of American rescue and benevolence, liberalism, and the American Dream. While it may be tempting to interpret Le's story as one of struggle and hardship, circling back to notions of refugee pity, it must be emphasized that Le's narration displays a woman profoundly aware of her everyday life and the social, political, and historical forces that shape it. In this way, history and politics, as Arendt claims, are truly open to this ordinary individual.

BEING WITH OTHERS

Building on Arendt's work, we can say that refugeetude is thinking, feeling, and acting that might be described as "indecent" within the prevailing social, cultural, and political milieu. Indecency is not necessarily oppositional, radical, or controversial; more often it is surprising, unexpected, and revealing—what Arendt calls "truth." An inappropriateness to or incongruence with an established epistemological and sociopolitical framework, organized around the naturalization of nation-state, border, and displacement, marks refugeetude's "unpopularity." As Arendt remarks, the keeping of refugeeness affords the refugee a more expansive vision of history and politics. Such a vision means that refugee subjects can begin to make crucial linkages between themselves and others who have undergone and are undergoing similar experiences within the "national order of things," including migrant, undocumented, racialized, and Indigenous groups.

This affective "mapping"—tracing the historicity or sociality of seemingly singular refugee experiences—with marginalized others is one of the advantages that Arendt gestures toward.[51] In this way, the world opens up for refugee subjects, for they are no longer just individual pariahs or outsiders, but people who could come to share in the collective struggle of those deemed "problems" for the nation-state and the international community to contain and manage. Vijay Prashad writes of a kind of assimilation different from the nationalistic type, a "horizontal assimilation engineered by migrants as they smile at each other, knowing quite well what is carried on each other's backs."[52] Horizontal assimilation stands in contrast to the false optimism of vertical assimilation, in that it looks to other modalities of connection, affiliation, and commitment. Refugeetude could become shared intimacies between refugee subjects, and cultivated affinities with others. In its most potent form, refugeetude is refugee subjects recognizing who they are, how they have come to be, and who they might become with others.

Le's story is, of course, incomplete. What refuge will look like in the future for her and her family is yet to be determined. Her candid reflections, however, constellate her, a refugee of the Vietnam War, relationally to coolies of the past and racialized migrants and workers of the present. These relations are not fully formed or figured, but they hold incipient potential for horizontal assimilations as an alternative to false optimism. They demonstrate different ways of existing within, but not solely with and of, the nation-state. This form of cross-group, inter-historical relationality is also articulated by another refugee from another, more contemporary, war in which U.S. neo-imperial intervention played a hand in producing displacement—the war in Syria. Fadia Jouny, a Syrian refugee who recently arrived in Canada, declares solidarity with Indigenous peoples who have been displaced and dispossessed by the Canadian nation-state. Although Le and Jouny are separated in time and space by different wars, different migrations, and arrivals in different settler-colonial states, their voicing of refugeetude shares a consciousness of the state violence that attends refuge, as well as an attunement to connections with those "others" affected by such violence.

In a *National Observer* article published in March 2017, Fadia Jouny expresses her desire to learn more about the history of First Nations peoples.[53] She articulates the bind whereby refugees who find safe haven in settler-colonial states like Canada come to occupy stolen Indigenous territory: "I feel very bad. We are on their land."[54] Evyn Lê Espiritu Gandhi calls this the "refugee settler condition," the "vexed positionality of refugee subjects whose citizenship in a settler colonial state is predicated upon the unjust dispossession of an Indigenous population."[55] Yet this condition might also be the site of incipient solidarities. Gandhi states, "Articulated together, refugee modalities of statelessness and Indigenous epistemologies . . . can unsettle settler colonial state violence, pointing us toward more pluralized forms of collective belonging."[56]

Jouny's statement is thus also the beginning of a different kind of recognition, one in which the Canadian state is not the only (willing or unwilling) "host" to refugees, or the primary point of reference. In refuge, refugees come into contact with many others, including Indigenous communities, who are the original inhabitants and protectors of the land upon which political asylum is based. Indeed, contact does not automatically produce solidarity; tensions, antagonism, and conflict can and do arise, as different groups are pitted against one another for a place in the Canadian multicultural mosaic.[57] But for those like Jouny, refuge means reckoning with the fact that political protection and safety in a settler state like Canada is predicated on more than a century of ongoing genocide and dispossession of Indigenous peoples. This initiates a more complicated understanding of how to be in refuge, and how to be with others who may seem quite disconnected and removed from one's own experience.

The violent histories of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, fought over territory, resources, religion, race, and ideology, tell us that the legal protection—and invitation into a life of rights—that juridical-political refuge offers has an insidious underbelly. Like all liberal democratic privileges or "rights" in an interconnected, globalized capitalist system, refuge is scaffolded by layers of violence toward others.[58] That is, the "house" of refuge is built on the stilts of violence. The refugee's physical presence in Canada (and her asylum claim, which reaffirms Canadian political sovereignty), renders her a complicit beneficiary in a system that operates on settler-colonial violence.

Yet how do we move forward from this indisputable fact? What other relations between refugees and Indigenous peoples are possible? Given that the refugee's arrival in settler states "transits" through (as Jodi A. Byrd would say) imperial genocide of Indigenous peoples, *how* she arrives matters in this calculus, in being positioned between the settler and the native.[59] The force of violence that has brought the refugee to Canada could be the very thing that prompts her to see the forces of violence—where such violence is historically and culturally erased and forgotten—that have been and continue to be enacted on others, and to reorient herself relationally to those whom the state has targeted for removal and extermination.

Jouny continues: "I feel I am the same as them, in some way. . . . The First Nations were removed from their land. I know what that is like."[60] While this comparison may seem simplistic at first, it gestures to the complex ways in which migrant and Indigenous populations are displaced and dispossessed by the logics of empire and capital, if not in the same way or to the same degree. According to Sunera Thobani, the nation-state requires Indigenous and migrant "others" in order to exalt itself, which should make clear that their fates are inextricably intertwined within settler formations.[61] This triangulation of Indigenous and migrant subjects with white "nationals" is a form of racial management that seeks to separate and

divide their interests, obscuring the most powerful common interest of all—the dismantling of and freedom from the settler-colonial state.

Jouny's statement begs the question: If refugees and Indigenous groups share a history of displacement, then what forces have played a role in these displacements, and how do these pasts of uprooting come to bind them in the present moment? Furthermore, how does what Harsha Walia describes as "border imperialism"—the uprooting of people through war, capitalism, and neo-imperialism in developing countries, and the simultaneous tightening of Western borders—relate to settler colonialism, the project of facilitating the "dispossession of Indigenous peoples of their lands and self-determining authority"?[62] How might knowing what it is like to be removed from one's home, however different in context and magnitude, be the beginning of an inchoate solidarity between refugees and Indigenous peoples?[63]

In his examination of the intersection between indigeneity and diaspora, Daniel Coleman writes that the two cultural formations share "in common the experiences of displacement from a homeland and marginalization in the metropolitan settler state."[64] Yet they have tended to "set very different, even opposed, political and social objectives."[65] If, as Audra Simpson argues, Indigenous enactments of sovereignty begin with refusals of setter citizenship and the gifts of the state, then refugees are at the opposite end, coveting the "gift" of political recognition in order to survive.[66] The desire for state recognition seemingly distances refugees from Indigenous groups and their political aims. While this problem seems irreconcilable, Jouny's comments demonstrate to us that refuge in Canada also facilitates the refugee's attunement to Indigenous histories, opening her eyes to the continuing struggles of Indigenous peoples for self-determination: "Since arriving in Canada in 2015, Jouny has been busy learning not just the English language, but also about Canadian culture, and Indigenous colonization, [and] missing and murdered Indigenous women."[67] She has also begun the work of raising awareness among youth groups in her own community.

In this work of learning, the possibility of some other desire, some other attachment, and some other way of relating can be felt, if not formalized or instituted. What this does for the larger project of decolonization, how it effects social action and social change, is still to be determined, but the refugee gains a deeper sense of the violence that undergirds her precious refuge, a more complex understanding of what it means to find "safe haven" in a settler state, and the work that might be involved in meaningful reconciliation.

Another refugee subject, Ali Abukar, who works for a resettlement organization in Saskatoon, writes that "reconciliation will only work if we acknowledge the truth of the past, build meaningful relationships, and stand with one another against injustices and inequities."[68] He notes that "being aware of my privileges" as a newcomer to Canada "makes me question the ongoing inequities and injustices perpetrated against our Indigenous sisters and brothers."[69] Serving new immigrants and refugees, then, means that "bridges" are built between them and

Indigenous communities through engagement and collaboration, so that Canada's colonial history is not covered over as it "welcomes" refugees into its fold.

In the summer of 2018, for example, the Kurdish Initiative for Refugees (KIFR) summer program visited the Brokenhead Ojibway Nation in an effort for not only cultural exchange but education. Nour Ali, founder of KIFR, says, "We lost our land also, so it is very important to know, respect and feel their struggles and what happened with the indigenous people."[70] Indigenous leaders, too, have reached out and stood in solidarity with refugees. In a 2018 open letter to President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau regarding the "immigrant and refugee children being torn from their families and jailed south of the medicine line," the Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs draws a connection between the current situation and their past: "For many of us, this is reminiscent of U.S. and Canadian policies of Indian Residential School and Indian Boarding Schools, where Indigenous children were kidnapped and forcibly separated from their families and communities."[71]

The making of these historical linkages—of loss of (home)land, family separation, and incarceration—identifies shared experiential commonalities that might be the basis for future coalitions. While their function and power remain largely discursive and symbolic at present, such work has the potential to plant the seeds for what Leanne Betasamosake Simpson calls "constellations of co-resistance," which is "working together toward a radical alternative present based on deep reciprocity and the gorgeous generative refusal of colonial recognition."[72] The kind of decolonial movement building that Simpson imagines has its foundations in allyship, in people and communities on "Turtle Island and beyond that are struggling in their own localities against these same forces, building movements that contain the alternatives."[73] Kim TallBear has articulated these alliances as "caretaking relations" that resist the "American Dreaming" of the progressive, extractive, and developmental narratives of settler-colonial states.[74] Rejecting such dreams of a more inclusive or liberal state requires kin making, or "making people into familiars in order to relate."[75] Doing so might "inspire change, new ways of organizing and standing together in the face of state violence against both humans and the land."[76] Refugeetude can be the politics through which refugee subjects participate in these forms of relationalities in the settler state. To "be with" is to be entangled in plurality and coexistence, to hold on to the many tensions that bind refugee and indigeneity in likeness and incommensurability.[77] It is a continual and constant form of awareness, critique, and being that develops with an impetus to understand the threads that link past, present, and future forms of displacement.

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Like Jouny's recognition of the colonial displacement of Indigenous peoples that makes possible her safe protection in Canada, Nhan T. Le's story exposes the capitalist exploitation behind the "good" of refuge in the United States. Understood as

a coveted gift of rights and political subjecthood for stateless individuals, refuge is also employed by the state to legitimize its nationalist projects of violence—of colonial and capitalist accumulation—at home and abroad. This is the insidious underbelly of refuge in the Global North. For a refugee subject like Le, refugeetude is an understanding that the exalted success stories of "good" refugees—almost always coded through upward mobility and economic success—are indeed exceptional. Refugee exceptionality, as scholars of the Vietnam War diaspora have pointed out, can be produced, circulated, and appropriated to inscribe revisionist histories and justify past and future foreign wars.[78] Refugeetude, then, manifests as an understanding of how refuge engenders ongoing, complicated entanglements with the state and its mechanism, as opposed to being a final destination or an end to rightlessness; it intertwines safety and violence, hope and limitation, past, present, and future.

But refuge also places refugee subjects in proximity to millions of racialized, migrant, and Indigenous groups, groups that have their own complicated histories and relationships to the nation-state. One way that a refugee does not cease being a refugee is through the consciousness of her relatedness (although, of course, there may be disavowals and rejections) with these other "others," and the kinds of connections and coalitional politics that are possible. On World Refugee Day 2020, in the midst of the COVID-19 global pandemic and the worldwide protests in the wake of George Floyd's brutal murder at the hands of the Minneapolis police, the Southeast Asia Resource Action Center (SEARAC), a civil rights advocacy organization, used the hashtag #RefugeesForBlackLives as a declaration of commitment and solidarity, acknowledging that "our lives are interconnected."[79] In an earlier statement, Quyen Dinh, the executive director of SEARAC, wrote: "As refugees and descendents [sic] of refugees, as survivors of war and genocide, our communities also know the devastating impacts of police force. It is incumbent on us as Southeast Asian Americans to show up for the Black community."[80] Dinh mobilizes the experiences of being a refugee—of *knowing* the violence that the state enacts—to "show up" or stand with people whose lives are being threatened and assaulted by white supremacy. Such a move represents the beginning of subjective consciousness developing into coalition building—the politics of refugeetude. It shows how the the conventionally abject position of refugee might signify not just a desire for legal recognition, but also a political yearning for forms of forthcoming justice. Refugeetude is sensing, feeling, thinking, knowing, and doing that finds a way to be *human* within a world order that often fails to be humane to the millions of people moving through the world in search of refuge.

Palestinian Refugees

Identity, space and place in the Levant

Edited by
Are Knudsen and Sari Hanafi

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1 Cartographic violence, displacement and refugee camps

Palestine and Iraq

Julie Peteet

Introduction

Mass displacements, with their attendant traumas, and the politics of mobility and immobility, are dual instances of the cartographic violence that has unfolded in the Middle East over the past century. They point to an implicit and, at times, explicit vision of the region in which imagined ethnic-sectarian, and perhaps tribal, affiliations and identities are isomorphic with particular spaces. On the ground, this suggests that while the formula associating space, territories, identities, and cultures has come un-done in anthropological thinking, it is alive and well and indeed is a conscious political project. Invasions and occupations with their projects of dismantlement are attempts to re-write local and regional geographies, craft new ethnic-sectarian and national spaces, impose external dominance, and squash the idea of resistance. These projects are well underway in Iraq and Palestine, each with its local variant and particular forms of violence. In both projects, territorial impulses and sentiments have engendered large numbers of displaced people. They are the human side of imposing imagined spaces, boundaries, and social entities. Indeed, in both cases, one can speak of a humanitarian disaster.

This chapter is an initial exploration of the intersection of ethnic-sectarian projects and imaginaries, the production of displacement, and spatial devices of containment. In Iraq, the concepts of sect, ethnicity, and tribe were mobilized by the occupying US forces as fairly self-evident, socially coherent entities with little regard for their historically and situationally fluid and contingent character. Usually refugees take flight or are expelled and subsequently prevented from returning because they do not fit the national boundaries of inclusion. Mass refugee flows are also produced as people flee the break-up of a state and its fragmentation into ethnic-sectarian or national entities. These displacements are diagnostic of who is included in the political body and who is outside and the re-arrangement of space and habitation. In other words, these on-going displacements are a lens through which to track imaginaries about places, social entities, and belonging in the region. In the case of Iraq, displacement seems to be part of reconfiguring the state and the notion of Iraq; in the case of Palestine it involves thinning the population, obstructing statehood, and accommodating an expansive state. The current nearly unparalleled

refugee flow in the region is occurring at a time when the internationally recognized category of refugee is 'shrinking' (Zetter 2007).

L. Malkki turned to Mary Douglas' work on human classification, particularly 'matter-out-of-place', at the level of state, citizenship, and categories of belonging (Douglas 1966; Malkki 1995a: 7–8). The refugee both emerges from the violence entailed in the process of manufacturing and assigning space and belonging and represents a refusal of categorization and its spatial articulation. Malkki distinguishes between matter-out-of-place in the natural and human worlds: 'people categorize back'. It is imperative that we ask about Iraq's minorities – the Mandeans, the Yazidis, and the various Christian communities among others – what is happening to them and where do they fit or not fit in the new Iraq? A critical arena for further investigation is the production of knowledge on Iraq. What body of texts is referenced in US policy and planning? Ethnographic work with Iraqi refugees could help to clarify the decision-making process about departure and sentiments about 'primordial' identities and affiliations.

The Middle East has long been a major producer of refugees.[1] By the beginning of 2007, the Middle East was generating 5,931,000 refugees out of a world total of 13,948,800 (World Refugee Survey 2007). It also has the distinction of being home to one of the most protracted refugee crises, the Palestinian crisis. In this region, refugees have left indelible marks, radically transforming urban space and politics, and notions of citizenship and categories of belonging.

Some states have complex histories of generating substantial waves of refugees or being built by the displaced. The Greek–Turkish population 'exchange' and the Armenian massacres and expulsions mark the beginning decades of the last century. Israel's establishment in 1948 resulted in over 750,000 Palestinian refugees and the constitution of Israel as Jewish state. Jordan, for example, has been host to multiple influxes of the displaced from the late nineteenth-century Circassians to Palestinian refugees in 1948, 1967, 1991, and more recently an estimated one million Iraqis. Jordan has an admirable history of refugee assistance. During the Algerian war of independence over two million were forcibly displaced by the French. In Lebanon, the civil war and periodic Israeli invasions over the past several decades generated hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Partition along sectarian lines was a prominent theme coursing through the civil war.

In the past few decades, Iraq has hardly been a stranger to forced displacement. Hundreds of thousands of Kurds fled the violence and turmoil of the Iran–Iraq war, the Gulf war, and murderous campaigns against them by the Iraqi state. In an attempt at demographic engineering, the Baathist regime destroyed thousands of Kurdish villages and expelled Kurds from the North. They then moved Arabs into Kurdish regions where these Arabs are themselves now facing pressure to leave. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqis fled the country in the past two decades to escape wars, sanctions, and state-perpetrated violence. However, the US occupation and its precipitation of a cycle of sectarian and ethnic violence have given rise to unprecedented mass displacement with discernable sectarian dimensions, particularly among the IDPs.

What is novel in this contemporary period of mass displacement and re-landscaping is the discursive, the spatial, and the classificatory and organizational: the silence about the Iraqi displaced and their non-categorization as refugees, the absence of refugee camps and minimal humanitarian assistance, and the simultaneous imputation and crystallization of sectarian and tribal affiliations, spaces, leadership, and identities. On the Palestinian side, there is silence about the confinement and immobility of Palestinians under the Israeli policy of closure and the economic devastation this has wrought, which is intended to propel a dilution of the population and thus facilitate the expansion of the state's borders and sovereignty. What is constant in this period is the imagined and actual 'enclavization' of the region along ethnic, national, and sectarian lines and the silence about the 'inequalities and costs' that Lutz notes often accompany empire (Lutz 2006: 594).

This chapter begins by exploring the current Iraqi refugee crisis then turns to the question of Palestine in search of intersections and emerging regional dimensions of displacement. The current Iraqi displacement crisis and the slowness to compel a significant international response may presage a re-conceptualization of the concept of the refugee, the spatial and administrative device of the camp, and humanitarian responses to large-scale emergencies. Recent attempts to geo-politically re-map the region and craft new political spaces has turned Iraq into a killing field of terrifying magnitude and has generated unprecedented displacement. Likewise, the Israeli policy of closure of the occupied territories, which severely obstructs Palestinian mobility, and its deleterious effects on the economy, health care and education may mark the final stage in the colonization of Palestine.

Enclaves and exclaves

Often repeated but still worth noting here is that Iraqis constitute the largest wave of displaced people since the Palestinian refugee crisis began in 1948. In the fragmentation of Palestine and Iraq, a sectarian sorting out and an assignment of space, mobility, and rights are discernable. In this emerging new geography, control of resources, underground (oil and water) and above-ground surfaces (space for military bases, colonies, and control of the skies, waterways, and borders) has been critical for the occupying authorities' inscription of power. Most significantly, both the Israeli state and the US occupation of Iraq have produced staggering numbers of displaced who are marginalized – if not indeed largely invisible – in the narratives of these conflicts outside the region. Underwriting both projects is a vision of national and ethnic-sectarian space. The twentieth-century notion of a 'state for everyone and everyone in a state' (Aleinikoff 1995: 257) is being violently re-written in Iraq and Palestine as 'everyone in his/her enclave and an enclave for everyone'. The imaginary Middle East mosaic in which ethnic and sectarian groups are assigned to particular spaces and conceptualized as bounded, coherent, nearly corporate groups harkens back to Orientalist and early anthropological elaborations (see Patai 2007) of the region and a Zionism that turns away from co-existence in a plural social order in favor of segregation and demographic superiority (see Soffer 2002). In both Iraq and Palestine, forced separation enacted through the

violence of ethnic-sectarian cleansing and displacement, the erection of physical barriers to mobility and interaction, and enforced immobility are giving material form to these imaginary spaces. Sect, ethnicity, and tribe are not preordained categories; they emerge through a historical process of configuring and re-configuring. Displacement, war, state-religious relations, and external interventions, among others, figure prominently in these processes. When assumptions are made about sectarian identities and boundaries Shami (2005: 573) argues they 'alternately exaggerate or underestimate societal tensions and political mobilization' based on this categorization that obscures the ways in which identity and boundaries are produced and reproduced. In the media and official US discourse, sect, tribe, and ethnicity have been strategically and discursively circulated as primary components of the local social order. In the US discourse on the war on Iraq, the term 'tribe' was appended to 'Sunni'. US forces have coordinated with, mobilized, distributed funds to, and armed 'Sunni tribes' as a counterinsurgency force (e.g. Awakening Councils). They may be endowing with power and military and financial resources groups and leaders that were hardly self-evident social and political entities.[2] Among US policy makers and pundits, these social categories were framed as 'age-old', 'timeless', and the sources of 'ancient hatred'. Re-invigorating critical scholarship on sectarianism and its historical manifestations is certainly called for at this time as is a rethinking of the concept of tribe. In the1970s, explorations of sectarianism peaked in the region and then declined. Current US policies and discourse as well as the media and popular understandings assume an already given ethnic, sectarian, and tribal structure and sentiment to contemporary Iraq. Lutz (2006: 594) calls for a joint project to theorize empire and capture it ethnographically, which would entail attention to the 'cultural making of value' to give recognition to the human face of empire rather than concentrating largely on its political-economic underpinnings.

In Iraq, a country with once subterranean sectarian tensions but without a history of open, prolonged sectarian conflict, the occupation, which exposed fault lines that exploded as well-calibrated sect-based violence, as well as the continuing violence against Iraqi civilians by the occupation forces, have propelled millions of people[3] to flee their homes and seek shelter and safety either outside of Iraq or within its borders. Paradoxically, the level of violence necessary to craft sectarian space may be an indication of how fluid and cosmopolitan Iraq was in terms of ethnic-sectarian co-existence.

In a move reminiscent of the Sykes–Picot Treaty dividing the region between France and Britain, nearly a century later, in the fall of 2007 then US Senator Biden's non-binding resolution to divide Iraq was approved by 75 votes to 23 in the US Senate. US policy and practices propelling partition into three semi-autonomous zones indicated a willful ignorance of the history of partitions – India–Pakistan, Palestine–Israel, and Ireland among others – with their demographic upheavals, the toll in human lives, and the long-term instability they can generate. Is there any historical precedent to Iraq's division and, if so, can and should it by mobilized for the present? The proposed sectarian and ethnic spaces re-affirm the vision of a regional mosaic and, at the same time, cast doubts on the notion of a more encompassing

Iraqi identity. Abou Samra (2007: 37) makes a provocative observation: displacement as a result of US and Iraqi forces is 'assessed as a short-term phenomenon, while so-called sectarian-induced displacement is viewed as a long-term trend'. Recourse to primordial explanations of 'age old hatreds' lends the potency of timelessness to our understanding of the conflict. This recourse tends to then cast the conflict as inevitable and deflects attention from analysis of the context. The Iraqi displacement may join that of the Armenians, Palestinians, and Kurds as human tragedies that re-write the demographic, political, and geo-social map of the region and contribute to the fashioning of ethnic-sectarian realities.

The US occupation of Iraq created a set of conditions that has led to one of the largest refugee flows in decades and a humanitarian emergency that has all but been ignored by the US, drastically under-reported by the media, and dithered over by the international community. Three waves of displacement can be identified. First, with the disassembling of the state and the de-Baathification process, tens of thousands of people were left unemployed and military personnel were de-commissioned. When combined with pervasive lawlessness and kidnappings for ransom that targeted those with some capital, the first wave began. In 2004, the second wave was triggered by US counter-insurgency operations that compelled flight to avoid violence. In 2005, a third wave could be discerned: those fleeing ethnic cleansing and death squads. Professionals, technocrats, and managers are prominent among the displaced – some estimates put their number as high as 40 per cent of the professional class – and this does not bode well for the reconstruction of Iraq and its future stability and growth.

By spring of 2007, the number of Iraqi refugees was staggering: an estimated two million Iraqis had sought refuge across the border in Jordan (around 750,000–1,000,000, about 15 per cent of Jordan's population) and in Syria (1.5–1.6 million, about 10 percent of its population), and tens of thousands are in Egypt (100,000), Lebanon (40,000), Iran (54,000), the Gulf states (200,000), and Turkey (10,000).[4] About one in six, or about 15 percent of the population, were either refugees or IDPs. In contravention of international law on the right to seek asylum, neighboring host states are increasingly closing their borders to Iraqis seeking asylum. Within Iraq, over two million people are estimated to be IDPs.[5]

Since February 2006, 1,037,615 Iraqis became IDPs at a rate of 80,000–100,000 people a month; this figure does not include IDPs from prior to February 2006.[6] As brutal ethnic-sectarian cleansing escalated, people sought refuge in neighborhoods with a prevalence of their particular sect. Formerly cosmopolitan or 'mixed'[7] neighborhoods became forcibly homogenized spaces. The extreme violence – threats, torture, kidnappings, murder – it took to effect such ostensibly homogeneous spaces is an indication of how alien is the idea and Iraqi resistance to sectarianism. Like Rwanda and Bosnia, Iraq had a fairly substantial rate of inter-marriage among its constituents groups – in this case – Sunnis, Shia, and Kurds. What happens to these now transgressive families when sect is politically mobilized and becomes a means of allocating space, resources, identity, and protection? In addition, Iraq is home to a number of minorities: Turkomen, Yazidis, Armenians, Christians, and Mandeans, among others.

According to a report published by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), less than 1 percent of the displaced are in camps. With little health care or electricity, minimal sanitation facilities, and paltry supplies of food and water, IOM calls the desolate desert camps 'the last resort'.[8] Iraqi refugees outside the country are concentrated in capital cities: Amman, Damascus, Beirut, and Cairo where more often than not they now reside illegally. As states of first asylum, Jordan and Syria have received the bulk of Iraq's refugees and have received little assistance from the US and the international community. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has criticized the lack of aid to these two countries who are shouldering the burden of over two million refugees (Raghavan 2007). In both countries, infrastructures have been unbearably stretched as the crush of refugees overwhelmed already limited water supplies, electricity, housing, education, and health care resources, not to mention employment. In addition, receiving Arab countries have security concerns that have acted to limit entrance to those seeking refuge. Iraqi refugees are often referred to as 'guests', a freighted term in Arabic, rather than refugees. The appellation of guest invokes the elaborate etiquette of Arab hospitality on the part of the host but also the guest. While the host is obliged to provide for the guest, the guest is supposed to know when to leave and to be able to estimate how much the host can offer and for how long. Both Jordan and Syria have been closing their borders to Iraqis seeking refuge citing the lack of assistance from the international community and the stretching of their states' limited resources to shoulder such a burden. Receiving states also are wary of the long-term nature of Iraqi displacement, fearing a prolonged refugee presence as happened with the Palestinians after 1948.

While the displaced reverberate regionally, outside they have been largely invisible and voiceless. This raises the question of the camp as a spatial device. In camps, refugees can potentially constitute an aggregate, spatially legible population and they can be places where national identity is reproduced and takes on new contours. Like Palestinian refugees in the first decades of exile, the Iraqi refugees are barely visible on the international scene. Most significantly, in the face of this nearly unparalleled flow of refugees, the US and the international community have largely been silent, refusing until very recently to even acknowledge a humanitarian emergency. This raises an interesting set of issues that will have to be explored in studies of displacement. For example, humanitarian organizations consider the near absence of refugee camps for Iraqis in a positive light. Perhaps camps will be subject to re-thinking in future refugee crises, particularly in heavily urban areas.

Spaces of containment

With millions of Iraqis having crossed international borders, the absence of Iraqi refugee camps in host countries Syria or Jordan may be an indication of a shift in the international refugee regimes' policy and practices (as well as an indication of the urban origins of most of the displaced – Iraq was around 75 per cent urban). It is worth contextualizing this in the observation that casualties of contemporary

warfare hover around 90 percent civilian compared to a hundred years ago when the civilian/non-civilian ratio was reversed (B. Turner 2006).

Spatial devices to shelter and manage the displaced can range from camps and safe havens to transit centers and open-relief centers, places where refugees can be protected and provided with relief. Iraqi refugees have sought refuge, by and large, in urban areas; increasingly as poorer refugees flee and those who have been displaced for a while are running out of money, they are seeking shelter in poorer areas of town. Refugee organizations and non-governmental organization (NGO) publications fairly consistently report that Iraqis will not go to camps. Although camps are not default spaces for the displaced and they have been duly criticized for warehousing refugees, within those spaces refugees can re-inscribe their meaning. Camps make refugees spatially legible but not necessarily visible in global consciousness or memory. If states are unwilling to provide asylum and close their borders and the UNHCR is opposed to setting up camps because they are costly and can become permanent, might camps disappear? If they do, will refugees become invisible as well? Without camps, do the displaced run the risk of becoming invisible and atomized exiles rather than a self-conscious aggregate with a potential voice and identity? We need to probe the implications of this trend for refugee rights, voice, and identity. It is important to note that while camps can contain and govern refugees in repressive ways, these small spaces are also imprinted by refugees and provide spaces for formulating new subjectivities as well as places from which to organize politically (Hammond 2004; Peteet 2005). Another reason perhaps for the absence of camps is the fear that they would be interpreted as an acknowledgment of the long-term nature of the refugee crisis. Yet we must acknowledge that the living conditions of the urban refugee is often much better than that of a camp dweller and communal life is not absent. In Jordan and Syria, Iraqi refugees are relatively integrated into the urban fabric, especially the labor markets. In Syria, Iraqi refugees have a communitarian life replete with social networks, restaurants, clubs, and religious shrines. With the advent of new communication technologies, refugees are no longer necessarily cut off from home.

While the Iraqi refugees may be forming 'little Baghdads' or areas of heavy concentration, we need to ask to what extent these embody the potential to re-create geo-social worlds and yet be radically transformative in the process. When refugees are scattered in urban area such as Amman and Damascus, they may transform the urban geography of these cities just as Palestinian refugees did in Beirut and Amman. Unlike camps, Iraqi spaces are not delineated from the larger society nor are they defined as spaces for the displaced. How sectarianism plays into refugee reception and whether the provisioning of aid by sectarian organizations engenders sectarian affiliations and identities should be high on the research agenda. For example, Shia refugees have reported being turned back at the Jordanian border on the basis of their sectarian affiliation. In Lebanon, Christian Iraqis have been encouraged to seek shelter and aid in predominantly Christian East Beirut. In some cases, sectarian aid organizations may provide more access to relief than the UNHCR. The absence of camps has to be conceptualized in a set of global processes and practices relating to containment of refugees. In the 1990s a more

restrictive state-centric global consensus to prevent refugee movements material-ized. As states closed their borders to refugees, new spatial devices to contain the displaced arose: safe havens, safe corridors, preventive zones, safe spaces, and protected zones. The move from camps to safe havens to urban dispersal begs the question: will refugee camps become an artifact of the twentieth century? What spatial forms, if any, will take their place? What is the role of 'securitization' policies and discourses that have dominated formulations of state policies in the region and globally? Camps are expensive to run, unduly burden receiving states, and embody the potential to de-stabilize host countries. As refugee fatigue and the recognition that refugee aggregates can de-stabilize neighboring countries took hold in the West and across the globe over the past two decades, an unwillingness to host refugees has become more prevalent. Since the founding of the UNHCR, three solutions to refuges situations have crystallized: local integration, resettlement, and repatriation. Yet for Iraqis, resettlement is presented by the UNHCR as a preferred solution. This is despite the US and Europe's unwillingness to accept any signific-ant number of refugees. Why is repatriation not on the agenda for Iraqi refugees and where are they to re-settle?In the current colonial cartography in Palestine and Iraq, spatial containment can be juxtaposed to strikingly uneven mobility. Bauman (1998: 9, 2) dubs mobility the 'most powerful and coveted stratifying factor' and an 'unequally distributed commodity'. Research to plumb the ways mobility is produced, its complex unevenness, and how it intersects with containment is called for. Palestine and Iraq represent two sides of the mobility coin: millions of Iraqis are being forcibly displaced, which contributes to the creation of sectarian space, while Palestinians are subjected to enforced immobility or containment intended to eventually propel some level of emigration from Palestine, or at the least from rural areas to selected urban centers. The freedom to move and the hierarchies built around its possibilities, are nowhere more apparent than in the West Bank and Gaza Strip where mobility is exceedingly circumscribed. The wall, checkpoints, barriers, barbed wire, and watchtowers are all measures to reduce and control mobility and sort out and separate populations; these physical obstacles are accompanied by administrative measures to curb mobility such as curfews and the permit system. B. Turner (2006: 8) perceptively comments: 'Human rights in a global world are, increasingly, rights of social and geographic mobility. This was one crucial lesson of the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989.' Israel's strategy in the West Bank is multi-pronged – spatial as well as legal and military. Mobility is a scarce right distributed along national, ethic-sectarian lines, nearly every dimension of which is under Israeli control. Mobility is a tangible thing that some have and others don't. Israeli cars whiz through checkpoints with a friendly wave of the hand and a smile while Palestinian cars are backed up in long lines waiting for permission to pass. Across the region Palestinian refugees are exceedingly vulnerable – from the violence against them in Iraq and their dire situation in desolate largely un-aided camps on the Iraqi–Jordanian border to Gazans stranded at the Egyptian–Gaza crossing, from refugees in Lebanon displaced from Nahr el-Bared to the forced immobility and confinement of millions of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. The Israelis have not pursued a temporally bounded mass expulsion that would constitute Palestinians

as refugees and instead have had recourse to strategies such as closure to encourage slow motion, or incremental, demographic changes to generate migrants rather than refugees. This coincides with a global move to deny refugee status and its attendant benefits to all but a select few. Closure, enclavization (Gaza), and exclavization (the West Bank) are strategies to dismember the remnants of Palestine and obstruct geographic contiguity. In these shrinking enclaves and exclaves, which resemble and are described by Palestinians as open-air prisons or camps, the population is a captive one. This novel camp, or prison, is now being enacted by closure with its concrete walls, fences, checkpoints, and the permit system, which materialize separation and exclusion. In Iraq, new spatial imaginaries to contain those who flee violence are evident in proposals for buffer zones and refugee collection points to serve as 'catch basins', intended as a non-place for refugees, and a new non-subject, the illegible refugee. Non-places are spatial expressions of liminality or suspension. V. Turner (1967: 96) pinpoints the character of liminal people: 'They are at once no longer classified and not yet classified.' Pollack and Byman (2007: 44–5) call for setting up buffer zones within Iraq to 'serve as "catch basins"' that would prevent 'spillover' of the displaced into neighboring countries and their potential destabilization. They also note that if refugee camps were set up outside of Iraq the refugees could be 'armed and manipulated' by those host states. Containing the refugees inside Iraq also reduces the legal rights they would acquire if they crossed an international border (Pollack and Byman 2007: 44–5). These devices seem like variations on the safe haven. While water metaphors to describe the potential impact of mass displacement can be difficult to avoid in refugee and immigration studies – waves, flows, floods, tidal waves, inundations, a sea of people, etc., in Iraq they have taken a new twist with the hydraulic 'catch-basin' concept and the 'spill-over effect'. According to the dictionary Webster's, catch-basins are 'a sievelike device at the entrance to the intersection of a sewer, for retaining solid matter likely to clog the sewer'. In this hydraulic image, Iraqis are metaphorically the equivalent of sludge. Catch basins would be located in border areas close to airfields in Iraq and thus could be easily supplied by the US. In them, refugees would have neither international protection nor would there necessarily be an international body to take responsibility. The goal of a catch-basin is to prevent cross-border movement and, most significantly, US forces could contain the refugees while also disarming and pacifying them. As non-refugees, akin to an ecological by-product, they are not just a non-political issue, they are hardly even a humanitarian one. Their legal rights would have all but been eviscerated.

Another new spatial device has appeared in Baghdad. A cement wall has been erected ostensibly to reduce violence but also to obstruct mobility between sectors of the socio-spatial urban fabric now characterized as 'Sunni' and 'Shi'ite', akin to Israel's wall in the West Bank to enforce separation.

Re-coding: the mantra of security

Refugees arouse little sympathy in a situation where they are increasingly conflated with the criminal, which is magnified if they are Muslims. Displaced Iraqis have

appeared at a time of dramatically changing conceptions of refugees, new forms of containment, and a lack of international response to their needs. New forms of warfare, the break-up of states, ethnic cleansings, and an increasing unwillingness of states to accept refugees have generated new ways of defining the displaced and the means of addressing them. Refugees are no longer iconic figures of compassion in dire need of aid. The current yoking of refugees to security issues well pre-dates 9/11, although 9/11 certainly magnified the securitization of refuges flows. In the political orbit of the post-Cold War world, refugees were no longer welcomed in Europe and the US as scoring an ideological victory over Communism. As public opinion began to demand limits to immigration, the doors of asylum tightened. Refugee flows were obstructed by tightening entry and asylum procedures on the one hand and introducing new measures of containment in refugee-producing sites. With wars in the 1990s in the Balkans and Iraq, containment emerged as the new approach to displacement. Containing the displaced within the borders of the state in safe havens or widely scattered, who are then classified as IDPs, protects the sovereignty of potential host states and minimizes the potential for regional de-stabilization sparked by large refugee flows. In addition, containment dilutes the need for an international response.

Should we conceptualize the displaced as 'refugees', 'forced migrants', or diasporic[9] as academics increasingly do? What are the legal, humanitarian, and political consequences of such re-conceptualizations? Does classifying refugees as forced migrants dilute the international commitment to provide assistance, protection, and durable solutions? Forced migration may aptly describe the current situation of migration in which the categories of refugee and forced migrant overlap but it still does not have the capacity to instigate action or intervention on behalf of the displaced. What happens to Palestinians who leave the West Bank because of the impact of the wall on their livelihood, education, health care etc. – are they simply migrants joining a diaspora, uncounted, voiceless, and invisible without any international recognition? Terminological innovations should follow new patterns and types of displacement. For example, a new category of IDPs is materializing in the West Bank. The 50,000 or so residents of the Seam Zone (the area between the wall and the Green Line) who find their mobility and access to their lands increasingly restricted through the permit system are moving to other areas of the West Bank. The pattern that initially seems to be crystallizing is that some members of a family will move and some will stay put. An estimated 20 percent of residents of the 'closed area' report household members moving to other places within the West Bank (Badil 2007: 21). This is a period of ambiguity as extant terms are challenged by novel situations of displacement. On the one hand, the modern twentieth-century concept of the 'refugee' arose from the displacement that followed war and exclusivist nationalisms and, on the other, from the subsequent emergence of administrative regimes that observe, enumerate, and govern the displaced and in so doing construct them as a legal category and subjects of intervention. In its very usage, 'refugee' once called for international intervention and solutions. Will the conceptual category of 'forced migrants' eventually elicit calls for intervention?

In the broader context of the post-9/11 world, the displaced are conceptualized less in terms of their rights under international law and in humanitarian terms and more as a security matter. Esmeir (2004: 3) reminds us that security can be a 'Black Hole' in which things 'collapse and disappear', a 'magical term able to absorb any and all content'. In much the same way that the US joins together a wide array of militant groups from Hezbollah to al-Qaeda, so some analysts categorize refugees with a host of others. For example Brookings Institute analysts, Pollack and Byman (2006a: 7), refer to the difficulties the US faced in stopping the 'flow of dangerous people across Iraq's border . . . refugees, militias, foreign invaders and terrorists'. In other words, refugees are now the equivalent of terrorists.[10] They also refer to Iraqi refugees as 'carriers of conflict' (Pollack and Byman 2006b). 'Carrier' evokes a pathogen, bringing disease in its wake much like Haitian asylum seekers in the US were cast as carriers of AIDS. Once objects of concern and assistance, refugees are now indistinguishable from potential criminals and terrorists who may sow instability much as Palestinian refugees in the 1950s were seen as 'ripe for recruitment to communism', then as subversives and eventually as terrorists, which successfully deflected recognition of a refugee crisis (Peteet 2005: 67). In Lebanon, camps have been referred to as 'security islands', lawless places outside the bounds of the state and thus challenges to state sovereignty. Palestinians were deemed a security issue decades before refugees in general became criminalized and policy became 'securitized'. In Jordan during the late 1960s and early 1970s, camps were discursively coded as extra-territorial or subversive sites out of the bounds of the state. Once Palestinian resistance forces were defeated and disarmed by the Jordanian army, the camps, now well monitored and surveyed by the Jordanian regime, were seen as pacified but always potentially subversive hence the need for continuing strict controls. In Lebanon, once the Palestinian 'guests' became burdens by overstaying their welcome and organizing politically, their camps became potential sites of subversion. In Jordan and Lebanon, the organic state, that unitary body, seemed threatened by the camps, which were framed as polluting, if not contagious.[11]

In coding refugees as potential subversives, they join the overlapping and also indistinguishable categories of Islamists, terrorists, and criminals. Or, Iraqi refugees may simply be invisible, no longer even calculated into the human costs of war. Former US Ambassador to the United Nations (UN), John Bolton, stated that Iraqi refugees had 'absolutely nothing to do' with the US invasion and occupation. Furthermore, he asserted, 'our obligation was to give them new institutions and provide security. We have fulfilled that obligation. I don't think we have an obligation to compensate for the hardships of war' (quoted in Rosen 2007: 74, 78). The category of refugee is shrinking and is available to only a select few (Zetter 2007). The idea of un-classifying Palestinian refugees and suspending or diluting the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) operation is decades old. In a new twist, there is a move underway to have Arab Jews who settled in Israel labeled 'refugees'; in other words a retroactive (50 years) classification as refugees. Resolutions have been introduced in the US House of Representatives and the Senate to include Jewish refugees in any mention of the resolution of the Palestinian refugee situation. This classificatory tactic is intended to dilute the specificity of the

Palestinians experience, recast it as part of an exchange of populations, and ensure that any future discussions of reparations or repatriation are counter-balanced by Jewish 'refugee' demands (Radler 2004). Calls for UNRWA to re-settle Palestinian refugees rather than have them remain in camps have been voiced frequently. A senior UN official told me that 'it is only Israeli extremists who call for an end to UNRWA. Israeli security and government understand that UNRWA is a necessity because otherwise Israeli would have to provide for the camps in the occupied territories.' In effect, UNRWA absolves them of responsibility.

The specter of Palestine, what is known in the world of humanitarian assistance as 'Palestinianization', in part, underwrites these strategies and policies toward refugees and the shrinking of the refugee category in the Middle East. Locally the collective memory of 1948 and 1967 nuances the reception, treatment, and labeling of the displaced. Governments also fear losing control over the process. Jordan and Syria have not labeled the Iraqis crossing their borders seeking sanctuary as refugees; both play host to a substantial Palestinian refugee population for whom the international community seems unable to provide durable solutions. As paradigmatic refugees, Palestinians provide lessons for the international management of displacement. Aid workers refer to the 'Palestinianization' of a refugee crisis when it is feared it will be prolonged, when durable solutions seem unattainable. To capture the depth of the crisis and their despair, Iraqi refugees refer to themselves as the 'new Palestinians', a highly resonant invocation in the region. Palestinian refugees provide a valuable lesson in the long-term human cost of re-mapping regions and dismantling place to make way for new political spaces and projects. Iraqi refugees have the potential to become the new 'Middle East crisis' in much the same way Palestinians have been for decades, a rallying point for mobilizing anti-government and anti-US sentiment. If there were camps and they became militarized and politicized like the Palestinians refugee camps once were, it is surmised, they could pose a threat to regional stability. In Palestinian camps, as well as Afghan camps in Pakistan and those in Central America during the 1980s, refugees politically organized, mobilized, and recruited for militant resistance and the camps could, but did not always, serve as bases for training and launching militant actions. In her award winning book, *Condemned to Repeat?*, Terry has carefully set out how refugee camps or humanitarian sanctuaries, with their connotations of being 'civilian, public and neutral' can 'provide advantages to guerrilla factions over purely military sanctuaries', which are 'militarized, secret and political' (Terry 2002: 9, 10). While her suggestions are certainly not to do away with refugee camps, her observations could be mobilized in support of such arguments. Along with the fear of 'Palestinianization', Terry's observations may underlie the apparent interest in spatial or non-spatial alternatives to camps. Another factor may be that camps are an acknowledgment that displacement will be long term. As the refugees become more and more impoverished, and unless aid is increased substantially, how long can Jordan and Syria continue to host them?

Agier (2002) argues that refugees are constituted by the wars that give rise to them as well as the humanitarian responses that deal with aggregate populations of displaced. I have argued elsewhere that UNRWA has played a pivotal role in

the production and reproduction of a Palestinian identity in Lebanon. Agier (2002) writes that '[o]fficially designated camps are reported to contain altogether 87.6 per cent of the refugees assisted by UNHCR'. Interestingly, he comments that camps and UNHCR assistance are 'unequally distributed around the globe' with camps being 'more common in Africa and Asia'. Indeed camps constitute a 'global space' for the humanitarian management of the displaced, those out-of-place in the global order (Agier 2002: 320). In the absence of camps, where are the spaces of humanitarianism? How is humanitarian aid being distributed and how is protection being provided? Could catch-basins become the new safe havens? If so, what happens to the right to seek asylum? A critical question concerns the role of relief institutions and the set of experiences they produce; UNRWA was a pivotal and transformative institution, shaping Palestinian refugee identity in manifold ways. For example, receiving and consuming rations as an aggregate population rendering them a medium for affirming identities.

UNHCR is playing a major role as a lead agency by offering some services and protection, and mobilizing donors. Neither Syria nor Jordan is a signatory to the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees. Both anticipate a return of the refugees. UNHCR has designated the refugees as 'prima facie'. Jordan has refused to call them refugees instead referring to them first as guests, a culturally loaded term in Arabic, then as visa holders and increasingly as illegals; only 20,000 are registered with UNHCR as asylum seekers most likely related to real concerns over becoming legible and thus visible. Palestinians have consistently insisted on staying on UNRWA rolls because doing so retains and reproduces their claim to Palestine and registers an injustice. Most importantly, registration invokes international responsibility. In the absence of camps and an identifiable refugee aid regime, will refugeehood become an individual condition of life or does it have the potential to be a condition that shapes the contours of a new shared identity? How will categories of difference play into local and regional politics? Especially where refugees settle among citizens, distinctions between the two can become sources of tension; refugee influxes can drive up the cost of housing and food and put tangible pressure on services; humanitarian agencies assist refugees but not the citizens. The categories don't define need, only one's relation to a state and legal identity. How will humanitarian spaces be reconfigured in the new global conditions of conflict? How will the Palestinian and Iraqi experience affect conceptualizations of refugees, IDPs, camps, and humanitarian assistance? Humanitarian space has all but disappeared in Iraq because of operational difficulties due to the security situation. Humanitarian organizations in Iraq and elsewhere may be increasingly losing the label of neutral, often being seen by their intended recipients as complicit with the occupying forces. In the Iraq case, US forces and private contractors often present their activities as humanitarian thus obfuscating military–humanitarian lines of distinction. This puts actual humanitarian agencies and their personnel at risk as their proclaimed neutrality becomes suspect. Attacks on the aid organizations and their staff have had a definite impact on the way NGOs operate in Iraq and suggest future directions. In the face of attacks, international humanitarian organizations have moved their offices and higher-level staff to neighboring

Jordan and Kuwait where they operate from what is now commonly referred to as 'remote control'.

The term 'humanitarian' itself can be a subject of critique. In the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, Palestinian activists insisted that the refugees were not a humanitarian issue but a political one; humanitarian interventions, often elided with charity, were disparaged as de-politicizing what was in essence a political question. However, to this day, Palestinians insist that UNRWA registration and ration cards indicate an international responsibility for them and constitute recognition of their loss (Peteet 2005). An unsettling if not incredible silence about the trauma of millions of Iraqis accompanied the US occupation. Neither refugees nor IDPs were publicly acknowledged by then President Bush. While the war itself may be daily front-page news, this is one of the least media covered humanitarian crises in decades. To acknowledge well over four million displaced Iraqis would be to admit to the unimaginable violence and chaos generated by the occupation and an admission that not only has the war been lost but also it unleashed an enormous humanitarian crisis for which the US bears primary responsibility. Malkki (1996: 386–7) contrasts the widespread twentieth-century circulation of 'visual representations of refugees' – a sort of 'mobile mode of knowledge about them' and 'key vehicle in the elaboration of transnational social imagination of refugeeness' with the paucity of refugee narratives. Yet in the West, particularly in the US, there are few visual images and almost no voices of displaced Iraqi or Palestinian refugees or those confined in enclaves. A startling comparison can be made to the displaced Kosovars, the Iraqi Kurds displaced in 1991, and more recently the displaced in Darfur.[12] Darfur is treated as a classic twentieth-century refugee crisis. Why? There is little risk that Darfuris will emigrate in large numbers to the West and in the discourse of the 'war on terror', the Sudanese regime, coded as 'Arab' and 'Islamic' is responsible, making apportionment of blame and accountability logical to the 'war on terror' and politically convenient. A campaign of silence and darkness has descended over the Palestinians behind the wall and the nearly unprecedented dismantlement of Iraq, the brutal dispersion of a significant portion of its population, and the re-mapping of its social geography.

Conclusion

The US, Israel, and the Arab states are acting in ways to reduce refugees: Israel's closure produces migrants and/or IDPs who, it will be claimed, left of their own volition. Displaced Iraqi refugees remain unrecognized as refugees in the region and by the US administration. Repatriation may be the preferred solution to refugee crises. Yet in the Middle East, repatriation of Palestinian refugees has never been seriously regarded by the international community. The UNHCR talks of resettlement for the Iraqis yet it is clearly not on the horizon. Without a massive infusion of aid, the absorptive capacity of Jordan and Syria may have reached its peak. Then there is the question of their capacity politically to absorb a new population. In 2007, the US took a paltry 7,000; European states accepted relatively more but the numbers were not enough to make a dent in the growing number of Iraqis refugees.

The displaced Iraqis are emblematic of the imaginary mosaic and the humanitarian disaster it has unleashed. The spatial configuration of Iraqi displacement and responses to it may portend future trends in refugee policy. Non-recognition of the Iraqi displaced suggests further re-definition of the term in a way that diminishes the right to asylum, protection, and assistance. In other words, fewer and fewer people will be able to claim refugee status. Zetter (2007: 16) argues that the category of refugee is shrinking and becoming 'a highly prized status'. New spatial devices beyond the camp and the safe haven seem to be in the works. Or perhaps, there will simply be non-places for the displaced as they merge into the surrounding urban areas with little if any recognition. Non-recognition mutes the voice of refugees and renders the nominally responsible parties oblivious to their needs. The lack of a concerted response to the Iraqi humanitarian crisis may be indicative of a gradual shift from concern with refugee rights to increasing invisibility and exclusion on a selective basis. While some displaced remain unseen and hardly heard (Iraqis, Palestinians, and Somalis among others) in comparison others have been or are clearly visible (Kosovars and Darfuris).

Acknowledgements

Notes

1 Over the past century, not just conflict but development projects, environmental disasters and sedentarization projects have precipitated displacement (Shami 1994). The region is also heavily implicated in another kind if displacement or migration; it imports hundreds of thousands of workers. Within the region, some countries export local labor (for example, Yemen and Egypt) to oil-producing states. North Africa and Turkey have significant histories of exporting labor to European countries.

2 This is what Aiden Southall refers to in the African context as 'definition by illusion' or the false application of the label 'tribe' usually to 'a large scale which becomes permanently adopted for administrative convenience and ultimately accepted by the people themselves' (Southall 1970: 45).

3 Estimates are that 4.7 million Iraqis are displaced; 2.7 million are IDPs and more than two million are refugees in neighboring states. 'The Continuing Needs of Iraq's Displaced', UNHCR (www.unhcr.org/Iraq) (accessed March 1, 2009).

4 See 'Statistics on Displaced Iraqis around the World', UNHCR (www.unhcr.org).

5 In the new global politics of displacement, IDPs, those who flee their homes but do not cross an international border, mushroomed from 1.2 million in 1992 to over 20 million in 2006, significantly outnumbering refugees.

6 'Iraq: Number of IDPs Tops One Million, Says Iraqi Red Crescent', UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. July 9, 2007. (www.irinnews.org).

7 For a pointed and poignant examination of the term 'mixed areas', see Al-Mufti (2006: 28).

8 Most of these camps are temporary affairs – often just a few weeks or months until they close as residents find better accommodations. Some are spontaneous sites created by IDPs in large buildings or schools – and house very small numbers often ranging from

30 to 100 families. UNHCR sites (around seven) in Iraq provide aid, shelter, and legal advice but they have not set up camps.

9 For a critique of the concept of a Palestinian diaspora see Peteet (2007).

10 In Gary Trudeau's well-respected and widely syndicated cartoon strip, Doonesbury, Ray has been followed home from Iraq by a terrorist. When asked why, he replies: 'He said he was a refugee.' *Courier-Journal* August 21, 2007, p. 7.

11 The discourse of pollution may have been more pronounced in Lebanon where the population was Lebanese unlike in Jordan where over 50 per cent of the non-camp population was Palestinian. Palestinian narratives cast the Jordanian Bedu as exhibiting the most violent behavior toward Palestinian fighters and civilians during the Jordanian regime's 1970 military offensive against Palestinian guerillas known as Black September.

12 For a probing look at the place of campaigns for Darfur in the US see Mamdani (2007).

"The Birth of a European Public": Migration, Postnationality, and Race in the Uniting of Europe

Fatima El-Tayeb

> The fact is that the so-called European civilization—"Western" civilization—as it has been shaped by two centuries of bourgeois rule, is incapable of solving the two major problems to which its existence has given rise: the problem of the proletariat and the colonial problem.
> —Aimé Césaire, 1955

I

Europe appears to be in a unique position in this post–cold war, post-9/11 world, both with regard to its internal reconstruction and to its potential role in current world politics. Seemingly having overcome the state of crisis famously analyzed by Césaire in his *Discourse on Colonialism*, at a time when "postnational" and "end of the nation-state" have become favorite buzzwords within academic and nonacademic discourses of globalization, it is Europe, and Europe alone, that has created a material manifestation of this new world order: the European Union appears as the first supranational system fit for the twenty-first century, meant to magnify the virtues and minimize the vices of the nation-states that built it. As concerns grow over the unilateral policies of the United States as the one remaining superpower, the inefficiency of the United Nations, and the apparent rise of antidemocratic movements and regimes worldwide, the perception of the European Union as a vanguard form of post-statehood rapidly gains ground.[1]

The "European vanguard" model has temporal as well as spatial dimensions, assessing Europe's position both geographically and in relation to its own history. Current discussions in Europe emphasize that essential to the success of the continental union is a sense of a transnational European identity, based on common values, rooted in a common past, distinguishing the continent from the rest of the world while connecting nations with vastly different cultures.[2] The quest for this European identity however, seems to have fallen far behind the process of creating a common legal and economic system. While changes

in national laws and the introduction of the Euro passed relatively smoothly, the rejection of a European constitution in a number of national plebiscites led to renewed debates, a search for an existing "European consciousness" able to hold the union together. All too often however, these debates devolve into an assessment of what, or rather who, is certainly *not* European. Migration in particular gains a central position here by functioning both as a threat uniting the beleaguered European nations and as a trope shifting the focus away from Europe's unresolved identity crisis.

In this essay, I briefly analyze discourses on the continent's future and past as they pertain to memory, identity, and migration. In order to do so, I will trace some of the complicated interactions resulting from the simultaneous construction of a European space, both materially and discursively, in the contemporary global landscape and of a normative European historical memory. My starting point is the notion of an emerging European "public space" and its role in creating a common continental identity. I focus on two recent incidents of what could be defined as the emergence of a "transnational" European public: the widespread antiwar demonstrations in the spring of 2003 and the "riots" in the French *banlieus* in the winter of 2005. Both events not only reflect on the ways in which the Second World War and colonialism are (not) evoked in the process of Europeanization, but also place the European public within the discursive space of two dominant tropes of current global politics, "the war on terror" and "the clash of civilizations," both tied to renewed attempts to create transatlantic Western unity. I believe that the emerging dynamic between migration and post-nationhood that I focus on here might be relevant beyond the European context, offering insights into developments on the other side of the Atlantic as well.

I will approach the events at the center of my analysis partly by way of their assessment by two of Europe's foremost "public intellectuals," Jürgen Habermas and Jean Baudrillard. Habermas's reflection on the meaning of the Western European resistance to the Iraq war and Beaudrillard's view of the uprising on the margins of French society can be seen as emblematic of two versions of postwar Europe—one in which the European Union stands for the successful construction of a civil society out of the ruins left behind by World War II, the other documenting the failure of this attempt. Ultimately, however, I will argue, both interpretations fail to place Europe's post- (and pre-) war history in a global context as they remain caught up in an outdated, solipsistic perspective that continues to place racialized migrant and minority populations outside "Europe."

Worldwide movements of migration have already emerged as one of the central issues in the new millennium. Apart from the material reality of dwindling resources, economic globalization, and internationalized migration regulations, immigration has gained increasing importance as a symbol of the various social, economic and political fears plaguing contemporary Western societies. Migration, both in its material and its discursive incarnation, possesses additional relevance within the European context, where the collapse of the Soviet empire and the process of economic and political unification generate a massive redefinition and reconstruction of borders. Europe is a densely populated continent with ostensibly clearly separated national and cultural, and often by implication ethnic, spaces. The tension between those imagined pure spheres of national identity and actual cultural and ethnic pluralities is not a new phenomenon.[3] It has been intensified, however, in the context of recent developments both within and beyond the continent's borders, which have created a renewed need to define what "Europe" means.

Current debates on the continent's identity seem to indicate that the twentieth century division between insiders and outsiders based on the model of the nation-state is not necessarily diminishing with the European unification, but often merely appears to be shifting to reconfigure migration as a European "problem" that threatens continental as well as national identities. The unified Europe manifests itself increasingly through ethnicized economic bonds: belonging to the Union primarily means having access to economic privileges not available to non-Europeans. In order to prevent or control the access of those non- (or, in the case of the East, not yet) Europeans, the continent's external borders are increasingly fortified.[4] "Fortress Europe," in turn, means that non-Europeans may break the law—and accordingly might be treated as criminals—simply by being present.[5] While the elimination of borders within the union produces increased freedom of movement for some, for others the border is now everywhere. Theoretically, "belonging to" Europe is a question of one's passport, but in everyday life this status is determined along different lines: if there are no systematic border controls regulating access to a particular national space and its resources, these controls must be replaced by informal, widely accepted definitions of (not) belonging. In practice, this frequently translates into racial and religious profiling.[6] The perception of "visible minorities" in European public discourse is still largely determined by long-standing pseudo-biological or implicitly racialized concepts of national, and by extension European, identity that invariably position them as other. Within the new types of omnipresent border policing, two main geographi-

cal, cultural, and racial threats are identified, both long-standing European tropes: one in the South, with African migration representing the quintessential racial difference from white Europe; and the other in the Middle East, where Muslim migrants embody the religious/cultural opposition to Christian/enlightened Europe.[7]

Within continental Europe, where nations cling to the notion of Europe as a multiethnic but "white" space, a European seems to be accepted as such only if able to merge with the majority in a rather literal sense. While present for centuries, communities of color continue to be perceived as "foreign matter," stand-ins for the masses beyond the continent's borders. The resistance to accepting the fragile, arbitrary, and ideological nature of these borders is reflected in the peculiar European definition of the term "migrant," at once implying a temporary and a permanent condition: migration appears as always reversible, coming with an expiration date, but at the same time stretching over several generations. Persons born in a European nation, of parents born and raised there as well, are thus routinely identified as "third-generation migrants," manifesting their position outside the community of citizens.[8] The notion that this is a deeply racialized concept is supported by the less than indiscriminate application of the "hereditary" migrant status, which is overwhelmingly attributed to the descendents of nonwhite postcolonial and non-Christian labor migrants.[9] Race and religion thus function as central but largely invisible factors in European concepts of identity.[10] Rather than entering new territory, debates around European identity and political rights are thus frequently sidetracked by discussions of the "Europe compatibility" of particular homogenized and marginalized groups, as if minorities of color could be returned to their "place of origin" if they fail to pass the integration test (and of course, within this racialized setup, they are inevitably doomed to fail).[11] This exclusionary discourse, one could argue, indeed manifests a specific European consciousness in its mobilization of images that have been central to constructing a European identity since the early Middle Ages: the racial threat of Africa and the religious/cultural threat of Islam reappear as key themes in contemporary Europe, constituting a commonality that indeed seems to transcend all national differences (it does not appear coincidental that immigration policies were the first part of the future European legal system that the member states could agree on).[12]

There is little awareness of the actual ethnic diversity in not only contemporary, but also historical Europe—rather, the supposed ethnic homogeneity of the latter is seen as an explanation for the persistent resistance to a multi-

ethnic and multireligious conceptualization of the former. National identity revolves around the construction and institutionalization of a common past, whether minorities find a place in the larger community thus also depends on their relation to its narrative of national origin.[13] Usually, migrants are denied "possession" of this common history.[14] At the same time, they and their descendants live the national past as much as the "native" population, while frequently simultaneously functioning as its other. This multidimensional position is turned into its opposite by the exclusionary approach of national historiography which, from its most populist to most sophisticated versions, tends to firmly place migrants of color outside of Europe's past and present. Historiography ascribes "the migrant" (including succeeding generations to the nth level) a flat, one-dimensional existence in which s/he has always just arrived, thus existing only in the present, but like a time traveler simultaneously hailing from a culture that is centuries (or in the case of Africa, millennia) behind, thus making him/her the representative of a past without connection to or influence on the host society's history.[15]

The "European memory" currently debated and constructed as a basis for a transnational continental identity could offer a perfect opportunity to overcome the structural (self-)exclusion of migrants and minorities so often lamented in mainstream discourses. Despite the professed desire to integrate inexplicably reluctant and hostile "foreigners" however, so far it seems as if the internalist focus of national histories will instead be reinscribed in twenty-first century "postnational" discourses, leaving unexplored the myriad ways in which minorities and migrants are part of this history. In current debates, the French Revolution, the Second World War, and the totalitarian systems of fascism and Stalinism, with their implications that obviously reach beyond the nation-state, are used as foundations for a continental European identity, incorporating as well as transcending national experiences. Their postnational Europeanization can also be read however as a continuation of exclusions that already shaped the European nation states. This exclusion is based on what Haitian anthropologist Michel-Rolph Trouillot calls "archival power," that is, "the power to define what is and what is not a serious object of research and, therefore, of mention."[16] By deeming irrelevant the involvement of non-Western and nonwhite populations in World War II and that conflict's effect on them, the proponents of a postnational Europe again reproduce the ideas that "world history" really is white history and that events of global importance take place in the West alone while excusing Western ignorance about the rest of the world. Equally important, this model is necessary to the

claim that migrant cultures and European cultures did not touch until the post-war period and thus do not share a common, interdependent history (and by implication, no common, interdependent future). In what follows, I will show how such an "internalist" narrative of Europe is constructed, how it adversely affects migrant and minority communities, and how it is being deconstructed by exactly those groups it is meant to exclude.

II

> Two dates we should not forget: the day when the newspapers presented to their baffled readers the oath of loyalty to Bush by the coalition of the willing, orchestrated by Spain behind the back of the other EU nations; but neither February 15th, 2003, when the protesting masses in London and Rome, Madrid and Barcelona, Berlin and Paris reacted to this surprise coup. The contemporaneity of these overwhelming demonstrations—the largest since the end of World War Two—could in hindsight enter history books as the signal for the birth of a European public.
>
> —Jürgen Habermas, 2003

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of the communist Other within Europe's limits, the extent to which ideological cold war debates were in fact often a reworking of the experience of World War II becomes increasingly obvious.[17] Support for the European unification process is frequently framed within an older model of postwar Western Europe that sees the Second World War in general and the Holocaust in particular as the "end of innocence" of modernity, the (temporary) collapse of Western civilization. The challenge and moral obligation that the postwar West thus faced was to recover and modify the Enlightenment project in a way that would reestablish it as the basis for an international regime of universal human rights. In this view, Europe appears as the driving force in creating a network of international relations and treaties effectively preventing a return to the state of "absolute war" that marked the birth of postmodern Europe.[18] It is this distinctive, paradigmatic European experience that in the eyes of many contributors to current discussions predestines the European Union for a key role in world politics.[19] Aimed at justifying (and demanding) a leading role for a united Europe in twenty-first century global politics, this argument also presents an interpretation of the Second World War that offers a happy ending of sorts: it was after all exactly the descent into anti-Enlightenment and thus ultimately un-European barbarism that motivated the unique success story of the European Union: during the second half of the twentieth century (Western) Europe has repented, has proven that it learned from its mistakes and should thus be granted another shot at world leadership.

While this position becomes increasingly common, it might have been expressed most forcefully in a piece that Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida published in 2003, as part of a concerted action of European intellectuals in response to the Iraq war and the popular Western-European opposition to it.[20] The European public made explicit references to World War II (rather than Vietnam) in its antiwar rhetoric, claiming a voice based on an experience with "total war" that Europeans (but not Americans) share. This position implies a superior moral authority that in fact becomes quite explicit in the Habermas/Derrida piece—and the argument for a European (intellectual) intervention certainly gained weight after being expressed by two of the most influential European philosophers, representing different schools of thought, known for their disagreement on almost everything of philosophical importance, but now united by the urgency of the occasion: Europe having to save the world. Again. Derrida characterized the essay, copublished but written by Habermas, as "the designation of new European political responsibilities beyond any Eurocentrism, the call for a renewed affirmation and effective alteration of international law and its institutions, particularly the United Nations, a new concept and a new practice of the separation of powers etc. in a spirit based on the Kantian tradition."[21] In addition to thus designating the European Union a central role in newly popular cosmopolitan theories, the text touches on many of the key arguments brought forward in favor of united Europe as model for a future world order.

It is entirely justified and potentially useful to ask about the particular role a united Europe might play in contemporary global politics, about the possibilities created by an association that intends to respond to the more than obvious crisis of the nation-state. The dominant answers as expressed in the Habermas/Derrida essay pose a number of problems however, both in their characterization of Europe's past and in their suggestions for a future world order. Of course, the Habermas/Derrida argument did not go unchallenged, but criticism focused primarily on the exclusion of Eastern Europe and the authors' wholesale dismissal of U.S. strategy.[22] Less critical attention was devoted to the matter of course way in which Europe appears as entirely self-contained, the eternal engine of historical development, and the world as divided between "the West" and those who reject its values. In a seemingly generous gesture, Europe's achievements are shared with the world, which thereby is effectively divided along very familiar lines—hardly the same as a departure from Eurocentrism:

> Because Christianity and capitalism, science and technology, Roman law and code Napoleon, a civil-urban lifestyle, democracy and human rights, the secularization of state and society

have spread over other continents, they are not Europe's property anymore. The Western spirit, rooted in Judeo-Christian traditions, certainly has characteristic properties. But the European nations share this way of thinking, defined by individualism, rationalism, and activism, with the United States, Canada, and Australia.[23]

Apart from peculiarly linking "the Western spirit" to European descent, this characterization of Europe as always creating, never receiving repeats a favorite trope of Eurocentrism: that of the continent continuously recreating itself, shaping other cultures but never fundamentally touched by them, a trope tying all "universal" concepts to the West, rejecting notions of "other" modernities, downplaying the influence of Islam on the European renaissance. In short, erasing any sense of a world in which Europe was not the center of "progress." As Stuart Hall has observed, "this has been the dominant narrative of modernity for some time—an 'internalist' story, with capitalism growing from the womb of feudalism and Europe's self-generating capacity to produce, like a silkworm, the circumstances of her own evolution from within her own body."[24] Europe's amazing ability to continuously give birth not only to itself but to every idea and movement of world historic relevance necessarily establishes the European as the normative type of human. Habermas's characterization of the European mentality can be seen as exemplary of this narrative:

> Here, citizens are distrustful of transgressions between politics and religion. Europeans have rather a lot of faith in the organizational and governing capacities of the state while being skeptical of the market. They have a distinct understanding of "the dialectic of enlightenment," are not overtly optimistic towards the possibilities of technological progress. They favor the securities of the welfare state and of joint guarantees. Their level of tolerance towards violence against persons is comparatively low. The desire for a multilateral, regulated international order joins in with the hope for an effective world domestic policy [*Weltinnenpolitik*]—through a reformed United Nations. (33)

This rather idealized representation of the European public consciousness is traced back directly to the French Revolution: "The emission of the French revolutionary ideal throughout Europe explains why here politics in both senses, as the medium that secures freedom and as structural power, have a positive value" (33). The French revolution thus functions both as the source of modern European difference and of Eurocentric universalism, since it is assumed that the idea of universal human rights was born there. One could argue however that the promise of the French revolution has been taken nowhere more seriously or put into practice more radically than on the French slave island of St. Domingue that transformed itself into the independent black

republic of Haiti—against the violent resistance of Europe's most powerful nations and without any support from either the French revolutionaries or those Enlightenment thinkers whose passionate commitment to the human quest for freedom inspired both the French and the American revolution but was bizarrely detached from contemporary racial slavery.[25] The obvious double standard applied to the black liberation struggle led Michel-Rolph Trouillot to the scathing yet accurate conclusion that "the Haitian revolution was the ultimate test to the universalist pretensions of both the French and the American revolutions. And they both failed."[26]

The immediate application and expansion of the French revolutionary ideals by Europe's colonized, enslaved subjects could have been interpreted as a sign that the "Western spirit" referenced by Habermas is no European property and as an indication of the complex interconnectedness of world cultures before the current "globalization." The contemporary reactions to the uprising on the other hand can draw attention to severe limitations of the European conception of universal rights, challenging the notion of a sudden "fall from grace" in the twentieth century. The Haitian revolution, despite its far-reaching consequences, however, is conspicuously absent from standard accounts of the age of revolutions, the Napoleonic wars (after all, more than a decade before Waterloo, Napoleon's army experienced a devastating defeat in Haiti, prompting him to give up all colonial ambitions in the Americas), or Western history in general. The investment in keeping invisible what challenges fundamental tenets of the Enlightenment narrative continues to limit the ability to envision a non-Eurocentric humanism. Discussions of the meaning of Europe's legacy such as Habermas's, while meant to envision new political formations beyond nationalism, reinforce rather than challenge the existing one that insists that "individualism, rationalism, and activism" are white, "Western" properties.

Just as the Haitian revolution is excluded from the list of universally significant events—which overwhelmingly happen to take place in the West, a West that, as these examples show, is a racial as much as a geographical location—so are people of color excluded from all the markers of Europeanness. This is evident, for example, in the ways the two world wars become a completely Western affair through a denial of the link between the war and colonialism, which provided Europe with non-Western resources, battle sites, and cannon fodder.[27] But of course colonialism itself is the big blank of European history, though it certainly qualifies as a common and identity-shaping experience. Again Habermas's essay summarizes a dominant position that acknowledges and at the same time erases Europe's colonial past:

Each of the big European nations went through a prime of imperial power, and, more important in our context, through the experience of losing an empire. In many cases, this descent went along with the loss of a colonial empire. With the growing distance from imperial power and colonial history, the European nations received the chance of critically reflecting on themselves. Thus they could learn, from the perspective of the defeated, to see themselves in the dubious position of winners who are held responsible for the violence of an enforced and rootless modernity. This might have advanced the rejection of Eurocentrism and fed the Kantian hope for a *Weltinnenpolitik*.[28]

This position does imply some guilt or rather regret over colonialism. Not for the exploitation, enslavement, and forced underdevelopment of large parts of the world however, but for an "enforced modernity" that although positive overall in retrospect might have been introduced more gently.[29] This image not only denies, or at least minimizes, the disastrous effects of colonialism on the colonized, but also the continued postcolonial exploitation from which Europe profits as much as the United States.[30] This deeply ambivalent attitude, attempting to "save" colonialism while admitting, at least to some degree, that it was wrong is a structural part of Europe's self-representation, also reflected in the European Union declaration on colonialism in the wake of the 2001 Durban conference against racism or the short-lived 2005 French law ordering high school teachers to instruct students on the positive effects of French colonialism (particularly in North Africa).[31] This whitewashing of the colonial past has obvious implications for Europe's perceived role in contemporary global politics in which it appears as a benevolent, neutral mediator, wizened by past mistakes and without a stake in current power struggles. But the effects of this distorted perception of the colonial past are just as stark for intra-European developments: the "internalist" European narrative could not survive an honest scrutiny of the impact of knowledge, resources, and manpower from the global South on European "progress." Furthermore, by excluding colonialism from the list of the key events shaping European identity, the complex effects of colonial rule on contemporary Europe can be ignored or externalized as can its postcolonial populations.

Instead, Europe continues to imagine itself as an autonomous entity, simultaneously part and whole of the dialectic of progress, untouched by "race matters," occasionally wizened but fundamentally unchanged by its contact with various Others who remain forever outside; a colorblind continent in which difference is marked along lines of nationality and ethnicized Others are routinely ascribed a position outside the nation, allowing the permanent externalization and thus silencing of a debate on the legacy of racism and colonialism. The fact that those who are most emphatically presented as "Oth-

ers-from-Without"[32] (Jews, blacks, Muslims, Roma, and Sinti) are always (also) "Others-from-Within," and that the "ethnic cleansing," aimed at achieving an already proclaimed national homogeneity has been a key feature of twentieth century European population politics long before the Yugoslavian war introduced the term into the common European vocabulary does not change this binary perception of cultural and national belonging any more than does the long-standing, naturalized European claim to other parts of the world.

What appears thus as an urgent task within the oft-proclaimed quest for a twenty-first century European identity is the exploration of the impact of these neglected aspects of Europe's history (and present), and more so of their inextricable link to the foundational elements of Europeanness. There are a number of possible, symbolically charged, entry points for such an exploration in recent history: 1945, 1989, 2001, or, possibly less obvious, 1961, the year of the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem, marking the end of the "postwar" period and the beginning of a new assessment of the Holocaust; the beginning too of the hot phase of the cold war marked by the building of the Berlin wall and the failed Bay of Pigs invasion; a year also in which more than a hundred Algerians were murdered by French police in the streets of Paris, a largely uncommemorated event exemplifying the repression of European colonial history (and echoing the French army's massacre of Algerian civilians on May 8, 1945);[33] the same year finally that the West German government signed a "guest worker" treaty with Turkey that brought to Europe what is now its largest ethnic and religious minority community, a community, however, that is still perceived as representing whatever is *not* European.[34] The events of 1961, all remembered in varying degrees but rarely together, could be seen as symbolizing the link between colonialism, World War II, cold war politics, and migration that is routinely ignored in discussions of either subject. Instead, in public narratives, colonialism is remembered as having taken place outside of Europe (if it is remembered at all), the war appears as a European event (while there is a dim awareness of the Pacific theater, this is certainly not true of the war's implications for colonized nations and Latin America), the cold war is seen as shaping Europe's postwar history, but not so decolonization, which in turn seems unrelated to migration, appearing as a recent, reversible phenomenon. While the detrimental effects of this compulsively compartmentalized perception of postwar European history are obvious on many levels, they are most urgently felt in the legal, social, and discursive treatment of "migration."[35]

III

> The French can reassure themselves that it is not just theirs but the whole Western model which is disintegrating; and not just under external assault—acts of terrorism, Africans storming the barbed wire at Melilla—but also from within.
> —Jean Baudrillard, 2006

As a result of the provincializing of the world wars, the externalization of colonial rule, and the dehistoricizing of migration, the majority of people of color currently living in Europe are officially and unofficially defined as being part of a "migrant population," even when they were born there. In fact, while the peak of postcolonial and labor migration from the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia occurred in the early 1970s, the children and grandchildren of these migrants are perceived as at least as "un-European" as their ancestors. The context in which this exclusion is currently framed in Europe, even more than in the United States, comprises clash of civilization scenarios that, although far predating 9/11, since then have become the dominant framework for discourses on migrants, especially those of Muslim background, who form Europe's largest religious minority and a substantial part of its migrant population.

The 2005 "riots" in France can function as an illustration of both the culturalist framing of the economic, social, and legal exclusions Europeans of color are facing and of the continent's repressed colonial and racist legacy.[36] The events unfolding in the French *banlieus* seemed to be in complete accordance with dominant discourses: urban minority and migrant youth after all play a prominent role in debates on Europe's demographic and economic future, usually as targets of alarmist discourses around an essentially different, dangerous other within, threatening both Europe's liberal and modern identity and its economic stability. Popular and academic discussions of minority youth focus largely on the male population, usually equating "minority" with "migrant" and migrant with "Muslim." Girls and women remain marginal, noticed almost exclusively as mute, passive victims of their culture, mainly in the context of "honor killings" and in revived debates on headscarf bans, granted a voice only after they, like Ayaan Hirsi Ali and others, have explicitly broken with their community and religion. Male agency on the other hand is framed largely in terms of aggression: Muslim men appear as intolerant and violent, against their communities' women, each other, and the state.[37]

After the death of two teenage boys running from the police, Zyed Benna and Bouna Traore, one of North African the other of West African descent,

in the Paris suburb Clichy-sous-Bois on October 27, 2005, long-standing tensions and frustrations erupted in three weeks of unrest that quickly spread from Paris all over the nation (and into neighboring countries such as Germany and Belgium). Violence was concentrated in the larger cities' *banlieus*, officially known as *zones urbaines sensibles*—structurally neglected, isolated neighborhoods with a high concentration of populations originating in France's former African colonies—resulting in about ten thousand torched cars and almost half as many arrests.[38] The conservative government under President Chirac reactivated a state of emergency law first introduced in 1955 in response to the colonial war in Algeria and then French minister of the interior, and current president, Nicolas Sarkozy took a strong man approach in defense of the nation (and Europe), threatening the deportation of the "ringleaders," as if the vast majority of protesters hadn't been French.[39]

The riots garnered Europe-wide media attention, resonating with fears of migrant populations throughout Europe, especially in the Western nations. The question "Could it happen here?" became a constant refrain in a debate that drew on images of violent, criminal minority youths recognized throughout the continent. The destructive rampage of young men of color in the suburbs seemed to validate this perception, offering an almost perfect inversion of the public space created by the white and middle-class protesters against the Iraq war: here the "civil" and "civilized," nonviolent antiwar demonstrations of a liberal European citizenry, there the violent, inarticulate, self-destructing, antidemocratic, and anti-European riots of a black and Muslim underclass. While the European media initially had difficulties classifying the rioters—Arab, African, migrant—most reports, especially those published outside of France, quickly focused on "Muslim" as a central characteristic, as if the young men's religion was an incentive for their violence (this was after all, only a couple of months after the London bombings). The search for the roots of the riots was visibly shaped by this perception: radical Islam, hip-hop gangs were identified as culprits.[40] And while the marginalization of black and Muslim French youth was admitted, their own explanations for the riots were dismissed as insufficient justification for their violent response:[41]

> The police come and hassle us all the time. They ask us for our papers 10 times a day. They treat us like delinquents—especially Sarkozy. That's not the answer. It would be good to have youth clubs and other places to go - then there would be less trouble. It's not good to burn cars but that's one way of getting attention, so people can come and solve our problems.[42]

The coverage of the "riots" was symptomatic in its homogenizing of a hetero-
geneous group, externalizing representatives of a postindustrial European ur-
banity as a foreign, hostile other. The *banlieus*, though invisible in Habermas's
vision of a new Europe, are a public space in many ways symptomatic of the
European postindustrial condition of spatial segregation, of borders running
through urban centers. Containing superfluous populations, they became
foreign territory, an enclave of the non-West, finally invading Europe itself.
The Mouvement de l'Immigration et des Banlieues (MIB), founded in 1995,
puts the media reports into context:

> Today we are told about these "young people from the suburbs" (by which we are to un-
> derstand "these Blacks and Arabs") who burn things down as if they were foreigners who
> came to pillage France.
> And yet from Minguettes (1981) to Vaulx-en-Velin (1990), from Mantes-la-Jolie (1991) to
> Sartrouville (1991), from Dammarie-les-Lys (1997) to Toulouse (1998), from Lille (2000)
> to Clichy, the message is plain and clear:
> Enough with unpunished police crimes, enough with police profiling, enough with crappy
> schools, enough with planned unemployment, enough with rundown housing, enough
> with prisons, enough with humiliation! And enough with the two-tier justice system which
> protects corrupt politicians and consistently convicts the weak.[43]

More sympathetic analyses of this decade-long history of failed communication
and of conscious structural neglect, creating and containing a native under-
class, nonetheless tend to retreat to established "lost between cultures" and
"nation within nation" tropes. Accusing the French state (and often European
societies in general) of failing the "second generation," the latter is nonetheless
naturalized as "foreign," denied the right to become European by the only
agent able to grant this right: the majority of "real Europeans." The criticism
of European integration policies thus falls short by assuming the existence of
a distinct, separate, non-European "culture of poverty" dominating minority
communities who are granted little agency in claiming a space within the
nation and the continent. Failing to note, as MIB does, the long history of
resistance against racialized oppression in France (and Europe), the inability
to contextualize within Europe's history minority communities in general and
the riots in particular is reflected in the media's frequent reference to 1960s
uprisings in the United States. Supported neither through a closer look at
U.S. structural racism, nor through a detailing of the supposed parallels, it
seems instead that the similarity of "black riots" speaks for itself, leaving the
United States as the paradigmatic site of "racial conflict," with Europe drifting
dangerously in its direction.[44]

The most prominent dissenting opinion in this Europe-wide public debate, that for the most part granted a voice only to members of the majority culture, used the riots to condemn an unjustified European arrogance, seeing them as the final proof of the failure of liberal democracy. Seemingly taking its inspiration from Aimé Césaire's scathing condemnation of post–World War II bourgeois Europe, but not sharing his concern with the fate of the global South, in this negative Eurocentrism the riots appear as a mere backdrop for the grander narrative of the West's decline. Jean Baudrillard, in his "The Pyres of Autumn," published in the *New Left Review* in early 2006, exemplifies this attitude that condemns Europe for its oppressive and exclusionary policies, but is not able to see those excluded as anything but a fundamentally different Other, ultimately existing only in relation to and for the benefit of greater self-realization for the majority:

> This society faces a far harder test than any external threat: that of its own absence, its loss of reality. Soon it will be defined solely by the foreign bodies that haunt its periphery: those it has expelled, but who are now ejecting it from itself. It is their violent interpellation that reveals what has been coming apart, and so offers the possibility for awareness.[45]

From this internalist perspective, the material and discursive exclusion of minorities becomes equal, and ultimately secondary, to the existential alienation of a European citizenry for whom the nation cannot offer sufficient meaning anymore and whose only remaining power lies in the rejection of Europe—the rejection of the European constitution that is, not that of actual membership:[46]

> Their No was the voice of those jettisoned by the system of representation: exiles too, like the immigrants themselves, from the process of socialization. There was the same recklessness, the same irresponsibility in the act of scuppering the EU as in the young immigrants' burning of their own neighbourhoods, their own schools; like the blacks in Watts and Detroit in the 1960s. Many now live, culturally and politically, as immigrants in a country which can no longer offer them a definition of national belonging.[47]

The blending of drastically different kinds of disenfranchisement and homelessness at play here is problematic on a number of levels, not the least the epistemological (mis)use of "the migrant" as a mere foil for deliberations on the European condition. This account is very different from, for example, Zafer Şenoçak's reflections on how the Turkish minority presence in Germany and its negotiation of a place in the nation's past and present could productively reconfigure the national memory.[48] For Baudrillard, through its daring and

convenient refusal to be integrated the minority remains outside Europe and unaffected, its "recklessness" proving a point from the margins while leaving the white center intact:

> Perhaps they consider the French way of life with the same condescension or indifference with which it views theirs. Perhaps they prefer to see cars burning than to dream of one day driving them. Perhaps their reaction to an over-calculated solicitude would instinctively be the same as to exclusion and repression.[49]

The subaltern stubbornly refusing to be domesticated, boogeyman of conservative migration discourses, becomes a romantic hero of this left Eurocentrism. But while he (this is definitely a male figure) might exist, the focus on the modern urban outlaw conveniently keeps intact a clear separation between "French" and "foreign" and ignores the larger context of the riots, born out of the frustration of a population for whom integration is not an option:

> The problem with French-style Republicanism is that you are accepted as long as you fit a certain mould. As soon as you have something that comes from outside, you are no longer viewed as entirely French. You are suspicious.[50]

Rather than religious difference or cultural alienation, economic disparities are at the center of the continued marginalization of Europeans of color. The massive deindustrialization of European urban centers since the 1980s especially affected migrant and minority communities. While postwar industrial metropolises had been in need of unskilled migrant work, contemporary postindustrial centers have moved to the service sector. As a consequence, a working migrant population has been replaced with a multiethnic underclass that represents an example of what Etienne Balibar and others have called "disposable populations," considered superfluous from the moment they are born, with no realistic prospect of being integrated into the system. In postindustrial Europe class thus not only is racialized but also (de)nationalized, placing an ethnicized underclass literally outside of the nation.[51]

The "riots" in the French suburbs were based on the economic desperation of a heterogeneous, racialized, and native underclass (of North and West African descent), their desperation caused exactly by the fact that they *are* French, not migrants. Despite the fact that the "migrant problem" routinely invoked in recent debates over Europe's future usually refers to native Europeans, that is, the second and third generations of migrants, these "visible minorities" remain invisible in the unambiguous discursive divide of "Europeans" and "migrants." It is this persistent exclusion that creates an explosive situation

that the culturalist framing of migration discourses works to cover up as much as it does the continued reality of postcolonial exploitation.

IV

> March 25th, 2006, Los Angeles. A multitude of migrants took over the streets and claimed their rights in this biggest demonstration ever seen in the history of the city. This was not an isolated event but rather the culmination of hundreds of other mobilizations taking place in every corner of the US. Millions were involved and they raised simple questions: Can you imagine the US without its migrant population? Can you imagine the impact on the US economy of a single-day strike of all migrant workers? . . . It is . . . worthwhile to raise the same questions in Europe. In fact, it is movements and struggles of migration that are raising these questions in Europe. We believe the answer on the both sides of the Atlantic to be the same.
>
> —The Frassanito Network[52]

If the French "riots" showed the failure of European integration policies, the vast majority of mainstream responses manifest the failure to envision the truly postnational, inclusive Europe postulated by Habermas and Derrida. After the events in France 2005, public attention briefly turned to the obvious consequences of the decade-long economic segregation underlying discourses of cultural Otherness and religious difference. But even while the need for more infrastructure, employment programs, and so on, was conceded, funding for existing measures was cut.[53] Like the momentary attention granted after the *march de beurs* in 1983 or the riots in Les Minguettes in 1996, the "rediscovery" of the *banlieus* by the majority had no lasting consequences. There still is no European framework of analysis for these events; instead the dialectic of amnesia and memory characteristic of European racializations seems in full effect. Punctual analyses warning of a "European apartheid" lead to no lasting change in public attitudes or polices and the only longtime effects are repressive measures, inevitably met with new violent responses.[54]

   This pattern proves drastically that the postindustrial minority communities in Europe's metropolises can lay little claim on the universal human rights that a more optimistic sociology of migration attributed to them in the 1990s.[55] It is the lack of recognition within the nation that makes any effective claim to supranational rights difficult, if not impossible. Despite all postnational rhetoric, it is still largely the state's prerogative to grant or withhold these rights. The precarious situation of communities of color lies precisely in their uncertain position within the nation. This precariousness notwithstanding, however, neither the mobilization of anti-immigrant sentiment in the United

States nor the European scapegoating of minority communities can be fully understood in a national context. The fight over who or what is granted free global movement and the ways in which mobility, geographically and socially, across national and internal borders, is restricted and contained, follows patterns that are shaped but not determined by the logic of the nation-state. Movements of resistance, in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere have responded by creating structures both below and above the level of the nation in order to circumvent and counter their marginalization. In order to grasp this complex interaction of commonalities and exclusions, scholarship will have to follow and move beyond the national paradigm and, in the European case, beyond the "postwar" moment. If it includes a break with its internalist tradition, the process of "postnational Europeanization" obviously offers a chance to include formerly excluded populations and narratives. However, it appears as if marginalizations that already shaped the nation state will continue. The interventions of Habermas, Derrida, and Baudrillard, while they should not be given undue importance, do show the complicity of European theory with exclusionary state and social practices, preventing the emergence of a "new European identity" by excluding exactly those groups central to the continent's changed, transnational culture and from whom, against all apparent odds, one might most reasonably expect a constructive intervention. Only a European public that incorporates these voices, as well as its own repressed history, might indeed become postnational.

Notes

1. See Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens, "Europa kann nicht auf den Ruinen der Nationen errichtet warden," *Die Welt Online Edition*, October 1, 2005, http://www.welt.de/print-welt/article168315/ Europa_kann_nicht_auf_den_Ruinen_der_Nationen_errichtet_werden.html (accessed June 16, 2008); Perry Anderson, "Depicting Europe," *London Review of Books*, September 20, 2007.
2. See, for example, "Constitution 'Key for EU Success,'" BBC News, January 17, 2007, http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/ 6269349.stm (accessed June 16, 2008).
3. See Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, *Race, Nation, Class, Ambiguous Identities* (London: Verso, 1991); and Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992).
4. See European Council on Refugees and Exiles, http://www.ecre.org; People Flow: Migration in Europe, open democracy dossier, http://www.opendemocracy.net/people-migrationeurope/issue.jsp (accessed June 16, 2008).
5. European Union refugee policies are part of the increasing use of prisons and internment camps as a means of population management, and incarceration is not based on an individual criminal act or even a court sentence but on belonging to the wrong group, that is, on lacking "legitimate" ties to privileged spaces. See the recent United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) condemnation of

Germany's refugee policy, "UNHCR wirft Deutschland in Flüchtlingsfrage Völkerrechtsbruch vor," *Neue Rhein Zeitung*, August 10, 2007, http://rhein-zeitung.de/a/ticker/t/rzo35543.htm (accessed June 4, 2008).

6. The extended jurisdiction of border police now includes the right to exert control anywhere, independent of "suspicious circumstances," if the patrol suspects a violation of immigration laws. Numerous complaints indicate that this translates into profiling of people of color and Muslims—while in fact the majority of "illegal" immigrants in the Union are white and Christian: Eastern Europeans, Ukrainians, and Russians. See Jochen Becker, http://www.moneynations.ch/topics/euroland/text/bahn.htm, *Euroland*, http://www.moneynations.ch/texte (accessed June 16, 2008).

7. One could argue that in recent years, these two groups are used to represent the internal and external threat migration presents for Europe: Muslim communities in Europe have come to stand for all the "migrants" already there or, rather, for those migrants that will remain "unassimilated" due to their inherently foreign culture, while West Africans, trying to reach Southern Europe by boat from North Africa (with as many as ten thousand people drowning in the process each year) stand for potential migrants, the vast masses in the global South threatening to overrun the wealthy West. See below.

8. Despite the obvious failure of the concept behind the original "guest worker" program, which assumed that a large number of people could be transplanted temporarily into another society without becoming part of it, ready to be returned unchanged after some years, the current European Union negotiations around "controlled" migration from West Africa are based on the very same idea. See Dominic Johnson, "Afrika schmiedet Europa zuammen," *Die Tageszeitung*, November 23, 2006, http://www.taz.de/index.php?id=archivseite&dig=2006/11/23/a0139 (accessed June 16, 2008).

9. The opposition between second-generation "French" Catholic Nicolas Sarkozy (whose Hungarian father acquired citizenship by serving in the French Foreign League in Algeria) and the "third-generation migrants" of North and West African descent is a case in point. See Michel Gurfinkiel, "A Battle Royal," *Weekly Standard*, February 26, 2007 (vol. 12, no. 23).

10. In the wake of the admission of ten new European Union members from the eastern part of the continent and renewed negotiations with Turkey, and in reaction to the assassination of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh by a young Muslim, the religious undertones of current European debates have become much more explicit. See Alan Travis and Madeleine Bunting, "British Muslims Want Islamic Law and Prayers at Work," *The Guardian*, November 30, 2004; Ilya Meyer, "*Swedish Children for Sale*," FrontPageMagazine, November 29, 2004; Dominik Cziesche et al., "*Fighting the Preachers of Hate*," *Der Spiegel*, November 26, 2004; Tom Hundley, "*Europeans in No Mood to Welcome Turkey*," *Chicago Tribune* and Yahoo! News, November 26, 2004; "*A Civil War on Terrorism*," *The Economist*, November 25, 2004; William Pfaff, "*Europe Pays the Price for Its Cultural Naïveté*," *International Herald Tribune*, November 25, 2004; "*Some 20,000 Protest in Cologne Against Violence in the Name of Islam*," AFP and Yahoo! News, November 21, 2004; Anthony Browne, "*Belgian MP Goes into Hiding After Criticising Muslims*," *The Times*, November 19, 2004; and Mary Riddell, "The Roots of Prejudice," *The Observer*, November 7, 2004.

11. Again, this is especially obvious in the case of black Europeans, who are stubbornly considered "migrants," and European Muslims, whose presence is discussed as if they were not already an integral part of the continent's makeup. A special case is presented by Roma and Sinti, who have been present in most parts of Europe since the fifteenth century but are nevertheless still denied the right of belonging (European Commission Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs, *The Situation of Roma in an Enlarged European Union* [Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2004]; Andrey Ivanov et al., *At Risk: Roma and the Displaced in Southeast Europe* [Bratislava: United Nations Development Programme 2006]; European Roma Rights Center, *The Glass Box: Exclusion of Roma from Employment* [Budapest, 2007]).

12. It is certainly no coincidence that not a single European nation has signed the "International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families," http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/m_mwctoc.htm (accessed June 16, 2008).

13. This narrative has lost none of its importance in these postnational times: in part it reappears in debates around a European identity, and in part, as Etienne Balibar claims, the discourse on the "end of the nation-states" is really one with its origins in *We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004), 14.

14. As Zafer Şenoçak writes about the specific situation of Turkish Germans: "One can immigrate into a country, but not to its past. In Germany, history is read as a diary of the 'community of fate,' the

nation's personal experience, to which Others have no access." Zafer Şenoçak and Leslie A Adelson, *Atlas of a Tropical Germany: Essays on Politics and Culture 1990–1998* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999), 53.

15. See Maurice Crul and Hans Vermeulen, "The Future of the Second Generation: The Integration of Migrant Youth in Six European Countries," *International Migration Review*, Special Issue 37.4 (2003): 965–86; Mark Terkessidis, *Die Banalität des Rassismus Transcript* (Bielefeld: Verlag, 2004).

16. Michel-Rolph Trouillot, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995), 99.

17. See the special issue of *National Identities* The Re-thinking of the Second World War since 1989 (August 4, 2006).

18. For an influential critique of this understanding of modernity from the perspective of diaspora studies, see Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), 420.

19. See Slavoj Žižek, "A Leftist Plea for 'Eurocentrism,'" in *Unpacking Europe*, edited by Salah Hassan and Iftikhar Dadi (Rotterdam: NAI, 2001), 112–30; Anderson, "Depicting Europe."

20. Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, "Unsere Erneuerung. Nach dem Krieg. Europas Wiedergeburt," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, May 31, 2003. Simultaneously, articles were published by Umberto Eco in *La Repubblica*, Adolf Muschg in the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Fernando Savater in *El Pais*, Gianni Vattimo in *La Stampa*, and Richard Rorty in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*.

21. Habermas and Derrida, "Unsere Erneuerung," 33, my translation.

22. See Ivan Krastev, "Nicht ohne mein Amerika," *Die Zeit*, August 14, 2003; Harold James, "Aussenpolitik missverstanden: Europa schwelgt in gefährlicher Sehnsucht," *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, June 3, 2003. For a more thorough critique see Marion Iris Young, "Europe and the Global South: Towards a Circle of Equality," August 20, 2003, www.opendemocracy.net (accessed June 16, 2008). Young points out, among other things, that the starting point of Habermas's argument, the huge antiwar protests all over Western Europe on February 15, 2003, which he terms the birth of a new European public, were in fact part of a *global* movement in which Europe was involved but not central (ibid., 2).

23. Habermas and Derrida, "Unsere Erneuerung," 33.

24. Stuart Hall, "Europe's Other Self," *Marxism Today*, August 1991, 18.

25. See, for example, Trouillot, *Silencing the Past*; Susan Buck-Morss, "Hegel and Haiti," *Critical Inquiry* 26 (2000): 821–65.

26. Trouillot, *Silencing the Past*, 88.

27. This history left its traces within Europe as well as outside of it, including, for example, the Muslim burial ground in the German town Mainz, housing the graves of French colonial soldiers who died during the post-WW I occupation of the German Rhineland.

28. Habermas and Derrida, "Unsere Erneuerung," 33.

29. This sentiment was echoed almost verbatim by French president Nicolas Sarkozy in a speech on Africa's future given in Senegal in the summer of 2007—to the understandable dismay of his audience. See Dominic Johnson, "Sarkozy befremdet Afrika," *Die Tageszeitung*, August 1, 2007, 1.

30. See Young, "Europe and the Global South"; Jean Ziegler, *L'empire de la honte* (Fayard: Paris, 2005).

31. European Commission, Council Conclusions 2001. The EU commission statement failed to define colonialism as a crime against humanity and instead condemned only aspects of it. The French law, passed in February 2005, was repealed a year later after massive protests; see, for example, *Claude Liauzu, "Une loi contre l'histoire," Le Monde diplomatique*, April 2005, 28.

32. Michelle Wright, *Becoming Black: Creating Identity in the African Diaspora* (Durham. N.C.: Duke University Press, 2004).

33. Since October 17, 2001, a plaque on St. Michel bridge in Paris does commemorate the event, whose near-complete suppression for 40 years nonetheless seems both stunning and characteristic (BBC News, October 17, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/monitoring/media_reports/1604970.stm (accessed June 16, 2008).

34. This is a community, moreover, that despite its longstanding presence in Western Europe is still primarily, if not exclusively, perceived to belong with the Turkish nation-state, whose attempts to enter the European Union in turn have been denied for half a century largely due to its majority Muslim population.

35. This is exemplified by the Dutch case: the dates of both the invasion of and the liberation from the German occupiers are keystones of ritualized national memory formations, the internment of Dutch

colonizers in Indonesia after the Japanese invasion is marginal by comparison but nevertheless part of the mainstream narrative. Surinamese soldiers fighting in Europe on the other hand have been written out of this narrative. Only in the 1990s were they for the first time included in the annual honoring of the war veterans, while the suffering of the Indonesians at the hands of the Dutch is rarely if ever related to the Dutch suffering at the hands of the Japanese.

36. Despite the central place of the Holocaust in European rituals of remembrance, its lasting effects on European societies remain understudied. In an astonishing act of suppression the "ethnic homogeneity" of postwar Europe upset by the beginning of large-scale labor migration often remains unrelated to the unprocessed "disappearance" of the Jewish minority population. See Amira Hass, *Drinking the Sea at Gaza: Days and Nights in a Land Under Siege* (New York: Holt 2000), 8.

37. See Fatima El-Tayeb, "Urban Diasporas: Race, Identity, and Popular Culture in a Post-Ethnic Europe," in *Motion in Place/Place in Motion: 21st Century Migration,* JCAS Symposium Series 22, Population Movement in the Modern World, October 2006, Tokyo.

38. See, for example, Yves Coleman, "The French Riots: Dancing with the Wolves," http://www.soli-darity-us.org/node/33 (accessed June 16, 2008), January 1, 2006; Michael Kleeberg, "Apartheid in Europa," *Die Welt,* November 12, 2005; Anne-Marie Vaterlaus, "Les Minguettes," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung,* December 9, 2006.

39. Alain Morice, "Comprendre avant de juger: à propos des émeutes urbaines en France," January 24, 2006, samizdat.net.

40. See Sylvia Poggioli, "French Rap Musicians Blamed for Violence," NPR World, August 6, 2006.

41. See, for example, Craig Smith, "France Has an Underclass, but Its Roots Are Still Shallow," *New York Times,* November 6, 2005. The article is also indicative in its historical analysis, contrasting the marginalization of African Americans, based on centuries of racial oppression, with the new "phenomenon of post-war ethnic minorities in France, completely ignoring the effects of centuries of colonial rule on the structural racism shaping the relationship between the majority and these groups."

42. Mehmet Altun, 15, from Clichy-sous-Bois, interviewed for BBC News during the riots, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/picture_gallery/05/europe_paris_riot_suburb_residents/html/6.stm.

43. I am using here the English translation published at http://sketchythoughts.blogspot.com/2005/11/communique-from-mouvement-de.html#jumpto. For the French original of the MIB statement, published on November 9, 2005, see http://lenumerozero.lautre.net/spip.php?article743.

44. See Kleeberg, "Apartheid in Europa"; Isolde Charim, "Wirklichkeit wird sichtbar," *Die Tageszeitung,* August 11, 2005; and Jean Baudrillard, "The Pyres of Autumn," *New Left Review* 37 (Jan/Feb 2006).

45. Baudrillard, "The Pyres of Autumn," 6.

46. See, for example, Anderson, "Depicting Europe."

47. Baudrillard, 7.

48. Zafer enoçak and Leslie A. Adelson, "Atlas of a Tropical Germany," in *Essays on Politics and Culture,* 1990–1998 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999).

49. Budrillard, 7.

50. Samia Amara, a twenty-three-year-old youth worker, interviewed by BBC News during the riots (http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4376500.stm). The riots took place twenty-two years after the *March of Beurs,* attended by more than 100,000 people, the high point of a nonviolent movement demanding equal rights for French minorities (Doug Ireland, "Why Is France Burning?" *The Nation,* November 28, 2005). According to a 1995 poll, 70% of second-generation Maghrebis said they felt closer to the French than to their parents' culture and 90% wanted to be integrated into French society. At the same time, less than a third of the majority population saw the *beurs* as French, and almost 80% of acts of racist violence and more than 90% of racist murders were committed against Maghrebis (Hargraves 1997, 19).

51. This happens both legally, through denying citizenship to (some) descendents of migrants, with all the implications for access to jobs, social services, and so on this has, and discursively through the persistent definition of minority youth as "migrants."

52. The Frassanito Network is a Europe-wide coalition of migrant activist groups founded in 2003.

53. Doug Irelands counts "60 percent cuts over the past three years in subsidies for neighborhood groups that work with youths, and budgets slashed for job training, education, the fight against illiteracy

and for neighborhood police who get to know ghetto kids and work with them. After the first riots in Toulouse, Sarkozy told the neighborhood police there, "Your job is not to be playing soccer with these kids; your job is to arrest them!" (Ireland, "Why Is France Burning?").

54. See Coleman, "The French Riots." Most recently, French President Sarkozy, whose "zero tolerance" stance during the 2005 riots arguably both helped to escalate the situation and helped to win him the presidential elections, ordered a sweep of the Parisian suburb of Villiers-le-Bel, center of the 2007 riots. The deployment of more than 1,000 police systematically searching the neighborhood and arresting several dozen people hardly qualifies as a change of policy ("French Police Target Riot Leaders," *BBC News*, February 18, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/w/hi/europe/7250102.stm).

55. See Yasemin N. Soysal, *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); and Miriam Feldblum, "'Citizenship Matters': Contemporary Trends in Europe and the United States," *Stanford Electronic Humanities Review* 5.2 (1997).

Lecture IV

BETWEEN STUCKED-NESS AND HYPERMOBILITY. THE PROMISES AND PITFALLS OF TIME-SPACE COMPRESSION

This lecture will cover the emergence of two different and opposing ways of conceptualising migration. The concept of transnationalism against the novel paradigms of stucked-ness and waithood. Most writing on transnationalism emphasises the counter-hegemonic nature of transnational practices, by portraying them as acts of resistance and as signs of the decline of the modern nation-state and its apparatus of sovereignty. Reversely there is now a significant attention on stucked-ness and waithood, particularly in the anthropology of migration. In this lecture, we will explore the pitfalls and promises of both paradigms against the lived experience of women, me, youth, elites, racialized "others".

Ong, A. (1999). 'The Pacific Shuttle: Family Citizenship, and Capital Circuits', in Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality. Durham: Duke University Press, pp. 110-136.

G. Hage (2015). On stuckedness. The critique of crisis and the crisis of critique.

2

On stuckedness

The critique of crisis and the crisis of critique

For a long time, the notion of crisis was a central component of the language of social critique. One could even say that, from the mid-nineteenth century until the 1970s—with the Marxist domination of the critical intellectual field—a certain merger was completed between social critique and the notion of crisis as an economic, social and political phenomenon. Within this political and intellectual framework, the role of critique was precisely to show that under the guise of being a system capable of reproducing itself indefinitely, capitalism was indeed a generator of crises. This was so in the strictly economic field (crises of capital accumulation), in the sociohistorical domain (crises produced by tension between the development of the forces of production and relations of production), and finally in the political sphere (crises generated by class antagonisms). The critical dimension of this 'archaeology of crisis' —in the sense that one had to do some digging to unearth the roots of crises in a milieu that was bent on showing itself to be crisis-free—was based on a conceptual association that was more or less implied rather than theorised. This was the association between crisis and hope for social change. A crisis was supposed to do two things: make manifest the structural cracks in the machinery of social reproduction through which social change could emerge, and bring forth political subjects whose practices were no longer invested in the reproduction of the existing social structure, but who would engage in transformative practices instead. The function of the critical thinking of the crisis was to find or clarify the presence of these cracks and these revolutionary subjects. Such a critique was therefore an intrinsically hopeful one, reflecting the radical belief in the possibility of transformative social ruptures that characterised the radical thinking of the period.

However, beginning in the middle of the twentieth century and becoming particularly generalised towards the end, a significant change occurred as capitalist societies, economies and institutions endlessly moved from one crisis to another. Slowly, beginning with the rise of fascism, there was a growing awareness that rather than necessarily being an opportunity for social transformation, a state of permanent crisis seemed to have become the very way in which capitalist economies and societies ensured their reproduction. Likewise, rather than leading to the emergence of a political

subject committed to social change, the subject of the crisis seemed to be as, if not more, likely to be conservative rather than revolutionary. It is in this way that the radical critique of capitalist crisis gave way to a crisis of this critique.

Nothing illustrates this situation as well as the intellectual reaction to the global financial crisis of 2008. While the crisis led to a 'revival of Marxism', celebrating once again the relevance of Marx's analysis of capitalist crises, in most cases this celebration was not accompanied by an equal celebration of the possibility of social transformation or of the existence of a political subject capable of bringing about such a transformation. The hopeful twentieth-century Marxist critique of crisis gave way to a depressed and depressing critique, which in fact reproduced a sentiment of a general paralysis of the radical imagination and the will for social change. The impetus for social change that ended up manifesting itself in the Occupy movement came almost entirely from outside that tradition of 'crisis critique'.

I don't want to imply with these introductory remarks that it is not possible to formulate a relationship between capitalist crisis, critique and hope for social change today. Rather, I want to use this 'crisis of critique' as an invitation to see the crisis not simply as a given but as a political field in the Bourdieu-ian sense of the word: as a space of rivalry between different forces with different interests and investments in the crisis, struggling among each other to enforce particular ways of living the crisis rather than others.

It should be made clear here that saying there are different interests in the crisis is not the same as saying that the crisis is the product of different conflicting interests. It is to emphasise that once a crisis occurs people have different interests and investments in its existence, intensity, duration and manifestation. For example, a crisis in a factory may well be the product of different contradictory class interests between workers and their bosses. But at the same time, these interests that play a role in generating the crisis also become differently invested in the crisis itself once it has occurred. In the simple case of a crisis in a factory, for example, the union may have an interest in the crisis to accelerate the unionisation of workers. On the other hand, the owner of the factory may also have an interest, although a different one, in the same crisis. Far from necessarily wanting to end the situation of crisis, he or she may even have an interest in suggesting to the workers that the crisis is even worse than it actually is. The owner may indeed engage in what might be called 'strategies of intensification of the crisis', to force its workers to accept, for example, a reduction in wages. It is crucial to see that this struggle is not simply a struggle between two different ways of 'interpreting' the crisis, but between attempts at highlighting and privileging a way of living the crisis over another. The union is fighting for workers to relate to their identities and their conditions of life as workers, and to make them live the crisis as a struggle against the owner of the factory, who is to be seen as an exploiter and an opponent. The owner is fighting to make the

workers identify with the plant as the source of their collective well-being. He or she is thus struggling to make them see the crisis as requiring solidarity between both workers and bosses against 'the 'economic downturn'.

To emphasise that this is a struggle over ways of living the crisis is to ensure that it is not reduced to a subjectively conceived struggle over the interpretation or construction of the crisis. The latter would imply that what the crisis is 'in reality', is always already there independent of the way people live it. Then comes a struggle over how to interpret it. The former implies that the crisis, as it is lived by the workers, is 'in reality' both what the union wants to make of it and what the owner wants to make of it. The struggle between the union and the owner becomes a struggle between two realities; it is an ontological struggle, or as Bourdieu would put it, it is a struggle over the making and unmaking of the social world.[1] This equation of the reality of the crisis to dominant forms of living the crisis, rather than to some prior reality requiring an *a posteriori* subjective interpretation, is crucial, I believe, if we are to understand the recent neo-liberal successes at making of the situation of permanent crisis a conservative technique of government. This is because one of the most important characteristics that defines this form of governmentality is of the order of the practico-affective. This has to do with the intimate relationship that this form of government can establish between the crisis and the exacerbation, as well as the routinisation, of a sentiment that has often marked social crises. This is what I call 'stuckedness': the sentiment and the state of being of experiencing oneself as existentially 'stuck'.

That a viable life presupposes a form of imaginary mobility—a sense that one is 'going somewhere', which I have called existential mobility—is something that has strongly emerged in both my research on transnational Lebanese migration as well as in my work on white racists in the West. In a sense, both the migrants and the racists seek existential mobility and aim to avoid its opposite: a sense of existential immobility or what I will be referring to here as 'stuckedness'. Although one can find evidence of people experiencing various forms of stuckedness at all times and in all places, I will argue below that the social and historical conditions of the permanent crisis we live in have led to a proliferation and intensification of this sense of stuckedness. What's more, there is an increasing sense that stuckedness has been normalised. Rather than being perceived as something one needs to get out of at any cost, it is now *also* experienced, ambivalently, as an inevitable pathological state that has to be endured. In this chapter, I am looking at this process whereby 'stuckedness in crisis' is transformed into an endurance test. As I will argue, such a mode of confronting the crisis by a celebration of one's

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Chapter 2
1   Bourdieu, *Sur l'État*.

capacity to stick it out rather than calling for change contains a specific experience of waiting that is referred to in common language as 'waiting it out'. As such, it is this *waiting out* of the crisis that I am examining.

In my work on migration, I have taken seriously the equation of well-being with a sense of mobility that is present in such common everyday statements as 'how are you going?' This equation is present in many other languages. In Lebanese dialect one asks '*Keef el haal?*', which literally means 'How is the state of your being?' The common reply is '*Mehsheh'l haal*', which literally means 'The state of my being is walking'.[2] I have tried to work with an understanding that such language of movement is not simply metaphoric but also conveys a sense in which when a person feels well, they actually imagine and feel that they are moving well. Existential mobility is this type of imagined/felt movement. As far as migration is concerned, I have shown that people engage in the physical form of mobility that we call migration because they are in search of existential mobility. This differs from the physical movement of tourists, for instance, whose physical mobility (travel) is part of their accumulation of existential mobility. In a sense, we can say that people migrate because they are looking for a space that constitutes a suitable launching pad for their social and existential self. They are looking for a space and a life where they feel they are going somewhere as opposed to nowhere, or at least a space where the quality of their 'going-ness' is better than in the space they are leaving behind. More often than not, what is referred to as 'voluntary' migration is either an inability or an unwillingness to endure and 'wait out' a crisis of existential mobility.

As I have pointed out above, this kind of comparative existential mobility has also come out as an issue in my work on certain specific forms of white racism that are marked by resentment and envy towards immigrants as well as ethnic and racial minorities.[3] While analysing this form of racism it became clear that it was shaped far more by a comparative sense of mobility than by simple class location. For instance, there is a common belief, especially among cosmopolitan small-L liberals, that the racism towards immigrants of the followers of Pauline Hanson in Australia, like that of the followers of Le Pen in France, is a 'working-class' form of racism. This is not the case. Hansonite and Le Pennist racism was primarily derived from a sense of 'mobility envy' by people from all classes who felt they weren't moving 'well enough'. This was sometimes voiced explicitly in terms of social mobility envy, such as white Australians resenting the presence of so many Indian-background doctors in their hospitals. But ultimately, it was existential mobility that was the issue. Thus, in interviews I conducted, some white racists exhibited racial resentment towards minorities even when they

2   Hage, 'A not so multi-sited ethnography'.
3   Hage, *White Nation*.

themselves were located in a 'higher' socioeconomic group than those minorities they were racialising.

Mobility envy followed a pattern similar to the following paradigmatic story. The story begins with the 'white/established' person owning a nice car and the immigrant 'outsider', who has just moved to the neighbourhood, buying themselves a motorbike. Some time after settling in, however, the immigrant neighbour buys a car while the established person still owns the same car. One begins to notice that racial resentment starts kicking into the discourse of the white/established person even though the car they own is much better than the car the immigrant just bought. What the racist becomes envious of, then, is not the ownership of the car itself (since they already own a better one) but the mobility implied in the move from a motorbike to a car at a time when they feel that they have remained stuck where they are. It is in this sense that I am arguing that just as there is an imaginary existential mobility, there is an imagined existential stuckedness. This form of stuckedness is existential in that it does not necessarily coincide with lack of social mobility. One can be in a job and climbing the social ladder within that job yet still feel stuck in it. This highlights the fact that social and existential mobility are not the same thing, even though they tend to coincide in a number of social situations.

It is on the basis of observing patterns of behaviour similar to the above that I have argued that, in Australia, there was a link between the racism towards Indigenous people and immigrants exhibited by the white racist Hansonites and the latter's sense of stuckedness, which was generated not only by neo-liberal globalisation but also in particular by the insecurity in job tenure that has increased the sense of 'being stuck in one's job' everywhere around the world.[4] The precariousness of their tenure made them feel constantly worried about losing their jobs, and they felt as if someone was constantly watching them and waiting for them to make a mistake so they could have a reason to sack them. This made their working culture increasingly claustrophobic. Interestingly for me, my research on Hansonism at the time of its emergence also coincided with what became known in Australia as the Thredbo disaster, a landslide at Australia's most famed ski resort in which a number of people were killed, buried under earth, rubble and snow, in July 1997. One person, Stuart Diver, survived under the rubble, in freezing temperatures, stuck under a slab of cement. All of Australia celebrated his endurance and survival. But what attracted my attention was the particular resonance this story of survival had in the white cultural milieus I was researching. To me, it seemed clear that this resonance was the product of a form of imagined affinity between the sense of being both

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4   See edition, *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales*, 'L'insecurité comme condition de travail', vol. 175.

socially and existentially stuck—as expressed by many Hansonites—and the stuckedness of Stuart Diver under the landslide. The celebration of his survival was a celebration of a 'heroism of the stuck'. With this form of heroism, it is not what you actively or creatively achieve that makes you a hero but your capacity to stick it out and 'get stuck well', so to speak. To be a hero under such circumstances is to be resilient enough to endure stuckedness, or, to put it in a way relevant to us here, it is to be able to *wait out* your stuckedness. It is also to be able to wait for deliverance so as to come out as a survivor and start 'moving' again. This heroic endurance spoke to many Hansonites who, in the absence of social alternatives, celebrated the heroism of ordinary people who simply endured a life where a sense of stuckedness prevailed as their social world was crumbling around them under the effect of globalisation, the rising precariousness of their hold over their jobs and the intensified migration that changed the shape of the cultural world they inhabit. This sat ambivalently with a continued desire to see themselves move existentially.

It is important to note carefully what it is about stuckedness that allows heroism. At first glance, being stuck presumes a lack of agency. Indeed it is lack of agency that defines stuckedness, whether physically or existentially understood. As such, stuckedness is by definition a situation where a person suffers from both the absence of choices or alternatives to the situation one is in and an inability to grab such alternatives even if they present themselves. So, how can one be a hero when by definition one is in a situation where one does not do much? I think the heroism of stuckedness lies in this ability to snatch agency in the very midst of its lack. This is what the notion of endurance implies: asserting some agency over the very fact that one has no agency by not succumbing and becoming a mere victim and an object in circumstances that are conspiring to make a total agent-less victim and object out of you. In this way, a certain nobility of spirit and an assertion of one's 'freedom as a human' oozes out of the very notion of 'endurance' that comes to negate the dehumanisation implied by a situation of 'stuckedness'.

More than a decade has passed since the Thredbo disaster, but it is notable how this 'heroism of the stuck' has become a pervasive generalised cultural form not just in Australia but also all over the world. With every earthquake, flood and other natural or war-induced disaster involving the crumbling of buildings and the burying of people alive comes a celebration of survival: an almost competitive account of finding people who have survived being buried alive, stuck, for two, three, four and five days under the rubble.

One can note a shift of sensibility that accompanies this redefinition of heroism in people's reactions towards a well-reported incident that occurred in the Himalayas. A climber who was successfully achieving his ascent of the mountain met with another climber who had encountered difficulties and was basically 'stuck' midway through his climb. It was an encounter between

the hero as a 'climber' and an 'achiever' and the hero as 'stuck'. That people's sympathy went overwhelmingly toward a person who was stuck reflected more than a common sympathy with 'victims' and the 'underdog'. It reflected a transformation in what Raymond Williams would call the structure of feeling built around collective notions of heroism.[5] But this also means that there is a sense of community among those who 'wait out' the crisis. In the paradigmatic example of white racist resentment that I gave above I argued that the established white person experiences a form of mobility envy in the face of the immigrant who has purchased a car. But there is another, more communal sense in which resentment is experienced: the migrant who is achieving mobility is like any 'petty bourgeois' achiever. She is standing out as different from the 'community'. She is exhibiting an unwillingness to be part of the community of the stuck. The ethnic difference of the immigrant becomes coupled with a social/cultural difference based precisely on their perceived unwillingness to wait out the crisis 'like the rest of us'.

The fascination with stuckedness is increasingly permeating popular culture. It is noteworthy, for instance, how, of all the possible angles from which one can approach the 9/11 terrorist attack on New York's twin towers, Oliver Stone's film based on the event was in large part about the heroism of people stuck in the towers' rubble waiting for deliverance.[6] There is clearly something timeless and universal about this celebration of the human spirit to endure. This universality exists even when each celebration also takes a cultural form specific to where it is occurring. In this chapter, however, I am neither interested in the universal nor the culturally specific aspect of this heroism of the stuck. Rather, I want to examine the historical specificity of its significance today, particularly as it becomes articulated to a celebration of a form of waiting or, more specifically, a 'waiting out' or weathering of a crisis situation where the self is experiencing existential immobility. 'Waiting out' is a specific form of waiting where one is not waiting for something but rather waiting for something undesirable that has come, like a spell of cold weather or a disliked guest, to end or to go. Unlike waiting, which can be passive or active, 'waiting out' is always passive, yet its passivity is, as I have pointed out, an ambivalent one. For it involves both a subjection to the elements or to certain social conditions and at the same time a braving of these conditions. It is this ambivalence that allows it to take the heroic forms discussed above. It is also this ambivalence that , as I want to now argue, makes it a governmental tool that encourages a mode of restraint, self-control and self-government in times of crisis.

In his *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, Jean-Paul Sartre famously aims for an 'existential' reconceptualisation of the Marxist notion of the revolutionary

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5   Williams, 'Structures of feeling'.
6   *World Trade Center*, directed by Stone.

class or masses. He rethinks Marx's well-known differentiation between class-in-itself and class-for-itself in terms of what he calls the difference between the '*série*' and the 'fused group'. The *série* is a collective that appears together only from the outside. In fact, it is what Sartre terms 'a plurality of isolations'. Interestingly for us, the example that Sartre gives of a *série* is that of people queuing at a bus stop.[7] The *série* unites and separates at the same time. The degree of isolation of the people waiting (together nonetheless) reflects what Sartre wonderfully calls their 'degree of massification'. Sartre argues that this is the law that governs most social organisations at work. We can see in this a hint of the self-disciplining in what Foucault will later call 'governmentality' in so far as it is a technique of individualisation and the internalisation of a mode of governing the self. The queue where one governs oneself into waiting in an orderly fashion is one form of such 'serial governmentality'.

What interested Sartre, however, is not so much this analysis of the alienation that is inherent to this serial governmentality—in this he was reconceptualising an old problematic that was already notably dealt with by Rousseau and Hegel among many others. Rather, Sartre wanted above all to examine and detail the process that led people to move from this individualised passive state to become active agents of history: how the '*série*' is transformed into 'fused group'. Interestingly for us, Alain Badiou, commenting on this piece, portrays this coming together of the fused group as a disruption of orderly waiting in the queue.[8]

Suppose the bus we are waiting for together does not come, he invites us to think. People start to feel agitated. People start talking to each other not about the banal things they usually do to fill up time while waiting but about the unbearability and inhumanity of being subjected to such conditions external to themselves. And suddenly our communication with the other is made on the basis that they, like me, find waiting unbearable. From the formula 'everyone is the same as the other in so far as they are other to themselves' we move to the formula 'the other is the same as I since I am no longer my other'. As Badiou puts it: 'In the *série* the Other is everywhere. In the fused group the same is everywhere.'[9]

For Badiou (and for Sartre), like for many sociologists who have worked on queuing, the queue symbolises social order. But what Sartre reminds us is that the queue encourages self-government in so far as it is moving, in so far as it is working as a mode of regulating access to resources, and so on. Once it stops working Badiou sees both a social crisis and a crisis of governmentality. Let us examine the Sartrian/Badiou-ian example from our perspective. Queuing for the bus involves at one level an orderly form of mobility. In so

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8   Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason* ~~Ibid.~~, pp. 256–7.

9   Badiou, *Petit Panthéon Portatif*, p. 30.

10 Ibid., p. 31.

far as the buses keep coming, the queue moves and people feel they are moving: physically and existentially. When the bus does not come this initiates a 'crisis'. Not only a social crisis that perturbs the flow of buses and flow of people queuing but also a crisis felt by each individual queuing in the sense that, when the queue stalls, the people queuing experience a sense of immobility, they are no longer going somewhere, they are now 'stuck' in the queue. In this sense, to reinterpret Sartre and Badiou from our perspective, it is this state of stuckedness that triggers the questioning of the existing social arrangement and leads to the social upheaval that transforms the *série* into a fused group. We see here the revolutionary optimism in formulation. It is an optimism characteristic of Sartre's time and still shared by Badiou: crisis is an unusual state of affairs that brings about upheaval, a rethinking of the social order (that is, the modality of waiting) and the formation of a revolutionary force (no more waiting!). One can recall here the way Herbert Marcuse addressed the students in the early 1970s: 'We should not wait. We cannot wait and what's more we do not have to wait.'

I want to argue that the reflections on stuckedness I have developed in this chapter emphasise that the perspective of our time on crisis and order is different from the way it is perceived in the Sartrian–Badiouian arguments above. Crisis today is no longer felt as an unusual state of affairs that invites the citizen to question the given order. Rather, it is perceived more as a normalcy, or, to use what is becoming perhaps an over-used concept, crisis is a kind of permanent state of exception. In this sense, enduring the crisis becomes the normal mode of being a good citizen, and the more one is capable of enduring a crisis, the more of a good citizen one is. As usual this takes on a racial, civilisational and class dimension: the ones who do not know how to wait are the 'lower classes', the uncivilised and racialised others. The civilised, approximating the image of the hero, are those who get stuck in a classy way. They know how to endure.

It is here that the heroism of the stuck seems to me to signal a deeper form of governmentality, a governmentality that is reproduced even in times of crisis. Even when the bus does not come, even when people are feeling stuck in a queue that is not moving, they heroically keep on queuing. And this is self-reproducing: the more one waits and invests in waiting, the more reluctant one is to stop waiting.

What we have, therefore, is a new form of governmentality that invites and indeed valorises self-control in times of crisis. Today, I board a plane and I am told that there is always a possibility of a 'crisis' and I need to be prepared—to know about oxygen masks, exits and so on—so that if a crisis comes I am prepared to self-govern myself even in such demanding times. Even when possibly facing death I should learn to act in an orderly fashion. Here, queuing, even in the midst of disaster, is understood as something one has to do. And far from being perceived as cowardly, to remain 'inactive' and

non-revolutionary in the face of crisis, to 'wait out' the crisis is perceived as something that one is proud to do. It is a mark of a deepening of the civilisation process. It is civilised to know how to endure a crisis and act in an orderly, self-governed, restrained fashion. It is the uncivilised 'Third World–looking masses' who are imagined to be running amok in the face of crisis. One can see the two faces of this racialised civilisational gap during the Hurricane Katrina disaster of 2005. One can also see it in Australia in the latter-day vilification of the refugee as a 'queue jumper': someone unable to wait for their turn. Likewise, the Parisian boys who revolt in the suburbs are not seen as ushering a revolution. They are seen as 'trash', as they were famously referred to by the French president Nicolas Sarkozy when he was interior minister.[10] They are so partly because, within this racialised civilisational discourse, they, and not their social situation, are perceived to be the problem. Indeed they are not seen by many of their detractors as living in especially difficult conditions. Everyone is living in especially difficult conditions in the eyes of such people. For the latter, what marks such boys is not the social condition of crisis but the fact that they do not know how to wait out and endure the crisis 'like everyone else'.

Perhaps this is one of the more important problematics that the radical imaginary of the past has to face as the desire for existential mobility sits ambivalently with this celebration of heroic stasis. How can one reimagine 'being revolutionary' at a time when to be revolutionary in the old Marxist or Sartrian sense is to be 'vulgar', 'impatient', uncivilised and unable to 'wait properly'?

Should we conclude from what has been discussed above that it is no longer possible to analyse a crisis critically in a way that focuses on the possibility of social change? I will conclude this chapter with a brief reflection on this question. A few years ago, some students at the American University of Beirut set up a tent in the middle of the campus with a sign saying: 'This is a crisis-free space.' Another sign explained: 'You are welcome to enter. There is no crisis in here.' That such a form of student activism makes sense in Lebanon is instructive because the country offers an extreme example of the state of permanent crisis that we have discussed above. Moreover, this state is so extreme that we can really speak of Lebanon as being in a permanent critical condition rather than in a state of crisis. The concept of critical condition must be understood here in its medical sense so that its political ramifications are well captured.

Patients are considered to be in critical condition when they are perceived to be on the borderline between life and death. We do not sit on the bedside of such patients in hopes of collaborative future projects with them. Quite simply, our hopes are limited to finding them still alive the next day.

11 Chalandon, 'Le Visiteur', p. 26.

Indeed, this is exactly the way that Lebanese politics as a permanent critical state is experienced. It is a politics of people continuously staring at the abyss. As with the critical patients, in such circumstances there is not much room for 'thinking big' politically. One just hopes the country survives from one day to another. And indeed this is what most Lebanese wake up every morning thinking: 'Incredible! The country has not totally disintegrated yet!' Thus Lebanon offers an admittedly extreme, yet instructive, example of the shrunken political imagination and the inability to think of social alternatives that prevails when one is inserted in such intense permanent state of crisis. Indeed, this absence of an alternative political path is integral to the very definition of the state of being stuck we have been examining here. Here is why the 'no crisis' tent mentioned above is also an invitation to think differently about what constitutes a critical intellectual politics vis-à-vis the crisis. Rather than thinking politics within a Hegelian lineage as an internal opposition to the crisis leading to its dialectical overcoming, the tent offers a metaphor of a thought that escapes the crisis by positioning itself outside its grip, especially outside the socio-affective stranglehold it can have on us—a thought that is 'alter' rather than just 'anti' crisis.

4 ≡ The Pacific Shuttle: Family
≡ Citizenship, and Capital Circuits
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Destabilizing Chineseness

During a recent late summer in the Ukraine, an angry mob dragging down a statue of Lenin reenacted the political collapse of the Soviet Union, while vendors selling Bolshevik trinkets reinvented the economy. David Chang, representing the Asia Bank in New York, was in town to snap up apartment houses and real estate before the dust settled. "Governments come and go," he said, "but business stays."[1]

In California, "the Silicon Valley way of divorce" among new Chinese immigrants has led to one failed marriage out of five. One "typical" Chinese couple—he is an engineer; she, an accountant—used to live in a half-million-dollar house with two well-schooled children. They invested in a second home and vacationed in Lake Tahoe. When the wife asked for a divorce, it was not because her husband had an affair, or at least not with another woman. "My husband works on his computer in the office during the day, comes home at 8 P.M., and continues to sit in front of his computer after dinner. . . . I am a 'computer widow' who is never asked how she is doing, nor what has happened to the family lately."[2]

In both of the above two stories, postmodern elements jostle for attention. These elements include *displacement* (Asians in Western worlds), *fragmentation* (families broken up by emigration and divorce), *difference* (male and female subjectivities), and *impermanence* (in everyday arrangements). Were these reports about people other than Chinese, they would attract no more than a passing glance. But to me, such postmodern snapshots are a jarring

reproach to academic descriptions of Chinese identity, family, and cultural practices.

Much scholarship on Chinese subjects has been shaped by the orientalist concern with presenting the other as a timeless, unchanging culture. Recent attempts to revise the static image of Chineseness nevertheless still confine the analysis of ways of "being Chinese" within the clearly defined Chinese contexts of the nation-state and culture.[3] An essentializing notion of Chineseness continues to dog the scholarship because the Chinese past, nation, singular history, or some "cultural core" is taken to be the main and unchanging determinant of Chinese identity. Sometimes we forget that we are talking about one-quarter of the world's population. What is conveyed is the sense that people identifiable as "Chinese" exist in their own world, and even when they participate in global processes, they continue to remain culturally distinct. I suspect that the grand orientalist legacy continues to lurk in a field, dominated by historians, that is convinced of the singularity of this great inscrutable other. Younger scholars and feminists who seek to provide more complex, historically and geopolitically contingent accounts of Chinese cultural practices are often merely tolerated, if they are not marginalized for threatening to disrupt the stable tropes of high sinology. Perhaps not so ironically, as I have mentioned above, ambitious Asian politicians have made much political capital by borrowing academic representations of Chineseness for their own self-orientalizing projects (see chapter 2). Grand orientalist statements are dialectically linked to the petty orientalisms generated by transnational corporate and advertising media, which make pronouncements about Oriental labor, skills, values, families, and mystery. The slogan for Singapore Airlines is "Singapore Girl, what a great way to fly."

But stories about capital, displacements, and hybridity explode the reigning notions about being Chinese. How do discrepant images reflect the changing social, economic, and political relations in which Chinese subjects are important participants? Today, overseas Chinese are key players in the booming economies of the Asia Pacific region. In what ways have their border-crossing activities and mobility within the circuits of global capitalism altered their cultural values and class strategies? This chapter explores how the flexible positioning of diasporan-Chinese subjects on the edge of political and capitalist empires affects their family relations, their self-representation, and the ways in which they negotiate the political and cultural rules of different

countries on their itineraries. In contrast to Edward Said's depiction of the objects of orientalism as silent participants in Western hegemonic projects,[4] I trace the agency of Asian subjects as they selectively engage orientalist discourses encountered on travels through the shifting cultural terrains of the global economy. Yet their countercultural production should not be interpreted as a simple reproduction of "the ways we are situated by the West" but as complex maneuvers that subvert reigning notions of the national self and the other in transnational arenas.

Perhaps more than other travelers and migrants, international managers and professionals have the material and symbolic resources to manipulate global schemes of cultural difference, racial hierarchy, and citizenship to their own advantage. Today, flexibility reigns in business, industry, labor, and the financial markets; all incorporate technologically enhanced innovations that affect the way people are differently imagined and regulated and the way they represent and conduct themselves transnationally.[5] But whereas international managers and professionals may be adept at strategies of economic accumulation and maneuvering, they do not operate in free-flowing circumstances but in environments that are controlled and shaped by nation-states and capital markets.

For instance, the form and meaning of citizenship have been transformed by global markets and floods of skilled and unskilled workers crossing borders. Although citizenship is conventionally thought of as based on political rights and participation within a sovereign state, globalization has made economic calculation a major element in diasporan subjects' choice of citizenship, as well as in the ways nation-states redefine immigration laws. I use the term *flexible citizenship* to refer especially to the strategies and effects of mobile managers, technocrats, and professionals seeking to both circumvent *and* benefit from different nation-state regimes by selecting different sites for investments, work, and family relocation. Such repositioning in relation to global markets, however, should not lead one to assume that the nation-state is losing control of its borders.[6] State regimes are constantly adjusting to the influx of different kinds of immigrants and to ways of engaging global capitalism that will benefit the country while minimizing the costs. For instance, nation-states constantly refine immigration laws to attract capital-bearing subjects while limiting the entry of unskilled laborers. From the perspective of immigrants such as well-heeled Hong Kongers, however, citizenship becomes

an issue of handling the diverse rules, or "governmentality," of host societies where they may be economically correct in terms of human capital, but culturally incorrect in terms of ethnicity.[7]

To understand the tactical practices of this diasporan managerial class, we must locate them within and one step ahead of the various regimes of truth and power to which they, as traveling persons, are subject. Michel Foucault uses *regime* to refer to power/knowledge schemes that seek to normalize power relations.[8] By appealing to particular "truths" that have been developed about science, culture, and social life, these systems of power/knowledge define and regulate subjects and normalize their attitudes and behavior. The regimes that will be considered here are the regime of Chinese kinship and family, the regime of the nation-state, and the regime of the marketplace—all of which provide the institutional contexts and the webs of power within which Chinese subjects (re)locate and (re)align themselves as they traverse global space.

As Donald M. Nonini has argued, each kind of regime requires "the localization of disciplinary subjects," that is, it requires that persons be locatable and confinable to specific spaces and relations defined by the various regimes: the kinship network, the "nation," the marketplace.[9] In this sense, "flexible citizenship" also denotes the localizing strategies of subjects who, through a variety of familial and economic practices, seek to evade, deflect, and take advantage of political and economic conditions in different parts of the world. Thus, we cannot analytically delink the operations of family regimes from the regulations of the state and of capital. One can say, for example, that Chinese family discipline is in part shaped by the regulation of the state and by the rules of the global marketplace, but the convergence of Chinese family forms with flexible strategies of capital accumulation enables them to bypass or exploit citizenship rules—whatever the case may be—as they relocate capital and/or family members overseas. So while I talk about flexible citizenship, I am also talking about the different modalities of governmentality—as practiced by the nation-state, by the family, by capital—that intersect and have effects on each other, variously encoding and constraining flexibility in global (re)positioning. By analyzing different modalities of flexibility *and* governmentality under conditions of globalization, I identify contemporary forms that shape culture making and its products. First, how does the regime of diasporan Chinese kinship structure, deploy, and limit flexible practices?

Middling Modernity: Guanxi and Family Regimes in Diaspora

One form of elite-Chinese sensibility developed in the context of the late nineteenth century, when interregional commerce flourished under European colonialism in East and Southeast Asia. The entry of Chinese into mercantile capitalism ruptured the traditional links of filiation among Chinese subjects, Chinese families, and the Chinese social order. In nineteenth-century China, the Confucian concept of filial piety (*xiao*) governed the relations of superior and subordinate (father/son, husband/wife, older/younger brothers). Because the family was considered a microcosm of the moral order, filial piety also figured in the relations of citizens to rulers.[10] But in nationalist discourse, elites striving to imagine a modern Chinese nation found that patriotism had little appeal in a climate of "semicolonialism," Japanese invasion, general lawlessness, and economic and social upheaval.[11] Republican China's founder, Sun Yat-sen, bemoaned the difficulty of extending loyalty to family into a loyalty to the new nation; he sadly compared the Chinese people to "a sheet of loose sand." European imperial domination and political humiliation did incite early modern anti-imperialist, antipatriarchal movements, especially among university students in Beijing. But among the commercial classes in the treaty ports, filial piety in the Confucian sense was narrowly focused on familial well-being and family interests, as well as on family firms outside China. Filial piety thereby became the substance for shaping other ways of being Chinese in the world.

A diasporan-Chinese modernity—in the "middling" sense of pragmatic everyday practices[12]—developed among emigrant Chinese in the colonial worlds of East and Southeast Asia. In city ports and colonial enclaves, Chinese subjects facing political mistreatment and intense competition for survival evolved an instrumentality in norms concerning labor organization, family practice, links between family and the wider economy, and dealings with political authorities.[13] London-trained anthropologist Fei Hsiao-tung was highly critical of the loss of Confucian ethics among this merchant class:

> To such ports a special type of Chinese was attracted. They are known as compradors. . . . They are half-cast in culture, bilingual in speech, morally unstable. . . . Treat ports . . . are a land where the acquisition of wealth is the sole motive, devoid of tradition and culture.
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> [Nevertheless] they occupy a strategic position in China's transi-

tion. . . . As their children grow up, they give them modern education and send them abroad to attend Western universities. From this group a new class is formed. . . . But being reared in a cosmopolitan community, they are fundamentally hybrids. In them are manifest the comprador characteristic of social irresponsibility.[14]

The Chinese comprador class became notorious for the systematic ways its members amassed personal power and wealth at the expense of the new republic. By forming profitable links overseas, merchant and industrial families repositioned themselves as subjects of global trade rather than as loyal subjects of the Chinese motherland. Political and economic instabilities, and a weakly developed patriotism, encouraged merchant families to develop links to overseas colonial empires. This turning away from Confucian social ethics toward a family-centered notion of Confucianism found its greatest expression among overseas-Chinese communities that developed under Western capitalism in Southeast Asia.

Modern Chinese transnationalism thus has roots in these historical circumstances of diaspora and European colonial capitalism; in the postcolonial era, Chinese family enterprises became fully integrated with the larger global economy. Chinese traders recruited labor gangs, organized construction and mining crews, built merchant houses, and also ran brothels, gambling houses, and opium dens—all activities that transgressed the localizing regimes of colonial powers—while at the same time, they became more firmly integrated within the colonial economies.[15] Their regional networks for labor and capital accumulation enabled Chinese traders to be the "wild men" who continually challenged political regimes and eluded their regulation.[16] As nationalism in China became channeled into party politics, many Chinese sojourners did express their patriotism by contributing funds to the leaders of the struggling republic. But in the colonies, paternal bonds and interpersonal relations structured networks for interregional trade and provided the institutional basis for a sense of a larger, diffused, "imagined" community of huaqiao.[17]

In the postcolonial era, most Southeast Asian states have remained suspicious of the political loyalty of their Chinese citizens, partly because of those citizens' economic domination and extensive overseas connections. Only Singapore and Taiwan, both of which possess a Chinese majority, have used Confucian education to inculcate state loyalty, which they maintain is analo-

gous to filial piety. But in most countries, especially in Islam-dominated Malaysia and Indonesia, the discourse of nationalism draws on colonial models of race-based and multiethnic nationhood.[18] Thus, the cultural politics of being Chinese varies in different countries, but for many overseas Chinese, there is no obvious continuity between family interests and political loyalty (especially since most overseas Chinese have experienced anti-Chinese discrimination in their host countries). Outside of Taiwan and Singapore, there is a disengagement between Chinese cultural interests and national belonging in host countries identified with dominant ethnicities such as Vietnamese or Malay. For instance, in Malaysia, lower-class Chinese subjects often seek to evade the localizing mechanisms of the state that stigmatize them as "more Chinese" (i.e., less assimilated than upper-class Chinese) and hence subject to regulation as second-class citizens. This diffused sense of being diasporan Chinese has also been shaped by their flexible, mobile relations across political borders and by the kinship regime of truth and control.

Launching family businesses on the edge of empires, Chinese subjects depend on a careful cultivation of guanxi and instrumentalist family practices. These habits, attitudes, and norms are not a simple continuation or legacy of some essentialized bundle of "traditional" Chinese traits. Guanxi networks in Southeast Asia are historically contingent; they are a kind of (post)colonial habitus, that is, they are the dispositions and practices that emphasize pragmatism, interpersonal dependence, bodily discipline, gender and age hierarchies, and other ethnic-specific modes of social production and reproduction in diaspora and under foreign rule.[19] Such overseas-Chinese habitus have ensured that the emigrant family has survived for generations while evading the discipline of the colonial (and later, the postcolonial) states, with their special regimes of othering Chineseness.

Produced and shaped under such conditions, the familial regimes of diasporan Chinese based on guanxi are not without their own violence and exploitation of workers, family members, kinsmen, and so on. In the early days of colonial capitalism, guanxi networks deployed Chinese emigrants in the "pig trade" (supplying coolies to labor camps throughout Asia), thus subjecting many to brutal control, lifelong indebtedness, poverty, and crime while enriching their patrons.[20] Guanxi, as a historically evolved regime of kinship and ethnic power, controls and often traps women and the poor while

benefiting fraternal business associations and facilitating the accumulation of wealth for Chinese families in diaspora.

In everyday life, however, there is widespread misrecognition of guanxi's violence, while its humanism is widely extolled by ordinary folk, businessmen, and cultural chauvinists alike. Such symbolic violence[21]—the erasure of collective complicity over relations of domination and exploitation—is also present in academic writings that unduly celebrate guanxi as the basis of the recent affluence of overseas Chinese.[22] Misrecognition of business guanxi as basically a structure of limits and inequality for the many and of flexibility and mobility for the few is part of the ritual euphemization of "Chinese values," especially among transnational Chinese and their spokesmen (see chapter 2).[23]

Indeed, guanxi regimes and networks have proliferated within the institution of the subcontracting industry, the paradigmatic form of flexible industrialization throughout the Asia Pacific region. Many Chinese firms enter light manufacturing by subcontracting for global companies, producing consumer items such as jewelry, garments, and toys in "living-room factories."[24] In recent years, guanxi networks have been the channel for subcontracting arrangements between overseas-Chinese capital and enterprises in mainland China. A Sino-Thai tycoon, who is the largest investor in China, invokes guanxi to explain the growth of his conglomerate on the mainland. He compares his own business style to what he sees as the inflexibility of Western firms: "American and European companies have adapted themselves to a very sophisticated legal-based society. . . . In China there is no law. There is no system. It is a government by individuals, by people."[25] Thus, the guanxi institution, as invoked and practiced, is a mix of instrumentalism (fostering flexibility and the mobility of capital and personnel across political borders) and humanism ("helping out" relatives and hometown folk on the mainland). Although guanxi connections may be mixed with patriotic sentiment, overseas-Chinese investors are also moved by opportunities for mobilizing cheap labor in China's vast capitalist frontier (see chapter 1). It is probably not possible to disentangle nostalgic sentiment toward the homeland from the irresistible pull of flexible accumulation, but the logic of guanxi points to sending capital to China while shipping the family overseas.

It may sound contradictory, but flexible citizenship is a result of familial

strategies of regulation. Michel Foucault suggests that we think of modern power, in its "government" of population and the welfare of that population (biopolitics), as productive of relations, rituals, and truths.[26] I consider the rational, normative practices that regulate healthy, productive, and successful bodies within the family and their deployment in economic activities for economic well-being as family governmentality. The biopolitics of families, however, are always conditioned by wider political-economic circumstances.

The rise of Hong Kong as a global manufacturing center was secured after British colonial rule put down and domesticated trade unions and student activists during the 1960s, a state strategy that was common throughout Asia.[27] In subsequent decades, refugee families from all classes adapted through hard work, fierce competitiveness, and tight control over the family to improve overall family livelihood and wealth. Hong Kong social scientists use the term "utilitarian familialism" to describe the everyday norms and practices whereby Hong Kong families place family interests above all other individual and social concerns. One scholar observes that economic interdependency is the basic structuring principle—expressed as "all in the family"—a principle that mobilizes the immediate family and relatives in common interests.[28] An individual's sense of moral worth is based on endurance and diligence in income-making activities, compliance with parental wishes, and the making of sacrifices and the deferral of gratification, especially on the part of women and children. In her study of factory women, Janet Salaff found that daughters are instilled with a sense of debt to their parents, which they "repay" by shortening their schooling and earning wages that often go toward their brothers' higher education.[29] These writers seem to identify these family practices as something inherent in "Chinese culture"; they ignore the effects of state discipline and a highly competitive marketplace on refugee families. Such family regimes among the working classes have been responsible for the phenomenal growth of Hong Kong into a manufacturing giant. Among the upwardly mobile, biopolitical considerations inform family discipline in production and consumption. Besides acquiring the habitus of continual striving, children, especially sons, are expected to collect symbolic capital in the form of educational certificates and well-paying jobs that help raise the family class position and prestige. In imperial and republican China, the accumulation of degrees was an established way to rise from peasant to mandarin status or a way for merchants to rise socially in the eyes of officials.[30] In

Hong Kong, the entrepreneur's rise to the highest status is determined solely by his wealth, regardless of how it has been accumulated, although he too may take on the trappings of mandarin learning.[31]

Familial regimes that regulate the roles of sons and daughters for the family well-being can also become discontinuous with or subvert the biopolitical agenda of the state. The British government's laissez-faire policy encouraged the population to pursue wealth with "flexibility and vigor" and, until the eve of the return of Hong Kong to Chinese rule, to express political freedom as a market phenomenon. This market-driven sense of citizenship was until recently viewed not as the right to demand full democratic representation but as the right to promote familial interests apart from the well-being of society.[32] Middling modernity thus places a premium on material goods and on an instrumental approach to social life, as indexed by the ownership of Mercedes-Benzes and market shares. There is a joke that professors spend more time playing the stock market than teaching. Risk taking and flexibility in the entrepreneurial sense induce an attenuated sense of citizenship. A young, single civil servant posted to San Francisco confided to me, "I don't think I need to associate myself with a particular country. I would rather not confine myself to a nationality defined by China or by the U.K. I am a Hong Kong person. I grew up there, my family and friends are there, it's where I belong. . . . [But] I lack a sense of political belonging due to the British colonial system. But we have thrived on the system—in terms of the quality of life . . . roughly fair competition . . . in terms of moving up through the educational system . . . even though Hong Kong is not a democracy."[33] This person planned to get a British passport and try his luck wherever he could practice his talents. Like many savvy Hong Kongers, he was outwardly mobile, aligned more toward world market conditions than toward the moral meaning of citizenship in a particular nation. Such middling, disaffected modernism has been shaped within the politics of colonialism and the nation-states over a refugee and diasporan population, and yet these strategies are adept at subverting the political regimes of localization and control.

English Weather: National Character and Biopolitics

Since the 1960s, ethnic Chinese from Hong Kong and Southeast Asia have sought residential rights in Western countries to escape political discrimina-

tion and anticipated upheavals that could disrupt businesses and threaten family security. But with the rising affluence of Asian countries and the relative decline of Western economies, they may find that economic opportunities and political refuge are not both available in the same place—or even in the same region of the world. With the return of Hong Kong to mainland-Chinese rule, many Chinese professionals would like to continue working in Hong Kong and China but have parked their families in safe havens in Australia, Canada, the United States, and Great Britain. Many, however, found that their search for overseas citizenship is constrained by the immigration policies of Western countries that are equivocating over capital and ethnicity.

The contours of citizenship are represented by the passport—the regulatory instrument of residence, travel, and belonging. Citizenship requirements are the consequence of Foucauldian "biopolitics," in which the state regulates the conduct of subjects as a population (by age, ethnicity, occupation, and so on) and as individuals (sexual and reproductive behavior) so as to ensure security and prosperity for the nation as a whole. Under liberal democracy, biopolitical regulation (governmentality) helps construct and ensure the needs of the marketplace through a policy of acting and not acting on society.[34] For instance, in Hong Kong, the British liberal government has always alternated between government action and necessary inaction in the commercial realm to maintain the wide-open capitalist economy. The question of Hong Kong Chinese emigration to Great Britain, then, must be considered within the dialectics between liberal governmentality and transnational capitalism.

As the residents of a remnant of the British Empire, Hong Kongers were designated British Dependent Territory Citizens (BDTC), with limitless rights of travel but no right to reside in Great Britain. After the reimposition of mainland-Chinese rule, these same residents came to be called British Nationals (Overseas) (BNO), with their conditions of domicile and travel unchanged. Hong Kong Chinese are thus normalized as an overseas population that is in, but not of, the empire; their partial citizenship rests on differences of territoriality, coloniality, and (unmentioned) British origins.

British immigration policy is on the threshold of structurally determining the relationship between class and race so that phenotypical variations in skin color can be transformed into social stratifications based on the assumed

capital and labor potential of different groups of immigrants. Postwar immigration laws institutionalized racial difference through the progressive exclusion of "colored" immigrants from the Commonwealth.[35] In the early 1960s, under public pressure to restrict colored immigrants (who were said to overwhelm housing and state benefits), the Conservative government withdrew the right of colored U.K. passport holders to enter Britain. A few years later, the same government granted the right of entry and settlement to several million "white" people from South Africa. This action was defended by a government white paper that maintained that expanded Commonwealth immigration creates social tensions; the immigrant presence had to be resolved if "the evil of racial strife" was to be avoided.[36] Although the language of immigration law was not explicitly racist, the distinction between whites and coloreds from the Commonwealth and their assumed differential contribution to racial tension (race was frequently used to refer only to coloreds, not to whites) clearly reproduced a class hierarchy whereby race was given concrete institutional expression.

In this transnational discursive formation of race, Chinese from Hong Kong were coloreds, yet they were clearly differentiated from Afro-Caribbean immigrants because of their significant role in overseas capitalism and their perceived docility under British rule in Hong Kong. In the 1960s, the restriction on immigration from the Commonwealth countries limited Hong Kong arrivals mainly to restaurant operators and employees.[37] In addition, thousands of students were sent by their parents for higher education in Britain. By the 1980s, fear of Hong Kong's imminent reversion to Chinese rule and the potential threat to the Hong Kong economy generated steady emigration, mainly to Western countries. Soon the monthly outflow of Hong Kongers reached one thousand; this jeopardized confidence in the Hong Kong financial market, which British interests were heavily invested in. The colonial government saw the problem as one of "brain drain" and fought to stem the outflow by appealing to orientalist reason. An official commented that "the [Chinese] have an overwhelming pragmatic concern for family and personal development—the same pragmatic self-interest that has made the Hong Kong economy so successful."[38]

In England, immigration policy was modified in 1990 to grant British citizenship to some Hong Kong subjects, mainly as a gesture to stem the

outflow from Hong Kong and stabilize faith in the Hong Kong economy. Again, biopolitical criteria that served market interests determined who was awarded citizenship. A nationality bill granted full citizenship or "the right of abode" to only fifty thousand elite Hong Kongers and their families (about a quarter-million out of a total Hong Kong population of almost six million). The members of this special subcategory of Chinese were carefully chosen from among householders (presumably predominantly male) who had connections in British government, business, or some other organization. A point system for different occupations, such as accountancy and law, discriminated among the applicants, who had to have a high educational standing and had presumably to speak fluent English. They were mainly in the age bracket of thirty to forty. Thus, these individuals were selected for their capacity to be normalized as British citizens and their ability to participate in the generation of transnational capital.

British immigration law thus produced a new discourse on overseas Chinese, who were eligible for citizenship only as *homo economicus*. Although the British Labour Party criticized the bill's "elitist" emphasis on the immigrants' educational and professional backgrounds, it did not address the larger subject of how interest in transnational capital colors the perception of race. Although still not fully implemented, the new nationality law constructs a different legal subjectivity of citizenship—as less than *homo economicus*—for Chinese already in the country.

Homi Bhabha has noted that English weather invokes the "most changeable and immanent signs of national character" and is implicitly contrasted to its "daemonic double": the hot, tropical landscapes of the former colonies. English weather represents an imagined national community under threat of "the return of the diasporic, the postcolonial."[39] Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, anxious to quiet a restive public over the admission of more coloreds into the "bless'd isle," defended her bill in Parliament by wondering why the Chinese would trade sunny Hong Kong for Great Britain, "a cold and cloudy island." She reminded the British that the nationality bill was intended as an "insurance policy" to keep would-be Chinese citizens in Hong Kong up to and beyond 1997.[40] In other words, full British citizenship for even those Chinese meeting the biopolitical criteria was citizenship indefinitely deferred; the nationality law operated as insurance against their ever becoming full British citizens. It was clear that a cold welcome awaited them.

China Recalls Prodigal Sons

Even before the "tidal wave" of emigration following the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989, China tried to stem the exodus of capital and professionals from Hong Kong. Through its mouthpiece, the Xinhua News Agency, the People's Republic repeatedly appealed to all Hong Kongers who had gone abroad to reconsider their decision, to "come back, to work for the prosperity of the land of [their] birth."[41] An official blamed the flight of Hong Kong Chinese on the instrumental ethos bred under Western influence. He charged that Chinese residents had been led astray by capitalist countries offering investment opportunities to attract Hong Kong skilled labor and capital.[42] China viewed the British nationality law as an insult to Chinese sovereignty and a shameless attempt by Britain to cream off Hong Kong's talent. It threatened expulsion of those who possessed British citizenship after 1997.[43]

Generally, China took a paternalistic tone with errant Chinese capitalists, who it promised would be "forgiven" for seeking foreign citizenship; "prodigal sons" who returned were favorably contrasted with the "traitors" who had abandoned capitalism in China altogether. While China appealed to filial piety and held out promises of capitalist opportunities, thereby hoping to retain Hong Kong subjects, Britain held out promises of citizenship and democratic rights, thereby hoping to ensure a place for British interests in the Pacific Rim economies.

Many Hong Kongers opted to work in China while seeking citizenship elsewhere. Caught between British disciplinary racism and China's opportunistic claims of racial loyalty, between declining economic power in Britain and surging capitalism in Asia, they sought a flexible position among the myriad possibilities (and problems) found in the global economy. Flexible capital accumulation is dialectically linked to the search for flexible citizenship as a way to escape the regime of state control, either over capital or over citizens. In Hong Kong, a small industry arose to disseminate information about the legal requirements and economic incentives for acquiring citizenship abroad. Just as Hong Kong–registered companies sought tax havens in places such as Bermuda, well-off families accumulated passports not only from Canada, Australia, Singapore, and the United States but also from revenue-poor Fiji, the Philippines, Panama, and Tonga (which required in return for a passport a down payment of U.S.$200,000 and an equal amount

in installments).[44] The Hong Kong authorities uncovered a business scam that offered, for a sum of U.S.$5,000, citizenship in a fictitious Pacific island country called Corterra. Wealthier travelers sought out actual remote islands, safe havens that issued passports with little commitment in return. Kenny Bao of the hotel family chain confided in me that his brother was a friend of the king of Tonga, who gave him citizenship in return for a major investment. A political refuge secured, his brother continued to operate the family's multinational hotel business out of their Hong Kong headquarters, managing properties in Britain and China but having citizenship in neither. Thus, Hong Kong Chinese, for whom the meanings of motherland, country, and family had long been discontinuous and even contradictory, sought legal citizenship not necessarily in the sites where they conducted their business but in places where their families could pursue their dreams. Among the elite and the not-so-elite, this meant a politically stable and secure environment where a world-class education could be found for the children and real estate was available for homesick housewives to speculate in.

Plotting Family Itineraries

Big-business families provide the clearest examples of a careful blending of discipline in familial practice and flexibility in business and citizenship. Li Ka-shing and the late Sir Y. K. Pao, both of whom rose from refugee poverty to immense wealth, are considered perhaps the most brilliant examples of entre-preneurial border running in the Chinese diaspora. Many tycoon families emerged in the 1960s, when businessmen amassed fortunes in real estate just as Hong Kong's manufacturing industries helped make the colony a house-hold word for inexpensive consumer products.[45] In interviews with the sons of some of these wealthy families, I found the familial regime of control to be very firm, even as the family businesses were taking off overseas. Fame and business-power relations are inseparable, and the company founding father is a patriarch who regulates the activities of sons who must be trained and groomed to eventually take over the family business. Filial piety is instilled through the force of family wealth. From the top floor of his San Francisco high-rise, Alex Leong, a mild-mannered middle-aged investor, told me, "I remember, even when I was in junior high [in Hong Kong], my objective was to follow my father's footsteps and be in business . . . to take over the family

business rather than to try to work for someone else or to do my own thing. Because I think it is very important for sons to carry on the family business, something that has been built up by your father. To me, that's the number one obligation. . . . If your family has a business, why would you go work for somebody else and leave a hired man to look after your family business? To me, that doesn't make any sense."[46]

Alex comes from a prominent family that traces its lineage back to a grand-uncle who was once the governor of Guangdong Province. Alex's father went to school in Germany, but after the communist victory in 1949, he took his family to Australia. His father then explored business opportunities in Brazil, where the family lived for a few years. They finally returned to Hong Kong, where his father went into the real estate business and set up a firm called Universal Enterprises. Filial piety dictated that Alex and his brothers take on the roles mapped out by their father. Alex explained that it is a common practice for big-business families to distribute their sons across different geo-graphic sites: "The fathers make a very clear subdivision whereby one brother doesn't infringe on the others, fearing that there would be too much fighting among them. For instance, my oldest brother works in Hong Kong. I take care of everything in North America. We always talk, but we know whose respon-sibility it is here and over there."[47]

In Kenny Bao's family—the one in which the eldest son obtained a Tongan passport and remains in Hong Kong to run the family hotel chain in the Pacific region—Kenny, based in San Francisco, takes care of the North Ameri-can and European hotels and the youngest brother, who came on board later, is managing the family business in southern California. Daughters, no matter how qualified, are never put into management positions in the family busi-ness, which is considered their brothers' patrimony.[48] Three Hong Kong–born women are running investment businesses in the San Francisco Bay area, but they have established their own firms using seed money from their fathers. Their businesses are not part of the family enterprises founded by their fathers. Leong refers to one of these women as "one of the men" because she has been highly successful in what is still considered a male vocation.

Although Leong cannot imagine doing anything else, he confesses that he sometimes feels "stifled" by the fact that the reins of control are in his father's hands: "When you have a father as a boss, to me that's a double boss, right? You can't just say, 'I don't agree, I quit,' and resign. . . . You can't just walk away

from your father. And then a father who has been in business for so long, he'll never recognize you as an equal, so you are always in a subordinate position." The familial regime is so powerful that even sons who try to slip its net are sometimes pulled right back into conformity. Leong's youngest brother graduated from college a few years ago, but having observed his older brothers' predicament, he has resisted working in the family business. The young man expressed his rebellion by working in a bank, but under the paternalistic eye of one of his father's wealthy friends. Leong expects that "eventually, when my youngest brother joins in, it is our objective to continue to expand here in the U.S. and to wind down in Hong Kong."[49] Scholars of rural China maintain that a man who has inherited family property rather than acquired his own fortune enjoys more power over his sons,[50] but here in the tumult of the global economy, it is the self-made tycoon who appears to exert strong control over his family throughout his lifetime. He directs and regulates the behavior of his sons, who are sent out across the world to carve out new niches for the family business empire. Leong's father has been retired for some years now, but the sons continued to consult him on major selling and buying decisions. A political analogue to this system of boss rule is the continuing power of the former prime minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, who still appears to exert tremendous *towkay* (boss) power over his state enterprise.[51]

Thus, the masculine subjectivity of this elite diasporan community is defined primarily in terms of the individual's role as a father or a son, that is, his role in maintaining the paternal/filial structure that both nurtures and expands family wealth. Unlike daughters, who inherit a small share of the family fortune (about a third of the sons' inheritance in Leong's family) and then have nothing to do with the male estates, sons must remain active, integral parts of the family business throughout their lives. To be passive—for example, to draw an income without being involved in the daily operation of the business—is to play a feminine role, like sisters (who marry out) or wives (who may manage the finances but rarely take on management roles). However, as uncertainties increase in Hong Kong and more sons break away and emigrate on their own, a few young women have taken over running their family businesses.[52] But the familial system has traditionally relied on men, and in families without sons, even "foreign devil" sons-in-law who have proved their loyalty to the family business can take the place of sons. For instance, the business empire of Sir Y. K. Pao, the late shipping and hotel

magnate, is now run by his two Caucasian sons-in-law. One can say that filial piety has been bent and channeled to serve the governmentality not only of the family but of global capitalism as well.

Families in America, Fathers in Midair

The modernist norms and practices of diasporan Chinese anticipate their relocation, along with capital infusions, into the Western Hemisphere. Earlier Chinese immigrants to the United States were largely laborers, with a sprinkling of merchants. Today, Chinese investors and professionals arrive as cosmopolitans already wise in the ways of Western business and economic liberalism.[53] With new modes of travel and communication, familial regimes have become more flexible in both dispersing and localizing members in different parts of the world. Hong Kong papers talk about the business traveler as an "astronaut" who is continually in the air while his wife and children are located in Australia, Canada, or the United States, earning rights of residence.

The turn toward the United States began in the 1960s, when teenagers from middle- and upper-middle-class families applied to American schools and colleges. Alex Leong's father often told him, "Your future is really going to be outside Hong Kong. So you should be educated outside, as long as you maintain some Chinese customs and speak Chinese."[54] The well-off used their children's overseas education as an entrée into a Western democracy, buying homes for the children and setting up bank accounts and exploring local real estate. Upon graduation, sons were expected to help expand the family business in their country of residence. After graduating from the University of California, Berkeley, and the University of Wisconsin business school, Leong set up a local branch of his father's company in San Francisco. Because he is not yet a citizen, his parents plan to retire in Vancouver, Canada, where residential rights can be had for an investment of Can$300,000. They expect to join him eventually in the Bay Area, while the sons take greater control over running the family empire. This mix of family and business strategies allows them to weave in and out of political borders as they accumulate wealth and security.

Many entrepreneurs, however, continue to shuttle between both coasts of the Pacific (because it is still more profitable to do business in Hong Kong) while their wives and children are localized in North America. The astronaut

as a trope of Chinese postmodern displacement also expresses the costs of the flexible accumulation logic and the toil it takes on an overly flexible family system. The astronaut wife in the United States is euphemistically referred to as "inner beauty" (*neizaimei*), a term that suggests two other phrases: "inner person," that is, wife (*neiren*) and "my wife in the Beautiful Country (America)" (*neiren zai Meiguo*). Wives thus localized to manage suburban homes and take care of the children—arranging lessons in ballet, classical music, Chinese language—sarcastically refer to themselves as "widows" (and computer widows), which expresses their feeling that family life is now thoroughly mediated and fragmented by the technology of travel and business.

In a Canadian suburb, some widows have formed a group called Ten Brothers to share domestic problems and chores in the absence of their husbands. "We have to start doing men's work like cutting grass in the summer and shoveling snow in the winter. So we call ourselves 'brothers' instead of sisters."[55] This sense of role reversal induced by flexible citizenship has also upset other prior arrangements. In the Bay Area, wives bored by being "imprisoned" in America parlay their well-honed sense of real estate into a business sideline. Down the peninsula, the majority of real-estate agents are immigrant Chinese women selling expensive homes to other newly arrived widows. Here, too, flexibility reigns as wives keep trading up their own homes in the hot residential real estate market. A Hong Kong industrialist told me that he has moved five times over the past sixteen years as a result.

In some cases, the flexible logic deprives children of both parents. These are teenagers who are dropped off in southern Californian suburbs by their Hong Kong and Taiwan parents and who are referred to as "parachute kids." One such child who was left to fend for herself and her brother refers to her father as "the ATM machine" because he issues money but little else. Familial regimes of dispersal and localization, then, discipline family members to make do with very little emotional support; disrupted parental responsibility, strained marital relations, and abandoned children are such common circumstances that they have special terms. When the flexible imperative in family life and citizenship requires a form of isolation and disciplining of women and children that is both critiqued and resisted, claims that the "Confucian affective model" is at the heart of Chinese economic success are challenged.[56] The logic of flexibility expresses the governmentality of transnational capitalism within which many

elite families are caught up, and their complex maneuvers around state regulations reveal the limits and pathos of such strategies.

American Liberalism and Pacific Rim Capital

I have argued elsewhere that in the United States, neoliberalism plays a role in shaping our notion of the deserving citizen. The history of racial conflict also tends to produce a perception that different kinds of ethnic and racial groups embody different forms of economic and political risks.[57] Following Foucault, I consider liberalism to be not merely an ethos but a regime of normalizing whereby *homo economicus* is the standard against which all other citizens are measured and ranked.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Chinese had the dubious distinction of being the first "racial" group to be excluded as undesirable and unsuitable immigrants to the United States. Earlier, Chinese immigrants had been welcomed by capitalists and missionaries as cheap, diligent, and docile laborers, but they were eventually attacked as unfair competitors by white workers in the railroad and mining industries. During the cold war, the public image of Chinese oscillated between that of the good Chinese, who were represented by America's Guomindang allies, and that of the bad Chinese, who were associated with "Red China."[58] In the 1960s, the emergence of a middle-class Chinese population provided contrast with the growth of a nonwhite "underclass," a term used mainly for inner-city blacks.[59] The media popularized the term *model minority* to refer to Asian Americans, who were perceived as having raised themselves up by their bootstraps, thus fitting the criteria for good, or at least deserving, citizens.[60] Images of Oriental docility, diligence, self-sufficiency, and productivity underpin contemporary notions that the Asian minority embodies the human capital that makes good citizens, in contrast to those who make claims on the welfare program.[61]

Through the next decade, the influx of immigrants from Hong Kong and Taiwan, many of them students bound for college, swelled the ranks of middle-class Asian Americans.[62] The rise of a Chinese-immigrant elite—many of them suburban professionals—coincided with the restructuring of the American economy and its increasing reliance on skilled immigrant labor and overseas capital. In the public mind, the Asian newcomers seemed to embody

the desired disciplinary traits of an increasingly passé model of American character. For instance, in the aftermath of the Tiananmen crackdown, a letter to the *San Francisco Chronicle* defended the admission of Chinese (student) refugees: "The opportunity to welcome the best and the brightest of China and Hong Kong into our area is fantastic. These are motivated, energetic, courageous people, with strong cultural traditions of taking care of their families, working hard, and succeeding in business. We need more of these values in our midst, not less."[63] It appears to me that "traditional" American values are to be found in these newcomers, who are coming with different kinds of capital but perhaps not so strong "cultural traditions." Earlier images of the Chinese railroad worker, laundryman, houseboy, and garment worker have been replaced by the masculine executive, a *homo economicus* model inspired in part by the so-called neo-Confucian challenge from across the Pacific.[64]

Increasingly, the reception of skilled and capital-bearing Chinese newcomers represents the triumph of corporate discourses and practices that invoke the Pacific Rim and its Oriental productivity and new wealth. For instance, under pressure from corporate and Asian lobbies, U.S. immigration laws were modified in 1990 to attract some of the Pacific Rim capital that was flowing toward Australia and Canada, where the laws are less stringent. A new "investor category" allows would-be immigrants to obtain a green card in return for a million-dollar investment that results in the creation of at least ten jobs. On Wall Street, seminars directed at Asian Americans offer suggestions on how to "get U.S. citizenship through real estate investment and acquisition." A consultant urges, "Think of your relatives in Asia. If they invest in you, they get a green card and you get a new business."[65] As in other Western countries with finance-based immigration, citizenship has become an instrument of flexible accumulation for the nation-state; it is a way for the nation-state to subvert its own regulatory mechanisms in order to compete more effectively in the global economy.

Narrating Cosmopolitan Citizenship

In what ways has the arrival of the diasporan Chinese reworked the cultural meaning of "Asian American" and produced a new discourse of Pacific Rim romanticism and even symbolic violence? Whereas Said has described orientalism as a one-sided and self-reifying process, I have tried throughout this

chapter to represent the discursive objects themselves as cocreators in orientalism. This has been, after all, part of their flexibility in negotiating the multicultural worlds of European imperialism. For centuries, Asians and other peoples have been shaped by a perception and an experience of themselves as the other of the Western world.[66] The new prominence of Asians in world markets has enabled Chinese subjects to play a bigger role in identifying what counts as "Chinese" in the West.[67] Diasporan-Chinese academics now use orientalist codes to (re)frame overseas Chinese as enlightened cosmopolitans who possess both economic capital and humanistic values. Wang Gungwu, the former chancellor of Hong Kong University, describes overseas Chinese living "among non-Chinese" as "a modern kind of cosmopolitan literati" who have embraced the Enlightenment ideals of rationality, individual freedom, and democracy.[68] Perhaps. Scholars based in the United States claim that "Confucian humanism" will create "an Oriental alternative" to the destructive instrumental rationality and individualism of the West[69]—in other words, a kinder and gentler capitalism for the twenty-first century. One wonders whether these scholars have bothered to visit factories run by Chinese entrepreneurs and observed whether their practices are really that "humanistic" and uninformed by the logic of capital accumulation.

These grand claims circle around and occlude the complex, wide-ranging realities of East Asian capitalism—or at least its Chinese variant. For instance, Hong Kongers hail from a colonial territory where there has been little nurturing of Confucian humanism and democratic values. Until Tiananmen, many had developed a radically apolitical stance toward the state. Just as Hong Kong is viewed as a place to maximize wealth, so the Western democracies to which many Hong Kongers are bound are considered "gold mountains" of opportunity. The subcontracting system of production used in Hong Kong and Taiwan and now in China is among the most exploitative of women and children in the world.[70] In Hong Kong, "democracy," for many entrepreneurs, often means freedom from political constraints on making money; the state and wider society are of concern only when they can be made relevant to family interests.[71] In the view of the business elite, the modern social order is built upon the domination of those who possess intellectual and economic power, and wealthy people are models for envy and emulation rather than enemies of the poor.[72] Like investors all over the world, Chinese businessmen who engage in philanthropy are seeking to escape property taxes and to gain social status

as prominent members of society; it is a stretch to construct these acts as acts of Confucian benevolence. As billionaire Li Kashing says, "There is no other criterion of excellence [except money]."[73] But such prideful discourses on diasporan-Chinese elites as humanistic citizens persist, and they are intervening in narratives about the role of Asian Americans in the United States.

From across the Pacific, corporate America answers the call to reconsider Chinese immigrants as exceptional citizens of the New World Order imaginary. Of course, the reception is not unambivalent, for global trade is viewed as war.[74] This contradictory attitude was expressed by David Murdock, chairman and CEO of Dole Foods, at a conference on Asian Americans in Los Angeles. Murdock personifies corporate America: his company has operations in more than fifty countries and employs thousands of employees in the Asia Pacific region. He warned that in a world of many big economic powers, the technological edge has shifted to the East. There are, however, more than seven million Asian Americans. He continued: "We need to be more competitive. We need people who understand the languages, cultures, the markets, the politics of this spectacular region. Many Asian Americans have language ability, cultural understanding, direct family ties, and knowledge of economic conditions and government practices throughout Asia. This knowledge and ability can help Americans achieve political and business success in the region. . . . Their insight and ability can [help] in opening doors for the U.S. [and in] building a new structure for peace in the Pacific."[75] By defining a role for Asian Americans as good citizens and trade ambassadors, Murdock's speech situates them in the wider narrative of the Oriental as trade enemy.

At the same conference, Los Angeles City Councilman Michael Woo, who was then seeking to be the first Asian mayor of Los Angeles, picked up the narrative by reframing the question: "What then is this new person, this Asian American, in the new era of the Pacific?" The question, which is reminiscent of European queries about Anglos earlier in the century, subverts the view that whites are the undisputed key players on the West Coast. Woo, whose family has close ties with Asian capital, went on to propose "a new hybrid role" whereby new Asian immigrants (rather than long-resident Asian Americans, he seemed to suggest) can act as "translators, go-betweens [between] one culture and another, using skills that have brought us to such prominence and success in the business world and in the professions and entering into the public arena" to become mediators in community relations.[76]

Asians are "bridge builders," Woo claimed.[77] In his view, the Asian American "middleman minority" is not the besieged ethnic group of academic theorizing.[78] Woo was using the term in the larger global sense, coming dangerously close to the meaning that evokes compradors, those members of the Chinese elite who acted as middlemen between colonial governments and the masses in Asia. Calling colonial go-betweens *muchachos*, Fred Chiu notes their role as "the ideal-typical mediating and (inter)mediating category/force in the reproduction of a world of—out-going as well as in-coming—nationalism and colonialism."[79] And of course the term "bridge" has gained new resonance for overseas Chinese in their new prominence as transnational capitalists. As I mentioned in chapter 1, in Chinese, the word for bridge puns with the word for overseas Chinese, and diasporan Chinese have been quick to play on the metaphor of bridging political boundaries in their role as agents of flexible accumulation and flexible citizenship. The bridge-building metaphor appeals to the members of an Asian elite who set great store in being engineers, doctors, managers, and bankers and who see themselves as self-made men who are now building the infrastructures of modern affluence on both sides of the Pacific. Woo saw a continuity between Asian economic and cultural middleman roles. He noted that trading skills developed in the diaspora "in the midst of cultures very different from their own" included not just those of use in "the handling of money, but also skills in sizing up people, negotiating a deal, and long-term planning." He suggested that these "survival skills" could be "transferred" to non-Asians.[80] Woo thus echoed the *homo economicus* construction of Chinese immigrants and elevated their role in the American social order.

Such narrativization is never simply complicit with hegemonic constructions but seeks to reposition Asian immigrants and Asian Americans as new authority figures while suggesting declining human capital and leadership qualities among Anglos. By calling Asian Americans the new Westerners, Woo implies that the Anglos have been surpassed in diligence, discipline, moral capital, and even knowledge of the changing multicultural world that is critical to America's success. His narrative carves out a space of Asian Americans as mediators in American race and class relations. The bridge-building citizen evokes the tradition of American communities and the ideal of a civil society in which neighbors look out for each other.[81] Asian American leaders, Woo seemed to suggest, could build bridges between racial minorities and the

government. By identifying Pacific Rim bodies with Pacific Rim capital, the concept of bridge builders gentrifies Asian American identity in both its local and its global aspects—in moral contrast to less-privileged minorities, with their dependence on the welfare state.[82] When Woo's talk ended, the largely Asian audience rose up and clapped enthusiastically; they voted to replace the model-minority label with the label bridge-building minority, a term that apparently enables Asian Americans to share the transnational role of diasporan Chinese in building the Pacific Century.[83]

Conclusion

The emigration of Chinese corporate elites out of Asia has entailed the cultural work of image management as they seek wider acceptance in Western democracies and in different zones of late capitalism. By revising the academic images of overseas Chinese as money handlers, trading minorities, and middlemen, corporate spokesmen paint a picture that mixes humanistic values with ultrarationalism and portrays the ideal *homo economicus* of the next century.[84] Such self-representations are not so much devised to collaborate in the biopolitical agenda of any nation-state as to convert political constraints in one field into economic opportunities in another, to turn displacement into advantageous placement in different sites, and to elude state disciplining in order to reproduce the family in tandem with the propulsion of capitalism.

Of course, whereas for bankers, boundaries are always flexible, for migrant workers, boat people, persecuted intellectuals, artists, and other kinds of less well heeled refugees, this apparent mix of humanistic concerns and capitalist rationality is a harder act to follow. For instance, Don Nonini has identified the tensions and pathos experienced by middle-class Malaysian Chinese whose familial strategies of emigration are intended to help them escape second-class citizenship as much as to accumulate wealth overseas.[85] Although Chinese small-business owners consider themselves locals in their Malaysian hometowns (e.g., as "natives of Bukit Mertajam"), many are vulnerable to anti-Chinese policies and feel that they have no choice but to send their children overseas, where they may feel less discrimination. These businessmen postpone joining their children in places such as New Zealand that do not feel like "home." Their loyalty to home places in Malaysia is ironically disregarded by state policies that discriminate against them as lower-class

ethnics in a way that does not affect wealthy Chinese, who are viewed as more "cosmopolitan" and open-minded about Malay rule. As Jim Clifford has reminded us, there are "discrepant cosmopolitanisms,"[86] and the cosmopolitanism of lower-class Chinese from Malaysia is fraught with tensions between sentiments of home and pressures to emigrate. This is not to say that members of the Hong Kong Chinese elite do not have patriotic feelings for the Chinese motherland but rather that the investor emigrants are well positioned to engage in a self-interested search for citizenship and profits abroad—a strategy that will enhance their economic mobility and yet sidestep the disciplining of particular nation-states.[87]

Among this elite group (though not limited to them), such a mix of ultra-instrumentalism and familial moralism reveals a postnationalist ethos. They readily submit to the governmentality of capital, plotting all the while to escape state discipline. In the most extreme expressions, their loyalty appears to be limited to loyalty toward the family business; it does not extend to any particular country. Kenny Bao, the hotelier in San Francisco, explains that he can live in Asia, Canada, or Europe: "I can live anywhere in the world, but it must be near an airport." Such bravado constructs the bearable lightness of being that capital buoyancy can bring. Yet the politics of imagining a transnational identity that is dependent on global market mobility should not disabuse us of the fact that there are structural limits, and personal costs, to such flexible citizenship.

This essay should not be interpreted as an argument for a simple opposition between cosmopolitanism and patriotism (taken to an extreme, either is an undesirable or dangerous phenomenon). I have argued that a Confucian cultural triumphalism has arisen alongside modern Chinese transnationalism in Southeast Asia. Some scholars have been tempted to compare the role of the modern Chinese economic elite to that of medieval Jewish bankers, whose activities protected free trade, along with liberalism and other Enlightenment values, in the Dark Ages. We should resist such a comparison. Although contemporary Chinese merchants, bankers, and managers have burst through closed borders and freed up spaces for economic activities, they have also revived premodern forms of child, gender, and class oppression, as well as strengthened authoritarian regimes in Asia.[88] A different kind of cosmopolitical right is at play. The point is not that all Chinese are painted by the same broad brush of elite narratives but that the image of the border-running

Chinese executive with no state loyalty has become an important figure in the era of Pacific Rim capital. What is it about flexible accumulation—the endless capacity to dodge state regulations, spin human relations across space, and find ever new niches to exploit—that allows a mix of humanistic relations and ultrainstrumentality to flourish? Indeed, there may not be anything uniquely "Chinese" about flexible personal discipline, disposition, and orientation; rather, they are the expressions of a habitus that is finely tuned to the turbulence of late capitalism.[89]

PART 3

Translocal Publics

Cosmopolitics and the Subaltern Unconscious

In *Anthropology and Politics*, Joan Vincent identifies the 1980s as the era of "cosmopolitics."[1] She sees the cosmopolitical turn as most promising for ethnographic research on the political economies of third-world countries. Vincent's remarkable contribution to anthropology has been grounded in intensive fieldwork in Zanzibar, Uganda, and Ulster and archival research on Ireland and the Philippines. Clearly, anthropology is the discipline to track down, delineate, and expose the complex politics of colonial imperialism and capitalism inside and outside the European homeland. Less well known, perhaps, is Vincent's extensive influence among students (graduates of Barnard College, Columbia University, and other institutions), who have been inspired, encouraged, and guided to study the cosmopolitics of subaltern classes, peasantries, and women "confronting global capital" in communities around the world.[2] I was one of those privileged students, and my work has always shown the traces, I hope, of Vincent's political sensibility. In this chapter, I want to recast some of Vincent's ideas about the strategic importance of "men in motion," in the "moving frontier" of colonial capitalism, as well as the question of class consciousness in late-twentieth-century capitalisms.[3]

In her study of British rule in colonial Uganda, Vincent wondered what factors in colonial capitalism accounted for the lack of class consciousness among subaltern groups.[4] Influenced, perhaps, by Marx's comparison of French peasants to "a sack of potatoes"—"they cannot represent themselves, they must be represented"[5]—Vincent suggested that the mobility of capitalist

agents disguised the class character of imperial capital, leaving local groups unconnected to each other even as they were objectively exploited by the same system. By arguing that the mobility of capital and its agents was dialectically linked to the fixity of subaltern groups, in both geographical *and* ideological senses, Vincent identified the critical process whereby transnational capital reinforces the mobility of some at the expense of many, a power mechanism that is especially significant in the era of late capitalism.[6]

The ideological murkiness of traveling agents of capitalism, and the "class unawareness" of subaltern groups, are complex ethnographic questions that challenge us to move beyond a class-centered analysis. While other scholars of colonial and postcolonial societies have dealt with issues of class consciousness in relatively stable situations of class exploitation,[7] Vincent's focus on the moving frontiers of capitalism vividly problematizes analytical linkages between capitalist mobility and the political (un)conscious of subaltern groups. Indirectly, her work on Teso poses the question, How does one account for political consciousness when the material links to capital are so attenuated as to seem invisible to the dominated?[8] This question suggests the obverse, that is, What happens when the material relations of exploitation are keenly felt and yet are not symbolically linked to a politics of class identity? This is an especially important theme in the contemporary world, where so much of what we take to be reality is complexly mediated by the dynamic flows of images that make all systems of referents highly fragmented, destabilized, and not directly connected to the structure of production.[9] While it is fashionable among orthodox Marxists to reject such observations as "postmodernist," I maintain that the days are over for calmly plotting a structural relationship between the "objective" and the "subjective" aspects of (class) consciousness. Capital remains fundamental to our understanding of contemporary social life, and it is sensible to think of capital as highly sped-up, constantly mutating sets of material, technological, and discursive relations, of production *and* consumption, in which everything is reduced to an exchange value. Donald Lowe refers to this phenomenon in the United States, where accelerated production/consumption has annihilated use values, as "the hegemony of exchangist practices."[10] Even when we move away from the centers of global capitalism, subaltern groups in the new transnational publics shaped by capital, travel, and mass media cannot develop political consciousness in a way that escapes the mediations of ethnic identifications, mass culture, and na-

tional ideologies. Indeed, transnational capitalism in Asia has been linked not so much to the rise of class hostility but to other forms of cultural struggle that privilege gender, family, ethnicity, and nationality.[11]

The problem of subaltern consciousness, then, is not merely one of the "invisibility" of dominant relations to subalterns or the impossibility of the "authentic" representation of subalterns by nonsubalterns;[12] rather, it is also one of linking "subaltern" imagination not to the structure of production but to what Foucault calls "knowledge power." In the contemporary world, where so much of everyday consciousness is mediated by "print (and electronic) capitalism," discursive knowledges constitute a field of power that defines entities such as the family, gender, ethnicity, race, and nationality and thus constitutes the political consciousness of class-differentiated subjects.[13] How are social identities rooted in objective class differences shaped not by an ideology of class exploitation but by the corporatist hegemony of exchangist values? I find Fredric Jameson's notion of "the political unconscious" especially useful for unmasking ideological messages embedded in cultural narratives about the traveling subject of contemporary Asian capitalism.[14] Although Jameson is interested in uncovering the political unconscious—a structure of psyche that is historical—in literary works, I wish here to uncover the political unconscious in commercialized cultural and political forms linked to mobile Chinese families that have recently dominated public cultures in Southeast Asia. What are the ideological messages in the figuration of traveling masculine subjects and entrepreneurial families? What do they tell us about the popular imagination of power, authority, and desires in the brave new Asian world of authoritarian states and free-flowing capitalism?

The Governmentality of Family Romances

This rise of Chinese corporate forms in the Southeast Asian public landscape has been sudden and quite startling. I remember visiting Malaysia in 1992 on Chinese New Year and being amazed by the huge commercial displays of Chinese words, figures, and banners on major hotels and stores. Despite Malaysia's large Chinese minority, the public display of Chinese symbols had been muted throughout the 1970s and 1980s, when Malaysianization policies established Malay language, personalities, and cultural icons as the appropriate vehicles for public prestige and pageantry. The new prominence of Chinese

iconography outside "Chinatown," I was told, was a sign of welcome for Taiwanese businessmen, who have become the main investors in Malaysia, overtaking the Japanese. Ironically, while blatant displays of Chinese artifacts in public culture have been suppressed for fear of inciting local ethnic-Chinese chauvinism, commercial images of Chineseness as symbols are permitted and even encouraged for their links to transnational capital and entrepreneurs, in effect casting them as "'thoroughly modern' Asians."[15]

This flamboyant display of Chinese corporatism indexes a new accommodation between translocal capital and the developmental state, an alliance that enables cosmopolitan Chinese iconography to dominate public culture. These, however, are not apolitical images of culture and consumption but are imbued with messages about the stereotypical "Asian" family order, gender hierarchy, and subscription to a particular state vision of communitarian capitalism. Indeed, just as the world of Walt Disney disseminates capitalist ideology,[16] the new Asian public culture creates a realm where cosmopolitan images promote a kind of ideological conformity that is especially powerful because it is cast in the language of family romance and modern adventure.[17]

Embedded in these public cultural forms are political messages about power, masculinity, and a mobile economic liberalism. As Foucault has reminded us, economic liberalism is not simply a theory of political and economic behavior but "a style of thinking quintessentially concerned with the art of governing."[18] The objective of political economy resituates "governmental reason within a newly complicated, open and unstable politico-epistemic configuration."[19] One can say that a kind of laissez-faire governmentality infuses the market behavior of overseas Chinese, among whom a premium is placed on norms that allow the free play of market forces, flexible activities, and the self-discipline of the profit maximizer. In Adam Smithian thinking, the state is ideally a solicitous institution that makes corrective adjustments to open channels to free trade, but its interventions should be limited so as not to hamper the workings of market rationality. Indeed, while nation-states such as Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia may be politically repressive now and again, the state ensures the freedom of economic activities across the region. Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia calls such a combination of "not-so-liberal democracy" and government intervention into the economy "communitarian capitalism."[20] These ideas about the inseparable links between economic liberalism and authoritarian rule are disseminated

through public cultures that recast capitalist strategies and state control as family romances.

The new Asian publics are increasingly contexts through which, in Lynn Hunt's words, "private sentiments and public politics" are interwoven and struggled over by different class, ethnic, and nationality groups.[21] Following Hunt, I use the construct of family romance(s) to mean the collective and unconscious images of family order that underlie public politics.[22] Narratives of affluent Chinese families provide a kind of structure to political imaginaries, which (like nationalism) can crosscut and neutralize the interpellations of class, gender, and ethnicity.[23] Family romances do not operate in an apolitical manner but inform the way people imagine the operations of power between individuals and the state, between different ethnic groups, and of course between men and women. Below, I suggest that family romances—as articulated in public displays, images, and narratives—are vehicles that variously encode political messages about (1) a fraternal tribal capitalism; (2) Chinese-native elite alliances; (3) the moral economy of the state; and (4) working-class women's dreams. These are different facets of "the family model of politics,"[24] and they speak to the differing notions of authority and legitimacy among transnational capitalists, their bureaucratic partners, and the new middle classes; they also shape the notions of authority and legitimacy of subaltern subjects in Asian modernity.

The Romance of Family Empires

Over the past two decades, Southeast Asia has seen the emergence of about a dozen major Chinese business families whose multinational holdings place them among the world's richest people. Chinese-owned companies that enjoy the patronage of politicians have become "larger than all but the biggest local branches of the global MNCs [multinational corporations] which proliferated throughout the region" in the 1980s.[25] Their owners include Robert Kuok and the Kwek brothers of Malaysia and Hong Kong, Liem Sioe Liong and William Soeryadjaya of Indonesia, and the late Chin Sophronphanich and the Lamsam family of Thailand.[26] Taken together, overseas-Chinese corporate families and professionals are the new economic elite in Asia (outside Japan); their activities, mobility, and stories are the stuff of a regional thinking about "communitarian capitalism."

The symbolic qualities of Chinese corporate families—interpersonal relations based on fraternity and mandarin ideals—are key elements in a political imaginary of regional development and interethnic dependence between rulers and capitalists. This Chinese capitalist triumphalism arose in the context of a sustained economic boom that began in the 1970s, when Singapore and Hong Kong joined South Korea as the new "dragons" in Asia. In the next decade, as Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia won the label "minidragons," ethnic-Chinese business groups began to exercise their critical role in forming economic linkages that supplemented and went beyond the strategies of the developmental states. In 1991, the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce held the first global meeting of Chinese chambers of commerce from all over the world, inviting participants from seventy-five countries. This meeting of business interests was represented as a model of postcolonial fraternal bonds that overcame regional and political differences. A leader of the Singapore Chamber of Commerce told me that there was no language barrier at the gathering because the Chinese entrepreneurs were all bound by kinship, in the double sense of having both blood and fictive fraternal bonds.[27] As I mentioned in chapter 2, this rediscovered brotherhood in the context of transnational capitalism has been dubbed a "momentary glow of fraternity"; it asserts a transnational autonomy vis-à-vis the less-flexible patriarchal authority of the state.[28]

Emboldened by their successes in forming transnational networks, overseas entrepreneurs boast of using fraternal links to bypass or do without political and legal regulations. In an interview, a member of the Singapore Chamber of Commerce recalled for me: "Overseas Chinese grew more confident and more concerned about their identity. Globalization requires going beyond just national identity in enlarging our scope and permutations of what we're trying to do. Although investments are directed by our government regionalization policy, most important linkages are made through company levels, and again at the local level through human relations."[29]

Ethnic-Chinese solidarity based on male bonding and networks has created what Joel Kotkin calls "the most economically important of the Asian global tribes" and has made the "old government ideology of nation-states . . . outmoded."[30] This use of the term *tribe* to refer to traveling ethnic businessmen constructs an essentialist concept of cultural difference and brings to mind the band of brothers who ritually sacrificed the original father figure in

Freud's *Totem and Taboo*.[31] Fraternal networks are represented as the modern Asian way of doing business man to man, usurping the paternalistic role of the government in economic activities. The familial morality of Chinese capitalism, then, is not that of the autocratic father but rather the fraternal flexibility that forms alliances across ideological, political, and ethnic borders.

The oxymoron *Confucian merchant* is a sign of the extravagance of Chinese capitalism.[32] That Confucian philosophy puts traders at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy and regards their singular pursuit of wealth as the very antithesis of Confucian values has not been an obstacle to business-news images of capitalists as reborn Confucians. In narratives of East Asian triumphalism, Chinese merchants are likened to mandarins whose high status stems not only from their fortunes but also from their representation of a reworked Confucianism of the "all-men-are-brothers" sort.

The merchant mandarin par excellence is Robert Kuok, a Malaysian-born tycoon who has been called "the embodiment of a Confucian gentleman" in the region's authoritative business magazine, the *Far Eastern Economic Review*.[33] The cover of the issue in which this assessment appears displays Kuok dressed in an emperor's yellow dragon robes in the regal pose of an ancestor figure. His spectacular economic success has been attributed not only to his masterful cultivation of relationships with capitalists and politicians but also to his loyalty to business subordinates and to his sense of business discretion. The family romance behind this merchant prince celebrates the values of discipline, pragmatism, and economic success; it opposes political idealism and the impractical goals of the anticolonial revolutionary. The trader and the revolutionary are key figures in overseas-Chinese history.[34] The story of Robert Kuok and his younger brother Willie is presented as a morality tale of overseas Chinese who are torn between a foolish anti-imperialist struggle (Willie) and practical adjustments to imperial rule and global capitalism (Robert). The sensible influence is represented by Kuok's mother, a "very austere, very religious" and "old-fashioned" woman, that is, an authentic Chinese parental figure of piety and moral uprightness.[35] It is instructive that maternal, rather than paternal, influence is constructed as the key influence on sons in this diasporan-Chinese family. Emigration from China breaks with the traditional patriarchal power associated with the lineages and the ancestral temples of the home culture.

The Kuok brothers were educated in elite colonial British schools (where

Robert's classmates included future politicians such as Lee Kuan Yew). The Second World War, which precipitated the process of decolonization, set the brothers off on radically different paths. While Robert worked with the occupying Japanese forces and learned from their rice trade, his younger brother, Willie, entered the jungle to join the anti-imperialist Communist Party of Malaysia as a propagandist. By the end of the war, both brothers had gained fame. Willie's death at the hands of British troops was announced in the British House of Commons. A few years later, Robert Kuok established a major sugar mill and, through rapid expansion, soon became the "sugar king" of Southeast Asia. Expanding his strategic ties to overseas-Chinese traders and indigenous politicians, Robert Kuok has built an empire based on commodities, shipping, banking, and property development, with offices in Hong Kong, Beijing, Paris, and Santiago.

This story, which has been reported in the international press and circulates among overseas Chinese, contrasts "good" and "bad" overseas-Chinese male subjects. Robert Kuok is the reassuring image of a new diasporan masculine ideal—open to all kinds of advantageous alliances, tempered by an astute judgment of human relations, and always nurturing social relations with associates. This mandarin image was further promoted by *Forbes*, the world's leading business magazine: "Nearly all the first-generation tycoons, such as Indonesia's Liem [Sioe Liong], Malaysia's Kuok, and Hong Kong's Li Ka-shing, have the same image: trustworthy, loyal, humble, gentlemanly, skilled at networking and willing to leave something on the table for partners."[36]

In his study of the intertwining of nationalism and sexuality in Nazi Germany and Great Britain, George Mosse notes that bourgeois manhood was often represented by values of restraint and self-control. "Manliness was not just a matter of courage, it was a pattern of manners and morals" that appealed to the middle classes as virtue and respectability, or the control of passion.[37] In Chinese dynastic romances, the manly virtues of the new bourgeoisie are a mix of restrained flamboyance and benevolence toward those who are less well endowed. This vision of a gentrified tycoon culture—a world away from the hubbub of Chinese commercial streets—appeals to the new middle classes, who have been keeping up with global "middling" norms of the good life.[38]

Such images of family morality—restraint, fraternity, princeliness—both represent and resonate with the fantasies of Chinese families, with their nos-

talgia for a remembered glorious culture, and with the ways they understand economic and political experiences. There is growing evidence that the middle classes in Southeast Asia now look to (Chinese) business families rather than to the families of sultans or kings as models for appropriate modern Asian masculine conduct, practices, and values. Chinese communities in Malaysia take great pride in the Kuoks, who are viewed as homegrown sons who have become global empire builders. They closely follow the business decisions and property acquisitions of the Kuoks (that is, of Robert, the surviving brother, and both brothers' children), seeking clues as to how to conduct themselves and attain economic success. Furthermore, the media prominence of the Kuoks, together with that of the Lis of Hong Kong, the Liems of Indonesia, and so on, has given ethnic-Chinese minorities in Southeast Asia a new respectability; spurred by the new political tolerance toward Chinese business, even the assimilated are "coming out of the closet" as "Chinese." For instance, with the end of military rule, more and more Sino-Thais are asserting their Chinese origins, and culture in Bangkok has become "more openly Chinese."[39] In visits to Singapore or Hong Kong, ethnic Chinese from ASEAN countries can discard their batik or Thai-silk shirts, drop their indigenous names, and speak Chinese dialects and perform kinship rituals, especially around business banquets. More and more, in cities such as Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok, and in trips back to the mainland, corporate power is stamped with Chinese business practices and rituals.[40]

Even indigenous ASEAN leaders, long suspicious of ethnic-Chinese business, now strategically position themselves as closer to Chinese corporate practices. Malaysian and Singaporean leaders use the category "East Asian" to refer to their own countries, seeking to link their "minidragon" status to the economic boom in China. Malay businessmen are taking up Mandarin to do business and learn from ethnic-Chinese entrepreneurs. Recently, the Malaysian deputy prime minister invoked the Chinese sage Lao Tse to urge "the youth of East Asia" to combine spiritual with material success. He said that they should struggle for both free trade (against Western protectionist policies) and ethical values (against the complacency that comes with affluence).[41] This yoking of free trade with reified Chinese values is one example of attempts by Malaysian leaders to proclaim that theirs is "a noncapitalist market economy" that is founded on the communitarian but flexible relations of the "bamboo network."

Cross-Ethnic and Cross-National Fraternities

What do these images of fraternal capitalism and economic dynasties tell us about the ways elite power sharing is imagined? In postcolonial Southeast Asian nation-states, whether monarchist or republican, discussion of dynastic rule is often tightly controlled, if not banned outright. In Thailand, subjects are forbidden to discuss the power and authority of the monarchy, while in Indonesia and Singapore, the state does not tolerate any commentary about the political and economic privileges of ruling families. In recent years, Lee Kuan Yew has sued foreign scholars and newspapers for writing about alleged nepotism in Singapore's political system.[42] While any discussion of patriarchal political rule is suppressed, there has been an explosion of stories about business dynasties.

Economic dynasties and alliances, not dynastic politics, are the narratives of elite power. Even as stories celebrate the restraint of the merchant princes, they also valorize the extravagance of their corporate networks. As is clear from the above, this fascination with Asian business empires is often fed by Western publications such as the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, which is owned by Dow Jones and Company, the Wall Street firm. In many ways, the family model of Asian capitalism is also a creation of Western media barons and reflects a mix of orientalist fantasy, business instrumentalism, and an American spin on economic opportunities and contacts in Asia. The *Review* has a new series called "Family Ties," devoted to "Asia's family-held business groups." One such story, about a Hong Kong beverage entrepreneur, is subtitled "Grandson of Indentured Servant in Malaysia Epitomizes the Overseas Chinese Success Story."[43] This rags-to-riches story is repeated many times because "probably at no point in history have so many families accumulated so much wealth in a single generation."[44] These stories are an endorsement and a celebration of the transnational expansion of business families beyond their host countries and beyond even the region. More fundamentally, they constitute a regime of truth about the ascent of a new kind of transnational fraternal alliance in the new Southeast Asia. They also note the role of strategic links to officials and the importance of cross-ethnic relations—business partnerships, marriages, kinship relations—in the rise of the new Asian tycoons.

The image of merchant princes has helped legitimize the new moral order of capitalist-state alliances. Although Islamic leaders in Indonesia have for

years criticized the links between Chinese bosses (*cukong*) and the Soeharto family, the fortunes of the Indonesian ruling class are intertwined with and dependent on their contacts with Chinese businessmen.[45] Under the cukong system, Chinese bosses bankroll and otherwise support Indonesian politicians in exchange for patronage and protection from excessive attacks on the Chinese. The biggest cukong is Liem Sioe Liong, whose great fortune has been tied to that of President Soeharto's family. Their partnership began during the Second World War, when Soeharto was an army man in the provinces and Liem was a commodities trader and suspected gunrunner.[46] The rise of Soeharto as president and the growth of Liem's Salim Group of companies are intertwined events that have led to many suspicions among the indigenous (*pribumi*) business community. The economic fortunes of the Soeharto family have also expanded as a result of the cukong connection that won the late Madam Hartinah Tien Soeharto the nickname "Mrs. Ten Percent" in reference to commissions she gathered through wielding nepotistic influence. The Soeharto children are partners in many of the Salim Group ventures. While the Soeharto government has suppressed Western press reports about Soeharto family business interests, such cukong arrangements have aided in the rise of many Chinese firms, which, with their ability to attract foreign investments, have led Indonesia's economic resurgence.[47]

Across the water, Malay-Chinese business alliances, called Ali-Baba partnerships,[48] have also been a key to the rise of powerful companies. For instance, one top Malay stockbroker not only has his de rigueur Chinese business partner but also a Chinese wife (Robert Kuok's daughter); in addition, he has access to top Malay government officials.[49] Someone else who participates in an Ali-Baba partnership is Francis Yeoh. Despite being an ethnic-Chinese Christian in a predominantly Muslim, Malay-chauvinist state, he has been called "the master builder of Malaysia [who] thrives with a little help from his friends."[50] Indeed, like virtually every successful corporate heavyweight here, he is a familiar presence in the halls of political power and is an intimate of Prime Minister Mahathir. That symbiosis of political power and entrepreneurial energy is a phenomenon that has spread throughout much of Southeast Asia and helps explain the region's economic dynamism. These stories suggest that fraternal alliances between (Chinese) businessmen and (indigenous) bureaucrats are partnerships that thrive because fraternal business links are meshed with authoritarian political structures.

But in a globalized economy, such business-government fraternizing is not limited to Southeast Asian countries. The overseas-Chinese corporate practice of providing credit and payoffs in exchange for political favors and protection has spread to the United States. Liem's banking partner, Mocthar Riady, was caught up in a recent uproar over giving "soft money" to the Democratic Party (see chapter 6). But precisely because the alliances between Chinese financiers and politicians in Southeast Asia have their limits in attracting capital from overseas, and because Chinese firms have become modern transnational corporations, they are moving beyond their own governments to seek relations with politicians in a number of countries. In transnational business fraternities, governments are resources that can be made to share power through capitalism.

Although indigenous communities in Southeast Asia continue to be suspicious of Chinese traders, their gentrification as merchant princes casts a glow of respectability and modernity onto generals and politicians often suspected of economic incompetence and corruption. The wider acceptance of Chinese business by political elites is reflected in the number of Beijing-bound trade delegations from ASEAN countries that are composed of ethnic-Chinese businessmen. Government-business partnerships are touted in the Malaysian press as the new vehicles for strengthening the national economy through the expansion of transnational contacts that build on Chinese networks. Ethnic Chinese in partnership with state enterprises are viewed as less disloyal, especially if, like Liem, they are careful to invest in their home country while exploring other opportunities abroad.

Another feather in the cap of the Chinese tycoon is his new image as a multicultural leader who is an effective mediator for governments, and not only between, say, Kuala Lumpur or Jakarta and Beijing. As their operations expand overseas, the press celebrates their ideologically indiscriminate flexibility in doing business: "Robert Kuok appears to blend just as easily with Cuban leader Fidel Castro and Chinese Premier Li Peng as he does with Malaysian Prime Minister Datuk Seri Mahathir Mohamad and Indonesian President Soeharto. . . . 'Robert Kuok has funded the entire world,' a Malaysian broker points out. 'He is everyone's friend.'"[51] Overseas-Chinese entrepreneurs are the new heroes, glad-handing world leaders while spreading fraternal friendship and business to any spots that remain resistant to global capitalism.

The Family Romance of the State

The romance of Chinese families is also deployed by academics and government officials to organize popular understanding of political morality. Since the 1980s, states such as Taiwan and Singapore have undertaken Confucianizing campaigns as a way to shape the cultural imagination of citizenship. These discourses allow the state to produce disciplinary knowledges and ideologically align family and state interests along a single moral continuum. In Singapore, an educational campaign was launched to promote religious knowledge and moral education through the systematic introduction of Confucian studies into the school curriculum. This strategy reached beyond the school gates through the promotion of research to support these Confucianizing claims.

In Singapore in 1994, a book on Chinese pioneers in capitalism was published to great fanfare—"They are selling like hotcakes," a scholar told me. Drawing on the life stories of forty-seven Chinese businessmen, *Stepping Out: The Making of Chinese Entrepreneurs* was presented as a collective morality tale of Singapore's success. The authors claimed that these businessmen's Confucian morality had been essential to their capitalist success, which in turn, had contributed to national strength. These rags-to-riches Singaporeans were constructed as paragons of Confucian virtue—self-sacrificing, honest, trustworthy, respectful—who were impelled by a moral ethos of "doing life . . . with others, for others, because of others." These capitalist pioneers were defined as examples of a Singapore Everyman, benevolent patriarchs who treated their business partners and workers "like brothers." The authors claimed that the "Confucian merchant" of contemporary Singapore was formed in a moral order that emphasized trust, confidentiality, and the social control of subordinates.[52] This relentlessly male vision of society—one that traces family genealogies from fathers to sons, who are construed as male-to-male partners—excludes women from the public sphere; women are constructed, almost by omission, as exclusively creatures of the private sphere, who never step out. Sociologist Claire Chiang, one of the authors of *Stepping Out*, seems quite content with this romantic picture she has helped produce. In an interview, she confided that in the course of her research among the business families, "there is no mention of the daughters holding the [reins]. But daughters are often on the cashier's side, holding the purse."[53] This rigid

public/private division along gender lines, with female power being relegated to the realm of the domestic budget, conjures up a fantasy about "traditional" Chinese gender roles, in which women remain fixed within the household. The book received the imprimatur of Goh Keng Swee, the architect of Singapore's modern economy, who maintained in a foreword that Singapore's economic affluence is proof that the moral basis of entrepreneurial success in Singapore was "founded on the Confucian ethic" of these male pioneers.[54]

Such a scenario makes public masculinity and private femininity the foundation of state. Indeed, there is a clear attempt to coordinate what I have called "the moral economy of the family" with the moral economy of the state (see chapter 2). For besides constructing the Confucianized family as the backbone of economic development, the state reiterates its policies of strengthening the family by providing guarantees of social security and order.[55] A Singapore official describes Singapore as a capitalist society built upon "socialist" families: "For many East Asian societies, it is not only the family that is socialist, it is the extended family and sometimes the extended clan."[56] The fact that women are an important part of the workforce, that divorce rates are rising, and that government campaigns promoting marriage among the professional elite fail to make a big dent in the number of unmarried women does not deter such profamily claims. On the contrary, it is the very anxiety engendered by such trends that accounts for the twinned ideologies of feminine domesticity and masculine public life.

The romance of the invented Confucian family is an ideological expression of the state's promotion of extended family formation through its housing, educational, and savings schemes.[57] These themes, which integrate the family romance with state policy, are further developed in profamily campaigns that encourage marriage and reproduction among professional women; these women are urged to return home, almost as a patriotic duty, to make babies who are deemed to be of a higher "quality" than those of lower-class women. By providing ideological and institutional supports to families threatened with individualism and fragmentation, the state restores faith that the moral power of Confucian ideology can forge a successful alliance with capitalism so that fraternal power can flourish in the public sphere without the threat of bad mothers undoing gender difference and hierarchy in the home. Geraldine Heng and Janadas Devan have coined the term "state fatherhood" to describe

the state engineering of racial demographics, family, gender, and class relations in Singapore.[58]

Working Women's Dreams of Traveling Romance

Thus far, I have discussed how different romances of the Chinese family express messages about fraternal power, interethnic alliances, and the gendered public-private division that betray unifying themes of an emerging political imagination in Southeast Asia, which is grappling with the forces of late capitalism. In what ways do these masculinist imaginaries resonate with the consciousness of working-class women, who, after all, form the bulk of the labor force in Asia? In his study of petit bourgeois and working-class Malaysian Chinese, Don Nonini identifies a dialectic of mobility and location that is highly gendered. He observes that their familial strategies send men overseas for education and work, while women are required to stay at home and care for the remaining family members.[59] How, one may ask, does the family romance resonate with working-class women who also migrate but whose experiences are different from those of traveling men? Do men in charge of mobility represent a kind of symbolic capital working women may identify with? I turn to the experiences of working-class women in south China, a region undergoing major transformations as a result of economic activities by ethnic Chinese from Southeast Asia.

In the fall of 1993, I visited China's most successful special economic zones, which are based in coastal cities such as Shenzhen, Xiamen, Guangzhou (Canton), and Shantou, where tens of thousands of young women from the inland provinces have descended to work in factories that are mainly financed and operated by overseas-Chinese capital. For instance, in Shenzhen, the roaring metropolis of China's future, right across the water from Hong Kong, 80 percent of the investors are Chinese from Hong Kong and the Asia Pacific region. These "Chinese from overseas," who are so vaunted in the mass media, are viewed in an intensely ambivalent way by local women (see chapter 1). In their workaday world, female workers in Shenzhen want to maintain distance from Hong Kong and overseas-Chinese managers, visitors, and businessmen. According to Ching Kwan Lee, young migrant women from the impoverished interior consider overseas Chinese to be outsiders who do not share their

culture or appreciate their own very different backgrounds.[60] Furthermore, as Lee's research has shown, overseas managers enjoy enormous discretionary power over the treatment of workers on the shop floor, as well as over their chances of remaining in the cities. Many female workers prefer to be supervised by their own kinsmen or townsfolk who work in the same factory. Indeed, regimes of control based on kinship and localistic ties are pervasive throughout the manufacturing industry, for personalistic relations increase workers' compliance and also lift the burden of direct confrontation from overseas-Chinese bosses. The cultural divide is deepened because female workers feel that their foreign bosses are unable to empathize with their problems and their very limited options in the labor force. There is also the image of overseas-Chinese men as uncontrollable agents of sexual exploitation, now made more flexible and invasive by the flows of capital.

In the Women's Federation (*Funü Lianhehui*) office of Shenzhen, the director told me that Hong Kong and overseas-Chinese men were perceived as good catches by local women, although "their cultural standards are not so high." This was her way of saying that for young women, these men are chiefly attractive because of their money and mobility. "Hong Kong visitors are bad for public morality. There are about ten thousand truck drivers coming into Shenzhen each day, and they contribute to prostitution."[61] The booming mistress trade is sparked by the Hong Kong men's "railroad policy" of keeping a mistress at each stop on their circuit, and there is a "concubine village" near a container-truck border crossing where many Hong Kong men have set up a home away from home, sometimes with children.[62] Some of these women may take second jobs as agents for their patrons' businesses in China. Such practices recall the early days of Chinese sojourning in Southeast Asia, when families were left in different sites in the diaspora. It is one of the many ironies of late capitalism that premodern family forms and female exploitation, which the communist state had largely erased in the cities, are being resurrected.

In the Deng era, the mass-entertainment industry has redefined the passive and self-sacrificing young woman, an icon of the precommunist era, as a cultural ideal. After having viewed *Yearnings,* a phenomenally popular TV series about family upheavals in post-Tiananmen China, Lisa Rofel notes that the family and female self-sacrifice have become new symbols of national unity. She argues that an underlying theme in the melodrama is the emergence of a strong and controlled masculinity that may lead the battered nation

into the future.[63] We must note, however, that the urban population in coastal China seems to favor foreign programs beamed from the Star TV satellite network, which has created a whole new trans-Asian public through its bewildering variety of Asian and Western offerings, including MTV, talk shows, movies, and so forth. In Shenzhen, working women watch Hong Kong soap operas for cultural scripts on how to be independent modern women. I visited a beauty parlor set up by three enterprising female migrants in one of the hastily built workers' apartment complexes to serve the increasing demand for personal grooming. While attending to the customers, the hairdressers watched Hong Kong soaps on television and made a running commentary on what they imagined to be women's greater choices and strategies in overseas-Chinese communities. For these young women, who had left their rural villages for the bright city lights and begun the difficult climb toward middle-class status, the lure of capitalism lay in the possibility for self-reliance, not self-sacrifice. They were preoccupied with figuring out strategies and networks for crossing into this brave new world. While young women routinely rely on family, neighbors, and friends to leave their villages and survive in the industrial cities, many are now seeking new relations that are not based on already constituted kinship or social bonds. Among Shenzhen's female working class, most kinship and hometown networks lead straight back to the village; at best, they prove to be only a weak source of coercion and support in the workplace.[64] Women who desire wealth and travel to rich places outside China answer to a different family romance.

For these women, overseas-Chinese men represent a vision of capitalist autonomy and a source of new "network capital."[65] In an interesting reformulation of Pierre Bourdieu's concept of symbolic capital,[66] Siu-lun Wong and Janet Salaff use network capital to mean acquired personal networks based on friendship, school ties, and professional contacts (rather than networks formed from links based on family, family name, and hometown).[67] They argue that the accumulation of network capital has been a critical practice of well-to-do Hong Kongers in their emigration strategies. Working-class women in coastal China are less well positioned to build on professional contacts, but many depend on personal charms to create new personal connections. So even a road-trip Romeo from Hong Kong can be an irresistible catch because he literally and figuratively embodies the guanxi (ideally through marriage) that will lead to the dazzling world of overseas-Chinese capitalism.

Marriage to a traveling man enables one to expand one's accumulation of network capital and can also benefit the members of one's family, who eventually may also emigrate to the capitalist world, where their desires for wealth and personal freedom can be met.

So mobility, wealth, and an imagined metropolitan future, rather than love or class solidarity, account for the lure of family romances. Feelings of regional, cultural, and class differences from overseas-Chinese men may remain, but not sufficiently to deter working women from marrying them to "develop a bridge to leave China," a common expression used by the women I met. One of the three hairdressers I visited was corresponding with a Chinese Canadian and a white American she met in a bar. I later learned that she had begun a courtship with a male cousin who had emigrated to California, and she eventually flew to San Francisco to marry him.[68] Hers was a particularly creative weaving of acquired and created networks in a successful emigration strategy. Another young woman I met, who is considered a classic north China beauty, has a faithful, perfectly respectable Chinese boyfriend who works in the government. This beauty, however, frequents bars; she hopes to meet an overseas-Chinese man who can help her leave China.

That karaoke bars are the sites of mobility and new wealth is apparent from their video equipment and their clientele of foreign businessmen, hustlers, and upwardly mobile women. Indeed, the bar has taken over from the workplace, where worker politics have become too contaminated by Communist Party and capitalist interests to protect the collective interests of workers. Instead, many working women prefer the "state-free" arena of bars and discos to work out individual strategies of eluding economic exploitation, at least of the factory kind. The romance of mobile capitalism, then, conjures up a felicitous brew of imagined personal freedom and wealth, a heady mix that young women imagine traveling men can provide the passports to. This particular conjunction of working women's middle-class dreams and mobile men has reinforced conditions ripe for the masculinist thrust and scope of sexual and class exploitation throughout Asia.

Conclusion

I have traced the different family romances between corporate brothers, state and capital, and men and women that have proliferated in the public cultures

of the new Asia. These unifying themes indicate that the family imaginary both expresses and normalizes the tensions between fluidity and rigidity, the public and the private, economic power and political power, exploitation and romance, and domination and subordination. David Harvey notes that the flexible operation of late capitalism is exceptionally creative in its destruction of rigidities. But he has not considered how cultural messages that romanticize mobile capital can also reinforce, ramify, and reinstall various relations of inequality and thus promote a new kind of conformity to flexible accumulation and state authority. Cultural forms labeled Chinese or Confucian in modern state regimes, corporate networks, and individual practices express and shape a political unconscious that construes male corporate power as benevolent, enlightened, and progressive for individuals and for the state. While capitalism has increased female employment at most levels of the labor market, its institutions and family metaphors have also made more mobile, more extensive, and more complex the sexual and class exploitation of women and the working population. The romance of merchant mandarins and the Confucian family defines men to be in charge of both wealth and mobility, while women are localized in domestic situations or workplaces commanded by men. These visions of social and family order resonate with aspirations of different classes and underlie the sense of a distinctive transnational Asian publicness that obscures the divisions of class and gender. Such family romances reinforce the dark secrets of family, nation-state, and global capitalism that promise wealth, security, and escape but deliver exploitation, despair, and entrapment. By stripping off the veil of romance, we reveal that the mobile forces of capitalism, as Joan Vincent has documented and theorized in her life's work, are alternately destructive and creative of the class, ethnic, and gender relations that constitute the very transnational networks that have developed within and alongside global capitalism.

Lecture V

BODIES, BORDERS AND THE RACIAL NECRO-POLITICS OF IM/MOBILITY

We explore the bio-politics and necropolitics of im/mobility: few people have the privilege of unhindered movement across borders and many migrant journeys never materialise - or, if they do, they may consist of protracted step-wise journeys, where people are often suspended en route and subject to stringent controls in the grey and border zones along the way. Other times moving is dying or living as bare lives. Through story- telling and readings we will examine the politics of life and death across borders. We will also consider whether the necropolitics of black bodies killed by state violence can be compared with the bare life of refugees, who are let die while crossing borders.

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SHANTI PARIKH
JONG BUM KWON

Crime seen:

Racial terror and the technologies of Black life and death

They shot big Mike Mike. I saw him dead in the street.

Three-year-old girl to activist Elizabeth Vega

Saturday, August 9, 2014, at about noon, in Ferguson, Missouri: white police officer Darren Wilson shot Michael Brown Jr., an unarmed Black 18-year-old, at least six times, killing him after a confrontation on a subdivision street outside the Canfield Green apartments.[1] "Within minutes, residents began pouring onto the street" (DOJ 2015b, 8). They captured video and still images of the young man's body lying facedown, uncovered, as a "ribbon of blood" flowed several feet down the street. The images, along with commentary, began circulating on Black Twitter.

Videos showed Brown's distraught mother clutching the back of her head, frantically pacing and calling for answers: "Where's the ambulance? Why isn't any anyone helping him?" Yellow crime scene tape and police officers kept her from her son's lifeless, bloodied body. Relatives tried to approach Brown but were pushed away from the police cordon. People continued to gather, agitated and searching for answers. More images and videos circulated of the quarantined space, Brown's body, and the increasing presence of a militarized state. People consoled and hugged each other, walking around the perimeter of the crime scene.

Brown's killing was a historic instance of what we call *racial terror*—a shorthand to name the many and varied ways that racialization determines, naturalizes, and normalizes the question of whose life is worth protecting and whose life is both not valued and considered a threat to the social order and to those whose lives matter. Racial terror is ultimately the power to control the technologies that establish and protect one race's entitlement to live a valued life that is worth protecting while establishing and maintaining structures that shape another race's life as one of precarity, disposability, presumed guilt, and fear of prosecution.

Here we find Achille Mbembe's (2003, 11) concept of necropolitics a useful analytic to think through racialized violence in colonial and contemporary governments.

Necropolitics—the power "to kill or allow to live"—challenges notions of historical progress as a movement from rituals of sovereign power (violence and condemnation to death) to rationality and expert administration over the welfare of populations (modern biopolitics). Violence and rationality, terror and reason, are not opposed, Mbembe argues, but are intimately conjoined in modern statecraft. Furthermore, state violence is not merely instrumental; rather, it is also culturally productive, creating what Mbembe describes as "relations of enmity," in which the Other (as in the case of Mike Brown) becomes a mortal threat or manufactured danger (to white safety), one that must be vanquished and excluded from the social order (of white supremacy). From the state's point of view, terror is "a way of marking aberration in the body politic" (Mbembe 2003, 19). Thus marked, such aberrations therefore reasonably can, and in some cases must, be condemned to death. "Race" is vital because it marks the limit of human belonging, setting the "precondition that makes killing acceptable" (Foucault 2003, 256).[2]

Racial terror has historically been tethered to and bolstered by white supremacy through the construction of anti-Blackness. We take racial terror as both an affect—one that hovers as a psychological trauma caused by fear and uncertainty—and as a material reality that has deadly consequences, as in the cases of Michael Brown and Emmett Till, the 14-year-old boy brutally beaten, murdered, and thrown into a river in Mississippi in 1955.

Some may argue that racial terror—given the rhetoric of our post–civil rights, advanced liberal democracy—is too extreme a framework for understanding contemporary race relations, an exaggeration abstracted from tragic but supposedly isolated events. We'd argue otherwise. It is difficult to overstate the pervasiveness of anti-Blackness in the United States, both today and in the past, and the resulting death, debilitation, and constrained possibilities of living. Our use of *racial terror* does not assume that *all* Black people experience its impact in the same way, and, in fact, the "Black community" in St. Louis, as elsewhere, is greatly stratified.

Lezley McSpadden, Brown's mother, outside the crime scene as her son's dead body lay in the street, Ferguson, August 9, 2014. (Screenshot, "A Look Back at the Events after Michael Brown's Death," FOX 2 St. Louis, uploaded August 7, 2019, 5:04, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a86DHJGwi7U)

Critics might argue that racial terror is analytically fatalistic, fixating on suffering Black bodies or overemphasizing structural violence while ignoring the creativity and agency of the oppressed. Here, too, we see the concept differently. We agree that racial violences "shape, but do not wholly define, black worlds," as Black feminist geographer Catherine McKittrick (2011, 947) has insisted. To say that Black people's disproportionate encounters with police emerge from and are experienced as acts of racial terror can be true even as we appreciate acts of liberation and humanity. As Black, Latina, and Indigenous feminist scholars have reminded us,[3] attending to the reality of terror allows us to move beyond coping and grieving as merely essentialized cultures or as blind acceptance of subordination, and toward a nuanced understanding of forms of resilience and acts of liberation emerging from particular local histories and demands.

The creative, liberatory acts in St. Louis can be fully understood only against the racialized backdrop that animates them. In the case of Brown's death, local activists had to contend with two technologies of racial terror crystalized by the incident: state domination over Black bodies and racialized geographic containment and control.

Unruly Black bodies and spectacles of state control

In the hours after Brown's death, social media continued to chronicle the state's increasing presence at the crime scene. Armored tanks. Police in riot gear with rifles. K9 units. Grieving, pain, confusion. State authority thickened. Brown's dead body lay for over four hours in the street in the humid afternoon heat (DOJ 2015b). People continued to gather. Videos caught voices of the crowd in confusion, disbelief, asking for answers: "The police shot this boy?" "What he do?" "The police killed him for no reason."[4] There was tension and grief. The Department of Justice report (DOJ 2015b, 8) notes that "by 12:14 PM, some members of the growing crowd became increasingly hostile in response to chants of '[We] need to kill these motherfuckers [the police].'"

Then a consciousness was sparked. What began as confusion and concern transformed into outrage. An outrage that had been simmering long before Brown's death. An outrage over the documented and unapologetic excessive policing of Black residents. An outrage that many speculate played a role in Brown's alleged "noncompliance" with Wilson's demand that the young man and his friend get out of the middle of the small street, a finable misdemeanor called "manner of walking in roadway," or jaywalking (DOJ 2015b, 12). An outrage over the psychic trauma caused by the disproportionate stops, searches, and citations that Black residents experienced compared to whites in the region (DOJ 2015a, 4–5, 62–78).

The Ferguson uprising was born that evening and intensified in the coming days, transforming at times into a collective, public memorializing not just of Brown but of Black death, suffering, and survival in general. Ferguson

A member of the St. Louis County Police tactical team fires tear gas into a demonstration in Ferguson, August 18, 2014. (David Carson / *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* / Polaris)

became ground zero for the Black Lives Matter movement. A diverse group of protesters from around the country gathered in the streets of Ferguson and St. Louis to demand police and criminal justice reform. They were met with highly militarized riot police and the deployment of tear gas, rubber bullets, smoke bombs, flash grenades, and other crowd-dispersal tactics.

One hundred and seven days after Brown's death, the St. Louis region reached a breaking point. On November 24, 2014, county prosecutor Bob McCulloch announced that a grand jury, convened to review charges against Wilson, had decided not to indict him. Using a legal defense for killing Black people that has long granted impunity to state agents, the grand jury determined that Wilson's use of "deadly force" was likely in "self-defense [and] thus not objectively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment."[5] In anticipation of the grand jury decision, Governor Jay Nixon again declared a state of emergency (the first was on August 16, 2014) and mobilized the National Guard. After McCulloch's announcement, protests and confrontations with riot police became increasingly volatile (Davey and Bosman 2014). The Ferguson uprising escalated in St. Louis, and while riot police protected the Ferguson police department and City Hall, the commercial section of Black Ferguson burned. The rows of militarized riot police clamped down

on the protests in an attempt to discourage and threaten large-scale assemblies. Resistance groups, however, continued to organize smaller direct actions and disruptions throughout the region into the early months of 2015, and another wave of protests emerged on the first anniversary.

Brown's killing was not an isolated incident of highly publicized Black death by police. In the 12-month period surrounding his death, five unarmed Black men in other states were killed by police, and a Black woman died in police custody. All these incidents gained national attention, sparking outrage and calls for reform.[6] Viral videos of police killings and beatings circulated globally, but it was Brown's fatal shooting—and more precisely the public display and disrespect of his dead body—that sparked a local uprising and in turn the dramatic images of angry protesters and militarized riot police captivated global attention. How did the police killing of Brown differ from others that occurred in this period? Why did Brown's killing spark a rebellion? Why did it mobilize such a broad and diverse coalition of people willing to sacrifice on the front line?

Brown's death lacked the graphic close-up footage of his killing—of his body going from living to dead in a struggle with a state agent, like the 2020 slow murder of George Floyd and many others. Instead, the visual archive of Brown's "crime seen" is state control over (and disregard

A protester takes shelter from tear gas exploding around him, August 2014. (David Carson / *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* / Polaris)

for) his dead body, as it lay lifeless and bloodied in the street for four hours, surrounded by yellow crime scene tape that separated him from his mother, father, and neighbors. The crime seen was the mastery of domination displayed by the state's fleet of police cars, military vehicles, and armed and armored officers to "keep the peace" and segregate Brown's loved ones and neighbors from his body. The crime seen of his dead body lingered (and still does in St. Louis) for public viewing and narration, fixing itself to the geographies of domination that led to his death in the first place.

Indeed, the spectacle in this case wasn't the display of excessive use of police force over a "hulking" Black body, as Wilson described Brown. Rather, the racial terror in this case was enacted even in the afterlife, as the state maintained control over Brown's body. The image of his body, like that of Emmett Till (whose mutilated body was made visible at his open-casket funeral), publicly displayed the disposability of Black life and white domination over it. "Dogs came before the ambulance did," we heard people recalling during various five-year anniversary events (see also Hunn and Bell 2014). "They kept his mother away from her son, didn't provide answers," another said.

Critical to maintaining white supremacy and domination over Black citizens, as scholars of slavery and lynching remind us, is the "display of mastery" (Hartman 1997,

4) in representing power, a display that reproduces terror (of Black residents) and pleasure (of white supremacy). The scene of Brown's unattended dead body reestablished logics of borders configured around race and space, as did the Jim Crow era's lynchings, in which limp, hanging bodies reassured white people of their protection and signaled their surveillance of Black people (E. Alexander 1994; Carby 1985; Young 2005).

The sight of Brown's *dead* body signified a performance of racial terror. But it was neither the *killing* of Brown nor the inattention to his dead body that captivated the attention of the mainstream media and their casual consumers. Rather, it was media coverage of the *Black outrage*—the iconic images of the burned QuikTrip gas station and other destroyed businesses, angry protesters confronting police, stores looted, and trash scattered on the streets—that turned the small suburban town of Ferguson into the unlikely symbol of the contemporary United States' deep and abiding racial divisions and tensions. The Ferguson uprising surfaced and codified preexisting cleavages in ideologies of racial inequality. Some people sympathized with protesters' demands for criminal justice reform or joined the uprising themselves, but there were others for whom the images of the protests reinforced and justified the excessive policing of Blackness. The spectacle of Black

The burned-out QuikTrip gas station in Ferguson, September 12, 2014. It became a national symbol in the debates surrounding the uprising, becoming both a staging ground for future demonstrations and an example of the damage caused by unruly rioters. (Eric Pan)

protest and defiance captivated the world, but for different reasons.

The state violence, together with the disregard for Brown's dead body, his grieving relatives, and residents, evokes centuries of state tactics that made the St. Louis region one of the most racially segregated and stratified in the US (Cambria et al. 2018). Dominated, contained, beaten, jailed, and killed Black bodies such as Brown's were not exceptions in the US social order. On the contrary, the exercise of state violence against Black bodies has been the very means by which white comfort, belonging, property rights, and supremacy have been performed, articulated, and maintained. In other words, we should not be surprised by Brown's killing. Proclamations of surprise function as alibis for the state, failing to recognize the settler-colonial and imperial foundations of the US and the violence inherent to forming and maintaining the integrity of whiteness, both symbolic and territorial. The neglect of Brown's body enacted and confirmed the disposability of Black life, or "bare life," as a perpetual outcast unworthy of sacrifice (Agamben 1998), intensifying anger, frustration, and protests.

In responding with militarized force, the state displayed its will and right to kill, and protesters became symbolic extensions of the disobedient Brown. State responses to Black bodies (alive and dead) exposed in spec-tacular fashion the enforcement of the boundaries of the white racial order. As Ruth Wilson Gilmore (2007, 28) argues, racism is "state-sanctioned or extralegal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerability to premature death."

The spectacle of the militarized police and National Guard at the protests should be seen as a show of disproportionate state power—a well-rehearsed drama (e.g., Selma, Newark, Watts, Detroit, Los Angeles, East St. Louis) of state defense against "Black terror." Black bodies and fear are mutually constituted in the borderwork of the police, and white fear always-already legitimizes police lethality. The trope of the dangerous and threatening "thug-bound-subject"[7]—a racialized subject predetermined to be a thug in the social imaginary and hence a disposable nuisance to white patriarchal order and comfort—features as a central "fact" in the legal defense of police officers charged with killing or using excessive force against Black people.[8]

Brown resided in a space of social death and was consequently already deemed an unworthy life, ineligible for rights, legal recourse, and protection. In other words, Brown was not mistaken for a criminal posing danger; to the state, he *was* a criminal, a thug-bound-subject, embodying white terror and justifying the continued domination of Black citizens (Cacho 2012, 6–7).

Racial occupancy by block group, Greater St. Louis, 2010. *Source:* HUD data (Segregation Patterns 2010), courtesy of Metropolitan St. Louis Equal Housing and Opportunity Council. Reprinted with permission from Colin Gordon, *Arresting Citizenship: Race, Democracy, and Inequality in the St. Louis Suburbs* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2019), 130.

The anti-Black archipelago

The St. Louis metropolitan region is an anti-Black archipelago, shaped over generations by laws and spatial controls that form a material type of racial terror. Racial terror in this sense is a form of boundary making and border patrol that structure the logic and practice of regional segregation, multiply white sovereignties, differentiate racialized lives, and justify the state's killing of Black people.

The region does not reflect popular binary imaginaries of Black inner-city ghetto and white suburb. Rather, the region was "fragmented by design" (Jones 2000) and is currently divided into nearly 100 separate municipalities and unincorporated communities. Most municipalities were founded as segregated cities and incorporated to defend against "Negro invasion." Incorporation granted political autonomy and authorized the exercise of "police powers" (which broadly encompass protection of safety, health, morals, and general welfare) to exclude and contain Black populations. As noted by a longtime scholar of the region, "Political jurisdictions are created for the express purpose of segregating and excluding populations, avoid-

ing burdens, and hoarding opportunities" (Gordon 2019, 12). Furthermore, within municipalities, isolated Black enclaves were spatially contained with often only one or two access points, feeding into secondary roadways or dead ends, like the Canfield Green apartments where Mike Brown was killed. Ferguson, which was one of the first to incorporate (1894), was 99 percent white and just 1 percent Black in 1970.[9]

While the notion of segregation has become widespread and commonplace, especially in describing rustbelt cities such as St. Louis, it is often misconstrued as simply the outcome of racist practices and policies, the sedimentation of past racist ideologies and interests. We emphasize, however, that the archipelagic racial landscape is not simply the background or history of racial inequality and violence; rather, it constitutes the racialized logic and structure of differentiated human life—technologies of racial terror. Riven into manifold sovereignties and tangles of borders, it maps out the inequitable distribution of wealth and resources—the material infrastructures of making life. But it also overdetermines risk for anti-Black violence and terror—to kill and let die.

Revenue policing in St. Louis County, 2013. *Source:* Better Together St. Louis, General Administration Study, report no. 2, table 3 (December 2015). Reprinted with permission from Colin Gordon, *Arresting Citizenship: Race, Democracy, and Inequality in the St. Louis Suburbs* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2019), 140.

Segregation structures social vulnerability. The vulnerability is, on the one hand, the slow violence of unemployment, educational inequality, toxic environments, housing and food insecurity, and lack of access to health care. The stark marker of Black social vulnerability is 18 years—the difference in life expectancy between two zip codes, one predominantly white (Clayton), the other Black (Jeff-Vander-Lou), separated only by about seven miles (Purnell, Camberos, and Fields 2014). On the other hand, the archipelagic formation of the region magnifies Black exposure to state surveillance and the risk of fatal encounters with the police. Black residents, we often forget, must move through and between white spaces for employment, education, and access to ordinary resources and amenities (Boyles 2015). The reticulated tangle of borders in the region reinforces racial-spatial divisions and entraps Black residents in the racist machinery of local judicial-police systems.

Police prey on Black residents, drawing on and enacting racial terror throughout the St. Louis region.[10] The region has 58 independent municipal police departments (the vast majority of which are not accredited) and 81 independent municipal courts (Harvey and Roediger 2016, 58). In protecting white spaces, residents, and businesses, anti-Black policing produces "collateral damage," as it was called by the police chief of affluent Clayton (Cole 2018).[11] The US Department of Justice report on the Ferguson Police Department concluded that "Ferguson's law enforcement practices overwhelmingly impact African Americans" (DOJ 2015a, 4). The report's evidence for "racial bias" included the following:

African Americans account for 85% of vehicle stops, 90% of citations, and 93% of arrests made by FPD officers, despite comprising only 67% of Ferguson's population. . . . From 2011 to 2013, African Americans

General fund revenues by source, Ferguson, 1973–2015. *Source:* Ferguson Combined Annual Financial Reports, 1973–2015. Reprinted with permission from Colin Gordon, *Arresting Citizenship: Race, Democracy, and Inequality in the St. Louis Suburbs* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2019), 134.

accounted for 95% of Manner of Walking in Roadway charges, and 94% of all Failure to Comply charges. Notably, with that while African Americans made up 67 percent of Ferguson's population from 2012 to 2014, they were policed by a nearly all white force. Blacks comprised nearly 90 percent of documented cases of police force, 93 percent of arrests, and 90 percent of citations. (DOJ 2015a, 4–5)

Predatory policing is sanctioned by a fragmented judicial system to supplement declining municipal revenues in the wake of white flight/fright. Like many peri-urban suburbs in the region, Ferguson faced fiscal crisis, one that started gradually in the 1990s and accelerated after the 2008 housing crisis. This led to deteriorating infrastructure and increasing public-service needs. As property values plummeted, poverty and unemployment rates doubled, and underfunded school districts, such as Normandy, where Brown had graduated, lost accreditation (Gordon 2019, 131). Traffic fines, petty citations, and court fees—which are disproportionately levied on Black residents—make up a large part of municipal revenues, what residents began calling the "Black body ATM" after the DOJ's findings were released (*St. Louis American* 2020a, 2020b). When Black and poor folks can't pay fines, fees, or jail bonds, they are jailed and often shuffled among municipal courts. Because many

poor Blacks have warrants for petty violations in multiple jurisdictions, they are caught in what residents call the "muni shuffle," incurring debt from each municipality (Harvey and Roediger 2016, 63).

This form of expropriation is not simply a consequence but a driver of Black poverty, even as it enriches and sustains white institutions. Black bodies continue to serve as currency, and debt remains a tool of subjugation, from colonial ventures, slavery, post-Reconstruction vagrancy laws and prison labor to the contemporary business of warehousing Black and brown bodies, in the metropole and at the borders.

The police do not merely enforce white power and privilege. They categorize and classify a social-moral world, communicating authoritative meanings about order and disorder, morality and criminality, normality and deviance (Garland 1993; Loader 2006). They enact "the thin blue line that underscores the fragility of [white racial] order" (Comaroff and Comaroff 2004, 823), dramatizing, often through violence, white anxieties of racial encroachment and danger (Martinot and Sexton 2003; see also Low 1997, 2001). And as mundane and unlikely as police stops may be for white drivers, for Black people they nonetheless replay a history of racial subordination, conveying their already criminal status and telling them that they are watched

A protester moves away from the line of riot police in Ferguson during the week after Brown's death, August 13, 2014. (J. B. Forbes / *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* / Polaris)

and that they are disposable and vulnerable to violence (M. Alexander 2010; Epp, Maynard-Moody, and Haider-Markel 2014).[12] Racial terror suffuses the everyday in the white supremacist archipelago.

Being here: The afterlife of an uprising

Anti-Blackness in St. Louis, and elsewhere in the contemporary US, is a form of "slow violence," as noted by George Lipsitz (2015, 123–24), "perpetuated by unemployment, education inequality, environmental racism, housing and food insecurity, and aggressive and oppressive police harassment and brutality." It was in this context, Lipsitz adds, that the "sudden death" of Mike Brown took place. The pressing question is, How is it that the Black body count seems normal and justified, being merely the consequence of bad neighborhoods, crime, accident, self-defense, negligence, or so-called implicit racial bias? How do we account for both the hypervisibility of certain forms of Blackness and the invisibility of other forms?

Technologies of racial terror—the spectacular, mundane, spatial, and material—intensify racial categories and harden sociocultural and spatial borders. Resulting geographies of Black dispossession and white privilege, however,

are neither complete nor impermeable; rather, they are spaces of encounter that reveal the joys and struggles of human living. There is resistance, refusal, creativity, caring, laughter, and what Saidiya Hartman (2019, 3–4) calls "beautiful experiments," or living as art—that even in their most modest challenges to existing structures of oppression may hold new possibilities and imaginings of the future. Black disposability and death are a crucial starting point for our analysis, but not the end of it. The contributions to this forum provide such possibilities.

The notion of terror is more than theoretical. It is a weapon of the state, but it is also wielded as a shield. Terror can be diffuse and fluid but also enacted through tangible methods and instruments. Whom or what do we fear? For Black, brown, and indigenous people, racial terror indexes the horror and violence of white supremacy. For white folk, terror takes the form of Black bodies. But whose terror is recognized, legitimized, justified? Under white supremacy, white people's fear is always-already recognized as legitimate, justifying violent reprisal, death. As refracted through patriarchy, white supremacy constructs women and children as fearful and needing the protection of white men, whose sovereign right to property and position in the "natural order" should remain unquestioned. White supremacy

is authorized by the presumption of what Gloria Wekker (2016, 2) calls "white innocence" and the convenient denial of the brutal history of colonialism and white supremacy; white people's terror is presumed as "reasonable" (Cacho 2014, 1087). In what other way can we explain the legal efficacy of white "self-defense" and consequent Black expendability? How do we account for the disproportionate police stops of Black citizens and the state's use of "excessive force"? Our argument is not that terror solely defines the existence of Black residents. It is that terror has been a constituent aspect of white supremacy's long reign in the St. Louis region.

For those involved in antiracist work in post-uprising St. Louis, being "still here" is therefore to feel rage and sorrow. It is to recognize that Black death is not randomly distributed violence but an accumulation of lives lost in zones of abandonment where Black people are disposed among the refuse of deindustrialization, white flight, disinvestment, and criminalization, with little to no public notice or care. It is to recognize that when institutions of the states kill or condone public violence—making a show of strength through disposability—the intention is to incite terror on one collective and comfort on another. It is a reminder of the sovereign authority of white supremacy.

Remaining engaged in antiracist work in the post-uprising is also to feel hope from the unstoppable acts of liberation around us. As contributor and artist Damon Davis stated, "For a people so far from freedom, our creative expressions are the most free." As our collaborators in this forum remind us, to pursue antiracist work post-uprising is to recognize that hope is found amid and despite the everyday terror of white supremacy in the production of a "black sense of place" (McKittrick 2011). This Black sense of place does not indicate a discrete space of opposition or resistance. Rather, as McKittrick (2013, 2–3) proposes, Black life can indeed emerge from violence and death, and this life may hold "secretive histories," decolonial poetics, and practices as acts of liberation. A Black sense of place "accepts that relations of violence and domination have made our existence and presence in the U.S. possible as it recasts this knowledge to envision an alternative future" (2013, 14). In the afterlives of (another premature) Black death, an uprising that captivated the world, and unplanned bonds of joy forged along the way, to be "still here" is ultimately to recognize that we honor the dead with life, in all of its complexities, protean possibilities, and fierce acts of liberation against the United States' enduring racism and white supremacy.

Notes

1. Exact details on the incident remain uncertain and are still disputed. See the Department of Justice report (DOJ 2015b) for witness accounts and conclusions. For a timeline of events after the shooting, including the police call and the emergence of protests and memorials, see St. Louis Public Radio's Ferguson Project: http://apps.stlpublicradio.org/ferguson-project/.

2. Black feminist critiques note that discussions of necropolitics often fail to critically examine not only how racial terror is gendered, but also how public responses to violence against Black women do not garner as much attention or outcry. While state terror frequently results in the death of young Black men, Black women are also targets of state violence, explicitly as direct victims of state-sanctioned violence and surveillance and implicitly as mothers (biological, social, and other) who endure "living death" (Smith 2016, 138) and have lost children to premature death, the carceral state, or other state system. As Smith (2016) argues, because Black mothers symbolize the reproduction of Black life, they are enemies of the state and objects of unique state strategies of terror.

3. See, for instance, Cox 2015; Hartman 1997, 2019; T. B. King 2019; McKittrick 2011, 2013, 2014; Perry 2018; Shange 2019; Sharpe 2016; Taylor 2017; Weheliye 2014; B. Williams 2018.

4. For an example of video footage, see "Michael Brown Murder Aftermath Video Ace Johnson," TDiddyDC, uploaded August 14, 2014, 10:03, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X4ioKoqfEnk

5. A pair of US Supreme Court decisions in the 1980s—*Tennessee v. Garner* and *Graham v. Connor*—provide an almost certain defense for police officers, such as Darren Wilson, to use "excessive force," deadly or not, against citizens who can be constructed as threatening. The two circumstances under which police can use deadly force (in self-defense and to stop a fleeing or resistant suspect) strongly resemble the justification of violence against Black subjects in the antebellum slave codes. The officer must show "objective reasonableness" in light of the "facts" and circumstances surrounding the use of excessive force or fatal interaction. As scholars and others have noted, the "facts" compiled to justify the police killing of Michael Brown and other Black and brown people rely not only on "evidence" but on racialized constructions of criminality, fear, and perceived intentions.

6. Highly publicized police killings of unarmed Black people during the 12-month period include 43-year-old Eric Garner (July 17, 2014), 12-year-old Tamir Rice (November 22, 2014), 50-year-old Walter Scott (April 4, 2015), 25-year-old Freddie Gray (April 12, 2015), 42-year-old Samuel DuBose (July 19, 2015), and 28-year-old Sandra Bland (July 13, 2015), who died in police custody.

7. Our formulation of "thug-bound-subject" draws from Abdul JanMohamed's (2005) concept of "death-bound-subject," which he uses to signify the ever-present threat of actual death for Black Americans during slavery and in the Jim Crow South. This ever-present threat of death, JanMohamed posits, engenders a psychosocial terrorizing fear experienced as "social death," a condition in which a person is denied protection, social standing, and value. Black life, therefore, is a constant renegotiation with a "death contract" with the master, or a racial subject formed by death. Extending this logic, a thug-bound-subject points to the floating signifier of Black criminality in our national consciousness and that assumes guilt. This does not limit life but rather opens up possibilities of creative living such as acts of defiance.

8. Despite post-Ferguson town halls, discussions, and recommendations for police reform, this defense remains untouched. It featured prominently in the 2017 acquittal of Jason Stockley, a white police officer who in 2011 fatally shot African American Anthony Lamar Smith. In his 2017 ruling, Circuit Court Judge Timothy Wilson refers to Smith as an "urban heroin dealer" and concludes that he was likely "in possession of a firearm," even though the officer had no knowledge of Smith's identity or background before approaching his car and shooting him.

9. The racialization of space that played a role in Brown's death has a long history in Missouri (W. Johnson 2020). Though a full analysis falls outside the scope of this article, broad contours of some of the important moments show the historical roots of racial terror. Enslavement of Black people began in Missouri in 1720 under Spanish control. The St. Louis Treaty of 1804 between Indigenous peoples and the British settlers gave the latter greater power in the area. More restrictive "black laws" followed in an attempt to more tightly regulate the life and mobility of the enslaved. Of particular concern was that Blacks might flee to the neighboring free state of Illinois. Amid growing debate about slavery in the US, the 1820 Missouri Compromise sought to preserve the balance of power in Congress by admitting Missouri into the union as a slave-holding state and Maine as a free state. A series of Supreme Court cases involving race and Missouri followed. Most notably, *Dred Scott v. Sandford* (1857) maintained that Black people were not citizens and hence not due any rights or protections. The majority held that Black people are "not included, and were not intended to be included, under the word 'citizens' in the Constitution." *Shelley v. Kraemer* in 1948 found that racially based restrictive housing covenants were not necessarily unconstitutional and private parties could voluntarily adhere to them; the state, however, could not enforce the covenants. Finally, in the mid-1960s, St. Louis was at the center of another housing segregation case, *Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.* In 1968, the Supreme Court ruled that the Thirteenth Amendment (outlawing slavery) gave Blacks equal rights to property. As legal challenges chipped away at residential segregation, a series of local policies, practices, and incentives helped keep alive the region's dramatic residential segregation, racial inequalities, and Black containment.

10. This argument is made in various chapters in Norwood (2016). In particular, see Smith (2016) and Harvey and Roediger (2016).

11. Characterizing racialized policing as "collateral damage" was part of an official statement issued by the City of Clayton, a wealthy suburb neighboring the city, in defense of police stopping 10 incoming Black students of Washington University after midnight in response to a dine-and-dash incident at IHOP (D. Moore 2018).

12. Because intrusive police stops are rarely shared by white drivers, the police stop is "a defining aspect of the racial divide in America" (Epp, Maynard-Moody, and Haider-Markel 2014, 2), communicating to African Americans that they are not regarded as full and equal members of society (16).

JASON DE LEÓN   WITH PHOTOGRAPHS BY MICHAEL WELLS

THE
LAND
OF
OPEN
GRAVES

LIVING AND DYING
ON THE MIGRANT TRAIL

CONTENTS

Introduction

Flies.
I mostly remember the goddamn flies.

It's funny how memory works. I made a thousand mental notes of the scene—and wrote a good many of them down soon after the event—but only a couple of years later they now seem to be forgotten, buried, reduced to background noise. After spending just a few weeks on the US-Mexico border hanging out with the desperate people looking to breach America's immigration defenses, I quickly learned that death, violence, and suffering are par for the course. It all started to blur together. Disturbing images lost their edge. As an observer, you grow accustomed to seeing strangers cry at the drop of a hat. Tears no longer had the impact they once did. Tragic stories repeatedly told under the strain of a cracking voice transformed into well-worn hymns that lost their provenience and became difficult to seriate. I fought sensory overload so as to not lose sight of the big picture or the brutal details. I tried to write it all down so that I could later connect the observed realities to larger structural forces. This, at least, is what I kept telling myself I needed to do during my five years of fieldwork on the Arizona-Mexico border and later as I wrote this book. It's what I told myself in this first encounter with death. It's easier said than done. It didn't matter, though, because on this day in July 2009 none of it could be comprehended, much less theorized. All I could do was stare at the flies and wonder how the hell they had gotten there so quickly.

It happened on my first day conducting ethnographic research in the border town of Nogales, Mexico. I had spent the sweltering morning sitting in the

shade talking with recently deported migrants. These were women and men who had just attempted and failed to walk across the Sonoran Desert of Arizona to illegally enter the United States. A few of them had been deported from elsewhere by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)[1] in hopes that being placed in geographic proximity to the desert, where hundreds die each year while migrating, would be enough to deter them from attempting a crossing. I didn't know his name, but I had seen him earlier in the day. Among the tired masses of deportees, he didn't stand out. Recently repatriated people are easy to spot in Nogales because of the uniformity of their appearance: dark T-shirts with powdery salt rings under the armpits and circling the neck; sneakers that look like they have been through a meat grinder; dusty black backpacks stuffed with extra socks, a few cans of food, and whatever meager personal possessions they have managed to hold on to. Their brown bodies broadcast exhaustion and vulnerability like a scarlet letter. Faces show a mix of sorrow, weariness, fear, and optimism. They may have walked for three days lost, quenched a paralyzing thirst at a cattle trough where the water was mostly algae and swimming insects, been robbed at gunpoint by bandits, and raped by a Border Patrol agent before being deported.[2] Still, the next time is going to be different. There is a husband waiting in Carrboro, North Carolina. A guaranteed job painting houses in Phoenix. A little girl with an empty belly back in the tiny village of El Manchon, Guerrero. *Si Dios quiere, voy a pasar.* The next time is going to be different.

I don't remember what he looked like when he was alive. In fact, I didn't really notice him at all until I was making my way toward the convenience store a block from where I had been conducting interviews down on *la linea*[3] in front of the Grupo Beta Office.[4] Like many who get caught in the cycle of repeated crossing attempts, he decided to spend the morning drinking a *caguama* (quart-sized bottle of beer) while planning what to do next. I passed him a few hours prior as he headed to an abandoned field across from the store. I took more notice of the early happy hour he was having than of his actual facial features. All I remember is that he was tall and skinny and had a shaved head. The next time I saw him was when I spotted a crowd gathering near the abandoned field. I walked up to investigate and found myself standing behind a chain-link fence with several migrants, including a short bald man I would soon come to know as Chucho.[5] For ten minutes Chucho and I stared in silent awe at the limp body flopped on the dirt. This dude had been dead for less than an hour and yet the flies were already there in full force.

They were landing on his milky eyeballs and crawling in and out of his open mouth. His head was turned and facing the crowd of migrants. He seemed to be staring right through everyone. We watched flies lay eggs on this man's face for what seemed an eternity.

Finally some Good Samaritan showed up with a Dallas Cowboys bedsheet and covered him up. A paramedic and a few of the neighbors milled around the corpse chatting, but no one seemed to be fazed. Death lay there like a casual summer breeze. I thought to myself that maybe this guy was headed to Dallas to wash dishes at an Applebee's. Maybe he hated the *pinches* Cowboys[6] after spending too many years in Philly doing landscaping jobs and rooting for the Eagles. No one seemed to know him. They just knew that he needed to be covered up to keep the flies away. I turned to Chucho for some insight into this spectacle. He shrugged and said, "This happens all the time. Some people get tired of trying to cross the border after many failed attempts. Some turn to drugs and alcohol to kill time. Who knows what killed him?" Reading the worry on my face, Chucho continued, "You watch. No one will remember this tomorrow. It's like it didn't even happen."

He was right. I would ask migrants the following day about the dead body in the field three hundred feet from the Grupo Beta Office, and no one would know what I was talking about. It was almost as if it didn't happen.

———

This book is about the violence and death that border crossers face on a daily basis as they attempt to enter the United States without authorization by walking across the vast Sonoran Desert of Arizona. If you live in the United States, you already know about many of the people you will meet in these pages. They pick your fruit, detail your cars, and process your meat. They toil in occupations that US citizens can't or won't do.[7] Keep in mind, though, that not everyone who crosses the desert is a first-timer. In the Obama era of mass deportations, close to 2 million people were removed from the country through fiscal year 2013.[8] Many of these deportees are now running scared across Arizona's Mars-like landscape to reunite with family members or simply return to the only place they have ever called home. My argument is quite simple. The terrible things that this mass of migrating people experience en route are neither random nor senseless, but rather part of a strategic federal plan that has rarely been publicly illuminated and exposed for what it is: a killing machine that simultaneously uses and hides behind the viciousness of the Sonoran

Dallas Cowboys death shroud, Nogales, Mexico, 2009. Photo by author.

Desert. The Border Patrol disguises the impact of its current enforcement policy by mobilizing a combination of sterilized discourse, redirected blame, and "natural" environmental processes that erase evidence of what happens in the most remote parts of southern Arizona. The goal is to render invisible the innumerable consequences this sociopolitical phenomenon has for the lives and bodies of undocumented people.

Those who live and die in the desert have names, faces, and families. They also have complicated life histories that reflect an intimate relationship with transnational migration and global economic inequality. We just rarely ever get to see them up close as they make these terrifying journeys or hear them describe this process in their own words. In what follows, I bring into focus the logic and human cost of the US border enforcement monster known as "Prevention Through Deterrence," a strategy that largely relies on rugged and desolate terrain to impede the flow of people from the south. I also present stories of survival, failure, and heartbreak that happen on *la linea* and beyond from the perspective of those who directly experience this unique security apparatus. Documenting these largely undocumented stories and giving the reader an up-close look at faces and bodies can perhaps help us remember tomorrow that people lived and died in this desert today.

BORDER STORIES

Keeping track of the sheer number of publications that focus in some way on the US-Mexico divide is an impossible task. It seems as though every month a new exposé hits the shelves and tantalizes the public with the trials and tribulations of the troubled geopolitical margin where the phrase "the Third World meets the First World" is still thrown around as if it means something. We don't like to admit it, but the United States is simultaneously afraid of and intrigued by its southern border. The general public can't shake its love of the movies, news programs, reality television shows, and tell-all books that reassure us that this is in fact a zone that is "out of control." If you're a writer, toss in words like *danger* and *violent* and come up with some creative (or not so creative) uses of war metaphors, and you've got yourself a best-selling piece of immigration pornography.

Don't get me wrong, there are many excellent books written about the border. It is a place full of captivating tales and complex histories, but also a well-worn path that many others have mapped out better than I ever could. Rather than giving you a history lesson that you could learn elsewhere, this book abruptly starts in 1993, the year that the policy later coined "Prevention Through Deterrence" (PTD) was first deployed in El Paso, Texas. At the time, PTD was just an off-the-cuff homegrown preventive measure against the unsightliness of brown-skinned illegal fence jumpers and the subsequent chaos the Border Patrol caused by chasing them through poor Latino

neighborhoods where it was impossible to figure out who belonged and who didn't.[9] By placing a gaggle (or is it a "murder"?) of crew-cut Border Patrol agents in combat boots and crisp green uniforms in and around downtown El Paso, the immediate goal of discouraging boundary offenders from attempting to hop the fence in these populated areas was achieved. Frustrated, but undeterred, these scrappy individuals, many of whom were locals from Ciudad Juárez simply commuting to work in Texas, went to the edge of town where the fence magically disappeared and agents were few and far between. Business quickly got back to normal.

Everything changed, though, after the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. The United States promised economic prosperity for its southern neighbor if it would only open up its ports of entry and take shipment of cheap goodies. Soon after Mexico signed on the dotted line, it found itself drowning in a *pinche montón*[10] of subsidized *gringo* corn that crashed their economy and put millions of peasant farmers out of work. As they had done in previous generations when things were bad in Mexico or when *los Yanquis* needed cheap labor,[11] this impoverished population started making their way north by the hundreds of thousands. Optimistic *campesinos* lined up in Tijuana, Juárez, and Reynosa and waited their turn to try and get past *la migra* so that they could join the US undocumented labor force.[12]

This NAFTA-induced human flood now meant there were hordes of fence hoppers in San Ysidro, California, and McAllen, Texas. Once again, the Border Patrol needed a way to reduce the bad press that comes with an avalanche of poor people spilling onto the streets of border towns daily. That little experiment in El Paso to push the Spanish-speaking invaders to the edge of town soon became a nationwide security paradigm that is still in place today. The basic premise was, and continues to be, that if they can't stop the huddled masses, at least they can funnel them into remote areas where the punishment handed out by difficult terrain will save money (or so some foolishly thought) and get this unsightly mess out of public view, which it did.

Between 2000 and 2013, approximately 11.7 million people were apprehended while trying to make the illegal pilgrimage to the United States via Mexico. During this same period, 4,584,022 of these arrests occurred in the Border Patrol jurisdiction known as the Tucson Sector, a craggy, depopulated, and mountainous patch of land that stretches westward from New Mexico to the Yuma County line in Arizona.[13] If you include the neighboring Yuma Sector during this same period, the number of arrests in this state climbs to

Border Patrol sectors and locales mentioned in the text.

5,304,345 people. This is equivalent to the population of Houston, Texas. It's no wonder Arizona hates immigrants;[14] for close to two decades the federal government has been using that state's backyard as a gauntlet to test the endurance of millions of border crossers and has often left local communities holding the medical bill.[15] Still, everyone knows that if you survive this death race, the backdoors of US stockyards, carpet factories, meat rendering plants, and sushi restaurants are wide open.

Much of what is described in this book took place in the strip of desert just south of Tucson between the Baboquivari and Tumacácori mountain ranges. This beautiful and challenging landscape has been home to the indigenous Tohono O'odham[16] ("Desert People") and their ancestors for millennia. Long before the arrival of colonial-era Spaniards seeking gold and Christian converts, nineteenth-century American geological surveyors itching to draw new maps, and twentieth-century Border Patrol agents,[17] the O'odham people were cultivating a set of cultural traditions and practices that has allowed them

to thrive in an environment that to most outsiders appears too barren to sustain agriculture or human life.[18] As ethnobotanist Gary Nabhan writes: "The perspiring and panting in the middle of the saguaro forests—they are part of the raw intimacy the [O'odham] maintain with the desert. Somewhat ugly to the outside eye, this routine is an honest indicator of the strong bonds between the Desert People and their surroundings. Instead of running away from the desert during its driest, hottest time, some still run to the heart of it."[19] O'odham poet Jeanette Chico sums up this intimacy: "When I walk in the desert the animals stop and look at me as if they were saying 'Welcome to our home.'"[20]

Unlike the Desert People, the border crossers who pass through this region do not share in the cultural acumen that conceptualizes this landscape as inviting. Try to envision what it is like going from the lush tropical lowlands of Veracruz or the cool mountains of Oaxaca to the sparse and smoldering desert. Migrants will tell you, "I never imagined it would be like this." How could they? They are fugitives traversing a deadly alien planet. The Border Patrol counts on this. This terrain is that federal agency's not-so-secret weapon, and the migrant injuries and death toll provide evidence that it is a painfully effective one. What's agonizing for the O'odham is that the American federal government has turned their sacred landscape into a killing field, a massive open grave.

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The line in the sand that currently exists between Arizona and Mexico was first drawn after the Gadsden Purchase of 1854. This geopolitical space has since had a troubling history marked by colonial and postcolonial subjugation and violence, much of which I skip so that I can draw a tighter focus on the lives of those who have passed through this political geoscape between 2009 and 2013. There are, however, several excellent publications that influenced my thinking about boundary enforcement and its evolution over the past hundred years. For those looking for a deeper, diachronic view of the geopolitics of this region, I recommend Patrick Ettinger's *Invisible Lines* and Rachel St. John's *Line in the Sand;*[21] both of these superb books provide up-to-date syntheses of archival material and previous historical research. Despite the amount of ink I dedicate to Border Patrol policies, this book lacks anything resembling a "History of Boundary Enforcement" section. Instead, I lean heavily on Kelly Lytle Hernández's thorough, eye-opening analysis of the US Border Patrol, Joseph Nevins's seminal book *Operation Gatekeeper,* and Peter Andreas's *Border*

Games to provide the reader brief glimpses into the history of immigration policing and the political chicanery that often (mis)guides how the United States negotiates the property line between its backyard and that of its Mexican neighbors.[22] Finally, Timothy Dunn's books *The Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border, 1978–1992* and *Blockading the Border and Human Rights* helped me appreciate the crucial backstory to our modern border industrial complex and describe the seeds that sprouted the current enforcement paradigm that I take to task in this book.[23] Obviously, many others have written about the US-Mexico border, and I cite them throughout this work, but the aforementioned authors proved especially useful for understanding how and why things have gotten so bad in southern Arizona and northern Mexico in the past two decades.

Having briefly lamented the quality of many recent books on the current border situation, I now find myself in the awkward predicament of needing to justify writing yet another book about this exhausted subject. I didn't start this project out of some misguided hubris that I was somehow going to get the story right. I'm the first person to tell you that no matter what you do, you can never get full comprehension of what is *actually* happening on our southern frontier. The system in place has too many moving parts traveling at sometimes blinding speed. Your view of any single part is blurry at best. But it doesn't matter what you can actually see, because there are always things going on out of sight. I'm not just talking about some gold-toothed *coyote*[24] speeding away in a primered minivan full of migrants or glue-sniffing cholos hiding in the bushes waiting for the next pack of border crossers to rob. I mean the closed door strategy meetings at Border Patrol headquarters in Tucson where new forms of "deterrence" are plotted and schemed using euphemistic defense jargon and slick corporate promotional videos touting next season's line of unmanned aerial drones. Sometimes it's those secretive moments when two nervous agents sit in their truck on a dusty road and try to get their story straight about why they shot some unarmed Mexican kid while he was hopping the border fence to run back into Mexico.[25] Don't forget the off-the-record dinner conversations when politicians and their federal contractor friends eat Delmonico steaks and drink single malt while laughing about how they are going to fill newly constructed private detention facilities and charge the government a pretty penny.[26] You are never going to capture all of the things that make the border system (dys)functional, and that is not my intention here.

CROSSING OVER

It started as nothing more than dinner conversation sometime in the fall of 2008. Fresh out of graduate school, I found myself teaching at the University of Washington and struggling to find a post-dissertation project. I had just spent a couple of years scrutinizing thousands of tiny pieces of obsidian in an attempt to reconstruct the political economy of the ancient Olmec,[27] those precocious indigenous people who built Mesoamerica's first great civilization. During the course of my doctoral fieldwork, I had become increasingly fascinated by the lives of the local Mexican women and men I had worked with on various excavations. These individuals, many of whom I became close with over the years, had a significant amount of experience migrating to the United States, including firsthand knowledge of what Prevention Through Deterrence felt like in the Arizona desert.

As soon as I finished my thesis, I said good-bye to ancient stone tools and made the first in a series of questionable career choices when I decided to change subdisciplines and reinvent myself as an ethnographer. As an undergraduate at UCLA and later a graduate student at Penn State, I had bought into the idea that anthropology's major contribution to knowledge production was its comprehensive approach to the human condition: past, present, and future. The discipline's holistic combination of archaeology, biology, language, and culture provides a vast set of tools and approaches to understand the things that make us human. By logical extension, all archaeologists, ethnographers, osteologists, and linguists are anthropologists at the end of the day. This is what we tell our students and that's what I believed when I made this career shift. I was simply following my anthropological interests.

Over dinner one night with an archaeologist friend, I began talking about Luis Alberto Urrea's moving book *The Devil's Highway*.[28] This tragic tale of fourteen border crossers who lost their lives in the Yuma Sector in 2001 was on the reading list I was using that semester to develop what was then a vaguely defined project about immigration. This friend said to me, "You know, when I was conducting archaeological surveys in the Arizona desert, we would often come across the things that migrants left behind. Once we found a backpack that contained a love letter in Spanish. It was really sad." She then joked, "I bet someone could do some sort of weird archaeological project on that stuff." A month later I was standing in the wilderness south of Tucson staring at an overwhelming pile of empty water bottles and abandoned clothes.

When I started the Undocumented Migration Project (UMP) in 2009, my goal was modest. I wanted to test the idea that archaeology could be a useful tool for understanding the evolution of border crosser technology and the economic system that undergirds clandestine migration. I quickly realized that I should also be asking other types of questions about this phenomenon and that archaeology was only one of the many tools I could use to get answers. One of the first conclusions I came to during the planning stages of this work was that, despite the intense public and academic interest in the subject, few scholars or journalists had attempted to write carefully about the physical movement involved in unauthorized migration. The firsthand accounts of border crossings in recent times largely came from the musings of gonzo journalists who headed down to the border and teamed up with some overly trusting Mexicans who let these people shadow them as they headed for El Norte. Privileged journalists running across the desert with their passports in their back pockets while chasing migrants produce little beyond what I consider problematic "Choose Your Own Adventure" books for American consumption.[29] One of the goals of the UMP was to collect robust data on the migration process that could provide a counternarrative to this literature.

DOCUMENTING THE UNDOCUMENTED

Given the furtive and illegal nature of undocumented migration, it is no surprise that academics have looked at it largely from a distance. Two outstanding books, for example—Leo Chavez's *Shadowed Lives* and David Spener's *Clandestine Crossings*—provide nuanced insight into the act of border crossing. The one limitation of both studies, from my perspective, though, is the fact that much of their data are collected after crossing events happened,[30] or their descriptions are almost exclusively based on interviews, a problem that Spener himself points out.[31] That being said, I am also not convinced that participant observation, the methodological cornerstone of ethnographic research, is an appropriate tool for understanding this type of migration.

Medical anthropologist Seth Holmes begins his recent book *Fresh Fruit, Broken Bodies* with a description of a clandestine border crossing through the Sonoran Desert that he undertook with indigenous Triqui migrants whom he first met while conducting research on a farm in northwestern Washington State.[32] Holmes writes that he decided to cross the border with his interlocutors because, "early in my fieldwork, I realized that an ethnography of suffering

and violence and migration would be incomplete without witnessing firsthand such an important site of suffering for Latin American migrants."[33] Although I understand his desire for an up-close view of a key aspect of the lives of the undocumented farmworkers he studies, I have never been comfortable with this type of ethnography.

Over the course of five years of research, many people I met in Nogales invited me to accompany them into the desert. For a number of reasons, I declined every offer. First, I have always believed that my participation in a border crossing would be an unnecessary risk for my informants to take and something that would have reinforced, if not exacerbated, the hierarchy between me (a college professor) and the working-class migrants who trust me with their stories. Putting myself into a research scenario where my interlocutors are highly vulnerable while I am protected by my citizenship status is at odds with the type of anthropology that I want to practice. A second, albeit from my perspective less important, issue is that "entry without inspection," which is what US citizens are charged with when they cross the border through a nonofficial port of entry, is a crime (a mere civil offense) and something that could potentially jeopardize my employment and federal grant funding. If I had undertaken such a problematic endeavor, the headline in the right-leaning media outlets that occasionally throw stones at this research would no doubt read: "Mexican Professor Helps Illegals Cross the Desert and Uses National Science Foundation Money to Pay for It."[34]

An unspoken issue that I think undermines Holmes's attempt to "witness" this process is the fact that his participation in a crossing is highly disruptive and guarantees that the event is anything but "normal."[35] By his own account, Holmes's presence in a group of migrants made various smugglers nervous, led to him being singled out by Grupo Beta, and resulted in his companions asking him if he could drive them to Phoenix to get past a Border Patrol checkpoint.[36] Moreover, his Triqui companions were no doubt well aware of the shit storm that would ensue if something happened to a *gringo* in their care.[37] It is easy to imagine how the media would spin a story about an American graduate student who died while crossing the desert with a bunch of undocumented migrants. Essentially, whether he liked it or not, Holmes became a concern and burden for the group as he attempted to observe this process. This phenomenon is something that journalist John Annerino experienced firsthand when he became sick while traveling through the Yuma Sector and ended up having to be cared for by the Mexican border crossers he was photographing.[38]

Although rattlesnakes and heat stroke can kill you regardless of citizenship, these "documented" observers don't have to worry about being abandoned by their *coyote* in the desert or getting brained by a Border Patrol Maglite.

Despite the good intentions behind accompanying migrants, these anthropologists and journalists have authorization to be in the United States, and after getting caught, they are inevitably set free. Holmes's description of his crossing routinely highlights that he had a lawyer whom he could call on for help and that his credentials as a student studying migration were a get-out-of-jail-free card. Although he was not allowed to use the phone or given toilet paper while in detention, Holmes was put into his own cell and received special treatment by law enforcement, which highlights just how abnormal his presence was for all parties involved. The Border Patrol threatened to charge him with illegal entry, but this turned out to be part of the normal scare tactics that agents use against citizens and noncitizens alike. In the end, the anthropologist was let go with a warning, while his nameless companions were processed and deported.[39]

Finally, this type of participant observation has always struck me as problematic because it tends to focus on the experiences of the writer[40] and doesn't necessarily give us insight into the terror and violence suffered by Latino border crossers. Holmes's descriptions emphasize his feeling "like a rabbit, vulnerable and hunted," while the voices of his traveling companions are noticeably mute or altogether absent.[41] To compound this issue, two of the three photographs of this event position Holmes as the center of attention and are labeled with captions such as "The author and Triqui men in the border desert." We get to see the grinning anthropologist's face and hear about his suffering, while these men are relegated to the status of anonymous undocumented border crossers. While I greatly value the work that Holmes has done to reveal the brutality and racism that indigenous farmworkers experience, I think that we as ethnographers need to be more critical regarding the contexts where participant observation is deployed and more reflective about how we write about the act of witnessing other people's trauma. In my approach to clandestine migration, I have sought to paint crossers not as anonymous shadows scrambling through the desert, but as real people who routinely live and die in this environment and whose voices and experiences we should be privileging.

I am inspired by Audrey Singer and Douglas Massey's recognition that undocumented migration is not the chaotic event often depicted in popular media but rather a "well-defined social process whereby migrants draw upon

various sources of human and social capital to overcome barriers erected by US authorities."[42] The Undocumented Migration Project has long been concerned with improving the resolution of the ethnographic data we have on this social process while also avoiding the problematics of directly observing a clandestine and illegal act. Accordingly, over the years I have freely borrowed various methods and theories from the anthropological toolbox. As you will see, this book draws on a four-field anthropology—that is ethnography, archaeology, forensic science, and linguistics—in the name of enhancing our understanding of the process of undocumented desert migration. In many ways, this project is intended to challenge preconceived notions about what a holistic anthropology can look like and how it can be deployed in politically hostile terrain.

If my writing is at times acerbic or in nonstandard academic English (or untranslated Mexican slang), it is because I am trying to match the frankness, sarcasm, and humor of my interlocutors, as well as the grittiness of the difficult worlds they inhabit. It is also because I see little public or personal benefit to "toning down" what I have seen, heard, and experienced while trying to get an anthropological handle on the routinely chaotic, violent, and sometimes tragicomic process of clandestine migration. Like many scholars before me, I aim to sully the often sterile anthropological discussion about undocumented Latino migration and its associated geographic, cultural, political, and economic boundaries.[43] By doing so, I want to show how productive it can be to sneak back and forth across the border between "accepted discourse and excluded discourse" in the name of generating new knowledge and new forms of cultural understanding.[44]

As I began working with a population in transit, it soon became obvious that a multisited ethnographic approach was needed to capture various elements of the migration process.[45] Over the years, I followed people across multiple states, countries, and continents. Although I conducted several dozen interviews during a ten-day trip to Ecuador in 2013, numerous short trips to New York in 2013 and 2014, and some two dozen domestic and international phone calls and Skype interviews, most of the ethnographic, forensic (chapter 3), and archaeological data (chapter 7) were collected in the border town of Nogales, Mexico, the northern Mexican town of Altar, and the deserts of the Tucson Sector between Nogales and Sasabe (see map of Tucson Sector, opposite).[46]

UTAH

89

40

Flagstaff

Prescott

17

93

ARIZONA

60

NM

10

Phoenix

70

Casa Grande

8

10

Safford

Ajo

Wilcox

Casa
Grande   Tucson

Tucson

10

Sonoita

Sahuarita

191

Arivaca

Nogales

Sonoita

Brian A.
Terry

Douglas

Sasabe

Douglas

Puerto
Peñasco

Nogales

Agua Prieta

Altar

Magdalena

MEXICO

0   50 miles

Undocumented Migration Project study areas and corresponding Border
Patrol substations in the Tucson Sector. Based on map by Cameron Gokee.

From 2009 to 2013, I interviewed hundreds of men and women between the ages of eighteen and seventy-five who were in the middle of the migration process.[47] These conversations took place at bus stations, on street corners, in restaurants, bars, humanitarian shelters, cemeteries, and any other place I encountered border crossers. The majority of people were Mexican nationals, though some Central Americans were also interviewed. Our interactions tended to be unstructured, and depending on the situation, I either took written notes, used a digital voice recorder, or both.[48] On several occasions, people were shown photographs of the desert and other migration-related settings and asked to comment on them.[49] In addition, I spent countless hours observing deportation proceedings in Tucson, touring government facilities with Border Patrol agents, and walking on the trails that migrants use to cross the desert.[50]

The interviews I conducted were almost exclusively in Spanish and are presented here in their translated English form, with some phrases and words left in their original language for effect. Because people often ramble, repeat themselves, or tell complicated stories out of order, at times I have edited material to preserve the narrative flow and reduce redundancy.[51] I made these edits carefully and sparingly, striving as much as possible to preserve the speaker's original meaning and tone. In all except a few cases, I used pseudonyms and changed some personal details to protect identities.[52] The names of the dead and missing have not been changed. Their families wanted their "real" stories told. They wanted to guarantee that the lost were not forgotten.

DEPICTING VIOLENCE

The primary theme of this book is violence: how it is constructed in the desert, its productive nature from the perspective of those benefiting from it, and how its victims come to know its destructiveness. The things that happen to the undocumented migrants who experience the strong pull of the US economy and the simultaneous blunt force trauma of its immigration enforcement practices can be generally characterized as a form of *structural violence*.[53] It is violence that is indirect (i.e., the result of federal policy). No one individual is responsible for it. Moreover, it often occurs out of site, many portray it as "natural," and it can easily be denied by state actors and erased by the desert environment.[54] Throughout this book the scale of analysis and perspective on this form of structural violence change depending on the context, moment, and analytical

goal. In some instances, the discussion focuses on federal enforcement discourse and large-scale infrastructure. At other times I give the viewer a full-frontal view of how those on the ground experience this policy.

The intent is to show what the violence looks like up close, and thus avoid sanitizing it, but also to offer what Žižek terms "sideways glances" that may help foster new ways of thinking about border crossings and the routinized pain and suffering that accompany them.[55] Theoretically, these efforts are aided by two key ideas. First is the proposition that nonhumans (e.g., the desert) play a major role in this process (see chapter 2) and should be considered crucial elements of the Border Patrol's enforcement strategy. The second argument is that the types of death people experience in the desert reflect their precarious political position and that the postmortem biographies of their corpses provide insight into the production of trauma that has a hemispheric reach.

There is no easy way to represent violence, a fact that I was acutely aware of throughout the course of writing this book. I spent many nights worrying whether the descriptions contained here are too graphic or insensitive. Admittedly, much of this endeavor is written from a male perspective. As a Latino researcher, I had significantly more access to men than women, at least during the phases of ethnographic work that took place on the northern Mexican border. For various reasons described throughout the text, men were more readily available for interviews, and it was their perspective on border-crossing violence that I became most familiar with. This means that I came to know about much of the sexual violence that women experience en route through the eyes of men who bore witness.[56] One researcher estimates that as many as 90 percent of women who attempt to cross undocumented into the United States through northern Mexico suffer sexual assault,[57] which indicates that there are many untold stories of trauma.[58] In fleeting moments the physical traces of the sexual assault that women experienced were visible to me. This sometimes manifested itself as blackened eyes or bruised wrists on the bodies of recent deportees. On a handful of occasions, I encountered deported women who were in catatonic states or were so visibly shaken that they couldn't be consoled. These are just the rare instances in which assault left visible marks. Whatever events caused these bruises or moments of trauma, they were largely inaccessible to me because of a combination of ethical, methodological, and gender issues.[59] That being said, I have tried to include as much as I can in this book about the gender-based violence women experience.

Although they are present throughout this text, at certain moments women are visible only through male eyes.[60] This is especially true in part 2, "El Camino." It is not my intention, however, to make "woman an icon, displayed for the gaze and enjoyment of men,"[61] but rather to emphasize that males primarily between the ages of eighteen and forty make up the bulk of apprehended border crossers (86.5 percent in 2012)[62] and were the population whose perspective I became most familiar with. I acknowledge the male perspective as a recurring framework in parts of this book largely for the purpose of illustrating that in this research context that perspective shouldn't be written off as simply patriarchal or pornographic. Instead, the viewpoint of men can highlight the power and experiences of female border crossers and illustrate the extent to which the narratives included here signal male "identification with, sympathy for, or vulnerability to the feminine."[63] In the end, I hope that my prose and the various perspectives I seek to represent strike a balance between reflecting violent realities and maintaining all people's dignity.

Finally, to complicate my written descriptions of violence, I have risked including photographs of vulnerable people in all types of precarious positions. This was a decision influenced by the new wave of photoethnographies published in the past ten years.[64] I was particularly inspired by Bourgois and Schonberg's *Righteous Dopefiend* and Danny Hoffman's *The War Machines*, both of which sensitively pair difficult-to-view images with insightful analyses of violence.[65] From the start of this project I knew that words alone could never capture the complexity, emotion, or realities of the violence, suffering, and victories that people experience during the migration process. You have to hear their voices *and* see their faces to appreciate them as human beings. Over the past several years many undocumented people in the United States have bravely come out of the shadows to tell their stories.[66] The people you will meet in this book wanted to do the same thing. They wanted to be heard and seen. For this reason, I have included pictures taken by border crossers while en route, troubling photos of physical injuries, and graphic images of death. Perhaps by humanizing that nebulous mass of humanity that we call the undocumented, we can begin to have a serious conversation about how to fix America's broken immigration system.

Although some of these pictures were taken by me or migrants themselves, the bulk were shot by my friend and longtime collaborator Michael Wells. Present from the beginning of this project, Mike Wells (everyone calls him by his full name) spent countless days with me hiking in the desert, hanging out in

shelters in Mexico, interviewing people in New York, and visiting with families of migrants in Ecuador. He is not an anthropologist by training, but for me his photos reflect a keen ethnographic sensitivity attuned to both the subtle reflections of humanity that happen in the blink of an eye and the minute details of the multiple worlds that migrants pass through. I have paired Mike's and the other images used here with various anthropological lenses (e.g., migrant narratives, archaeological typologies, and forensic descriptions) with the firm belief that long-term anthropological work that fuses text and photographs is "more than the sum of its parts analytically, politically, and aesthetically."[67]

The decision to include people's faces in a large number of the images in this book was largely informed by those whose stories are included here. The undocumented wanted you to see them as people. They wanted you to see what they go through and how the process of migration impacts their lives. I once asked Christian (whom you will meet in chapter 10) whether he wanted me to obscure his face or include photos of his sister-in-law in this book. He responded: "I want you to put photos that show our reality. That is better. That way people can see what happens. The realness. That way people will believe what is happening. That they will know that this is the truth. A lot of people think it's all a lie. That this stuff doesn't happen." Maybe the photos and stories revealed in the following pages will somehow help those of us who will never know the desperation required to head into the desert or the sorrow that accompanies losing someone to this process get a little closer to "the realness."

Prevention Through Deterrence

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NOTES FROM A CRIME SCENE

Drive out in the late afternoon to one of the many hills on the outskirts of the tiny Arizona town of Arivaca and look west. You will see the golden sun creep behind the Baboquivari Mountains. The vanishing orb makes it look as if the distant peaks and valleys have been cut out of thick black construction paper. It's the stenciled silhouette you see in old western films. For an hour or so, the backlit barren landscape glows as though it's slowly being covered in liquid amber. The beauty of this Sonoran Desert sunset is overwhelming. It can convince you that there is goodness in nature. It will make you briefly forget how cruel and unforgiving this terrain can be for those caught in it during the height of summer. Right now I'm dreaming about that sunset; visualizing my hand plunging into a watery ice chest full of cold beers. I can feel the touch of the evening breeze on my skin. These are the tricks you play in your head during the dog days of July in the desert.

The Norwegian explorer Carl Lumholtz once wrote that the summer heat in the Sonoran Desert felt like "walking between great fires."[1] That's putting it nicely. Right now it feels more like walking directly through flames. Despite the protection of my wide-brimmed cowboy hat, the sides of my face are sunburned after only a few minutes of exposure. Tiny water-filled blisters are starting to form on my temples, cheeks, and other places that get exposed to the sun when I lift my head or stare up at the empty blue sky. I try not to look up unless I have to duck under a mesquite tree or the trail makes a

hard break left or right. Better to keep your gaze downward to watch for sun-bathing rattlesnakes and ankle-twisting cobbles.

Sweat beads up and rolls off my chin, leaving behind a trail of droplets on the ground as I walk. It takes only a few seconds for these splashes to evaporate. My clothes, on the other hand, are soaking wet. I find myself periodically shivering and getting dizzy; my body is working hard to make sense of this inferno. The overpriced backpack I am wearing has started to heat up along with the water bottles it contains. This means that from here on out, every time I try to quench my thirst, it's like drinking soup. It is easily over a 100 degrees and it is only 10 A.M. My sunset and cold beer fantasies are starting to lose their efficacy. Mike Wells and I are climbing through the Tumacácori Mountains with my longtime friend Bob Kee,[2] a member of the southern Arizona humanitarian group the Tucson Samaritans. Bob has been haunting these trails for years, leaving food and water for unseen migrants and occasionally giving first aid to abandoned souls he comes across.

It's a rough path full of sharp-angled rocks and angry mesquites whose branches all seem to be aiming for your eyes. We are moving at a fast clip, which is typical for any outing led by Bob. He is almost thirty years our senior, but is running us ragged as we struggle to keep up. Mike and I are being led by a wilderness Zen master who never seems to sweat, complain, or slow down. Every turn he makes seems to lead to another steep climb. I am convinced he seeks out the most arduous routes just to make sure that those he takes into the desert get a sense of how punishing this environment can be for migrants and anyone else who dares to hike this terrain in the middle of a summer day. "We're almost there. I promise," Bob says. I force a smile because in the past when he has told me this, it was a white lie to make me feel better. "Almost there" is one of Bob's euphemisms for "four more miles to go." On this day, however, the tone in his voice is different. He is not his normal jovial self. He hasn't been joking around, which usually includes offering to carry me on his back. It is clear that he is on a mission. We round a bend and stop. Bob calmly says: "This is the spot where I found the person. The sheriff's department came out and took away what we could find, but it was getting dark and we didn't have a lot of time to go over the entire area. It was mostly arm and leg bones and some pieces of clothing. I want to see if we can find the head. That would make it easier to identify the body. I'm sure there are still bones out here."

Just a few weeks earlier Bob had encountered the fragmented and skeletonized remains of a border crosser in this area. It was the second person he

had found in under a month. He called the police, who sent two detectives out to remove what bones they could find. Bob says they spent five minutes poking around before they called it quits. It was too damn hot and the cops were unprepared and unmotivated to do a large-scale survey. Besides, searching for the bones of dead "illegals" has never been a top priority for any law enforcement agency out here. The three of us have returned and are now looking for the rest of what was once a living, breathing person.

Bob is right. There are bones that the detectives overlooked, but we have to cover a lot of ground before we find any of them. There are pieces strewn everywhere. We walk downslope and see part of an articulated arm wedged between two rocks. Aside from sinew still holding the bones together, it has been picked clean of skin and muscle by an unknown creature. Further up the trail I notice several white flecks that stand out against the red mountain soil. It looks as if someone dropped a box of blackboard chalk on the ground. I get closer and realize they are splinters of human bone, mostly sun-bleached rib fragments that have been cracked and gnawed by some long-gone animal. Just off the trail I spot a complete tooth lying on top of a rock. This dental find gives us hope that the skull is nearby.

We start a desperate search for this person's head. Rocks are overturned. Subterranean nests are probed. Bleeding hands blindly grope under thick brush in hopes of finding bones that may have been squirreled away by scavengers or deposited by monsoon flood waters. Everyone is moving with great urgency despite the debilitating heat. After forty-five minutes of intensive survey, we give up. There is no skull. There are no other teeth. We do, however, come across a pair of worn-out hiking boots in close proximity to some of the bones. Where the hell is the skull? I start imagining what has happened to it. A montage of laughing vultures rips this person's eyeballs out of the sockets. I hallucinate two coyotes batting the head around like a soccer ball so that they can access brain matter through the foramen magnum. It's a moment when you despise the capacity of the human imagination. People whose loved ones have disappeared in this desert will tell you that it's the not knowing what happened to them coupled with the flashes of grotesque possibility that drive you insane.

Mike starts snapping photographs while Bob collects bones. The gnarled arm fragment goes into a black trash bag. The ribs and tooth fall into a Ziploc. Bob scribbles down the GPS coordinates and will later deliver the remains to the sheriff's office, where he will be scolded for "disturbing a crime scene." The irony of the statement is that the police were already out here once and Bob is

Human tooth, Tumacácori Mountains, 2011. Photo by Michael Wells.

simply collecting what they overlooked during their hasty survey. The fact of the matter is that although this is a crime scene, few people actually care or want to know what has happened here. For many Americans, this person—whose remains are so ravaged that his or her sex is unknown—is (was) an "illegal," a noncitizen who broke US law and faced the consequences. Many of these same people tell themselves that if they can keep calling them "illegals," they can avoid speaking their names or imagining their faces. The United States might be a nation founded by immigrants, but that was a long time ago. Countless citizens today suffer historical amnesia and draw stark divisions between the "noble" European immigrants of the past and Latino border cross-ers of today. How quickly they forget about the violent welcome receptions that America threw for the Irish, Chinese, and many other newly arrived immigrant groups. The benefit of the chronological distance from the pain and suffering of past migrations is that many Americans today have no problem putting nationality before humanity. A cursory glance at the online comment section of a recent article titled "Border Crossing Deaths More Common as Illegal Immigration Declines"[3] provides insight into some of the more extreme anti-immigrant perspectives on migrant death:

I'm not condoning deaths or anything, and I do think it's cruel to let a human being die in pain, but in a way isn't it better? I mean after all some of these people are risking their lives because there are nothing better [*sic*] back home, and if they die on the way, at least they end their sufferings [*sic*].[4]

Since it is a common practice to print indications on everything in the US, and since just printed indications will not . . . [deter] people from entering the US illegaly [*sic*], why not . . . take some of those dried out corpses, hang them at the places where they [migrants] are known to cross with a legend, "This may be you in a couple of days."[5]

When you see such comments, which accompany practically every article about migrant death on the Internet, you think you're mistakenly reading the American Voices column from the satirical newspaper *The Onion*. It should be easy to dismiss responses like these as extreme forms of Internet hate speech, but this disregard for the lives of undocumented people and the idea that dead bodies should act as a form of deterrence to future migrants are fundamental components of the US federal government's current border security strategy.

But that fact doesn't really matter as we survey the ground for more human remains. The desert has already started to erase this person, along with whatever violence and horror she or he experienced. This event will soon be forgotten before it was ever known.

BONE DUST: RENDERING BARE LIFE

Many border researchers turn to Giorgio Agamben's influential work on sovereignty, law, and individual rights to understand the role that the physical space between adjoining nations plays in the construction of citizens, noncitizens, and state power.[6] Agamben's *state of exception*—the process whereby sovereign authorities declare emergencies in order to suspend the legal protections afforded to individuals while simultaneously unleashing the power of the state upon them—is a particularly salient concept for those working on the margins of nation-states. It is here that the tensions of sovereignty and national security are both geolocated and visibly acted out on a daily basis.[7] Like Agamben's characterization of the concentration camp, the spatial arrangement of borders often allows a space to exist outside the bounds of normal state or moral law. Border zones become *spaces of exception*—physical and political locations where an individual's rights and protections under law can be stripped away upon entrance. Having your body consumed by wild animals is

but one of many "exceptional" things that happen in the Sonoran Desert as a result of federal immigration policies.[8]

Roxanne Doty has pointed out that the US-Mexico border forms an exemplary space of exception where those seeking to enter the country without permission are often reduced to *bare life*—individuals whose deaths are of little consequence—by border policies that do not recognize the rights of unauthorized migrants.[9] At the same time, these policies expose noncitizens to a state-crafted geopolitical terrain designed to deter their movement through suffering and death.[10] The perception that the lives of border crossers are insignificant is reflected in both their treatment by federal immigration enforcement agencies and in the pervasive anti-immigrant discourse, including the online comments cited above. Contributing to this dehumanization is the fact that the Sonoran Desert is remote, sparsely populated, and largely out of the American public's view. This space can be policed in ways that would be deemed violent, cruel, or irrational in most other contexts. Just imagine how people would react if the corpses of undocumented Latinos were left to rot on the ninth hole of the local golf course or if their sun-bleached skulls were piled up in the parking lot of the neighborhood McDonald's.

The isolation of the desert combined with the public perception of the border as a zone ruled by chaos allows the state to justify using extraordinary measures to control and exclude "uncivilized" noncitizens. It is a location "where the controls and guarantees of judicial order can be suspended—the zone where the violence of the state of exception is deemed to operate in the service of 'civilization.'"[11] Sovereign power produces migrants as excluded subjects to be dealt with violently while simultaneously neutralizing their ability to resist or protest. The environment becomes a form of deterrence so that "the raw physicality" of the desert "can be exploited and can function to mask the workings of social and political power."[12] If we dare to approach this frightening geopolitical space, we can see how America's internal surveillant gaze functions,[13] and understand why maps of this region should be labeled "Here be monsters."

As we start to walk away from this death site, I notice something on the ground. Crouching down, I pick up a piece of bone smaller than my fingernail. It immediately crumbles to dust. I try to hand it to Bob, and an unexpected breeze passes through and blows many of the particles off my hand. I scrape what I can from my finger and sprinkle it into the bag. It's a futile gesture. There is little that forensic scientists can do with bone dust. This person will

likely become a line in the Pima County Office of the Medical Examiner's database of migrant fatalities reading: "Name: Unknown. Age: Unknown. Country of Origin: Unknown. Cause of Death: Undetermined (partial skeletal remains)." The identity of this individual and much of his or her body has been swallowed up by the desert, and there were no witnesses. Bare life has been reduced to shoes, shards of bone, and the "Unknown."

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I often think about this particular day, for two reasons. First, we know this death and its physical erasure are by no means a unique event. Between October 2000 and September 2014, the bodies of 2,721 border crossers were recovered in southern Arizona alone.[14] Approximately 800 of these individuals are still unidentified.[15] Second, this particular moment in the desert perfectly illustrates the structure, logic, and corporeal impact of current US border enforcement policy. This point was driven home in the spring of 2012 when I visited the Juan Bosco migrant shelter in Nogales (see chapter 5). The stucco walls of this nonprofit organization are always decorated with glossy Mexican government fliers that warn about the conditions in the desert, oversized maps produced by the group Humane Borders showing locations of border crosser deaths, and photocopied posters put up by family members of missing migrants. It wasn't until 2012, though, that I noticed for the first time a tiny sign on the wall of the men's bathroom that had been produced by the US Department of Homeland Security. In Spanish the flier warned, "The next time you try to cross the border without documents you could end up a victim of the desert." This line was accompanied by a pathetic cartoon drawing of a saguaro cactus.

I laughed at this crude representation of the desert, but also started thinking about how this was one of the few times I had seen a warning sign produced by the US government in a Mexican shelter. More interesting, however, was that the wording of the pamphlet personified the desert as a perpetrator of violence targeting migrants.[16] Conveniently, this flier contains no mention of the tactical relationship between federal border enforcement policy and this harsh landscape. When put in historical context, however, this public service announcement offers insight into the structure of the Prevention Through Deterrence (PTD) strategy that since the 1990s has deliberately funneled people into the desert. It also illustrates the cunning way that nature has been conscripted by the Border Patrol to act as an enforcer while simultaneously

providing this federal agency with plausible deniability regarding blame for any victims the desert may claim. In what follows, I outline the history and logic of PTD and begin to draw the connections between border enforcement policies and the migrant suffering and death that I explore in detail in the rest of the book.

OUT OF SIGHT

In July 1993, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)[17] promoted Mexican American Border Patrol agent Silvestre Reyes to chief of the El Paso Sector. Reyes was brought in during a moment of crisis when a series of lawsuits and claims of human rights violations had been brought against the Border Patrol in the region. Two of the major grievances lodged against the agency were that legal Latino residents were subjected to unfair racial profiling and harassment, and that the consistent pursuit of undocumented border crossers through neighborhoods was a dangerous and abusive practice.[18] The majority of El Paso residents who lived along the border were Latino, which made it difficult for la migra to figure out who was "illegal" without directly interrogating people. Locals were tired of law enforcement questioning them about their citizenship while they were going about their daily business. In response to these complaints, Reyes came up with a radical new enforcement strategy that would fundamentally change how the border was policed. Timothy Dunn describes what happened on September 19, 1993, when Reyes launched "Operation Blockade":

> The emphasis of the operation was to deter unauthorized border crossings in the core urban area between Ciudad Juárez and El Paso by making a bristling show of force. . . . This took the form of posting 400 Border Patrol agents (out of 650 total in the sector) on the banks of the Rio Grande and adjacent levees in stationary, ubiquitous green and green-and-white patrol vehicles around the clock, at short-distance intervals (from fifty yards to one-half mile) along a twenty-mile stretch between El Paso and Ciudad Juárez. . . . This mass posting of agents created an imposing line, if not [a] virtual wall, of agents along the river, which was supplemented by low-flying and frequently deployed surveillance helicopters.[19]

Prior to this strategy, the standard operating procedure had been to try to apprehend border crossers *after* they had crossed the boundary line. The circuslike atmosphere created when dozens of people at a time jumped the bor-

der fence while agents in green uniforms chased after them like Keystone Cops was ludicrous. Comedian Cheech Marin even built his film *Born in East L.A.* around this borderwide phenomenon. These daily scenes exemplified the difficulties of trying to seal the border. Reyes's mass deployment of agents in and around the El Paso port of entry was an effective public relations move that seemed to satisfy local residents. This "show of force", however, didn't stop illegal immigration. It mostly frustrated migrants accustomed to crossing in urban zones and forced them to move toward the edge of town where they could easily hop the fence in depopulated areas.[20]

In addition to funneling traffic away from downtown, this strategy also made migration less visible and created a scenario in which the policing of undocumented people occurred in areas with few witnesses. Out of sight, out of mind. Despite the fact that this "deterrence-displacement" strategy only made border crossers harder to see,[21] some politicians soon touted it as a success.[22] The operation's effects were felt along much of the US-Mexico border during the 1990s when it was adopted in Southern California ("Operation Gatekeeper" in 1994), Arizona ("Operation Safeguard" in 1994 and 1999), and South Texas ("Operation Rio Grande" in 1997). When Reyes set Operation Blockade in motion, he intended to shift traffic away from the city and "put [migrants] out in areas where they're on [Border Patrol's] turf."[23] Little did he know that this approach would soon evolve into a large-scale policy that would strategically use the natural environment and subsequently become the foundation for border security in a post-9/11 world.

HOSTILE TERRAIN

The logic behind Operation Blockade was straightforward. Placing heightened security in and around the downtown urban port of entry in El Paso would force undocumented migrants to attempt crossings in more rural areas that were easier for law enforcement to monitor. Although this initial strategy in El Paso had neither been officially sanctioned nor fully evaluated by INS, it immediately garnered media and political attention and was soon adopted as a part of a new federal project. Less than a year after Operation Blockade, INS published its Strategic Plan,[24] which essentially repackaged what Reyes had done informally into a national program: "The Border Patrol will improve control of the border by implementing a strategy of 'prevention through deterrence.' The Border Patrol will achieve the goals of its strategy by bringing

a decisive number of enforcement resources to bear in each major entry corridor. The Border Patrol will increase the number of agents on the line and make effective use of technology, raising the risk of apprehension high enough to be an effective deterrent."[25] One of the primary components that structured the new PTD strategy was the recognition that remote areas along the border (e.g., the Sonoran Desert) are difficult to traverse on foot and hence can be effectively used by law enforcement. This, however, was by no means a recent epiphany, as noted by historian Patrick Ettinger: "From their earliest work enforcing the Chinese Exclusion Acts [enacted in 1882], immigration authorities had discovered that the desert and mountain wilderness could be made effective allies in the fight against undocumented entry. Desolate routes deprive migrants of access to food and water. Only along well-defined roads or on railroads could immigrants obtain the necessary resources for travel, and it was along those routes that immigration patrols might be best stationed to capture undocumented immigrants."[26] As one federal agent testified in 1926, the goal of border enforcement was to "at least make attempts to cross the border dangerous and hold illegal entry down to small proportions."[27]

The acknowledgment that the desert, as well as the other extreme environments cross-cut by the border, could strategically be used to deter migrants from illegal entry on a large scale was not, however, formally laid out in policy documents until the start of the official PTD era, after 1993. The initial Strategic Plan memorandum was among the first to refer to environmental conditions as a potential resource for securing the geopolitical boundary: "The border environment is diverse. Mountains, deserts, lakes, rivers and valleys form natural barriers to passage. Temperatures ranging from sub-zero along the northern border to the searing heat of the southern border effect [sic] illegal entry traffic as well as enforcement efforts. *Illegal entrants crossing through remote, uninhabited expanses of land and sea along the border can find themselves in mortal danger*" (emphasis added).[28]

Although policy makers have written extensively about PTD for decades,[29] only the earliest documents associated with this strategy articulate a clear vision of the role that officials imagined the environment playing in enforcement: "The prediction is that with traditional entry and smuggling routes disrupted, illegal traffic will be deterred, or forced over more *hostile* terrain, less suited for crossing and more suited for enforcement" (emphasis added).[30] Prior to PTD, the dominant enforcement practice emphasized catching people after an illegal entry had been achieved and then processing them through

the *voluntary-departure complex*, whereby apprehended migrants were permitted to waive their rights to a deportation hearing and returned to Mexico without lengthy detention.[31] Many have described this as a relatively useless process that individuals become familiar with, and less afraid of, after repeated apprehensions.[32] PTD was a direct reaction to the ineffectiveness of this previous disciplinary practice.

In the 1994 Strategic Plan, the use of the word *hostile* suggests that this new form of boundary enforcement was intended to be more aggressive and violent (and thus more effective) than previous programs. The word choice is also interesting given that the architects of the Strategic Plan did not involve only the Border Patrol, but also included "planning experts from the Department of Defense Center for Low Intensity Conflict,"[33] experts who had previously been charged with developing strategies for quelling insurgencies in the developing world.[34] The great irony is that some of the migrants whose movement these defense experts were working to stop were fleeing violence in Central America that US interventionist policies had sanctioned and supported.[35]

After this initial report was issued, the words used to characterize the desert environment would be gradually changed from "hostile" to "harsh," "inhospitable," and the like.[36] This shift in tone reflects but one of many bureaucratic attempts to sanitize the human costs of this policy. For example, although actual desert conditions are a linchpin of this enforcement strategy, relatively few public documents focused on PTD describe them or comment on the correlation between the strategy and migrant fatalities.[37] In addition, despite showing numerous photographs of agents both on patrol and "rescuing" people in the Sonoran Desert, the 2012–2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan makes no mention of this landscape or its key role in deterring migration. This hostile terrain is now camouflaged in policy memorandums.

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In 1994, it was predicted that PTD would push the migrant experience beyond simple apprehension and deportation. The architects of the Strategic Plan relied on a number of key assumptions, including the fact that "violence will increase as effects of strategy are felt."[38] *Violence*, however, was poorly defined in this document and probably too blunt for some people's liking. Later policy briefs substitute this word for euphemisms such as "costly." A congressional report written just three years after the Strategic Plan stated: "The southwest border strategy [previously known as the Strategic Plan] is ultimately designed

to deter illegal entry into the United States. It states that "The overarching goal of the strategy is to make it so difficult and so costly to enter this country illegally that fewer individuals even try.'"[39]

Although no public record explicitly states that a goal of PTD is to kill border crossers in an attempt to deter other would-be migrants, the connection between death and this policy has been highlighted by both academics and various federal agencies charged with evaluating Border Patrol programs.[40] An excerpt from a 2010 report to Congress reads: "'Prevention Through Deterrence' . . . has pushed unauthorized migration away from population centers and funneled it into more remote and hazardous border regions. This policy has had the *unintended consequence* of increasing the number of fatalities along the border, as unauthorized migrants attempt to cross over the inhospitable Arizona desert without adequate supplies of water" (emphasis added).[41]

This comment that the increasing number of migrant fatalities is an "unintended consequence" of PTD is misleading and ignores previous evidence suggesting that policy makers were well aware of the role that death would play in this enforcement strategy. For example, a 1997 report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) identifies as one of the "Indicators for Measuring the Effectiveness of the Strategy to Deter Illegal Entry Along the Southwest Border" the "deaths of aliens attempting entry." Concerning the "predicated outcome if AG's [the attorney general's] strategy is successful," the same report claims that it "depends on how enforcement resources are allocated. In some cases, deaths may be reduced or prevented (by fencing along the highways, for example). In other cases, deaths may increase (as enforcement in urban areas forces aliens to attempt mountain or desert crossings)."[42] I had to read the foregoing quote several times before I fully grasped its message. It clearly and publicly states that one way for the government to measure the efficacy of PTD is via a migrant body count. In some ways this is merely a sanitized version of the many anti-immigrant comments that accompany online articles about border crosser deaths; for example: "As long as the immigration numbers are declining . . . I can live with the border death numbers."[43] The sector of the American public that attributes a low value to the lives of migrants seems to mirror the federal government's perspective.

The statement from this official document suggests both that early on in the planning of this policy the migrant death rate was considered a useful metric to gauge the program's effectiveness (i.e., "violence will increase as effects of strategy are felt") and that the Border Patrol clearly understood that

fatalities would rise as "enforcement in urban areas forces aliens to attempt mountain or desert crossings." This report was published prior to the spike in deaths that occurred in the Arizona desert starting in the early 2000s.[44] As early as 1997, however, evidence clearly showed that the body count associated with PTD was primarily caused by "environmental exposure (falls, hyperthermia, dehydration)."[45] Rather than shooting people as they jumped the fence, Prevention Through Deterrence set the stage for the desert to become the new "victimizer" of border transgressors.

CONNECTING THE DOTS

Since the beginning of PTD, both the number of people who have been apprehended in the remote regions of Arizona and the annual rate of migrant fatalities have risen steeply. In 1993, 92,639 people were caught by Border Patrol in the Tucson Sector. By 2000, this number had grown to 616,346, an almost sevenfold increase (see appendix A). Although overall apprehension rates across the southern border did not rise significantly during this seven-year period, the funnel effect of PTD became visible as crossing attempts in the Tucson Sector skyrocketed. In 1993 this sector accounted for 8 percent of total southern border apprehensions. By 2000, 37 percent of all immigration arrests happened in this region. For almost two decades, until recently, the Tucson Sector was the primary crossing corridor for undocumented migrants.[46]

Although Prevention Through Deterrence redirected people toward more "hostile" ground, it has not significantly dissuaded would-be crossers, a point recognized as early as 2001 by the GAO: "Although INS has realized its goal of shifting illegal alien traffic away from urban areas, this has been achieved at a cost to ... illegal aliens. ... In particular, rather than being deterred from attempting illegal entry, many aliens have instead risked injury and death by trying to cross mountains, deserts, and rivers."[47] Many have died since the implementation of this policy, and the correlation between the funneling of people toward desolate regions of the border and an upsurge in fatalities is strong.[48] Still, even when the connection between PTD and migrant death is recognized by the federal government, there is generally a refusal to causally link the two phenomena. As a 2012 GAO report notes:

> Known migrant deaths fell from a high of 344 in 1988 to a low of 171 in 1994 before climbing back to 286 in 1998. According to DHS data, known migrant deaths climbed from 250 in 1999 to 492 in 2005, and averaged 431 deaths per

year in 2005–2009 before falling to an average of 360 per year in 2010–2011. . . . The apparent increase in migrant deaths is particularly noteworthy in light of the declining number of alien apprehensions (i.e., estimated unauthorized entries) during the same period. . . . *Overall, these data offer evidence that border crossings have become more hazardous since the "prevention through deterrence" policy went into effect in the 1990s, though once again the precise impact of enforcement on migrant deaths is unknown.* [emphasis added][49]

There is also significant disagreement among the federal government, social scientists, and human rights groups regarding how to count dead border crossers. Compared to other organizations, the Department of Homeland Security routinely publishes the lowest number of recorded migrant deaths.[50] Given the unpopular and controversial nature of such statistics, it is not surprising that the government lowballs these body counts. A conservative estimate is that 5,596 people died while attempting to migrate between 1998 and 2012;[51] and between 2000 and September 2014, the bodies of 2,771 people were found in southern Arizona,[52] enough corpses to fill the seats on fifty-four Greyhound buses. These grim figures represent only *known* migrant fatalities. Many people may die in remote areas and their bodies are never recovered. The actual number of people who lose their lives while migrating will forever remain unknown (see chapter 3).

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Silvestre Reyes's Operation Blockade in El Paso in 1993 may be separated by 350 miles and almost two decades from the ravaged skeleton described at the start of this chapter, but the two phenomena are unequivocally linked. Operation Blockade became the cornerstone of a nationwide border policy that used, and continues to use, the desert as a weapon. Prevention Through Deterrence has evolved from an explicit program that once acknowledged that the dangers posed by the desert could be strategically exploited as a weapon in the war on immigration to a sterilized description of an enforcement paradigm that has unfortunately (and "unexpectedly") resulted in migrants "risking their lives."

In 1994, the federal government clearly appreciated that people could be funneled over "hostile terrain" where law enforcement had "tactical advantage." Twenty years later, the common Border Patrol discourse focuses on blaming the smugglers who "endanger migrants in the desert." This shift in federal tone that now deflects culpability away from policy and toward the environment

and *coyotes* is summed up well in an article in the *Arizona Daily Star* in which a Border Patrol agent reflects on the discovery of several migrant bodies: "The Sonoran Desert is extremely vast and remote with very few water sources. . . . [I]t is important to realize illegal immigrants are being victimized and lied to by smugglers who lead them through treacherous terrain and expose them to extreme conditions."[53] Joseph Nevins has wisely pointed out that the federal government's refusal to acknowledge any responsibility for this death toll, coupled with the blaming of *coyotes* for taking people through high-risk areas, overlooks the fact that the "significant growth in use of *coyotes* has been the predictable, direct result of the enhanced border-enforcement strategy."[54]

The increase in migrant traffic through Arizona and the rise in crossing fatalities indicate that security practices have effectively and systematically funneled people toward violent terrain and made the process more deadly. In no uncertain terms, Prevention Through Deterrence relies on the desert to "deter" people from attempting to cross. But what does this "hostile" landscape look like? What are the environmental factors that are meant to stop people? In the following chapter I address these questions and offer a theoretical framework to help understand the complex relationship between border crossers and the many humans and nonhumans who act as agents of deterrence.

Death as the border: Managing missing migrants and unidentified bodies at the EU's Mediterranean frontier

CrossMark

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A B S T R A C T

The paper explores how the management of migrant bodies by national and EU authorities reflects particular understandings of contemporary borders and how the failure to address such bodies has implications far from the frontier. The study of the management both of the dead and of the data that can serve to identify missing migrants, can benefit our understanding of the contemporary border, and has to date received only limited scholarly attention. To address this gap we draw on field research carried out on the Greek island of Lesbos, one of the key migrant entry points to the EU, that has seen repeated incidents of deadly shipwrecks. Based on interviews with families of migrants and local stakeholders the paper explores how death at the border introduces novel — and often invisible — borders and categories of inclusion and exclusion. By shedding light on the experiences of the families of the dead we aspire to introduce a critical set of actors who have been marginalized from the study of the border. In exploring the remote effects of deaths on such families in migrant countries of origin, the paper shows that bordering practices have transnational impacts at the human level, thereby broadening our conceptualization of the border.

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1. Introduction

In recent decades thousands of migrants and refugees have died or gone missing in their efforts to cross the Mediterranean and enter the European Union (EU) often using flimsy boats (Last & Spijkerboer, 2014).[1] Although accurate figures are still unavailable, reflecting an entrenched policy of the EU and its member states to decline to quantify the phenomenon of migrant deaths, according to a report published by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), between 2000 and 2014 the estimated total number of deaths at the EU borders was 22,400 (Brian & Laczko, 2014), while officially recorded deaths at the EU border in the period 1990—2014 totalled 3188 persons (Last & Spijkerboer, 2014). It is clear that this latter figure does not reflect the actual number of deaths but rather illustrates the lack of systematic recording of statistics concerning deaths at sea (Last, 2015). In 2015, 3772 are known to have died crossing the Mediterranean, constituting 70% of global migrant deaths that year,[2] with an additional untold number of unrecorded deaths.

Shipwrecks with high numbers of casualties have made the headlines in European media and have briefly transformed the discourse around Mediterranean migration from one concerned with the threat to Europe, to humanitarian concerns. Yet typically the focus of international media and the resulting political attention wanes just days after such deaths are reported. One result of this is that both policy-makers and academics focus exclusively on the phenomena circumscribing shipwrecks, such as smugglers, rescue, push-backs etc, and ideological, institutional or structural aspects of border policies. This paper seeks to ask three important and interrelated questions. First, what happens to the bodies of would be migrants who die on their journey across the Mediterranean? Second, how do states at the EU border deal with this unprecedented humanitarian challenge amidst a policy void at

[2] IOM (2015) Missing Migrants' Project: Latest Global Figures — **Migrant Fatalities Worldwide**, Available at: http://missingmigrants.iom.int/latest-global-figures.

national and EU levels? Finally, what are the legal, bureaucratic and practical challenges that the families of missing and dead migrants face in their effort to find their loved ones?

Studying the novel and complex humanitarian problem of migrant bodies at the border is important for several reasons. First, it is critical in exploring how death at the border introduces novel forms of inclusion and exclusion. The study of the contrasting policies deployed by state authorities to deal with dead migrants and dead EU citizens can shed light on the enduring impact of the border on migrant bodies even after their death. This represents an alternative approach to studying the intersection of borders with security and human rights.

Second, for every body that is washed ashore at the EU border, there is a family living with ambiguity, not knowing if their loved one is dead or alive. For such families their loved ones are missing, having left home and never having been heard from since. In the absence of information about the fate of loved ones, families cannot start the mourning process and live forever with uncertainty (Boss, 2006). Where can a family receive information about a relative who may have died while seeking to migrate? Where death is confirmed and families seek to learn where a body is buried, what processes are required to manage both bodies and data to ensure identification? In addressing these questions, our approach deviates from the Eurocentric framing of the 'refugee crisis', focusing exclusively on the EU (spatial) border and shaped by security concerns. By exploring the effect on families of the dead and missing in states of migrant origin, we highlight how these bordering practices often have transnational and emotional impacts that transcend the EU boundaries. Hence, our approach to of combining official policy responses and the situation of families of the missing seeks to provide a more complete account of how death introduces novel, and often invisible, borders. This is one of the first papers to systematically collect data in one of the states most impacted by migrant bodies at its borders, namely Greece, in an effort to map and critically evaluate policy approaches.

In what follows, we briefly discuss the management of dead bodies in the Greek island of Lesbos, which has experienced a large number of deadly shipwrecks. We then identify gaps in the relevant literature and explain why the management of migrant bodies at the EU frontier has received so little attention in both policy discussions and mainstream academic literature.

2. Death as the border

Building on insights drawn from the work of Judith Butler (2004, 2009) we explore how death at the EU border introduces novel and parallel borders. In what follows we seek to make a number of contributions. First, we expand thematically the study of borders to understand new forms of inclusion and exclusion introduced by what we call *death as the border*. A border spatially demarcates politically sovereign lives (i.e. citizens from aliens) while death creates a new border which separates families from loved ones. Hence, studying the simultaneous management of the living and the dead at the border sheds light on the continued relevance of the border even after death.

Second, we challenge the EU-centric approach to the study of the border, confronting a political focus on migrants as a security threat with the impact of deaths at the border on the families of migrants far from it. Deaths at the border have transnational political, psychological and social effects on families in migrant countries of origin. Hence, the border is defined not only in spatial, geographical, or political terms. It has also a strong emotional component: its presence has an affective impact far away. The struggle of families to cope with the lack of clarity of the fate of their loved ones not only remains invisible but becomes a permanent and dominant feature of their daily lives. The corpse problematizes the relationship between the securitization of the border, the experience of the human bodies that (attempt to) cross the border, and those with an emotional link to the border crossers. As the policing of bodies, rather than merely of spatial borders, has become a principal doctrine in recent decades, we shift our attention to the corporeal dimension, building on a growing trend in the literature (Andrijasevic, 2010; Coleman & Stuesse, 2014; Pugliese, 2009).

Finally, our contribution is methodological. While most analyses focus either on the authorities or on individuals at the site of refugee arrival, we combine both perspectives by mapping the range of official policy responses to the management of the dead coupled with the experiences of families in search of their loved ones. To this end, we focus on the uneasy experience of dealing with migrant bodies. The fact that a performative understanding of the border (Salter, 2011) sees the frontier constructed from the bodies of migrants and the trauma of their family members, suggests that the study of the phenomenon of missing migrants can shed analytical and critical light on the contemporary border. As an NGO activist stressed,

'the dead (migrants) are the most appalling spectacle I have ever seen, because I visualized the death and what it means not to be able to cross the border. So, the theoretical framework about walls, securitization, acquires a new dimension when you see decomposed bodies. Even more tragic is the fact that you cannot bury them as they deserved to be buried and that no one could identify them (Interview #12).

To illustrate 'death as the border' we focus on three key distinctions, or themes, emerging from the situation in Lesbos to explore how the management of the dead at the border introduces parallel, yet often unnoticed borders. An emphasis on the management of living as opposed to dead migrants and the significant effects of this distinction; the (in)visibility of the families of the dead; and the official characterisation of dead migrant bodies as evidence of crime rather than an understanding of the dead body as an object of mourning by loved ones.

3. The experience of Lesbos

The Greek island of Lesbos is located in the Aegean Sea at its Eastern border with Turkey and the island's proximity to Turkey has made it a major destination for migrants and refugees, fleeing Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, and more recently Syria, to cross into the EU. In 2015 it became the most frequented route for informal migration into the EU, surpassing that between North Africa and Lampedusa. Although complete data are still absent, in 2015 Lesbos received more than 500,000 refugees and migrants (Brian & Lazcko, 2015; UNHCR, 2015). Beyond such abstract data, the direct experience of deadly shipwrecks is shocking to the local population in Lesbos; a local journalist recalled that 'I have seen corpses before in my career, but what I experienced in the big shipwreck of 15th of December 2012, it's something unprecedented. That was a war scene … ten dead bodies were lying on the shore' (Interview #10).

This drives the selection of Lesbos as a case study to explore state responses to the phenomenon of dead migrants. Over three periods of fieldwork, in July 2013, in March—April 2015, and September—December 2015 we interviewed local stakeholders, including coast guards, local coroners, municipal authorities, NGO workers, and members of migrant communities on the island, as well as policy-makers in Athens. This was coupled with semi-structured interviews with families of dead and missing migrants

who had the opportunity to share their experiences in their search for their loved ones, as well as survivors of the journey to Lesbos.

The vast majority of the families of missing and dead migrants who visit Lesbos in search of bodies or information about missing loved ones do so for a very short-term period, often for only a few days after a shipwreck. This coupled with their vulnerable emotional state when searching for their loved ones raised an insurmountable ethical concern and ruled out the prospect of interviewing them during their visit to the island. To overcome these problems we pursued two paths. First, a researcher working on the island who had already built relationships of trust with a number of families after helping them in their search or missing loved ones was recruited. As most families had moved to their country of origin or other EU countries they were interviewed several months after the traumatic experience to minimize the prospect of retraumatization. As a result of this strategy the majority of interviews were taken in the country of origin (i.e. Tunisia) or over the phone or on skype. Second, another researcher collected interviews in Tunisia from families of dead and missing migrants. Although most of the Tunisian families lost their loved ones while traveling to Italy (not Lesbos), they face similar challenges emotionally, psychologically and socially. Hence this set of interviews helps us highlight the transnational effects of death at the EU border. The majority of interviews were semi-structured in an effort to enable participants to express their views and experiences on the subject. Due to the sensitive nature of the topic and the insecure legal status of some respondents, all interviewees cited are anonymized or given pseudonyms.

A visit to the cemetery in Lesbos where most dead migrants are buried is shocking, yet revealing (photo 1). In the graveyard one finds bodies covered with earth and no headstone to identify the dead. The only markers are broken stones — often recycled from older graves — on which is written the purported nationality of the deceased, a number, and a date. Since most bodies are unidentified, this nationality is typically based on an informed guess or information from survivors, rather than from established facts (Interview #11). As a local priest aptly put it 'these people become a number in the cemetery of Mytilene', the capital of Lesbos (Interview #25). To shed light on this phenomenon we embarked on a study to trace the processes followed by local authorities in the aftermath of a deadly shipwreck, with specific emphasis on the management of the dead bodies of migrants, including the collection, identification, burial and repatriation of remains.

A central finding is that there is a 'grey zone' around the management of migrant bodies, in which the obligations and responsibilities of a range of actors are ill-defined, enmeshed in legal and bureaucratic ambiguity. The coast guard maintained that their responsibility is limited to collecting the dead body and transporting it to the hospital, after which responsibility lies with the district attorney (Interview #18). The district attorney in practice assumes only a marginal role, typically declining any substantive investigation on the assumption that death was not caused by criminal activity, and then signing the relevant documentation to permit burial (Interview #28). The body remains at the local hospital with the coroner, whose duty is limited to the examination of the corpse to establish the cause of death and carry out the autopsy (Interview #23). When asked about the next steps, the coroner had no answer; he only revealed that a swift burial was necessary, as the hospital has no facilities to store bodies for more than a few days. The director of social services at the hospital informed us there is no budget available for burying dead 'illegal' migrants, only for treating living migrants (Interview #24). There is no standardized procedure to deal with a migrant body, and this policy vacuum legitimizes local authorities in denying their legal and moral responsibility to address the issue of identification. Most often relevant data found on the body — documents, tattoos, other identifying marks — are not systematically collected, analysed and stored to support identification. Similarly, only a limited effort is made to collect other information — such as testimony from survivors of a shipwreck — that could advance this goal.

Whilst Greek bureaucracy is subject to an entrenched culture of 'blame avoidance' (Dimitrakopoulos, 2001) this is exacerbated by the deep social, political and economic crisis, with Greek civil servants reluctant to assume any responsibilities beyond those clearly articulated. A local doctor who offers medical aid to incoming migrants argued 'It is certain that there are no accountability procedures to ensure that civil servants are doing their work properly, while they believe that it is not their responsibility to deal with the problem' (Interview #12).

Despite migrant deaths being a persistent phenomenon in recent years, dealing with shipwrecks takes place on an ad hoc basis; no standardized procedure has been established. Even members of the Greek bureaucracy admit this absence of long-term preparedness. At a visit to the local hospital a staff member argued that 'although the hospital is obliged to design an emergency plan for humanitarian or natural disasters (i.e. earthquakes, floods), which could have included immigrants, this has never happened' (Interview #1). This ineffectiveness of the Greek state combined with the intrinsic complexity of the phenomenon has made this policy vacuum even more apparent. The Head of the Greek office of UNHCR highlighted this issue: 'there is a gap in dealing with this problem, and there is a need to create a policy mechanism that would respond more effectively to incidents of shipwrecks, and facilitate relatives to find their loved ones' (Interview #21). Despite repeated calls from high-ranking policy-makers for attention to this issue, to date research has failed to produce empirical evidence that could drive policymaking in accommodating the humanitarian needs of the victims.

4. Migrants deaths: lost in the literature

Although the growing phenomenon of deadly shipwrecks in the Mediterranean constitutes a complex humanitarian crisis, the academic literature has made limited efforts to explore the management of the dead and the consequences of failing to do so. This can be partly attributed to the novel nature of the phenomenon; as time passes more attention will be paid to fully explore the many facets of this humanitarian disaster. For example, legal scholars have shed light on legal and normative perspectives of deaths at sea (Grant, 2015; Spijkerboer, 2013).

However, the limited effort to explore the management of the dead and the phenomenon of missing migrants also reflects a more fundamental methodological flaw in the literature, which prioritizes certain levels of analysis (and thereby specific aspects of the refugee crisis) over others. For example, the majority of such literature emphasises the EU and member-states' official policy responses to 'migrant' flows, including surveillance technologies (Topak, 2014), border policing and 'push-backs' (Bialasiewicz, 2012; Bigo, 2014), and the role of 'smuggling networks' (Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012). This very much reflects — if sometimes critically — the securitization agenda of concerned states. Even the most insightful perspectives from 'critical' security studies, by focusing primarily on state discourses, actions and omissions, have side-lined victims' own experiences, with a few notable exceptions (e.g. Squire, 2014). In a similar vein, human rights organisations and international relief agencies have failed to provide a comprehensive account of the needs of the families, who beyond the dead themselves are the principle victims of the neglect of migrant bodies. Indeed, the families of those dead and missing — with the exception of a few high profile cases — are entirely invisible in approaches to the phenomenon.

Most importantly, by focusing primarily on state responses which are localised at the border most analyses provide a static picture of a very fluid phenomenon, the consequences of which extend well beyond EU borders. Whilst the direct victims of the phenomenon are all too visible on Europe's beaches, the indirect victims are those waiting for news from a loved one who has migrated. Crucially, investigating the remote impacts of deaths that extend to migrants' countries of origin, provides a larger picture and sheds light on the transnational impact of the border on the lives of thousands of families of dead and missing migrants.

To fully explore the phenomenon we build on theoretical insights from the work of Judith Butler and Giorgio Agamben. These frameworks inform particular aspects of the issue, yet each alone is insufficient to account for this complex phenomenon.

Critical border studies has increasingly turned to both Foucault's biopolitics and Agamben's concept of *bare life*, understood as what remains when human existence is stripped of the encumbrances of social location and bereft of the qualifications of political inclusion and belonging (Agamben, 1998). Politics for Agamben is an ongoing tension between inclusion and exclusion, between forms of life that the sovereign will protect and represent and those it will not: this defines the meaning of what it is to be human and thereby distinguishes an excess, the migrant as something other than human, which cannot be made sense of in terms of the nation-state. This prescription resonates with how the EU and its member states treat migrants at their borders. Often in critical border studies Agamben's framework is reduced to an understanding of mere 'exclusion' while its power lies precisely in that bare life revolves around the zone of in distinction between 'outside and inside, exclusion and inclusion' that is created by sovereign power (Agamben, 1998: 91). The liminality of bare life coincides with the undocumented migrant's effort to negotiate both border and sovereignty, confined to a status without even the 'right to have rights' (Arendt, 1951:177), even when within the borders of an entity such as the EU. Sovereign power in contemporary Europe lets migrants die at the border by framing their deaths as accidents, unrelated to the machinery of militarization and securitization that accompanies those deaths (Albahari, 2006).

Agamben portrays the refugee as the ultimate biopolitical subject, and bare life as demonstrating the futility of seeking to represent political subjectivity in terms of state, nation and territory (Owens, 2009). As Agamben has described for living refugees, the bodies of the missing become a part of the legal order precisely through their constitutive exclusion (Agamben, 1998). Such an approach does, however, provide only a partial account of the phenomenon of deaths at the border. By offering a Manichean view of sovereign power, it deprives migrants and their families of the possibility of agency, condemning then to the 'complete embrace of bare life' (Edkins & Pin-Fat, 2004: 17) and, as such, it leaves unaddressed important, yet not easily detectable, processes taking place at the grassroots — in contexts of both migrant arrival and departure. Agamben's emphasis on the state of exception in which the refugee finds herself denies refugees as subjects of political action and as capable of acts of resistance to sovereign power (Huysmans, 2008). In the refugee camp, perceived as the emblematic space of exception, Agamben's approach neglects the political acts of hunger strikes, lip sewing or ethical practices by solidarity groups that nuance this view (Owens, 2009: 573; Sigona, 2015). Most importantly, for the study of dead bodies, Agamben appears to deny that the migrant body can be political, whereas we see the very existence of the body and its presence at the border as a product of politics and, as Verdery has shown (2000), the corpse itself as a political subject. The migrant body appears to have agency; such bodies can both nourish and haunt the living, animating the social and political processes around death and challenging the body as purely an object of politicisation. Beyond the affective impacts of the dead body, i.e. those that touch people emotionally, attachment to the dead and in particular to certain bodies — particularly where they are absent — gives them power over the living (Borneman, 2014).

To this end, Judith Butler's framework sets the stage for a more nuanced discussion of how the dead body and its particular 'vulnerability' can benefit our understanding of the border. Butler raises important questions: 'who counts as human? Whose lives count as lives? And, finally, what makes for a grievable life?' (2004:20). Butler explores the power relations and norms that construct our understanding of what makes some lives grievable and others open to continued vulnerability and precarity, even after death. This is a useful analytical lens to approach both state authorities' policy responses and the experiences of families of dead migrants. Butler calls on us to 'critically evaluate … the conditions under which certain humans are more grievable than others' (2004:30), and identifies moments of loss and grief as critical in determining who counts as human (2004). A number of studies have drawn on Butler's insights to explore the impact of the border (e.g. Hodge, 2015; Mountz, 2015). Drawing on Butler, Mountz suggests 'that if we fail to understand lives as liveable, we fail to understand them as being lost or injured' (Mountz, 2015:188). Hence, those that are not valued in life, are by extension not grievable after death; this is a valuable compass to guide us through the uncharted fields of the management of dead bodies at the border.

5. Living and dead migrants: a novel form of exclusion

The most important innovation of the border is that it serves as a tool of inclusion (for the in-group, largely citizens) but at the same time excludes the rest of humanity. Paasi (2011:62) argues that 'bordering separates and brings together. Borders allow certain expressions of identity and memory to exist while blocking others'. As Green (2012:576) puts it, 'borders always involve a form of classification and categorization of the world'. On Lesbos this entails an additional novel distinction between living and dead (would-be) border crossers. Butler helps us shed light on this distinction. The dead bodies of would-be border crossers are framed as non-grievable by state authorities, and subject to almost no attention, while living migrants are perceived as a potential security threat and constantly surveyed. The dead 'cannot be mourned because they are always lost …. the derealisation of the

'Other' means that it is neither alive nor dead, but interminably spectral' (Butler, 2004:53).

A range of specific labels is ascribed to living migrants, such as 'illegal', 'undocumented', 'minor', and 'asylum seeker', which drive policy approaches. Administrative procedures around 'undocumented' migrants are thorough, while the responsibility for enforcing these procedures lies with central government. This is integral to the broader securitization discourse circumscribing migration: as living migrants are regarded as a 'threat' to national security (Karyotis, 2012) and are subject to more surveillance than perhaps any other category of person. By contrast, dead migrants are ignored and the management of their bodies circumscribed by legal and bureaucratic ambiguity. Migrant deaths are seen as a mere accidental deviation from the (securitization) norm, and their management is ill defined, defaulting to local authorities. This is not unique to Greece; a similar situation is also evident in Lampedusa (Zagaria, 2012:18). Interviews with political elites and policymakers showed they had little familiarity with the problem, including one senior policymaker at the Greek Ministry of Justice in Athens, tasked to deal with human rights, who admitted 'I do not know what is the standard practice or if there is a practice that it is followed at the borders' (Interview #7).

Echoing this 'logic of security', the central government collects and publishes detailed statistics of living migrants who enter the sovereign territory of an EU state. In contrast, there is an almost complete absence of data concerning migrant deaths; as Stefanie Grant has aptly put it 'there is an acute lack of accurate – or often any – information about these deaths' (Grant, 2015:9) consistent with the overarching logic that they are 'accidents', the EU and its member states do not maintain a record of these deaths. This is analytically important. As Andreas and Greenhill have argued 'If there are no 'data', an issue or problem will not be recognized, defined, prioritized, put on the agenda, and debated.'(Andreas & Greenhill, 2011:1). Evidence from one of the most comprehensive efforts to compile data based on death registries in Greece, Spain, Italy and Malta suggests that only a very small fraction of deaths are recorded, and only around half of these are identified (Last, 2015). The result is that very large numbers of dead migrants are officially and formally entirely invisible while considered missing by families who continue to search for their loved ones (Last, 2015).

Integral to the logic which frames the death of migrants as an 'accident' is that burial is seen as an act of benevolence, rather than an act of justice or a moral obligation on the part of the state, and unrelated to any obligation an authority may have to inform relatives of the death. Although there is a specific budget allocated by the EU and the Greek state to care for living migrants at Greek hospitals, there is no allocated budget (from the state or EU) to cover expenses associated with the burial of dead migrants (Interview #24). To organize a burial the (former) mayor of Lesbos had to raise funds from local sponsors or 'beg local offices organizing funeral services to give us the coffins' (Interview #22). At times, migrant communities in Athens and local NGOs collect money to pay for coffins (Interview #19, #20). In this way, an already ambiguous policy becomes both arbitrary and privatised. In an interview with the mayor of Lesbos, he deflected any legal responsibility for the burial of dead migrants, arguing 'I do not know what happens with the management of the dead, because the municipality is not the competent authority to deal with it' (Interview #2). Evidence of this blame avoidance is seen in the fact that local funeral services, which have been requested to carry out burials of migrants on behalf of the city council in the past, have not been reimbursed and as a result have recently brought a case to court (Interview #9).

A visit to the cemetery in Lesbos revealed the graves of migrants to be unmarked except for a broken stone containing a date of death and the purported nationality of the dead. Procedural ambiguity, driven by the effort to avoid blame, ensures that no local agency assumes responsibility for the burial of migrant bodies. Even local NGOs mobilized around migrants' rights are unaware as to which is the designated authority to carry out such burials (Interview #11, #6).

Greek law does not have a specific provision for the burial of unidentified migrants. In the absence of a specific regulatory framework (*lex specialis*) the general laws and regulations concerning the dead apply, irrespective of their nationality. Under Greek law, local municipalities are exclusively responsible for the establishment and proper functioning of cemeteries:

'Cemeteries are destined for the burial of all the dead, irrespective of religion or nationality. Municipalities and communities are obliged to grant to the cemeteries in their jurisdiction space for the burial of every dead person, parishioner or not, and of every other person having died in their prefecture, irrespective of whether the dead was a Greek national or a foreigner, Christian or not.' (Law 582/1968, art. 6.)

Interestingly, the authority tasked to manage the local cemetery does not even maintain a map of the graves in the cemetery (Interview #8). This, coupled with the efforts of local authorities to deflect responsibility, leaves funeral services carrying out the messy business of burial, and in several cases having the monopoly of knowledge about the specific location of particular bodies, an essential piece of data if those bodies are ever to be identified. By subcontracting the responsibility for burial to a non-state actor the authorities not only deliberately deny their legal duties, but, most significantly, make it impossible to determine if standardized procedures are followed, such as whether a tag with vital information is placed on each body buried (Interview #29).

Illustrative of the distinction between living and dead migrants is the contrast between efforts to identify living migrants and the absence of interest in identifying dead bodies. According to a Greek coroner, while the identification rate for the bodies of Greek citizens is almost 97% – an exceptional rate even by international standards – for migrants this rate is approximately 20% (Interview #29). This can partly be attributed to the fact that timing is of the essence in identifying dead bodies. In cases where no one claims a body in the first days after death, a critical window of opportunity is missed and subsequently it becomes far more difficult to make an identification. The passage of time affects \ the condition of the dead body, and inhibits visual identification by relatives, which is the most common form of confirmation of identity. Most significantly, as illustrated below, once the unidentified body is buried in a common grave it becomes almost impossible to identify it.

The leader of a NGO in the neighbouring island of Chios remembers the story of a relative who took the decision to travel from Australia a year and a half after a deadly shipwreck to search for the body of his brother. '[W]e went through a very complicated process. We found the file at the coast guard, we then went to the funeral service and nobody knew where he was buried. We started asking the priests at local cemeteries […] at last we found a gravedigger who hurriedly buried him, but didn't remember exactly the location. Then we brought an excavator and a mass grave was revealed without any signs, nothing. And that was the common procedure' (Interview #17). The mingling of human remains in this way, and the refusal to isolate and record individual burials recalls the chaos of Bosnia's mass graves, the result of a conscious effort to prevent identification.

6. The (In)Visibility of death at the border

A principle driver of the failure to effectively manage the bodies of dead migrants is the invisibility and marginality of bodies found at the border. As Judith Butler argues 'there are radically different ways in which human physical vulnerability is distributed across the globe. Certain lives are highly protected … Other lives will not find such fast and furious support and will not even qualify as 'grievable' (2004:32). Butler provides a theoretical backdrop against which we can explore the continued invisibility and marginality of the dead bodies of migrants. International relief agencies and NGOs, sympathetic or opposing political parties and international media have mobilized around the needs or perils of living migrants, yet a similar mobilization around the dead or missing is absent. Individual incidents of deadly shipwrecks have attracted significant media attention, perfectly illustrated by the death of the 3-year old Aylan Kurdi (Withnal, 2015). Still, there has been no follow up, mobilization or political process to highlight this aspect of the refugee crisis or to make visible the families of the dead.

This raises a paradox. The dead body has historically been an exceptionally powerful symbol of mobilization. Antigone's claim to the dignified obligation to the dead served as a tool of resistance to state authority, while the mothers of the disappeared in Argentina created one of the most powerful human rights movements around the search for their loved ones (Brysk, 1995). Along these lines, Butler argues that 'grief … furnishes a sense of political community of complex order', adding that making 'grief into a resource for politics, is not to be resigned to inaction, but it may be understood as the slow process by which we develop a point of identification with suffering itself' (Butler, 2004:30). However, despite the large number of deaths at the EU's shores and powerful images of the dead that have been widely disseminated, no such mobilization has occurred.

The distinguishing feature of migrant deaths is that they occur *at the border*. Most theoretical frameworks around social movements and contentious politics focus on the presence of opportunities for collective action; the framework is built on the premise that even for the marginal there are routes to action (Tarrow, 1998; Tilly, 1995). For the families of missing and dead migrants however such opportunities for mobilization are simply absent. Their (il) legal status in the EU, their inability to exert any political influence, their dispersion across a range of states and continents, and the absence of culturally salient symbols to construct their mobilization around their search for their loved ones all present obstacles. As such, the border effectively annihilates opportunities for collective mobilization around grief envisaged by Butler. Where mobilization has occurred, such as among families of missing migrants in Tunisia,[3] the border remains an often insurmountable barrier between families' need for truth and the states in a position to address it.

Whilst this invisible status, coupled with the collapse of Greek institutions, has provided opportunities for living migrants to escape the total control of the border, for the families, invisibility is the greatest obstacle. While some families have used social media and other informal networks to access information about the fate of loved ones, all must rely ultimately on official procedures to confirm death, identify a body, and return remains of loved ones. In the absence of any perception of obligation on the part of authorities, it is however families who must take the initiative and seek out a relevant authority, while authorities remain passive. Once a

family takes on the heavy burden of traveling to Greece to trace their loved one, they are confronted by a number of legal, bureaucratic and practical obstacles. They often do not have a legal permit to enter the EU and as such it is not uncommon for their arrival to be delayed or even denied. When a refugee with permanent resident status in Germany came to Lesbos in search of his missing father 'the port authority did not accept that his documents were legal, and he was stopped. When he tried to come through the airport, he faced the same problem' and a local NGO had to convince the authorities to release him (Interview #11). As families are the only ones who can visually identify dead migrants, these bureaucratic obstacles often inhibit the only realistic opportunity to identify the body.

Within this context of marginality and invisibility imposed by the border, networks of exploitation thrive around the suffering of the families. In the face of the failure of the authorities to identify bodies, even in the unlikely event that a survivor informs families of the dead in the country of origin, they cannot afford the cost of repatriation of remains. Thus, while poor (living) migrants experience the greatest barriers (and dangers) in entering the EU, it is also the poorest who face the greatest obstacles to repatriating remains if a loved one dies making the journey. As a migrant interviewed in Lesbos who has organized a number of funerals argued 'Only the rich get back, the poor stay here' (Interview #19). Ironically, while it is wealthy living migrants who have the greatest possibilities to stay in the EU, it is the families of the poorest dead migrants who see that their loved one must remain on EU territory forever. This insight challenges the simplistic image of migrants (and their families) as a homogenous unity. Even among refugees and migrants there is a class element which co-exists with their identity as border crossers. Hence, the study of this novel humanitarian phenomenon sheds light on how abstract concepts such as sovereignty, citizenship and the border create new dividing lines not only between the dead (citizens and non-citizen), but most interestingly between dead and living migrants.

This raises another prevalent feature of the policy vacuum, the repatriation of remains. Even if families are fortunate enough to overcome all other bureaucratic obstacles and identify their relatives, it is almost impossible to get the dead body back home. The repatriation of the corpse is an extremely complicated and expensive procedure (Interview #10). Precisely because families have limited knowledge of Greek legal procedure and often hurriedly visit Greece with no legal status, they pay excessive amounts of money to middlemen who claim they can expedite the process. A number of participants revealed that there is an established 'network of profit', which often involves the smugglers (Interviews #26, #27). A respondent from Afghanistan stated 'They (smugglers) are people that get money and make profit from the deaths […] They know how to deal with funeral services and when relatives try to find someone to help they get in contact with these people. They don't usually ask for money from families but they take some money from the funeral service, which overcharges the families. It is all organized' (Interview #30).

One of the key obstacles is that dead bodies often need to get visa status to travel back home within an extremely tight time frame as corpses must travel within days for sanitary reasons. A Syrian relative remembers that 'after the death we had to organize the funeral. The first thought was to take them back to Syria as our family wanted that […] but the problem was taking the body back to Syria, as Turkey requires a visa for the dead. The ambassador of Turkey told me that they had to check the coffin. The visa was difficult' (Interview #27). Hence, after spending an exorbitant amount of money to repatriate the body, the family took the decision instead to bury their loved one in Athens.

As a result of these obstacles, over the past years only a handful

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[3] Mobilization of families of missing migrants in Tunisia is led by a NGO called Terre pour Tous ('Everybody's earth') who have documented some elements of their work, e.g. http://la.terre.est.pour.tous.over-blog.com/tunis/06/09/2013-information.

of families have managed to claim remains, usually those with significant political or economic influence. For example, two migrants currently living in Lesbos who have followed incidents of shipwrecks remember one in which 22 migrants died; only two bodies were repatriated largely because they were the relatives of an Afghan minister who mobilized the Afghan embassy in Athens (Interview #15). All other victims were buried at the local cemetery. Other migrants interviewed confirmed the high cost of repatriation: 'most frequently the family does not have the money to bring them [bodies] back as the money is usually spent to pay the smugglers' (Interview #20). Hence, the border inhibits the efforts of families to repatriate the remains of their loved ones but also drives networks of exploitation which benefit from the families' suffering.

7. Tensions between the dead body as evidence of crime and as a reference for mourning

One of the key tensions examined here is that between the bodies of migrants as evidence of crime (the rhetoric of forensic truth) and a particular body as a reference point for mourning and the addressing of trauma (the rhetoric of memory). Whether the bodies of those missing are considered objects of forensic investigation that serve judicial purpose or are sacred relics of a loved one that permit mourning determines which of these understandings is prioritized. Death separates people from their loved ones in a more profound way than the physical border and simple distance does; where information is absent, death is perceived as an uncertain lack of presence and creates an ambiguous space in which mourning is impossible. The bodies of missing migrants represent a space of conflict between different interests, including power, knowledge and the sacred. The evidential approach will seek to emphasise the past, while families will seek approaches that permit them to address their present and their future, which will include the identification that transforms remains from an object into the relics of a loved one.

Ambiguous loss, where a family member is psychologically present, but physically absent, is 'a situation of unclear loss resulting from not knowing whether a loved one is dead or alive, absent or present' (Boss, 2004: 554). For many families of migrants who die at the border ambiguous loss is a trauma generated by the confluence of death and the border as a divide that prevents not only access to a migrant, living or dead, but access even to knowledge of their death, leaving them caught between hope and despair.

'When my son disappeared, I was lost in thought all the time and looked for answers and explanations for his disappearance. I am oscillating between believing that they are alive and admitting that they are dead. After all, only God knows what is going on.' (Interview 31)

This articulates the power of the border over both the migrant and his or her family and its capacity to communicate trauma over large distances. To end the trauma of ambiguity demands the creation of meanings for families that can only emerge from truth about their loved one, and that can permit the rituals that allow the dead to assume their proper place as a part of — albeit removed from — family and community (Danforth, 1982). Families want to know the truth and they want to be able to bury their loved ones if they are dead:

'They must tell us where our children are. The truth will comfort us; I want him alive or dead. If they say that he's alive, they should tell us in which place is he and if he is dead, we will be able to do our mourning, bury him, after all it is the will of god.' (Interview #32)

Power relations that deny that dead migrants are grievable intersect with the lack of knowledge of death that prevents families mourning. The ambiguity of a family's loss emerges as a result of the denial of grievability of migrants who die at the EU's border, — an extension of their exclusion in life. As Butler states:

'Do they have names and faces, personal histories, family, favourite hobbies, slogans by which they live? [...] After all, if someone is lost, and that person is not someone, then what and where is the loss, and how does mourning take place?' (p.32)

Grief emerges from both the individual and collective meanings given to events, just as the rituals that mark death seek to create social understandings that bind someone to their community whilst acknowledging they are no longer a part of it. As such, grief is both built upon and demonstrates the relational ties that link families, clans and communities. Mourning is an ethical responsibility of those close to the dead, and one denied to the relatives of those missing, as described by Tunisian families:

'They have to bring them back for us here whether they're dead or alive. It's important, I wouldn't deny his fate, but in case my son is dead, I'd like to bury him here and, at least, I'll be better and I'd have a place where I can pray. Even bones, I'll bury them. The cemetery is in front of my house. Every morning, I wake up in front of it. I recite the *Fatiha*, I do this daily. I don't have any hostility towards death. At least, if he's brought back to me, I'd look through the window to see his grave and I'd say that he's there.' (Interview #33)

The inscription of the border on both the bodies of the dead and the lives of their families can benefit our understanding of the official policies designed to respond to this problem and the families' political grief.

Katherine Verdery (2000) has highlighted the symbolic capital of human remains and how elites use graves to advance their political objectives. In the case of missing migrant graves it is the public silence and the *absence* of political interest that make these graves politically important. The question of 'ownership of the dead body' is symbolically and politically important. Although historical examples of confrontations and conflicts around dead bodies abound, in the case of dead migrants their bodies are trapped on the wrong 'side' of the border and thereby condemned to political marginality. Death creates a new border which not only separates migrants from their loved ones but that initiates the trauma of ambiguous loss that becomes a permanent by-product of the border on relatives' daily lives. Most families will never know the truth, or recover the remains of their loved ones and must live with the consequences of that.

'I don't sleep any more, I have hallucinations and dark ideas. It's like a crisis, I start wandering in the house and sometimes I hit the furniture. I have disrupted sleep. I usually wake up at 3 in the morning. There is a voice in my head telling me sometimes that my son is dead, and sometimes I tell myself that he is alive. I feel choked. I always think deeply and I usually feel afraid when I stay alone. The medicines that were prescribed to me are too strong; I can no longer wake up. I'm so tired because of all this, you know.' (Interview #34)

For the families each grave contains the remains of a personal

history and an individual who used to be loved. For the authorities receiving the body, however, the corpse serves firstly as a potential tool of evidence in advancing a narrative that criminal responsibility for death lies with smugglers. In many EU states investigation of migrant bodies is driven solely by a desire to prosecute, and identification of a body is only pursued if this will advance such a prosecution. Secondly, the body is an object to be managed for reasons of hygiene and propriety. Probably the best illustration of the official approach to dead migrants is that of the civil registries. The death certificate is a key document precisely because state authorities certify that a person was a member of the human community and after death grant a legal status to the body that was denied in life, forever buried on Greek soil. The death certificates of unidentified migrants perfectly illustrate that they are not 'grievable' in Butler's terms, but drive only a bureaucratic duty. The responsible registrar in Lesbos described the typical process of preparing a death certificate of an unidentified migrant buried in Mytilene:

'The coroner informs us that he carried out the autopsy and indicates the most probable date of death. Then he sends us (i.e. the registry) an official document with a reference number. Once we have prepared the death certificate we also use a new reference number. Then we usually add a remark to the document that this certificate was based on information provided by the coroner's report, and it has a reference number, date etc' (Interview #35)

Interestingly, death certificates usually narrate a very fundamental (official) story about a dead person, such as the date of birth if s/he was married, if s/he had children. The certificate for the vast majority of unidentified migrant deaths is overshadowed by their invisible status, containing only the report of the coroner. This captures the remote forensic and legal approach of the state, which merely seeks to follow the legal and bureaucratic procedures. A caveat is in order. This does not mean that all members of the civil service are indifferent; to the contrary, the registrar we interviewed showed much support for the families. In fact she led an initiative to collect food and clothes for the living migrants (Interview #35). Yet, feelings of grief or empathy are overshadowed by the bureaucratic culture of blame avoidance.

The process of DNA collection from bodies best exemplifies both the 'forensic' and bureaucratic approach of the authorities. The coroner at the local hospital in Lesbos verified that a DNA sample is taken and sent to the headquarters of the Forensic Science Division (FSD) of the Greek police in Athens. An interview with the two leading members of the FSD revealed that since 2007 the law has obliged coroners to take DNA samples from all victims of 'accidents', irrespective of their nationality and even where physical identification has been possible (Interview #4).[4]

It could be argued that this central collection of information concerning individuals who would otherwise be anonymous to the Greek state is tied to the embedded securitization regime, namely to determine at a later date if a particular subject (e.g. a suspected terrorist) is in fact dead. Yet, a closer tracing of the process reveals that even this forensic approach is implemented poorly enough to make the possibility of future identifications remote. The complete lack of grievability is evident in the use of DNA and the failure in practice to collect and store in a systematic way post-mortem data

from shipwrecks.

For example, beyond DNA, local authorities tasked with dealing with bodies, including the port authority, hospitals and the district attorney have taken only minimal steps to collecting other post-mortem data that would facilitate future identification. According to a local journalist, in the aftermath of a shipwreck coast guards often neglect to collect critical evidence that migrants carry with them, including mobile phones, notebooks or personal objects that if systematically collected and stored could aid identification (Interview #10). An informed observer maintained that although local coroners have the capacity to follow the Disaster Victims' Identification (DVI) protocol, a rigorous set of guidelines for post-mortem autopsy set up by Interpol (2014), they rarely do (Interview #29). This is crucial, as autopsy is the only opportunity to provide an accurate description of bodies found, including information concerning jewellery, tattoos or other bodily marks, and in this way facilitate future identification. Yet, most coroners spent little time making a comprehensive autopsy, especially in cases where a DNA sample is taken.

Although the head of the Forensic Team of the police informed us that families can send a DNA sample from the country of origin, in only around 10% of deaths is such a sample received (Interviews #4, #5). This is hardly surprising, as there is no outreach to states of origin of migrants and minimal cooperation among different agencies tasked to deal with different elements of the problem. For example, local coast guards were not only unaware that this service was available but were unsure whether a DNA sample was taken in all cases (Interview #18). This is important, as the port authority in Lesbos is the agency responsible for drafting and maintaining legal files for cases of missing and unidentified migrants, as well as for recording any developments in individual cases.

Most importantly, there is only minimal exchange with the relevant forensic branch of the police tasked to match DNA samples, and with the municipal authorities responsible for the burial. So, although the local coast guards are maintaining a file that should include information on the precise gravesite for each unidentified individual, in most cases this is not done because burial is organized by a different local agency with very limited coordination. Hence, even if a family manages to overcome all the obstacles discussed above and a DNA match is finally made, this does not necessarily mean they will find the whereabouts of their loved ones, precisely because the identification and the burial are completely insulated processes, such that no one DNA sample can be linked unambiguously to a particular buried body.

In sharp contract with this legal and forensic approach to the dead body by state authorities, families' experience of loss and the perception of the dead body is radically different. As Edkins has shown, Western politics 'misses the person' (2011:2). Families perceive the dead body as an object of mourning, and their struggle is to make sense of the absence of their loved ones. The disappearance of loved ones confronts those impacted by it with the power of the border; power to not only deny life, but to deny even access to confirmation of death. As a result, power is embodied not only in the very present absence of the bodies of missing migrants but also in the minds and bodies of their families through trauma and somatism. The missing, situated as they are between life and death, assume a power of their own, something familiar made unfamiliar as a result of the border. It is a defining feature of those missing that they resist the dichotomous classification of present versus absent, and it is this that most determines the experience of their families, characterised by ambiguity and ambivalence. Deaths at the EU's southern borders are a tragedy, but the politics of the border that denies the value of those who die there constitutes a second crisis whose victims are scattered throughout the migrant producing states of Africa and the Middle East.

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[4] This is not however linked to the epidemic of migrant deaths at sea, but is a response to the false identification of two (Greek) victims of wildfires in the summer of 2007, as a result of which the state has institutionalized the use of DNA with all victims of accidents, including dead migrants.

8. Conclusions

Our analysis indicates that the management of migrant bodies at EU's southern frontier reflects particular understandings of contemporary borders and their biopolitics. This paper offers a unique insight into the 'refugee crisis' in the Mediterranean. The treatment of migrant bodies at the EU's southern frontier and the experience of families with no information about missing loved ones, drives the analytic lens of 'death as the border' to expand our conceptualization of the border. It sheds light on the 'logic of the border', which extends well beyond the physical frontier and the living migrants crossing it, to determine the political afterlife of dead migrants and their families. To highlight this we have introduced an important new actor — the families of dead and missing migrants. Our analysis reveals a key tension between state authorities' responses to the management of the problem, guided by a legal and 'forensic logic', and the families' approach, which experience a human body as a reference point for mourning and the addressing of trauma. Although official policies include DNA testing, limited efforts are made to identify individual bodies and bury them in a dignified way, thereby depriving families of the capacity to mourn or bury loved ones. The result is that the bodies of the dead are literally lost in a fog of bureaucratic ambiguity, unmourned and uncounted. This highlights the transnational affective impact of death at the border: death creates a new border as a direct result of the presence of the physical frontier, which separates families from their relatives and even from news of dead loved ones.

The paper also contributes to the growing debates on biopolitics, by challenging the monolithic and often simplistic biopolitical lenses which perceive dead bodies as lacking agency. Even Butler's concept of *grievability*, which links the non-grievability of dead migrants to the exclusion and marginality of the living, ultimately sees no agency in the migrant body. This resonates with the perception that the live migrant is the ultimate biopolitical subject, while denying any subjectivity to both the bodies of the dead and their families. Our analysis challenges this view by foregrounding families' experiences and their approaches to mourning; from this perspective, the dead body is itself a political subject, a symbol of political and cultural contestation. For every common grave in the Mediterranean there is a family which mourns, struggles, and often takes political steps to find the truth about their loved ones and honour their remains. This is the political story of these deaths, which often remains marginalized by perspectives which focus almost exclusively on official authorities' responses.

Conflict of interest

None.

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List of interviews

Interview #1 Female staff of Vostaneio Hospital (Mytilene, 30 March 2015).

Interview #2 Mayor of Lesbos, Male (Mytilene, 3 April 2015).

Interview #3 Female local activist in her 30s (Athens, 15 April 2015).

Interview #4 Female Head of Forensic Science Division of the Greek Police (Athens, 17 April 2015).

Interview #5 Female Senior Scientist in the Forensic Science of the Greek Police (Athens, 17 April 2015).

Interview #6 Male local activist in his 30s (Mytilene, 1 April 2015).

Interview #7 Secretary General of the Greek Ministry of Justice (Athens, 15 April 2015).

Interview #8 Head of the Mytilene Charity Institutions, Male in his 60s (Mytilene, 3 April 2015).

Interview #9 Owner of funeral services Lesvos, Male in his 60s (Mytilene, 4 April 2015).

Interview #10 Local journalist, male in his 50s (Mytilene, 19 July 2013).

Interview #11 Local activist, female in her 40s (Mytilene, 16 July 2013).

Interview #12 Local doctor, male in his 30s (Mytilene, 22 July 2013).

Interview #13 Local activist, female in her 30s (Mytilene 20 July 2013).

Interview #14 Moroccan, Male in his 20s (Mytilene 16 July 2013).

Interview #15 Afghan, Male in his 20s (Mytilene 16 July 2013).

Interview #16 Local activist in his 20s (Mytilene 18 July 2013).

Interview #17 Local activist in his 40s (Mytilene 18 July 2015).

Interview #18 Member of Port authority, male in his 40s (Mytillene 5 August 2013).

Interview #19 Afghan, Male in his 20s (Mytilene 26 July 2013).

Interview #20 Female activist in her 20s (Mytilene 26 July 2013).

Interview #21 Head of the Greek UNHCR(Mytilene 3 August 2013).

Interview #22 Former mayor of Lesbos (Mytilene 24 July 2013).

Interview #23 Local coroner at Vostaneio hospital (Mytilene 21 July 2013).

Interview #24 Director of social services, vostaneio hospital (Mytilene 22 July 2013).

Interview #25 Local priest in his 60s (Mytilene 23 July 2013).

Interview #26 Local activist, female in her 40s (Mytilene 25 May 2015).

Interview #27 Syrian, Male in his 50s (Mytilene 27 May 2015).

Interview #28 Secretary of the local District Attorney (Mytilene 4 April 2015).

Interview #29 Coroner, Male in his 40s (Athens 9 April 2015).

Interview #30 Syrian, Male in his 30s (Mytilene 23 July 2013).

Interview #31 Tunisian, Father of missing migrant (Tunis, 27 November 2015).

Interview #32 Tunisian, Mother of missing migrant (Kef, 29 November 2015).

Interview #33 Tunisian, Mother of missing migrant (Bizerte, 5 December 2015).

Interview #34 Tunisian, Mother of missing migrant (Tunis, 11 November 2015).

Interview #35 Greek civil servant in Lesbos registry (Mytilene 13 December 2015).

SHAHRAM KHOSRAVI

The 'illegal' traveller: an auto-ethnography of borders*

Borders of nation-states have come to be a natural order in human lives. They are not only edges of a state but also seen as an essential reference of national identity. Based on a capitalist-oriented and racial discriminating way of thinking, borders regulate movements of people. In an era of global inequality of mobility rights, freedom of mobility for some is only possible through systematic exclusion of others. This paper is an auto-ethnography of borders and 'illegal' travelling. Based on personal experiences of a long journey across many borders in Asia and Europe, I attempt to explore how the contemporary border regime operates. The paper focuses on the rituals and performances of border crossing. This is a narrative of the late 20th century through the eyes of an 'illegal' migrant.

Key words borders, nation-states, refugees, irregular migration, human smuggling

Introduction

One cold night in late February 1987 I stood on a gravelled road which was the border separating Iran from Afghanistan. It was around midnight. Deadly silent and pitch-dark. 'If I take a step,' I thought, 'I will be somewhere else. When my foot touches the ground on the other side of the road, I will not be the same person. If I take this step I will be an "illegal" person and the world will never be the same again'.

The paradigmatic scene of the world today is undoubtedly a picture of bodies, squeezed between pallets inside a truck. The picture is taken by an X-ray camera on the border between nation-states. It exposes those invisibles, the people without papers on the wrong side of the border. The X-ray image shows the naked white bodies on a black background – a silhouette of human beings. Metaphorically, human bodies are displayed also naked of their political rights. The image illustrates a depoliticised body, or in Giorgio Agamben's words a *homo sacer* (1998). *Homo sacer* personifies 'the naked life', which differs from the politicised form of life, explicitly represented in the notion of citizenship. The X-ray image testifies to a hegemonic topography of borders. Borders determine how the world looks. The map of the world shows how the world is represented in a mosaic of unities (of nations) with clear outlines and

distinct in different colours. The political map today resembles, in Ernest Gellner's words, the painting style of Modigliani: 'neat flat surfaces are clearly separated from each other, it is generally plain where one begins and another ends, and there is little if any ambiguity or overlap' (Gellner 1990: 139–40). Borders of nation-states have come to be a natural order in many dimensions of human lives (Malkki 1995: 5). Borders are no longer simple edges of a state. 'Borders shape our perception of the world … border thinking is a major component of our consciousness of the world' (Rumsford 2006: 166). Borders are essential reference of communal sense, of identity. They are not only external realities but also a 'colour bar' situated everywhere and nowhere (Balibar 2002: 78). Violation of border-regime is thus a violation of ethical and aesthetical norms. 'Illegal' border crossing challenges the sacred feature of the border rituals and symbols. It is seen as a criminal act deserving punishment. Based on a capitalist-oriented and racial discriminating way of thinking, borders regulate movements of people. However, borders are also the space of defiance and resistance. 'Illegal' border crossing and borders are defined in terms of each other. The existence of borders is the very basis of this form of travelling (Donnan and Wilson 1999: 101). In this auto-ethnography I attempt to interject personal experiences into ethnographic writing. It is 'a form of self-narrative that places the self within a social context' (Reed-Danahay 1997: 9). In auto-ethnographic text the distinction between ethnographer and Others is not clear. It challenges imposed identities and boundaries. Auto-ethnography can be seen as alternative forms of meaning different from the dominant discourse (Pratt 1992). Based on my own journey I will offer a narrative of the polysemic nature of borders, border politics, rituals and performances of border-crossing.

Border guards and border people

That night I took the step and became 'illegal'. But my border biography had in fact begun six months earlier in September 1986 at my first attempt to leave Iran 'illegally'. I had then just finished high school and I was called up to do military service during the ongoing terrible war between Iran and Iraq. To come back alive from the front was a chance I did not want to take. A 'middleman' took me to Iranshahr, a small city in Baluchistan province near the border with Pakistan. He was the link to a local human smuggler. What I did not know was that the smuggler collaborated with the police. He, as we later found out, gave 'small fry' to the police to be allowed to take the 'big ones'. We were arrested on the first night in a hotel. In custody and later in prison, everybody I met had been arrested in connection with the border. For more than one month, I was in cells with big and small drug smugglers, undocumented Afghan immigrants, a dozen young men like myself who had tried to flee the country, and local native Baluchi tribesmen who for generations had crossed the border freely but were now punished for violating the rules.

This border is one of the most profitable borders for smugglers, traffickers and corrupt border guards in the world. A combination of human smuggling and trafficking and drug smuggling has made this border a lucrative place. Through the 909 kilometre border with Pakistan and the 936 kilometre border with Afghanistan, young girls are trafficked from Iran to Pakistan and from Afghanistan to Iran for sexual exploitation. Young boys from Bangladesh and Pakistan are trafficked to Iran en route to the Gulf States, where they are forced to work as camel jockeys, beggars or labourers.

Afghanis seek a future in Iran – either as their country of destination or in transit to Europe. Furthermore, up to 90% of the heroin consumed in Europe crosses this border (Gouverneur 2002). In contrast to the common perception that 'borders are a boon for traffickers and a nightmare for law-enforcement agencies' (Rumsford 2006: 164), the borders are beneficial even for border guards. Border crossers without papers are robbed by the guards before they are taken into custody. Not surprisingly, the border people usually view the various border officials as the true criminals and not the smugglers (*cf*. McMurray 2001: 123).

Human smugglers and the sacrifice of border transgressors

After five weeks I was released on bail. Five months later, I tried to leave again. This time I did not turn to a smuggler. An Afghani cellmate put me in contact with Homayoun, a 25-year-old Afghani man who had lived clandestinely in Iran since he was just fifteen. His parents still lived in Kabul under Soviet occupation. One day in January 1987, he called me and said that he was planning a visit to Kabul to marry 'the most beautiful girl in the town'. He asked if I wanted to come along. Homayoun requested $500 to take me to Quetta, the largest city in northeastern Pakistan. It was less than half of what my first smuggler had demanded. I have never considered Homayoun in terms of a *smuggler*. Himself an undocumented immigrant, Homayoun facilitated my escape from undesired martyrdom in a long and bloody war. Human smuggling is recurrently misrepresented by the media and politicians as an entirely mafia-controlled criminality. Furthermore, it is also usual not to differentiate between human smuggling and trafficking in persons. Human smuggling is multifaceted and is a complex market for highly differentiated services (see Bilger *et al.* 2006; Liempt 2007). Moreover, there are various actors involved who conduct sequential operations on different levels (see Içduygu and Toktas 2002). Human smugglers do not make up a homogenous group. Alongside the criminal ones there are local people living in the border regions. They might facilitate an 'illegal' border crossing for a low price.

I arrived in Zahedan, the centre of Baluchistan province, by air around noon. A taxi took me to a marketplace in a suburb, where I was to meet Homayoun. He took me to a house and brought me some food and said that I should get some rest. We left Zahedan on a pick-up truck in the evening. We drove north for a few hours and then took a side road to the east. Somewhere the truck was stopped and we were ordered to jump down and run towards the silhouette of huge mountains which separated Iran from Afghanistan. I changed my jeans and T-shirt to Afghani national dress and began to climb. It was pitch dark and I tried to stay very close to Homayoun. I had heard stories of how smugglers just disappeared in the night and left their clients alone, which meant certain death. After crossing the mountain we were at the border, a gravelled road. With a few steps I crossed the border and began my odyssey across many national borders, outside all regulations and laws, without travel documents.

We continued going all night. Once, Homayoun said that he was not sure if we were going in the right direction and approaching dawn we saw a border watch-tower, which Homayoun said belonged to Pakistan. We began to run in the opposite direction. The guards, Homayoun said, would shoot to kill, not to arrest. However, after 13 hours climbing and walking we reached a camp. It was a sort of self-organised camp

for displaced people who had fled the Red Army. It was 1987 and Afghanistan was still under occupation by the Soviet Union. The camp was not large and consisted of around a hundred tents. There was no running water or any other basic facilities. I did not see any trace of international organisations there. A forgotten camp on the most remote frontier of Afghanistan. An Islamic militia group, perhaps Afghan Mujaheddin, controlled the camp. There were numerous trucks with heavy weapons on them. All the men carried arms. For a few dollars, an old man let us hide in his shelter. He gave us tea and bread, which he said was the only meal in the camp. The day we arrived in the camp was a Friday, the Muslim Sabbath. At noon, militia searched the tents and forced people to attend Friday prayers. A young man with a Kalashnikov in his hand found me and wondered who I was. Homayoun asked me to go outside. After a while the Kalashnikov-carrying man left us alone. He had probably been paid by Homayoun to ignore my presence in the camp. After this incident Homayoun decided to leave Afghanistan as soon as possible and said that he would follow me all the way to Karachi.

According to immigration law, Homayoun was a human smuggler, a law breaker and a criminal. But in fact he saved my life in one of the most dangerous places, under the rule of ruthless criminal gangs, corrupt border guards and fanatic Mujaheddin. Needless to say, not everyone was lucky enough to have a good 'helper'. Later in Karachi I heard horrible stories of rape, homicide, kidnapping and blackmail of persons on the borders by their smugglers. An 'illegal' traveller is in a space of lawlessness, outside the protection of the law. This is the main aspect of contemporary border politics. It exposes the border transgressors to death rather than using its power to kill (Agamben 1988; Mbembe 2003). The vulnerability of border transgressors is best demonstrated by their animalisation. The terminology used in this field is full of names of animals to designate human smugglers and their clients; *coyote* for the human smuggler and *pollos* (chickens) for Mexican border crossers (Donnan and Wilson 1999: 135); *shetou* (snakehead) for Chinese human smugglers and *renshe* (human snakes) for smuggled Chinese (Chin 1999: 187). Iranians usually use the terms *gosfand* (sheep) or *dar poste gosfand* (in the skin of sheep) to refer to 'illegal' border crossers. Represented in terms of chicken and sheep – two animals traditionally sacrificed in rituals – the border transgressors are sacrificial creatures for the border ritual.

Homayoun and I fled from the camp under cover of darkness later that day on the back of a pick-up going southwards. The driver drove very fast on gravelled roads and over wastelands. Around midnight we crossed the border. There were no guards or barriers. A single room, which was supposed to be a checkpoint, was the only trace of a nation-state system on the border. The pick-up kept driving all night. At dawn we reached a small town. It was on the Pakistani side but crammed with Afghani refugees and armed Mujaheddin. The driver said that the Red Army jets occasionally bombed the town because of the concentration of Afghanis. The town was lawless. Homayoun said that all kinds of weapons and drugs were sold openly on the streets. The driver took us to a garage, where I got some rest. Homayoun went out to find out how we could get to Karachi. Around noon he came back with two bus tickets to Quetta, the largest city in northwestern Pakistan. It was not easy to find a way out of the town. Thousands of refugees were searching for a vehicle to take them south to a safer place. The bus, decorated and painted like a holy shrine, was overloaded. Refugees occupied the aisle and even a handful of people sat on the roof of the bus. All the other passengers were Afghani refugees. I still wore Afghani clothes and was instructed by Homayoun

how to present myself as a Kabuli. However, all these precautions did not help when a police officer at a check point said without hesitation: 'You are not Afghani' and asked for my passport. Once again, with some rupees the border problem was solved. I do not know how much Homayoun bribed the border guards, the bus driver to let me on, the hotel managers to overlook my illegality, and many others. I, however, witnessed that many people earned money thanks to my journey. In Quetta, the UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) gave me a letter, which did not have any legal or political significance. I was told that Quetta was not a safe place for refugees and I should go to Karachi. It was a long journey by land to Karachi. It meant many checkpoints and many persons to be bribed. So we decided to travel by air. With the paper I had received from UNHCR, I bought a ticket. We arrived at Karachi at night. We noticed that a police van was following our taxi when we left Karachi airport. After a few kilometres the van overtook us and ordered the taxi driver to stop. A police officer and six policemen surrounded the taxi. Five hundred rupees (approx US$40) more and we were again free. Later on I realised that it was a rite of passage for all undocumented people coming to Karachi airport.

Just before midnight we arrived in the vicinity of Cantt Station in central Karachi. Close to the railway station, Cantt Station was an odd place packed with Iranian, Iraqi and Afghan refugees, together with poor Pakistani migrant workers, petty gangsters, drug dealers, male prostitutes and a sea of beggars. There were several small, cheap hotels, mostly occupied by refugees. The lobbies and coffee houses next to the hotels were a sort of 'migration market' where human smugglers met their clients and dealers and middlemen hunted newly arrived refugees. Cantt Station was, in some ways, an urban refugee camp within the larger city. There was also an Iranian restaurant and a hostel where Iranians could transfer money from Iran. Iranians who lived in other parts of the city came there to get news and meet other Iranians. Room 404 in Hotel Shalamar, a cheap, five-storey hotel became my home for the next eight months. Amongst the cheap eating places on the pavements, which at night were transformed into sleeping-places for the tired bodies of poor migrant workers, Hotel Shalamar stood, still glamorous with its rosy façade and green windows. Homayoun left me the day after our arrival to continue his journey to his beloved in Kabul. I never met him again. I do not know if he survived the Taliban or the Americans.

Almost everyone had the same answer: 'there is no point in going to the UNHCR'. It was a common belief that it was a waste of time. To flee a war was not enough and only a political case had a chance. In the first days I was offered a 'strong case' with a 'guarantee to be approved' for a US$100 in the 'migration market'. I made a mistake and did not buy it. My fear of being killed in a horrible war was not 'well-grounded' enough in the view of the UNHCR officer. Later on the 'case-dealer' laughed at me when I told him that my application had been rejected. I agreed with him that it was no use telling the UNHCR the truth. It was all about performance. Those who came first and were interviewed first, in their narratives of their 'well-founded fear', left a hallmark by which the UNHCR officers scrutinised other asylum seekers. The UNHCR officers used information from previous interviews to check the reliability of others' accounts. They had detailed knowledge about *Evin* and *Ghasr*, two prisons in Tehran, as well as about the most infamous interrogators, their appearances and nicknames.

Henry, a young Iranian-Armenian man, who lived in room 308 of Hotel Shalamar, was an activist within a communist militia, *Cherikhaye Fadai*, in Iran. But the UNHCR did not believe him. The reason was a wall painting in a corridor in the basement of

a prison in Isfahan, where Henry had been detained for several months before his escape to Pakistan. In the interview Henry was asked by the UNHCR official to say what was painted on the wall in the corridor, to test his reliability. Henry had not seen such a painting and consequently his application was rejected. How did the UNHCR officer know about the wall painting? How could she or he be sure that there was any painting at all in that corridor? Henry was desperate and did not know what to do. Just a few weeks before my departure from Karachi, one morning when the UNHCR officials arrived in their dark-windowed cars, he poured gasoline on himself and struck a match in front of the UNHCR. Unfortunately, Henry was not the only victim from our refugee community. During the eight months of my stay in Karachi, two dissident Iraqi refugees were brutally killed, probably by Saddam Hussein's agents. Then Babak hanged himself in his room on the second floor. Another friend from Hotel Shalamar whom I lost was Behrooz. He was a young student from Tehran and only three years older than I. After one year in Karachi he decided to go to India. There were rumours that the UNHCR in New Delhi was much more sympathetic towards Iranians. He went to Lahore to be smuggled across the border. It was a cheap but very dangerous way to India. The Pakistani–Indian border was and still is one of the most militarised borders in the world. Besides the military, ethno-religious conflicts made the border crossing even more dangerous. Stories of how people who tried to cross the border were tortured and killed by local people were circulated among refugees in Cantt Station. Yet Behrooz saw no way out. He did not have enough money to try other options. A short phone call from Lahore just before his leaving for the border is the last trace of him.

There were many human smugglers in Cantt Station; from big ones like Nasser, the Baluch who had hundreds of *mosafer*s (lit. passenger, clients), to amateur ones. Many smugglers were themselves migrants or refugees who joined the business for a few years before going to the West. In addition there were a large number of dealers, middlemen and lackeys who worked for the smugglers. The smugglers usually demanded the whole or a large part of the payment in advance. When the amount was paid, they let hell loose on the clients. Young women were sexually abused for a long period before the smuggler sent them on. Young men were turned into lackeys who would hunt new clients. Sometimes the smuggler forced their clients to be drug carriers, to take 'a bag' with them to Europe. There was no smuggler in our hotel, except for Farhad. He called himself a smuggler but in fact he was nothing more than a dealer for the big smugglers. In room 304, right under my room, Farhad lived with two Iranian teenagers, a brother and sister. The sister was a few years older than the brother. The siblings had given all their money to Farhad to be smuggled to Canada. It was obvious to all that Farhad had no intention of sending the teenagers anywhere, or of paying their money back. The situation became worse when he moved into their room. After that, the girl never left the room. There were rumours that Farhad was sexually abusing her. How could they protest? Farhad had all the money their parents had saved to send them to safety. Before our very eyes, Farhad was holding them captive. Room 304 in Hotel Shalamar is still a frequent nightmare.

My smuggler was Abbas, a second generation Iranian immigrant in Karachi. In his early thirties, Abbas was a businessman with a 'good' reputation in Cantt Station. His father opened an Iranian restaurant, which was now run by Abbas. For $2500 he promised to send me to a European country. Two months or so after my arrival in Karachi, my father paid the money to Abbas' brother-in-law in Iran. Weeks passed and I realised that Abbas had no intention of arranging my journey. I asked him to give

me back my money. He refused and said 'I will send you. Come back next week'. This 'come back next week' was repeated for a further four months. Abbas was an influential businessman with connections within the police and the Iranian consulate. I did not even have a passport. The irony was that an officer from the Pakistani secret police was placed in Cantt Station to keep an eye on the refugees while the smugglers mingled freely with diplomats and the police. Powerless to demand my money back, I began a new strategy. One day I stood in front of his restaurant from the time it opened until one or two in the morning when it closed. I did this again and again. At first, he ignored me. Then his workers threatened me and pushed me away. But I was there the next day. Finally after a few months he gave me US$2000 and said that the remaining US$500 had been paid for a false passport which he refused to give to me.

One week later, in late October, I left Karachi for Delhi. After eight months in Cantt Station I knew exactly what to do. It was impossible for me to make it to Europe by myself, so I decided to go to India. For $500 I bought an Iranian passport, whose owner had already been smuggled to Europe. An Iranian-Armenian, famous for high-quality work in forging stamps and changing photos, replaced the owner's photo with mine. He also put the necessary stamps – such as an entry stamp to Pakistan – in the passport. Then an Afghani dealer got me a visa to India for $500. He also arranged a contact at Karachi airport for a few hundred dollars. I paid my debts to friends and the manager of Hotel Shalamar, who had kindly let me stay on credit. I said goodbye to only a few friends. It was a rule: 'do not trust even your brother'. In Cantt Station you never knew who was friend and who was foe. Rival smugglers would inform the airport authorities in order to damage each other's business. For stateless travellers, secrecy is vital. At the airport, the immigration officer who was bribed to let me go through asked me to follow him to his office. There he asked me to put all I had on the table. It was robbery again. Since I expected such, I had hidden a $100 bill, all I had left, inside my belt. I put $20 on the table. He threatened me and asked for more money. He pointed to the chain which I had worn since I was a child, a keepsake from my mother. I refused, vehemently and loudly. He got scared, took the $20 and let me go. I was robbed twice at Karachi airport, once on arrival by the police and once by an immigration officer when leaving.

The community of displacement

At Delhi airport, an Iranian lady who saw the Iranian passport in my hand asked me to help her to fill out a customs form. When finished I told her that I was travelling 'illegally', so it was better for her not to be seen with me. She got worried and left me, but waited for me on the other side. My passport had been professionally forged and I went through without any problem. The Iranian woman and I shared a taxi to New Delhi. She was visiting her son who had lived clandestinely in Delhi for a long time. It was almost midnight and she kindly let me stay the night at their place. Her son told me I could find Iranians in Defence Colony Market. In the next few days I visited the neighbourhood to find a contact. There were a lot of Iranians, but I did not know any of them. To save money I slept in a park close to Defence Colony. After a few days I got to know Hiva, a middle-aged undocumented Afghani prostitute who usually hung around the market waiting for customers. She had been a dancer in Kabul before she was forced to flee. One aspect of border crossing is anonymity and absence of the

social moral codes. G.B. Road, the red light district in New Delhi, was crammed with Nepalese prostitutes. Border zones offer sites for work which may not be acceptable in the homeland. Nevertheless Hiva was not safe from harassment even in Defence Colony. Other Afghani refugees saw her as a disgrace to their nation. Just as an anthropologist in a new field is first contacted and helped by the most marginalised, Hiva was the only one who helped me. Both of us were outcast and stateless. Through her I found an Iranian man who came from the same ethnic group as I, the Bakhtiari. Thanks to ethnic solidarity I was put up in a single room, which I shared with six other Iranians. Unlike Cantt Station, Defence Colony was a nice middle-class neighbourhood, where retired army officers rented their servants' rooms to refugees. The rumour in Karachi was correct. The UNHCR in New Delhi was much more humane. The personnel were helpful and the building was more welcoming in contrast to the fortress-like one in Karachi. I was recognised as a refugee, but unlike the situation in Karachi the UNHCR offered no migration programme. I got a refugee card and $50 a month. It was just enough to pay for my share of the rent and for food for two weeks. However, in New Delhi my situation improved dramatically. There was no police harassment and it was easier to move around in the huge city of Delhi. During my five months in New Delhi I shared rooms with many persons in transit. All are now residents of Europe or North America – thanks to the smugglers. Amir, Kian and Jahan went to Holland; Saman, Pour, Masoud, Maziar and Hamid to Canada; Keyvan to England; Mohammad and Manoucher to Germany; Latif to the USA; and Reza to Norway.

Transferring money from Iran to India was impossible. Unlike Karachi, there was no Iranian immigrant community. Those who had relatives in the USA or Europe received money easily through the banking system, but not us whose money came from Iran. Having someone – a sibling, a friend or even a distant relative – in Europe, Canada or the USA meant a lot to refugees. Having such a network gave security and self-confidence. Beside economic support, the network meant access to information and to having a clear and defined prospect of the journey. The choice of country of destination was primarily determined by such networks. After I had been in New Delhi a month or so, my father sent money with an Indian man who came from Tehran. Nevertheless, he gave me a few hundred dollars less than what my father had paid him, arguing that 'it costs'. We 'illegal' travellers were an easy source of income for many people we came across en route. With the money in my hand I decided to leave India and to go on my way. In New Delhi there were two smugglers with good reputations. One was Pooya, a young Iranian in his early thirties, who was a graduate in civil engineering from a university in Delhi, the other was Nour, a middle-aged Afghani man who lived with his elderly mother in Defence Colony. One day in December 1987 when I went to his place to ask about the rates, his mother invited me in and asked me to stay for lunch. During negotiations over rates, destinations and routes, we were served tasty Afghani food. After lunch she joined us and while she prepared tea on a samovar she turned to Nour and asked him to give me a discount. Nour told me that his wife and son lived in Canada and he would join them when he had saved enough money to start a business in Toronto. Her hospitality and kindness alongside Nour's reputation for being reliable and proficient made it easy for me to choose him.

The rates were not fixed. They increased by the week and sometimes by the day. Like shares, the rates for an 'illegal' journey depended on global politics and events. For instance, the death of the President of Pakistan, Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, in a plane crash in August 1988 caused the rates to soar in a day. Furthermore, when a *khat* (lit.

line, flight route) was 'disclosed', the smuggler would raise the price, arguing that the bribes had increased at airports and the routes, flights, combinations and destinations should be changed. Nour always worked with only a handful of *mosafer* (lit. passengers, clients). When they were sent abroad, he would take on new ones. In mid January 1988 I became his *mosafer*. For most European countries Nour demanded between US$2300 and US$2500. By then I had only US$2000 left of the money my father had sent. Just like any other market negotiation, hard bargaining resulted in a discount of US$300. Nour gave me two options: Holland or Sweden. I chose Holland. Nour accepted to send me to Holland for US$2000 but without 'guarantee', i.e. in case of deportation or arrest he had no obligation toward me. A 'guarantee' cost a few hundred more, which I could not afford.

The choice of destination was rarely as it was intended and designed. An 'illegal' journey is after all arbitrary. Sometimes the migrants end up in a country just coincidentally. 'Control of one's movement', which is usually seen as the main difference between human smuggling and trafficking in persons, is vague and uncertain. First of all, the destination was determined by the payment. A few hundred dollars could change the destination from one continent to another. Masoud, a roommate, was Nour's *mosafer* at the same time as I was. He had US$500 more than me and today he is a Canadian citizen, lives in Toronto and his children's mother tongue is English. I am a Swedish citizen, live in Stockholm and my children's language is Swedish: US$500 destined our lives so differently. However, information or rather rumours of the asylum policy in different countries was also a determining factor in the choice of country of destination. Information came from smugglers but also from the friends and roommates who had been sent to Europe or Canada. By phone and letter, they sent detailed information about the country of destination, the route, the airport and the journey. Nour demanded half of the payment at once to start the 'project'. We agreed that the rest would be paid when I reached my destination. A friend in Defence Colony would do that after receiving a call from me. Nour said that I should contact him regularly. The journey could not be planned too much in advance. Due to all the security factors involved, we could only know the day of departure one or two days in advance.

The performance of border rituals

The most important item of the travelling process was an appropriate passport. Some smugglers have a 'look-alike' strategy, i.e. to find a passport whose owner looks like the client to avoid altering the passport. New Delhi was a huge market for European passports. Many backpackers sold their passports when their money ran out. For a few hundred dollars one could get a Danish, German, Spanish or Greek passport. Southern European passports were much in demand and therefore more expensive, due to the Mediterranean look of these nationals. An Iranian could pass more easily as a Greek or Italian than as a German. Another factor that determined the price of a passport was the number of stamps inside it. More visa stamps and entry/exit stamps in a passport made it more trustworthy and more expensive. However, Nour did not waste money on a real passport for me. He *made* one. It was a so-called 'second-grade' passport. 'Second-grade' passports were in fact photocopied passports. Mine was a Greek passport. The first time I saw it, I thought it was a joke. It was not even copied adequately. The vignettes on some pages were crooked and some parts of the text at the top of the pages were missing. The cover was worse. It would not even fool the parking attendant at the

airport, let alone an immigration officer. Nour said that the passport was not a big issue and the immigration officer would be bribed to overlook my passport. Nour would also get the boarding card himself. I was not able to protest. I had already paid him half the agreed sum and the rate for Europe was by then up to US$2600.

In mid February Nour informed me that his 'line' to Holland had been uncovered by the European police. He decided to stop sending *mosafers* to Holland for some time. I should wait for a few months to see what would happen. Nour asked if I wanted to go to Sweden instead; I could be there in a week. 'Sweden?' I did not even know the geographical location of Sweden in Europe. 'Volvo!' said Nour, in an attempt to give me a clue. After 18 months living on borders, I did not really care where I would end up. On 27 February 1988, Nour handed me the passport and ticket and said that departure was the next day. We would meet at the airport. I had a night to prepare my role as the Greek owner of the passport. My first name was Kostas and the surname, which I never learned by heart, was at least four or five centimetres long and impossible to pronounce. The whole night before departure I tried to say and write *my* name by heart. Since I could not count on my photocopied passport, the rest depended on my performance. Border crossing is, after all, a matter of performance. Borders are zones of cultural production, spaces of meaning-making and meaning-breaking (Donnan and Wilson 1999: 64). Border crossing reinforces and challenges our social and political status. It has its own ritual – passport, applying for a visa, security checks and the performance of going through specific places and spaces of border control and customs. Border crossing, being in 'borderland' (Hannerz 1997), a zone of betwixt and between, a predicament of liminality (Turner 1982) is *per se*, in anthropological sense, a ritual. The border ritual reproduces the meaning and order of the state system. The border ritual is a secular and modern sort of divine sanctity with its own rite of sacrifice. Several hundred clandestine migrants die en route to Europe each year. From January 1993 to July 2007 the deaths of more than 8800 border-crossers were documented in Europe. The Mediterranean Sea is turned into a cemetery for the transgressive travellers. The floating dead bodies washed up on the shores of European tourist islands are evidence of border-necropolitics. The border-regime exercises its power not only through 'the right to live or die', but pre-eminently through 'the right to expose to death' (Mbembe 2003; Perera 2006). The border-regime exposes transgressive refugees/travellers to death through consigning them to 'the zones of exemption where the sovereign power cease to function' (Rajaram and Grundy-Warr 2004: 38).

Nour gave me some instructions for the border performance. The first rule was to be cool and not to panic. If you are self-assured, you go through even with the worst passport in your hand. However, your body can betray you. Border guards recognise this at once. They seek the tell-tale signs. It is the body of the border-crosser that provides the signs: furtive eyes, sweaty palms, nervous tension when answering questions (Donnan and Wilson 1999: 131). Body performance is the central part of the ritual. The body should be masqueraded and trained to move. Those with Northern European passports should have the proper coloured hair, eyebrows and even hair on arms. 'Correct' dress was another part of the masquerade. Except for Saman, who had a Saudi Arabian passport and was dressed 'properly' in a suit and tie, to act as a well-to-do businessman, the rest of us were to be back-packer types. Sometimes the smuggler sent one male and one female client as a couple. Their belongings were mixed and they were given instructions on how to perform in order to give the impression of a married couple. The situation was even more complicated if a child was involved. It was difficult

to induce a child to call a stranger 'daddy'. I had spent many hours in Connaught Place and Tourist Camp, the zones with a high concentration of tourists in New Delhi, to observe them. Sometimes I got into conversation with them in a coffee shop, just to know more about them and their journey. I wanted to know how and why they had come to India. I asked them about their backgrounds in their homelands and such issues. Another source of inspiration for border-performance was Hollywood movies. Amir, an old friend in both Hotel Shalamar and later Defence Colony, was inspired by the film *Midnight Express* (dir. Alan Parker, 1978). The protagonist of the film felt profusely nervous going through immigration control, with packets of drugs taped on his body. Before going through, the protagonist goes to the washroom and keeps taking very short, fast breaths for several minutes in order to control his breathing. The night before his departure to Holland, Amir talked a lot about this specific scene and how he would imitate the protagonist. It is a tactic by the 'illegal' migrants to subvert the dominant border-regime (de Certeau 1984).

I met Nour in the departure lounge at the airport. He gave me the boarding cards and showed me where to go and wished me good luck. I do not remember how long I stood there in front of the officer and stared at his fingers browsing through my photocopied passport. Was there really a 'contact' or had Nour just lied? I was anxious and wanted to run, but to where? There was no going back. Heathrow was my transit airport. The flight was arranged in such a way that I was several hours in transit. This made it more difficult for the Swedish police to trace my flight and the country of departure. Somewhere between London and Stockholm, following Nour's instructions, I tore up the passport, the boarding pass and the ticket and flushed them down the toilet. Needless to say, I did not carry any identification other than my Greek passport. I had left letters, photos and my Iranian ID-cards behind to be sent to me when I reached Sweden. At Arlanda airport, two policemen waited at the gate and picked out 'asylum-seeker-looking' passengers. My masquerade and 'performance' did not work in Sweden. Along with a few other asylum-seeker-looking-persons, we were taken to the police station at the airport, albeit still in the transit area. In a corridor we waited outside a door. There were only a few chairs. Some of us sat on the floor and others stood along the wall, while regular passengers passed by. Border crossing can be experienced in terms of honour and shame (cf. Kumar 2000). A legal journey is regarded as an honourable act in the spirit of globalism and cosmopolitanism. The legal traveller passes the border gloriously and enhances his or her social status, whereas the border transgressor is seen as anti-aesthetic and anti-ethical (they are called 'illegal' and are criminalised). We live in an era of 'world apartheid', according to which the border differentiates between individuals. While for some the border is a 'surplus of rights', for others it is a 'color bar' (Balibar 2002: 78–84). The freedom of mobility for some is only possible through the organised exclusion of others (Cresswell 2006: 233). For the first time since I crossed the first border, I was struck by the shame of my migrant illegality. Nowhere else had I experienced the border so tangible, powerful and distressing. Shame is a part of the punishment for transgression of the nation-state sovereignty. The worst was that I internalised the shame and for many years I lied about my route to Sweden. I pretended to be a quota-refugee, one of the thousands of conventional refugees the Swedish government *takes* to Sweden annually. Shame is an experience of being exposed to the disapproving gaze of others. There is a risk that the illegal migrant, subjected to a gaze and treatment that divests him or her of humanity, internalises the shame – as I did – and understands the lack of travel documents and documentation as personal

deficiencies and inadequacies. The importance and centrality of shame in the experience of migration is still unexplored.

After waiting for a long time in the corridor, I was called inside a room. The police searched me and asked me about my flight and transit country. After Nour's instructions, I answered that I was Iranian and had come via Dubai. The police did not believe me and planned to send me to Istanbul, which they supposed to be my transit country. I was jailed at Arlanda airport for two days. A long interview was conducted by a police officer on the second day. It was a cold day and the window was half-open. I froze in the light jacket I had worn from hot New Delhi. When I mentioned this to the police officer, in the hope that he would close the window, he said: 'You refugees always overdramatise'. What, I thought then, would he say if I told him the story of Hotel Shalamar and its guests. However, after two days in jail I was sent to a refugee camp and six months later I was granted refugee status based on humanitarian grounds.

Final remarks

Eighteen years later, on 18 September 2006, I arrived at Bristol airport, along with a few colleagues from Stockholm University. I was convener for a workshop on 'irregular migration in Europe' at the biannual conference of the European Association of Social Anthropologists (EASA). After passing immigration control, I was stopped by a security official who let my blond fellow travellers pass. In the middle of a narrow corridor a mini interrogation began which lasted for half an hour. 'Bordering is selective and targeted' (Rumsford 2006: 164). My status as a Swedish citizen disappeared at the border because of my face. I answered questions about myself, my education, work, purpose of visit to Bristol. Then she asked about my parents, where they lived and what they did. I was not willing to disclose to her any kind of information about my elderly parents, who have been subjected to persecution by the Iranian state for decades. When I refused to answer her questions about my parents, she threatened to detain me first for nine hours and then, if necessary, for nine days according to the Anti-Terrorism Act. I protested that she had targeted me because of my 'Middle Eastern' look and her selection of suspicious persons was racist. She did not even deny it and said 'you [me and who else?] want to kill us. We have to protect ourselves'. Hearing this, I decided to return to Sweden at once. This was not an option either until I had answered the questions. Put into a petrifying immobility, I could neither move in nor out. I was indistinguishable from the border; I *was* the border. The officer handed me a leaflet on the 'Anti-Terrorism Act', according to which I was obliged to answer any question the officer asked. When she realised that I had decided to be detained rather than answer her questions, she wished me a pleasant time in Bristol! Suddenly I was a full EU citizen again with a surplus of mobility rights and free movement. My legal status as an EU citizen is situational, conditional and unconfirmed. I am a quasi-citizen whose rights can be suspended in the state of emergency. I am included and at the same time excluded. This is exactly how the contemporary border regime operates. Through 'inclusive exclusion' (Agamben 1988: 17), the undesirable persons – 'illegal' migrants, refugees and quasi-citizens – are positioned on the threshold of *in* and *out*. Their experience is indistinct from the operation of nation-state and their very existence is indistinct from the border (Raj 2006). Through rebordering politics, the sovereign power does not merely exclude the undesirable persons but penalises and regulates them by petrifying them into immobility in detention centres, by ignominious and terrifying

forms of deportation, or by racialised internal border control – that turns the citizen into a quasi-citizen. As Balibar puts it 'some borders are no longer situated at the borders at all' in geographical or political senses of the terms (2002: 84). Borders have become invisible borders, situated everywhere and nowhere. Hence the undesirable persons are not expelled by the border, they are forced to *be* border (*ibid*.).

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Abstracts

Le Voyageur 'Clandestin': Une Auto-Ethnographie des Frontières

Les frontières des états-nations sont entrées dans l'ordre naturel des vies humaines. Elles sont perçues non seulement comme les bordures d'un état, mais aussi comme le point de

référence essentiel de l'identité nationale. Fondées sur un mode de pensée d'orientation capitaliste et discriminatoire en termes de race, les frontières contrôlent la circulation des personnes. A l'ère de l'inégalité mondiale des droits à la circulation qu'est la nôtre, la liberté de circuler de certains n'est rendue possible que par l'exclusion systématique des autres. Cet article est une auto-ethnographie de frontières et de voyage 'clandestin'. A partir d'expériences personnelles au cours d'un long voyage par-delà de nombreuses frontières d'Asie et d'Europe, l'article tente d'explorer les modes d'opération de l'actuel régime des frontières. L'accent est mis sur les rites et spectacles mis en scène lors de la traversée de frontières. Il s'agit d'un récit de fin de vingtième siècle, à travers le regard d'un migrant 'clandestin'.

Der 'Illegale' Reisende: eine Auto-Ethnographie der Grenzen

Grenzen von Nationalstaaten werden zunehmend als naturgegeben angesehen. Sie sind nicht nur die Ränder des Staates, sondern werden auch als wichtigster Bezugspunkt nationaler Identität wahrgenommen. Einer kapitalistischen und rassistischen Sichtweise zufolge regulieren Grenzen die Bewegung von Menschen. In einer Zeit der global ungleichen Verteilung des Rechts auf freie Bewegung, ist die freie Mobilität für die einen nur möglich, weil die anderen systematisch davon ausgeschlossen werden. Der Beitrag ist eine Selbstethnographie von Grenzen und „illegalem" Reisen. Basierend auf persönlichen Erfahrungen während einer langen Reise über mehrere Grenzen Asiens und Europas hinweg, habe ich versuche herauszufinden, wie Grenzsysteme (*border regimes*) heutzutage funktionieren. Der Artikel stellt Rituale und Performanzen des Grenzübergangs in den Mittelpunkt der Untersuchung. Es ist eine Erzählung über das späte 20. Jahrhundert aus der Perspektive eines 'illegalen" Migranten.

El Viajero 'Ilegal': Una Auto Etnografia de Fronteras

Las fronteras de los Estados Nación se han naturalizado en las vidas humanas. No sólo son los límites de un Estado pero también se consideran una referencia esencial de la identidad nacional. Basado en pensamientos orientados hacia el capitalismo y la discriminación racial, las fronteras regulan el movimiento de la gente. En una era de desigualdad global respecto a los derechos de movilidad, la libertad de movimiento para algunos se hace posible sólo a través de la exclusión sistemática de otros. Este artículo es una auto etnografía de fronteras y del viajar 'ilegalmente.' Basado en experiencias personales de un viaje largo, cruzando muchas fronteras en Asia y en Europa, intento indagar en como opera el régimen contemporáneo de fronteras. El artículo enfoca los rituales y performances de cruzar fronteras. Esta es una narrativa de la última parte del Siglo XX a través de la mirada de un migrante 'ilegal.'

Necropolitics

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Necropolitics

Achille Mbembe

Translated by Libby Meintjes

Wa syo' lukasa pebwe
Umwime wa pita
[He left his footprint on the stone
He himself passed on]
Lamba proverb, Zambia

This essay assumes that the ultimate expression of sovereignty resides, to a large degree, in the power and the capacity to dictate who may live and who must die.[1] Hence, to kill or to allow to live constitute the limits of sovereignty, its

1. The essay distances itself from traditional accounts of sovereignty found in the discipline of political science and the subdiscipline of international relations. For the most part, these accounts locate sovereignty within the boundaries of the nation-state, within institutions empowered by the state, or within supranational institutions and networks. See, for example, *Sovereignty at the Millennium*, special issue, *Political Studies* 47 (1999). My own approach builds on Michel Foucault's critique of the notion of sovereignty and its relation to war and biopower in *Il faut défendre la société: Cours au Collège de France, 1975–1976* (Paris: Seuil, 1997), 37–55, 75–100, 125–48, 213–44. See also Giorgio Agamben, *Homo sacer. Le pouvoir souverain et la vie nue* (Paris: Seuil, 1997), 23–80.

fundamental attributes. To exercise sovereignty is to exercise control over mortality and to define life as the deployment and manifestation of power.

One could summarize in the above terms what Michel Foucault meant by *biopower*: that domain of life over which power has taken control.[2] But under what practical conditions is the right to kill, to allow to live, or to expose to death exercised? Who is the subject of this right? What does the implementation of such a right tell us about the person who is thus put to death and about the relation of enmity that sets that person against his or her murderer? Is the notion of biopower sufficient to account for the contemporary ways in which the political, under the guise of war, of resistance, or of the fight against terror, makes the murder of the enemy its primary and absolute objective? War, after all, is as much a means of achieving sovereignty as a way of exercising the right to kill. Imagining politics as a form of war, we must ask: What place is given to life, death, and the human body (in particular the wounded or slain body)? How are they inscribed in the order of power?

Politics, the Work of Death, and the "Becoming Subject"

In order to answer these questions, this essay draws on the concept of biopower and explores its relation to notions of sovereignty (*imperium*) and the state of exception.[3] Such an analysis raises a number of empirical and philosophical questions I would like to examine briefly. As is well known, the concept of the state of exception has been often discussed in relation to Nazism, totalitarianism, and the concentration/extermination camps. The death camps in particular have been interpreted variously as the central metaphor for sovereign and destructive violence and as the ultimate sign of the absolute power of the negative. Says Hannah Arendt: "There are no parallels to the life in the concentration camps. Its horror can never be fully embraced by the imagination for the very reason that it stands outside of life and death."[4] Because its inhabitants are divested of political status and reduced to bare life, the camp is, for Giorgio Agamben, "the place in which the most absolute *conditio inhumana* ever to appear on Earth was realized."[5] In the political-juridical structure of the camp, he adds, the state of exception ceases to be a temporal sus-

2. Foucault, *Il faut défendre la société*, 213–34.

3. On the state of exception, see Carl Schmitt, *La dictature*, trans. Mira Köller and Dominique Séglard (Paris: Seuil, 2000), 210–28, 235–36, 250–51, 255–56; *La notion de politique. Théorie du partisan*, trans. Marie-Louise Steinhauser (Paris: Flammarion, 1992).

4. Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harvest, 1966), 444.

5. Giorgio Agamben, *Moyens sans fins. Notes sur la politique* (Paris: Payot & Rivages, 1995), 50–51.

pension of the state of law. According to Agamben, it acquires a permanent spatial arrangement that remains continually outside the normal state of law.

The aim of this essay is not to debate the singularity of the extermination of the Jews or to hold it up by way of example.[6] I start from the idea that modernity was at the origin of multiple concepts of sovereignty—and therefore of the biopolitical. Disregarding this multiplicity, late-modern political criticism has unfortunately privileged normative theories of democracy and has made the concept of reason one of the most important elements of both the project of modernity and of the topos of sovereignty.[7] From this perspective, the ultimate expression of sovereignty is the production of general norms by a body (the demos) made up of free and equal men and women. These men and women are posited as full subjects capable of self-understanding, self-consciousness, and self-representation. Politics, therefore, is defined as twofold: a project of autonomy and the achieving of agreement among a collectivity through communication and recognition. This, we are told, is what differentiates it from war.[8]

In other words, it is on the basis of a distinction between reason and unreason (passion, fantasy) that late-modern criticism has been able to articulate a certain idea of the political, the community, the subject—or, more fundamentally, of what the good life is all about, how to achieve it, and, in the process, to become a fully moral agent. Within this paradigm, reason is the truth of the subject and politics is the exercise of reason in the public sphere. The exercise of reason is tantamount to the exercise of freedom, a key element for individual autonomy. The romance of sovereignty, in this case, rests on the belief that the subject is the master and the controlling author of his or her own meaning. Sovereignty is therefore defined as a twofold process of *self-institution* and *self-limitation* (fixing one's own limits for oneself). The exercise of sovereignty, in turn, consists in society's capacity for self-creation through recourse to institutions inspired by specific social and imaginary significations.[9]

This strongly normative reading of the politics of sovereignty has been the

6. On these debates, see Saul Friedlander, ed., *Probing the Limits of Representation: Nazism and the "Final Solution"* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992); and, more recently, Bertrand Ogilvie, "Comparer l'incomparable," *Multitudes*, no. 7 (2001): 130–66.

7. See James Bohman and William Rehg, eds., *Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997); Jürgen Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996).

8. James Schmidt, ed., *What Is Enlightenment? Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century Questions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).

9. Cornelius Castoriadis, *L'institution imaginaire de la société* (Paris: Seuil, 1975) and *Figures du pensable* (Paris: Seuil, 1999).

object of numerous critiques, which I will not rehearse here.[10] My concern is those figures of sovereignty whose central project is not the struggle for autonomy but *the generalized instrumentalization of human existence and the material destruction of human bodies and populations*. Such figures of sovereignty are far from a piece of prodigious insanity or an expression of a rupture between the impulses and interests of the body and those of the mind. Indeed, they, like the death camps, are what constitute the *nomos* of the political space in which we still live. Furthermore, contemporary experiences of human destruction suggest that it is possible to develop a reading of politics, sovereignty, and the subject different from the one we inherited from the philosophical discourse of modernity. Instead of considering reason as the truth of the subject, we can look to other foundational categories that are less abstract and more tactile, such as life and death.

Significant for such a project is Hegel's discussion of the relation between death and the "becoming subject." Hegel's account of death centers on a bipartite concept of negativity. First, the human negates nature (a negation exteriorized in the human's effort to reduce nature to his or her own needs); and second, he or she transforms the negated element through work and struggle. In transforming nature, the human being creates a world; but in the process, he or she also is exposed to his or her own negativity. Within the Hegelian paradigm, human death is essentially voluntary. It is the result of risks consciously assumed by the subject. According to Hegel, in these risks the "animal" that constitutes the human subject's natural being is defeated.

In other words, the human being truly *becomes a subject*—that is, separated from the animal—in the struggle and the work through which he or she confronts death (understood as the violence of negativity). It is through this confrontation with death that he or she is cast into the incessant movement of history. Becoming subject therefore supposes upholding the work of death. To uphold the work of death is precisely how Hegel defines the life of the Spirit. The life of the Spirit, he says, is not that life which is frightened of death, and spares itself destruction, but that life which assumes death and lives with it. Spirit attains its truth only by finding itself in absolute dismemberment.[11] Politics is therefore

10. See, in particular, Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), especially chap. 2.

11. G. W. F. Hegel, *Phénoménologie de l'esprit*, trans. J. P. Lefebvre (Paris: Aubier, 1991). See also the critique by Alexandre Kojève, *Introduction à la lecture de Hegel* (Paris: Gallimard, 1947), especially Appendix II, "L'idée de la mort dans la philosophie de Hegel"; and Georges Bataille, *Oeuvres complètes XII* (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), especially "Hegel, la mort et le sacrifice," 326–48, and "Hegel, l'homme et l'histoire," 349–69.

death that lives a human life. Such, too, is the definition of absolute knowledge and sovereignty: risking the entirety of one's life.

Georges Bataille also offers critical insights into how death structures the idea of sovereignty, the political, and the subject. Bataille displaces Hegel's conception of the linkages between death, sovereignty, and the subject in at least three ways. First, he interprets death and sovereignty as the paroxysm of exchange and superabundance—or, to use his own terminology: *excess*. For Bataille, life is defective only when death has taken it hostage. Life itself exists only in bursts and in exchange with death.[12] He argues that death is the putrefaction of life, the stench that is at once the source and the repulsive condition of life. Therefore, although it destroys what was to be, obliterates what was supposed to continue being, and reduces to nothing the individual who takes it, death does not come down to the pure annihilation of being. Rather, it is essentially self-consciousness; moreover, it is the most luxurious form of life, that is, of effusion and exuberance: a power of proliferation. Even more radically, Bataille withdraws death from the horizon of meaning. This is in contrast to Hegel, for whom nothing is definitively lost in death; indeed, death is seen as holding great signification as a means to truth.

Second, Bataille firmly anchors death in the realm of *absolute expenditure* (the other characteristic of sovereignty), whereas Hegel tries to keep death within the economy of absolute knowledge and meaning. Life beyond utility, says Bataille, is the domain of sovereignty. This being the case, death is therefore the point at which destruction, suppression, and sacrifice constitute so irreversible and radical an expenditure—an expenditure without reserve—that they can no longer be determined as negativity. Death is therefore the very principle of excess—an *anti-economy*. Hence the metaphor of luxury and of *the luxurious character of death.*

Third, Bataille establishes a correlation among death, sovereignty, and sexuality. Sexuality is inextricably linked to violence and to the dissolution of the boundaries of the body and self by way of orgiastic and excremental impulses. As such, sexuality concerns two major forms of polarized human impulses—excretion and appropriation—as well as the regime of the taboos surrounding them.[13] The truth of sex and its deadly attributes reside in the experience of loss of the boundaries separating reality, events, and fantasized objects.

12. See Jean Baudrillard, "Death in Bataille," in *Bataille: A Critical Reader*, ed. Fred Botting and Scott Wilson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), especially 139–41.

13. Georges Bataille, *Visions of Excess: Selected Writings, 1927–1939*, trans. A. Stoekl (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), 94–95.

For Bataille, sovereignty therefore has many forms. But ultimately it is the refusal to accept the limits that the fear of death would have the subject respect. The sovereign world, Bataille argues, "is the world in which the limit of death is done away with. Death is present in it, its presence defines that world of violence, but while death is present it is always there only to be negated, never for anything but that. The sovereign," he concludes, "is he who is, as if death were not. . . . He has no more regard for the limits of identity than he does for limits of death, or rather these limits are the same; he is the transgression of all such limits." Since the natural domain of prohibitions includes death, among others (e.g., sexuality, filth, excrement), sovereignty requires "the strength to violate the prohibition against killing, although it's true this will be under the conditions that customs define." And contrary to subordination that is always rooted in necessity and the alleged need to avoid death, sovereignty definitely calls for the risk of death.[14]

By treating sovereignty as the violation of prohibitions, Bataille reopens the question of the limits of the political. Politics, in this case, is not the forward dialectical movement of reason. Politics can only be traced as a spiral transgression, as that difference that disorients the very idea of the limit. More specifically, politics is the difference put into play by the violation of a taboo.[15]

Biopower and the Relation of Enmity

Having presented a reading of politics as the work of death, I turn now to sovereignty, expressed predominantly as the right to kill. For the purpose of my argument, I relate Foucault's notion of biopower to two other concepts: the state of exception and the state of siege.[16] I examine those trajectories by which the state of exception and the relation of enmity have become the normative basis of the right to kill. In such instances, power (and not necessarily state power) continuously refers and appeals to exception, emergency, and a fictionalized notion of the enemy. It also labors to produce that same exception, emergency, and fictionalized enemy. In other words, the question is: What is the relationship between politics and death in those systems that can function only in a state of emergency?

In Foucault's formulation of it, biopower appears to function through dividing

14. Fred Botting and Scott Wilson, eds., *The Bataille Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 318–19. See also Georges Bataille, *The Accursed Share: An Essay on General Economy*, vol. 1, *Consumption*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Zone, 1988), and *Erotism: Death & Sensuality*, trans. Mary Dalwood (San Francisco: City Lights, 1986).
15. Bataille, *Accursed Share*, vol. 2, *The History of Eroticism*; vol. 3, *Sovereignty*.
16. On the state of siege, see Schmitt, *La dictature*, chap. 6.

people into those who must live and those who must die. Operating on the basis of a split between the living and the dead, such a power defines itself in relation to a biological field—which it takes control of and vests itself in. This control presupposes the distribution of human species into groups, the subdivision of the population into subgroups, and the establishment of a biological caesura between the ones and the others. This is what Foucault labels with the (at first sight familiar) term *racism*.[17]

That *race* (or for that matter *racism*) figures so prominently in the calculus of biopower is entirely justifiable. After all, more so than class-thinking (the ideology that defines history as an economic struggle of classes), race has been the ever present shadow in Western political thought and practice, especially when it comes to imagining the inhumanity of, or rule over, foreign peoples. Referring to both this ever-presence and the phantomlike world of race in general, Arendt locates their roots in the shattering experience of otherness and suggests that the politics of race is ultimately linked to the politics of death.[18] Indeed, in Foucault's terms, racism is above all a technology aimed at permitting the exercise of biopower, "that old sovereign right of death."[19] In the economy of biopower, the function of racism is to regulate the distribution of death and to make possible the murderous functions of the state. It is, he says, "the condition for the acceptability of putting to death."[20]

Foucault states clearly that the sovereign right to kill (*droit de glaive*) and the mechanisms of biopower are inscribed in the way all modern states function;[21] indeed, they can be seen as constitutive elements of state power in modernity. According to Foucault, the Nazi state was the most complete example of a state exercising the right to kill. This state, he claims, made the management, protection, and cultivation of life coextensive with the sovereign right to kill. By biological extrapolation on the theme of the political enemy, in organizing the war against its adversaries and, at the same time, exposing its own citizens to war, the Nazi state is seen as having opened the way for a formidable consolidation of the right to kill, which culminated in the project of the "final solution." In doing so, it became the archetype of a power formation that combined the characteristics of the racist state, the murderous state, and the suicidal state.

17. See Foucault, *Il faut défendre la société*, 57–74.
18. "Race is, politically speaking, not the beginning of humanity but its end . . . , not the natural birth of man but his unnatural death." Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*, 157.
19. Foucault, *Il faut défendre la société*, 214.
20. Foucault, *Il faut défendre la société*, 228.
21. Foucault, *Il faut défendre la société*, 227–32.

It has been argued that the complete conflation of war and politics (and racism, homicide, and suicide), until they are indistinguishable from one another, is unique to the Nazi state. The perception of the existence of the Other as an attempt on my life, as a mortal threat or absolute danger whose biophysical elimination would strengthen my potential to life and security—this, I suggest, is one of the many imaginaries of sovereignty characteristic of both early and late modernity itself. Recognition of this perception to a large extent underpins most traditional critiques of modernity, whether they are dealing with nihilism and its proclamation of the will for power as the essence of the being; with reification understood as the *becoming-object* of the human being; or the subordination of everything to impersonal logic and to the reign of calculability and instrumental rationality.[22] Indeed, from an anthropological perspective, what these critiques implicitly contest is a definition of politics as the warlike relation par excellence. They also challenge the idea that, of necessity, the calculus of life passes through the death of the Other; or that sovereignty consists of the will and the capacity to kill in order to live.

Taking a historical perspective, a number of analysts have argued that the material premises of Nazi extermination are to be found in colonial imperialism on the one hand and, on the other, in the serialization of technical mechanisms for putting people to death—mechanisms developed between the Industrial Revolution and the First World War. According to Enzo Traverso, the gas chambers and the ovens were the culmination of a long process of dehumanizing and industrializing death, one of the original features of which was to integrate instrumental rationality with the productive and administrative rationality of the modern Western world (the factory, the bureaucracy, the prison, the army). Having become mechanized, serialized execution was transformed into a purely technical, impersonal, silent, and rapid procedure. This development was aided in part by racist stereotypes and the flourishing of a class-based racism that, in translating the social conflicts of the industrial world in racial terms, ended up comparing the working classes and "stateless people" of the industrial world to the "savages" of the colonial world.[23]

In reality, the links between modernity and terror spring from multiple sources. Some are to be found in the political practices of the ancien régime. From this perspective, the tension between the public's passion for blood and notions of jus-

22. See Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures*, trans. Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), especially chaps. 3, 5, 6.
23. Enzo Traverso, *La violence nazie: Une généalogie européenne* (Paris: La Fabrique Editions, 2002).

tice and revenge is critical. Foucault shows in *Discipline and Punish* how the execution of the would-be regicide Damiens went on for hours, much to the satisfaction of the crowd.[24] Well known is the long procession of the condemned through the streets prior to execution, the parade of body parts—a ritual that became a standard feature of popular violence—and the final display of a severed head mounted on a pike. In France, the advent of the guillotine marks a new phase in the "democratization" of the means of disposing of the enemies of the state. Indeed, this form of execution that had once been the prerogative of the nobility is extended to all citizens. In a context in which decapitation is viewed as less demeaning than hanging, innovations in the technologies of murder aim not only at "civilizing" the ways of killing. They also aim at disposing of a large number of victims in a relatively short span of time. At the same time, a new cultural sensibility emerges in which killing the enemy of the state is an extension of play. More intimate, lurid, and leisurely forms of cruelty appear.

But nowhere is the conflation of reason and terror so manifest as during the French Revolution.[25] During the French Revolution, terror is construed as an almost necessary part of politics. An absolute transparency is claimed to exist between the state and the people. As a political category, "the people" is gradually displaced from concrete reality to rhetorical figure. As David Bates has shown, the theorists of terror believe it possible to distinguish between authentic expressions of sovereignty and the actions of the enemy. They also believe it possible to distinguish between the "error" of the citizen and the "crime" of the counterrevolutionary in the political sphere. Terror thus becomes a way of marking aberration in the body politic, and politics is read both as the mobile force of reason and as the errant attempt at creating a space where "error" would be reduced, truth enhanced, and the enemy disposed of.[26]

Finally, terror is not linked solely to the utopian belief in the unfettered power of human reason. It is also clearly related to various narratives of mastery and emancipation, most of which are underpinned by Enlightenment understandings of truth and error, the "real" and the symbolic. Marx, for example, conflates labor (the endless cycle of production and consumption required for the maintenance of human life) with work (the creation of lasting artifacts that add to the world of things). Labor is viewed as the vehicle for the historical self-creation of humankind.

24. Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York: Pantheon, 1977).
25. See Robert Wokler, "Contextualizing Hegel's Phenomenology of the French Revolution and the Terror," *Political Theory* 26 (1998): 33–55.
26. David W. Bates, *Enlightenment Aberrations: Error and Revolution in France* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002), chap. 6.

The historical self-creation of humankind is itself a life-and-death conflict, that is, a conflict over what paths should lead to the truth of history: the overcoming of capitalism and the commodity form and the contradictions associated with both. According to Marx, with the advent of communism and the abolition of exchange relations, things will appear as they really are; the "real" will present itself as it actually is, and the distinction between subject and object or being and consciousness will be transcended.[27] But by making human emancipation dependent upon the abolition of commodity production, Marx blurs the all-important divisions among the man-made realm of freedom, the nature-determined realm of necessity, and the contingent in history.

The commitment to the abolition of commodity production and the dream of direct and unmediated access to the "real" make these processes—the fulfillment of the so-called logic of history and the fabrication of humankind—almost necessarily violent processes. As shown by Stephen Louw, the central tenets of classical Marxism leave no choice but to "try to introduce communism by administrative fiat, which, in practice, means that social relations must be decommodified forcefully."[28] Historically, these attempts have taken such forms as labor militarization, the collapse of the distinction between state and society, and revolutionary terror.[29] It may be argued that they aimed at the eradication of the basic human condition of plurality. Indeed, the overcoming of class divisions, the withering away of the state, the flowering of a truly general will presuppose a view of human plurality as the chief obstacle to the eventual realization of a predetermined telos of history. In other words, the subject of Marxian modernity is, fundamentally, a subject who is intent on proving his or her sovereignty through the staging of a fight to the death. Just as with Hegel, the narrative of mastery and emancipation here is clearly linked to a narrative of truth and death. Terror and killing become the means of realizing the already known telos of history.

27. Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, vol. 3 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1984), 817. See also *Capital*, vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1986), 172.

28. Stephen Louw, "In the Shadow of the Pharaohs: The Militarization of Labour Debate and Classical Marxist Theory," *Economy and Society* (29) 2000: 240.

29. On labor militarization and the transition to communism, see Nikolai Bukharin, *The Politics and Economics of the Transition Period*, trans. Oliver Field (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979); and Leon Trotsky, *Terrorism and Communism: A Reply to Karl Kautsky* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1961). On the collapse of the distinction between state and society, see Karl Marx, *The Civil War in France* (Moscow: Progress, 1972); and Vladimir Il'ich Lenin, *Selected Works in Three Volumes*, vol. 2 (Moscow: Progress, 1977). For a critique of "revolutionary terror," see Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Humanism and Terror: An Essay on the Communist Problem*, trans. John O'Neill (Boston: Beacon, 1969). For a more recent example of "revolutionary terror," see Steve J. Stern, ed., *Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980–1995* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1998).

Any historical account of the rise of modern terror needs to address slavery, which could be considered one of the first instances of biopolitical experimentation. In many respects, the very structure of the plantation system and its aftermath manifests the emblematic and paradoxical figure of the state of exception.[30] This figure is paradoxical here for two reasons. First, in the context of the plantation, the humanity of the slave appears as the perfect figure of a shadow. Indeed, the slave condition results from a triple loss: loss of a "home," loss of rights over his or her body, and loss of political status. This triple loss is identical with absolute domination, natal alienation, and social death (expulsion from humanity altogether). To be sure, as a political-juridical structure, the plantation is a space where the slave belongs to a master. It is not a community if only because by definition, a community implies the exercise of the power of speech and thought. As Paul Gilroy says, "The extreme patterns of communication defined by the institution of plantation slavery dictate that we recognize the anti-discursive and extralinguistic ramifications of power at work in shaping communicative acts. There may, after all, be no reciprocity on the plantation outside of the possibilities of rebellion and suicide, flight and silent mourning, and there is certainly no grammatical unity of speech to mediate communicative reason. In many respects, the plantation inhabitants live non-synchronously."[31] As an instrument of labor, the slave has a price. As a property, he or she has a value. His or her labor is needed and used. The slave is therefore kept alive but in a *state of injury*, in a phantom-like world of horrors and intense cruelty and profanity. The violent tenor of the slave's life is manifested through the overseer's disposition to behave in a cruel and intemperate manner and in the spectacle of pain inflicted on the slave's body.[32] Violence, here, becomes an element in manners,[33] like whipping or taking of the slave's life itself: an act of caprice and pure destruction aimed at instilling terror.[34] Slave life, in many ways, is a form of death-in-life. As Susan Buck-

30. See Saidiya V. Hartman, *Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); and Manuel Moreno Fraginals, *The Sugarmill: The Socioeconomic Complex of Sugar in Cuba, 1760–1860* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976).

31. Gilroy, *Black Atlantic*, 57.

32. See Frederick Douglass, *Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, an American Slave*, ed. Houston A. Baker (New York: Penguin, 1986).

33. The term *manners* is used here to denote the links between *social grace* and *social control*. According to Norbert Elias, manners embody what is "considered socially acceptable behavior," the "precepts on conduct," and the framework for "conviviality." *The History of Manners*, vol. 1, *The Civilizing Process*, trans. Edmund Jephcott (New York: Pantheon, 1978), chap. 2.

34. "The louder she screamed, the harder he whipped; and where the blood ran faster, there he whipped longest, says Douglass in his narration of the whipping of his aunt by Mr. Plummer. He

Morss has suggested, the slave condition produces a contradiction between freedom of property and freedom of person. An unequal relationship is established along with the inequality of the power over life. This power over the life of another takes the form of commerce: a person's humanity is dissolved to the point where it becomes possible to say that the slave's life is possessed by the master.[35] Because the slave's life is like a "thing," possessed by another person, the slave existence appears as a perfect figure of a shadow.

In spite of the terror and the symbolic sealing off of the slave, he or she maintains alternative perspectives toward time, work, and self. This is the second paradoxical element of the plantation world as a manifestation of the state of exception. Treated as if he or she no longer existed except as a mere tool and instrument of production, the slave nevertheless is able to draw almost any object, instrument, language, or gesture into a performance and then stylize it. Breaking with uprootedness and the pure world of things of which he or she is but a fragment, the slave is able to demonstrate the protean capabilities of the human bond through music and the very body that was supposedly possessed by another.[36]

If the relations between life and death, the politics of cruelty, and the symbolics of profanity are blurred in the plantation system, it is notably in the colony and under the apartheid regime that there comes into being a peculiar terror formation I will now turn to.[37] The most original feature of this terror formation is its concatenation of biopower, the state of exception, and the state of siege. Crucial to this concatenation is, once again, race.[38] In fact, in most instances, the

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would whip her to make her scream, and whip her to make her hush; and not until overcome by fatigue, would he cease to swing the blood-clotted cowskin. . . . It was a most terrible spectacle." Douglass, *Narrative of the Life*, 51. On the random killing of slaves, see 67–68.

35. Susan Buck-Morss, "Hegel and Haiti," *Critical Inquiry* 26 (2000): 821–66.

36. Roger D. Abrahams, *Singing the Master: The Emergence of African American Culture in the Plantation South* (New York: Pantheon, 1992).

37. In what follows I am mindful of the fact that colonial forms of sovereignty were always fragmented. They were complex, "less concerned with legitimizing their own presence and more excessively violent than their European forms." As importantly, "European states never aimed at governing the colonial territories with the same uniformity and intensity as was applied to their own populations." T. B. Hansen and Finn Stepputat, "Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants and States in the Postcolonial World" (paper, 2002).

38. In *The Racial State* (Malden, Mass: Blackwell, 2002), David Theo Goldberg argues that from the nineteenth century on, there are at least two historically competing traditions of racial rationalization: naturism (based on an inferiority claim) and historicism (based on the claim of the historical "immaturity"—and therefore "educability"—of the natives). In a private communication (23 August 2002), he argues that these two traditions played out differently when it came to issues of sovereignty, states of exception, and forms of necropower. In his view, necropower can take multiple forms: the terror of actual death; or a more "benevolent" form—the result of which is the destruction of a culture in order to "save the people" from themselves.

selection of races, the prohibition of mixed marriages, forced sterilization, even the extermination of vanquished peoples are to find their first testing ground in the colonial world. Here we see the first syntheses between massacre and bureaucracy, that incarnation of Western rationality.[39] Arendt develops the thesis that there is a link between national-socialism and traditional imperialism. According to her, the colonial conquest revealed a potential for violence previously unknown. What one witnesses in World War II is the extension to the "civilized" peoples of Europe of the methods previously reserved for the "savages."

That the technologies which ended up producing Nazism should have originated in the plantation or in the colony or that, on the contrary—Foucault's thesis—Nazism and Stalinism did no more than amplify a series of mechanisms that already existed in Western European social and political formations (subjugation of the body, health regulations, social Darwinism, eugenics, medico-legal theories on heredity, degeneration, and race) is, in the end, irrelevant. A fact remains, though: in modern philosophical thought and European political practice and imaginary, the colony represents the site where sovereignty consists fundamentally in the exercise of a power outside the law (*ab legibus solutus*) and where "peace" is more likely to take on the face of a "war without end."

Indeed, such a view corresponds to Carl Schmitt's definition of sovereignty at the beginning of the twentieth century, namely, the power to decide on the state of exception. To properly assess the efficacy of the colony as a formation of terror, we need to take a detour into the European imaginary itself as it relates to the critical issue of the domestication of war and the creation of a European juridical order (*Jus publicum Europaeum*). At the basis of this order were two key principles. The first postulated the juridical equality of all states. This equality was notably applied to *the right to wage war* (the taking of life). The right to war meant two things. On the one hand, to kill or to conclude peace was recognized as one of the preeminent functions of any state. It went hand in hand with the recognition of the fact that no state could make claims to rule outside of its borders. But conversely, the state could recognize no authority above it within its own borders. On the other hand, the state, for its part, undertook to "civilize" the ways of killing and to attribute rational objectives to the very act of killing.

The second principle related to the territorialization of the sovereign state, that is, to the determination of its frontiers within the context of a newly imposed global order. In this context, the *Jus publicum* rapidly assumed the form of a distinction between, on the one hand, those parts of the globe available for colonial

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39. Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*, 185–221.

appropriation and, on the other, Europe itself (where the *Jus publicum* was to hold sway).[40] This distinction, as we will see, is crucial in terms of assessing the efficacy of the colony as a terror formation. Under *Jus publicum*, a legitimate war is, to a large extent, a war conducted by one state against another or, more precisely, a war between "civilized" states. The centrality of the state in the calculus of war derives from the fact that the state is the model of political unity, a principle of rational organization, the embodiment of the idea of the universal, and a moral sign.

In the same context, colonies are similar to the frontiers. They are inhabited by "savages." The colonies are not organized in a state form and have not created a human world. Their armies do not form a distinct entity, and their wars are not wars between regular armies. They do not imply the mobilization of sovereign subjects (citizens) who respect each other as enemies. They do not establish a distinction between combatants and noncombatants, or again between an "enemy" and a "criminal."[41] It is thus impossible to conclude peace with them. In sum, colonies are zones in which war and disorder, internal and external figures of the political, stand side by side or alternate with each other. As such, the colonies are the location par excellence where the controls and guarantees of judicial order can be suspended—the zone where the violence of the state of exception is deemed to operate in the service of "civilization."

That colonies might be ruled over in absolute lawlessness stems from the racial denial of any common bond between the conqueror and the native. In the eyes of the conqueror, *savage life* is just another form of *animal life*, a horrifying experience, something alien beyond imagination or comprehension. In fact, according to Arendt, what makes the savages different from other human beings is less the color of their skin than the fear that they behave like a part of nature, that they treat nature as their undisputed master. Nature thus remains, in all its majesty, an overwhelming reality compared to which they appear to be phantoms, unreal and ghostlike. The savages are, as it were, "natural" human beings who lack the specifically human character, the specifically human reality, "so that when European men massacred them they somehow were not aware that they had committed murder."[42]

40. Etienne Balibar, "Prolégomènes à la souveraineté: La frontière, l'Etat, le peuple," *Les temps modernes* 610 (2000): 54–55.

41. Eugene Victor Walter, *Terror and Resistance: A Study of Political Violence with Case Studies of Some Primitive African Communities* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969).

42. Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*, 192.

For all the above reasons, the sovereign right to kill is not subject to any rule in the colonies. In the colonies, the sovereign might kill at any time or in any manner. Colonial warfare is not subject to legal and institutional rules. It is not a legally codified activity. Instead, colonial terror constantly intertwines with colonially generated fantasies of wilderness and death and fictions to create the effect of the real.[43] Peace is not necessarily the natural outcome of a colonial war. In fact, the distinction between war and peace does not avail. Colonial wars are conceived of as the expression of an absolute hostility that sets the conqueror against an absolute enemy.[44] All manifestations of war and hostility that had been marginalized by a European legal imaginary find a place to reemerge in the colonies. Here, the fiction of a distinction between "the ends of war" and the "means of war" collapses; so does the fiction that war functions as a rule-governed contest, as opposed to pure slaughter without risk or instrumental justification. It becomes futile, therefore, to attempt to resolve one of the intractable paradoxes of war well captured by Alexandre Kojève in his reinterpretation of Hegel's *Phenomenology of the Spirit*: its simultaneous idealism and apparent inhumanity.[45]

Necropower and Late Modern Colonial Occupation

It might be thought that the ideas developed above relate to a distant past. In the past, indeed, imperial wars did have the objective of destroying local powers, installing troops, and instituting new models of military control over civil populations. A group of local auxiliaries could assist in the management of conquered territories annexed to the empire. Within the empire, the vanquished populations were given a status that enshrined their despoilment. In these configurations, violence constituted the original form of the right, and exception provided the structure of sovereignty. Each stage of imperialism also involved certain key technologies (the gunboat, quinine, steamship lines, submarine telegraph cables, and colonial railroads).[46]

Colonial occupation itself was a matter of seizing, delimiting, and asserting control over a physical geographical area—of writing on the ground a new set of social and spatial relations. The writing of new spatial relations (territorializa-

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43. For a powerful rendition of this process, see Michael Taussig, *Shamanism, Colonialism, and the Wild Man: A Study in Terror and Healing* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).

44. On the "enemy," see *L'ennemi*, special issue, *Raisons politiques*, no. 5 (2002).

45. Kojève, *Introduction à la lecture de Hegel*.

46. See Daniel R. Headrick, *The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981).

tion) was, ultimately, tantamount to the production of boundaries and hierarchies, zones and enclaves; the subversion of existing property arrangements; the classification of people according to different categories; resource extraction; and, finally, the manufacturing of a large reservoir of cultural imaginaries. These imaginaries gave meaning to the enactment of differential rights to differing categories of people for different purposes within the same space; in brief, the exercise of sovereignty. Space was therefore the raw material of sovereignty and the violence it carried with it. Sovereignty meant occupation, and occupation meant relegating the colonized into a third zone between subjecthood and objecthood.

Such was the case of the apartheid regime in South Africa. Here, the *township* was the structural form and the *homelands* became the reserves (rural bases) whereby the flow of migrant labor could be regulated and African urbanization held in check.[47] As Belinda Bozzoli has shown, the township in particular was a place where "severe oppression and poverty were experienced on a racial and class basis."[48] A sociopolitical, cultural, and economic formation, the township was a peculiar spatial institution scientifically planned for the purposes of control.[49] The functioning of the homelands and townships entailed severe restrictions on production for the market by blacks in white areas, the terminating of land ownership by blacks except in reserved areas, the illegalization of black residence on white farms (except as servants in the employ of whites), the control of urban influx, and later, the denial of citizenship to Africans.[50]

Frantz Fanon describes the spatialization of colonial occupation in vivid terms. For him, colonial occupation entails first and foremost a division of space into compartments. It involves the setting of boundaries and internal frontiers epitomized by barracks and police stations; it is regulated by the language of pure force, immediate presence, and frequent and direct action; and it is premised on the principle of reciprocal exclusivity.[51] But more important, it is the very way in which necropower operates: "The town belonging to the colonized people . . . is

47. On the township, see G. G. Maasdorp and A. S. B. Humphreys, eds., *From Shantytown to Township: An Economic Study of African Poverty and Rehousing in a South African City* (Cape Town: Juta, 1975).

48. Belinda Bozzoli, "Why Were the 1980s 'Millenarian'? Style, Repertoire, Space and Authority in South Africa's Black Cities," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 13 (2000): 79.

49. Bozzoli, "Why Were the 1980s 'Millenarian'?"

50. See Herman Giliomee, ed., *Up against the Fences: Poverty, Passes and Privileges in South Africa* (Cape Town: David Philip, 1985); Francis Wilson, *Migrant Labour in South Africa* (Johannesburg: Christian Institute of Southern Africa, 1972).

51. Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. C. Farrington (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991), 39.

a place of ill fame, peopled by men of evil repute. They are born there, it matters little where or how; they die there, it matters not where, nor how. It is a world without spaciousness; men live there on top of each other. The native town is a hungry town, starved of bread, of meat, of shoes, of coal, of light. The native town is a crouching village, a town on its knees."[52] In this case, sovereignty means the capacity to define who matters and who does not, who is *disposable* and who is not.

Late-modern colonial occupation differs in many ways from early-modern occupation, particularly in its combining of the disciplinary, the biopolitical, and the necropolitical. The most accomplished form of necropower is the contemporary colonial occupation of Palestine.

Here, the colonial state derives its fundamental claim of sovereignty and legitimacy from the authority of its own particular narrative of history and identity. This narrative is itself underpinned by the idea that the state has a divine right to exist; the narrative competes with another for the same sacred space. Because the two narratives are incompatible and the two populations are inextricably intertwined, any demarcation of the territory on the basis of pure identity is quasi-impossible. Violence and sovereignty, in this case, claim a divine foundation: peoplehood itself is forged by the worship of one deity, and national identity is imagined as an identity against the Other, other deities.[53] History, geography, cartography, and archaeology are supposed to back these claims, thereby closely binding identity and topography. As a consequence, colonial violence and occupation are profoundly underwritten by the sacred terror of truth and exclusivity (mass expulsions, resettlement of "stateless" people in refugee camps, settlement of new colonies). Lying beneath the terror of the sacred is the constant excavation of missing bones; the permanent remembrance of a torn body hewn in a thousand pieces and never self-same; the limits, or better, the impossibility of representing for oneself an "original crime," an unspeakable death: the terror of the Holocaust.[54]

To return to Fanon's spatial reading of colonial occupation, the late-modern colonial occupation in Gaza and the West Bank presents three major characteristics in relation to the working of the specific terror formation I have called necropower. First is the dynamics of territorial fragmentation, the sealing off and

52. Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, 37–39.

53. See Regina M. Schwartz, *The Curse of Cain: The Violent Legacy of Monotheism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).

54. See Lydia Flem, *L'Art et la mémoire des camps: Représenter exterminer*, ed. Jean-Luc Nancy (Paris: Seuil, 2001)

expansion of settlements. The objective of this process is twofold: to render any movement impossible and to implement separation along the model of the apartheid state. The occupied territories are therefore divided into a web of intricate internal borders and various isolated cells. According to Eyal Weizman, by departing from a planar division of a territory and embracing a principle of creation of three-dimensional boundaries across sovereign bulks, this dispersal and segmentation clearly redefines the relationship between sovereignty and space.[55]

For Weizman, these actions constitute "the politics of verticality." The resultant form of sovereignty might be called "vertical sovereignty." Under a regime of vertical sovereignty, colonial occupation operates through schemes of over- and underpasses, a separation of the airspace from the ground. The ground itself is divided between its crust and the subterrain. Colonial occupation is also dictated by the very nature of the terrain and its topographical variations (hilltops and valleys, mountains and bodies of water). Thus, high ground offers strategic assets not found in the valleys (effectiveness of sight, self-protection, panoptic fortification that generates gazes to many different ends). Says Weizman: "Settlements could be seen as urban optical devices for surveillance and the exercise of power." Under conditions of late-modern colonial occupation, surveillance is both inward- and outward-oriented, the eye acting as weapon and vice versa. Instead of the conclusive division between two nations across a boundary line, "the organization of the West Bank's particular terrain has created multiple separations, provisional boundaries, which relate to each other through surveillance and control," according to Weizman. Under these circumstances, colonial occupation is not only akin to control, surveillance, and separation, it is also tantamount to seclusion. It is a *splintering occupation*, along the lines of the splintering urbanism characteristic of late modernity (suburban enclaves or gated communities).[56]

From an infrastructural point of view, a splintering form of colonial occupation is characterized by a network of fast bypass roads, bridges, and tunnels that weave over and under one another in an attempt at maintaining the Fanonian "principle of reciprocal exclusivity." According to Weizman, "the bypass roads attempt to separate Israeli traffic networks from Palestinian ones, preferably without allowing them ever to cross. They therefore emphasize the overlapping of two separate geographies that inhabit the same landscape. At points where the networks do cross, a makeshift separation is created. Most often, small dust roads

55. See Eyal Weizman, "The Politics of Verticality," *openDemocracy* (Web publication at www.openDemocracy.net), 25 April 2002.

56. See Stephen Graham and Simon Marvin, *Splintering Urbanism: Networked Infrastructures, Technological Mobility and the Urban Condition* (London: Routledge, 2001).

are dug out to allow Palestinians to cross under the fast, wide highways on which Israeli vans and military vehicles rush between settlements."[57]

Under conditions of vertical sovereignty and splintering colonial occupation, communities are separated across a *y*-axis. This leads to a proliferation of the sites of violence. The battlegrounds are not located solely at the surface of the earth. The underground as well as the airspace are transformed into conflict zones. There is no continuity between the ground and the sky. Even the boundaries in airspace are divided between lower and upper layers. Everywhere, the symbolics of the *top* (who is on top) is reiterated. Occupation of the skies therefore acquires a critical importance, since most of the policing is done from the air. Various other technologies are mobilized to this effect: sensors aboard unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), aerial reconnaissance jets, early warning Hawkeye planes, assault helicopters, an Earth-observation satellite, techniques of "hologrammatization." Killing becomes precisely targeted.

Such precision is combined with the tactics of medieval siege warfare adapted to the networked sprawl of urban refugee camps. An orchestrated and systematic sabotage of the enemy's societal and urban infrastructure network complements the appropriation of land, water, and airspace resources. Critical to these techniques of disabling the enemy is *bulldozing*: demolishing houses and cities; uprooting olive trees; riddling water tanks with bullets; bombing and jamming electronic communications; digging up roads; destroying electricity transformers; tearing up airport runways; disabling television and radio transmitters; smashing computers; ransacking cultural and politico-bureaucratic symbols of the proto-Palestinian state; looting medical equipment. In other words, *infrastructural warfare*.[58] While the Apache helicopter gunship is used to police the air and to kill from overhead, the armored bulldozer (the Caterpillar D-9) is used on the ground as a weapon of war and intimidation. In contrast to early-modern colonial occupation, these two weapons establish the superiority of high-tech tools of late-modern terror.[59]

As the Palestinian case illustrates, late-modern colonial occupation is a concatenation of multiple powers: disciplinary, biopolitical, and necropolitical. The

57. Weizman, "Politics of Verticality."

58. See Stephen Graham, " 'Clean Territory': Urbicide in the West Bank," *openDemocracy* (Web publication at www.openDemocracy.net), 7 August 2002.

59. Compare with the panoply of new bombs the United States deployed during the Gulf War and the war in Kosovo, most aimed at raining down graphite crystals to disable comprehensively electrical power and distribution stations. Michael Ignatieff, *Virtual War* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2000).

combination of the three allocates to the colonial power an absolute domination over the inhabitants of the occupied territory. The *state of siege* is itself a military institution. It allows a modality of killing that does not distinguish between the external and the internal enemy. Entire populations are the target of the sovereign. The besieged villages and towns are sealed off and cut off from the world. Daily life is militarized. Freedom is given to local military commanders to use their discretion as to when and whom to shoot. Movement between the territorial cells requires formal permits. Local civil institutions are systematically destroyed. The besieged population is deprived of their means of income. Invisible killing is added to outright executions.

War Machines and Heteronomy

After having examined the workings of necropower under the conditions of late-modern colonial occupation, I would like to turn now to contemporary wars. Contemporary wars belong to a new moment and can hardly be understood through earlier theories of "contractual violence" or typologies of "just" and "unjust" wars or even Carl von Clausewitz's instrumentalism.[60] According to Zygmunt Bauman, wars of the globalization era do not include the conquest, acquisition, and takeover of a territory among their objectives. Ideally, they are hit-and-run affairs.

The growing gap between high-tech and low-tech means of war has never been as evident as in the Gulf War and the Kosovo campaign. In both cases, the doctrine of "overwhelming or decisive force" was implemented to its full effect thanks to a military-technological revolution that has multiplied the capacity for destruction in unprecedented ways.[61] Air war as it relates to altitude, ordnance, visibility, and intelligence is here a case in point. During the Gulf War, the combined use of smart bombs and bombs coated with depleted uranium (DU), high-tech stand-off weapons, electronic sensors, laser-guided missiles, cluster and asphyxiation bombs, stealth capabilities, unmanned aerial vehicles, and cyber-intelligence quickly crippled the enemy's capabilities.

In Kosovo, the "degrading" of Serbian capabilities took the form of an infra-structural war that targeted and destroyed bridges, railroads, highways, commu-

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60. See Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (New York: Basic Books, 1977).

61. Benjamin Ederington and Michael J. Mazarr, eds., *Turning Point: The Gulf War and U.S. Military Strategy* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1994).

nications networks, oil storage depots, heating plants, power stations, and water treatment facilities. As can be surmised, the execution of such a military strategy, especially when combined with the imposition of sanctions, results in shutting down the enemy's life-support system. The enduring damage to civilian life is particularly telling. For example, the destruction of the Pancevo petrochemical complex in the outskirts of Belgrade during the Kosovo campaign "left the vicinity so toxic with vinyl chloride, ammonia, mercury, naphtha and dioxin that pregnant women were directed to seek abortions, and all local women were advised to avoid pregnancy for two years."[62]

Wars of the globalization era therefore aim to force the enemy into submission regardless of the immediate consequences, side effects, and "collateral damage" of the military actions. In this sense, contemporary wars are more reminiscent of the warfare strategy of the nomads than of the sedentary nations or the "conquer-and-annex" territorial wars of modernity. In Bauman's words: "They rest their superiority over the settled population on the speed of their own movement; their own ability to descend from nowhere without notice and vanish again without warning, their ability to travel light and not to bother with the kind of belongings which confine the mobility and the maneuvering potential of the sedentary people."[63]

This new moment is one of global mobility. An important feature of the age of global mobility is that military operations and the exercise of the right to kill are no longer the sole monopoly of states, and the "regular army" is no longer the unique modality of carrying out these functions. The claim to ultimate or final authority in a particular political space is not easily made. Instead, a patchwork of overlapping and incomplete rights to rule emerges, inextricably superimposed and tangled, in which different de facto juridical instances are geographically interwoven and plural allegiances, asymmetrical suzerainties, and enclaves abound.[64] In

62. Thomas W. Smith, "The New Law of War: Legitimizing Hi-Tech and Infrastructural Violence," *International Studies Quarterly* 46 (2002): 367. On Iraq, see G. L. Simons, *The Scourging of Iraq: Sanctions, Law and Natural Justice*, 2d ed. (New York: St. Martin's, 1998); see also A. Shehabaldin and W. M. Laughlin Jr., "Economic Sanctions against Iraq: Human and Economic Costs," *International Journal of Human Rights* 3, no. 4 (2000): 1–18.

63. Zygmunt Bauman, "Wars of the Globalization Era," *European Journal of Social Theory* 4, no. 1 (2001): 15. "Remote as they are from their 'targets,' scurrying over those they hit too fast to witness the devastation they cause and the blood they spill, the pilots-turned-computer-operators hardly ever have a chance of looking their victims in the face and to survey the human misery they have sowed," adds Bauman. "Military professionals of our time see no corpses and no wounds. They may sleep well; no pangs of conscience will keep them awake" (27). See also "Penser la guerre aujourd'hui," *Cahiers de la Villa Gillet* no. 16 (2002): 75–152.

64. Achille Mbembe, "At the Edge of the World: Boundaries, Territoriality, and Sovereignty in Africa," *Public Culture* 12 (2000): 259–84.

this heteronymous organization of territorial rights and claims, it makes little sense to insist on distinctions between "internal" and "external" political realms, separated by clearly demarcated boundaries.

Let's take Africa as an example. Here, the political economy of statehood dramatically changed over the last quarter of the twentieth century. Many African states can no longer claim a monopoly on violence and on the means of coercion within their territory. Nor can they claim a monopoly on territorial boundaries. Coercion itself has become a market commodity. Military manpower is bought and sold on a market in which the identity of suppliers and purchasers means almost nothing. Urban militias, private armies, armies of regional lords, private security firms, and state armies all claim the right to exercise violence or to kill. Neighboring states or rebel movements lease armies to poor states. Nonstate deployers of violence supply two critical coercive resources: labor and minerals. Increasingly, the vast majority of armies are composed of citizen soldiers, child soldiers, mercenaries, and privateers.[65]

Alongside armies have therefore emerged what, following Deleuze and Guattari, we could refer to as *war machines*.[66] War machines are made up of segments of armed men that split up or merge with one another depending on the tasks to be carried out and the circumstances. Polymorphous and diffuse organizations, war machines are characterized by their capacity for metamorphosis. Their relation to space is mobile. Sometimes, they enjoy complex links with state forms (from autonomy to incorporation). The state may, of its own doing, transform itself into a war machine. It may moreover appropriate to itself an existing war machine or help to create one. War machines function by borrowing from regular armies while incorporating new elements well adapted to the principle of segmentation and deterritorialization. Regular armies, in turn, may readily appropriate some of the characteristics of war machines.

A war machine combines a plurality of functions. It has the features of a political organization and a mercantile company. It operates through capture and depredations and can even coin its own money. In order to fuel the extraction and

65. In international law, "privateers" are defined as "vessels belonging to private owners, and sailing under a commission of war empowering the person to whom it is granted to carry on all forms of hostility which are permissible at sea by the usages of war." I use the term here to mean armed formations acting independently of any politically organized society, in the pursuit of private interests, whether under the mask of the state or not. See Janice Thomson, *Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997).

66. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Capitalisme et schizophrénie* (Paris: Editions de minuit, 1980), 434–527.

export of natural resources located in the territory they control, war machines forge direct connections with transnational networks. War machines emerged in Africa during the last quarter of the twentieth century in direct relation to the erosion of the postcolonial state's capacity to build the economic underpinnings of political authority and order. This capacity involves raising revenue and commanding and regulating access to natural resources within a well-defined territory. In the mid-1970s, as the state's ability to maintain this capacity began to erode, there emerged a clear-cut link between monetary instability and spatial fragmentation. In the 1980s, the brutal experience of money suddenly losing its value became more commonplace, with various countries undergoing cycles of hyperinflation (which included such stunts as the sudden replacement of a currency). During the last decades of the twentieth century, monetary circulation has influenced state and society in at least two different ways.

First, we have seen a general drying-up of liquidities and their gradual concentration along certain channels, access to which has been subject to increasingly draconian conditions. As a result, the number of individuals endowed with the material means to control dependents through the creation of debts has abruptly decreased. Historically, capturing and fixing dependents through the mechanism of debt has always been a central aspect of both the production of people and the constitution of the political bond.[67] Such bonds were crucial in determining the value of persons and gauging their value and utility. When their value and utility were not proven, they could be disposed of as slaves, pawns, or clients.

Second, the controlled inflow and the fixing of movements of money around zones in which specific resources are extracted has made possible the formation of *enclave economies* and has shifted the old calculus between people and things. The concentration of activities connected with the extraction of valuable resources around these enclaves has, in return, turned the enclaves into privileged spaces of war and death. War itself is fed by increased sales of the products extracted.[68] New linkages have therefore emerged between war making, war machines, and resource extraction.[69] War machines are implicated in the constitution of highly

67. Joseph C. Miller, *Way of Death: Merchant Capitalism and the Angolan Slave Trade, 1730–1830* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), especially chaps. 2 and 4.

68. See Jakkie Cilliers and Christian Dietrich, eds., *Angola's War Economy: The Role of Oil and Diamonds* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2000).

69. See, for example, "Rapport du Groupe d'experts sur l'exploitation illégale des ressources naturelles et autres richesses de la République démocratique du Congo," United Nations Report No. 2/2001/357, submitted by the Secretary-General to the Security Council, 12 April 2001. See also

transnational local or regional economies. In most places, the collapse of formal political institutions under the strain of violence tends to lead to the formation of militia economies. War machines (in this case militias or rebel movements) rapidly become highly organized mechanisms of predation, taxing the territories and the population they occupy and drawing on a range of transnational networks and diasporas that provide both material and financial support.

Correlated to the new geography of resource extraction is the emergence of an unprecedented form of governmentality that consists in the *management of the multitudes.* The extraction and looting of natural resources by war machines goes hand in hand with brutal attempts to immobilize and spatially fix whole categories of people or, paradoxically, to unleash them, to force them to scatter over broad areas no longer contained by the boundaries of a territorial state. As a political category, populations are then disaggregated into rebels, child soldiers, victims or refugees, or civilians incapacitated by mutilation or simply massacred on the model of ancient sacrifices, while the "survivors," after a horrific exodus, are confined in camps and zones of exception.[70]

This form of governmentality is different from the colonial *commandement*.[71] The techniques of policing and discipline and the choice between obedience and simulation that characterized the colonial and postcolonial potentate are gradually being replaced by an alternative that is more tragic because more extreme. Technologies of destruction have become more tactile, more anatomical and sensorial, in a context in which the choice is between life and death.[72] If power still depends on tight control over bodies (or on concentrating them in camps), the new technologies of destruction are less concerned with inscribing bodies within disciplinary apparatuses as inscribing them, when the time comes, within the order of the maximal economy now represented by the "massacre." In turn, the generalization of insecurity has deepened the societal distinction between those who bear weapons and those who do not (*loi de repartition des armes*). Increas-

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Richard Snyder, "Does Lootable Wealth Breed Disorder? States, Regimes, and the Political Economy of Extraction" (paper).

70. See Loren B. Landau, "The Humanitarian Hangover: Transnationalization of Governmental Practice in Tanzania's Refugee-Populated Areas," *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 21, no. 1 (2002): 260–99, especially 281–87.

71. On the *commandement*, see Achille Mbembe, *On the Postcolony* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), chaps. 1–3.

72. See Leisel Talley, Paul B. Spiegel, and Mona Girgis, "An Investigation of Increasing Mortality among Congolese Refugees in Lugufu Camp, Tanzania, May-June 1999," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 14, no. 4 (2001): 412–27.

ingly, war is no longer waged between armies of two sovereign states. It is waged by armed groups acting behind the mask of the state against armed groups that have no state but control very distinct territories; both sides having as their main targets civilian populations that are unarmed or organized into militias. In cases where armed dissidents have not completely taken over state power, they have provoked territorial partitions and succeeded in controlling entire regions that they administer on the model of fiefdoms, especially where there are mineral deposits.[73]

The ways of killing do not themselves vary much. In the case of massacres in particular, lifeless bodies are quickly reduced to the status of simple skeletons. Their morphology henceforth inscribes them in the register of undifferentiated generality: simple relics of an unburied pain, empty, meaningless corporealities, strange deposits plunged into cruel stupor. In the case of the Rwandan genocide—in which a number of skeletons were at least preserved in a visible state, if not exhumed—what is striking is the tension between the petrification of the bones and their strange coolness on one hand, and on the other, their stubborn will to mean, to signify something.

In these impassive bits of bone, there seems to be no *ataraxia*: nothing but the illusory rejection of a death that has already occurred. In other cases, in which physical amputation replaces immediate death, cutting off limbs opens the way to the deployment of techniques of incision, ablation, and excision that also have bones as their target. The traces of this demiurgic surgery persist for a long time, in the form of human shapes that are alive, to be sure, but whose bodily integrity has been replaced by pieces, fragments, folds, even immense wounds that are difficult to close. Their function is to keep before the eyes of the victim—and of the people around him or her—the morbid spectacle of severing.

Of Motion and Metal

Let us return to the example of Palestine where two apparently irreconcilable logics are confronting each other: the *logic of martyrdom* and the *logic of survival*. In examining these two logics, I would like to reflect on the twin issues of death and terror on the one hand and terror and freedom on the other.

In the confrontation between these two logics, terror is not on one side and

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73. See Tony Hodges, *Angola: From Afro-Stalinism to Petro-Diamond Capitalism* (Oxford: James Currey, 2001), chap. 7; Stephen Ellis, *The Mask of Anarchy: The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an African Civil War* (London: Hurst & Company, 1999).

death on the other. Terror and death are at the heart of each. As Elias Canetti reminds us, the survivor is the one who, having stood in the path of death, knowing of many deaths and standing in the midst of the fallen, is still alive. Or, more precisely, the survivor is the one who has taken on a whole pack of enemies and managed not only to escape alive, but to kill his or her attackers. This is why, to a large extent, the lowest form of survival is killing. Canetti points out that in the logic of survival, "each man is the enemy of every other." Even more radically, in the logic of survival one's horror at the sight of death turns into satisfaction that it is someone else who is dead. It is the death of the other, his or her physical presence as a corpse, that makes the survivor feel unique. And each enemy killed makes the survivor feel more secure.[74]

The logic of martyrdom proceeds along different lines. It is epitomized by the figure of the "suicide bomber," which itself raises a number of questions. What intrinsic difference is there between killing with a missile helicopter or a tank and killing with one's own body? Does the distinction between the arms used to inflict death prevent the establishment of a system of general exchange between the manner of killing and the manner of dying?

The "suicide bomber" wears no ordinary soldier's uniform and displays no weapon. The candidate for martyrdom chases his or her targets; the enemy is a prey for whom a trap is set. Significant in this respect is the location of the ambush laid: the bus stop, the café, the discotheque, the marketplace, the checkpoint, the road—in sum, the spaces of everyday life.

The trapping of the body is added to the ambush location. The candidate for martyrdom transforms his or her body into a mask that hides the soon-to-be-detonated weapon. Unlike the tank or the missile that is clearly visible, the weapon carried in the shape of the body is invisible. Thus concealed, it forms part of the body. It is so intimately part of the body that at the time of detonation it annihilates the body of its bearer, who carries with it the bodies of others when it does not reduce them to pieces. The body does not simply conceal a weapon. The body is transformed into a weapon, not in a metaphorical sense but in the truly ballistic sense.

In this instance, my death goes hand in hand with the death of the Other. Homicide and suicide are accomplished in the same act. And to a large extent, resistance and self-destruction are synonymous. To deal out death is therefore to reduce the other and oneself to the status of pieces of inert flesh, scattered every-

74. See Elias Canetti, *Crowds and Power*, trans. C. Stewart (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1984), 227–80.

where, and assembled with difficulty before the burial. In this case, war is the war of body on body (*guerre au corps-à-corps*). To kill, one has to come as close as possible to the body of the enemy. To detonate the bomb necessitates resolving the question of distance, through the work of proximity and concealment.

How are we to interpret this manner of spilling blood in which death is not simply that which is *my own*, but always goes hand in hand with the death of the other?[75] How does it differ from death inflicted by a tank or a missile, in a context in which the cost of my survival is calculated in terms of my capacity and readiness to kill someone else? In the logic of "martyrdom," the will to die is fused with the willingness to take the enemy with you, that is, with closing the door on the possibility of life for everyone. This logic seems contrary to another one, which consists in wishing to impose death on others while preserving one's own life. Canetti describes this moment of survival as a moment of power. In such a case, triumph develops precisely from the possibility of being there when the others (in this case the enemy) are no longer there. Such is the logic of heroism as classically understood: to execute others while holding one's own death at a distance.

In the logic of martyrdom, a new semiosis of killing emerges. It is not necessarily based on a relationship between form and matter. As I have already indicated, the body here becomes the very uniform of the martyr. But the body as such is not only an object to protect against danger and death. The body in itself has neither power nor value. The power and value of the body result from a process of abstraction based on the desire for eternity. In that sense, the martyr, having established a moment of supremacy in which the subject overcomes his own mortality, can be seen as laboring under the sign of the future. In other words, in death the future is collapsed into the present.

In its desire for eternity, the besieged body passes through two stages. First, it is transformed into a mere thing, malleable matter. Second, the manner in which it is put to death—suicide—affords it its ultimate signification. The matter of the body, or again the matter which is the body, is invested with properties that cannot be deduced from its character as a thing, but from a transcendental *nomos* outside it. The besieged body becomes a piece of metal whose function is, through sacrifice, to bring eternal life into being. The body duplicates itself and, in death, literally and metaphorically escapes the state of siege and occupation.

Let me explore, in conclusion, the relation between terror, freedom, and sacrifice. Martin Heidegger argues that the human's "being toward death" is the deci-

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75. Martin Heidegger, *Etre et temps* (Paris: Gallimard, 1986), 289–322.

sive condition of all true human freedom.[76] In other words, one is free to live one's own life only because one is free to die one's own death. Whereas Heidegger grants an existential status to being-toward-death and considers it an event of freedom, Bataille suggests that "sacrifice in reality reveals nothing." It is not simply the absolute manifestation of negativity. It is also a comedy. For Bataille, death reveals the human subject's animal side, which he refers to moreover as the subject's "natural being." "For man to reveal himself in the end, he has to die, but he will have to do so while alive—by looking at himself ceasing to exist," he adds. In other words, the human subject has to be fully alive at the very moment of dying, to be aware of his or her death, to live with the impression of actually dying. Death itself must become awareness of the self at the very time that it does away with the conscious being. "In a sense, this is what happens (what at least is on the point of taking place, or what takes place in an elusive, fugitive manner), by means of a subterfuge in the sacrifice. In the sacrifice, the sacrificed identifies himself with the animal on the point of death. Thus he dies seeing himself die, and even, in some sense, through his own will, at one with the weapon of sacrifice. But this is play!" And for Bataille, play is more or less the means by which the human subject "voluntarily tricks himself."[77]

How does the notion of play and trickery relate to the "suicide bomber"? There is no doubt that in the case of the suicide bomber the sacrifice consists of the spectacular putting to death of the self, of becoming his or her own victim (self-sacrifice). The self-sacrificed proceeds to take power over his or her death and to approach it head-on. This power may be derived from the belief that the destruction of one's own body does not affect the continuity of the being. The idea is that the being exists outside us. The self-sacrifice consists, here, in the removal of a twofold prohibition: that of self-immolation (suicide) and that of murder. Unlike primitive sacrifices, however, there is no animal to serve as a substitute victim. Death here achieves the character of a transgression. But unlike crucifixion, it has no expiatory dimension. It is not related to the Hegelian paradigms of prestige or recognition. Indeed, a dead person cannot recognize his or her killer, who is also dead. Does this imply that death occurs here as pure annihilation and nothingness, excess and scandal?

Whether read from the perspective of slavery or of colonial occupation, death and freedom are irrevocably interwoven. As we have seen, terror is a defining feature of both slave and late-modern colonial regimes. Both regimes are also

76. Heidegger, *Etre et temps*.
77. Bataille, *Oeuvres complètes*, 336.

specific instances and experiences of unfreedom. To live under late modern occupation is to experience a permanent condition of "being in pain": fortified structures, military posts, and roadblocks everywhere; buildings that bring back painful memories of humiliation, interrogations, and beatings; curfews that imprison hundreds of thousands in their cramped homes every night from dusk to daybreak; soldiers patrolling the unlit streets, frightened by their own shadows; children blinded by rubber bullets; parents shamed and beaten in front of their families; soldiers urinating on fences, shooting at the rooftop water tanks just for fun, chanting loud offensive slogans, pounding on fragile tin doors to frighten the children, confiscating papers, or dumping garbage in the middle of a residential neighborhood; border guards kicking over a vegetable stand or closing borders at whim; bones broken; shootings and fatalities—a certain kind of madness.[78]

In such circumstances, the discipline of life and the necessities of hardship (trial by death) are marked by excess. What connects terror, death, and freedom is an *ecstatic* notion of temporality and politics. The future, here, can be authentically anticipated, but not in the present. The present itself is but a moment of vision—vision of the freedom not yet come. Death in the present is the mediator of redemption. Far from being an encounter with a limit, boundary, or barrier, it is experienced as "a release from terror and bondage."[79] As Gilroy notes, this preference for death over continued servitude is a commentary on the nature of freedom itself (or the lack thereof). If this lack is the very nature of what it means for the slave or the colonized to exist, the same lack is also precisely the way in which he or she takes account of his or her mortality. Referring to the practice of individual or mass suicide by slaves cornered by the slave catchers, Gilroy suggests that death, in this case, can be represented as agency. For death is precisely that from and over which I have power. But it is also that space where freedom and negation operate.

Conclusion

In this essay I have argued that contemporary forms of subjugation of life to the power of death (necropolitics) profoundly reconfigure the relations among resistance, sacrifice, and terror. I have demonstrated that the notion of biopower is insufficient to account for contemporary forms of subjugation of life to the power

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78. For what precedes, see Amira Hass, *Drinking the Sea at Gaza: Days and Nights in a Land under Siege* (New York: Henry Holt, 1996).

79. Gilroy, *Black Atlantic*, 63.

of death. Moreover I have put forward the notion of necropolitics and necropower to account for the various ways in which, in our contemporary world, weapons are deployed in the interest of maximum destruction of persons and the creation of *death-worlds*, new and unique forms of social existence in which vast populations are subjected to conditions of life conferring upon them the status of *living dead*. The essay has also outlined some of the repressed topographies of cruelty (the plantation and the colony in particular) and has suggested that under conditions of necropower, the lines between resistance and suicide, sacrifice and redemption, martyrdom and freedom are blurred.

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Lecture VI
DIASPORIC IMAGINATION AND TRADITIONAL FUTURES. ROOTS, ROUTES AND RITES OF RETURNS

What is the political and analytical work performed by "Diaspora"? Scholars of Diaspora have argued that Diaspora has enabled the conceptualisation of communities beyond reified and essentialist ethnic, territorial or racial configurations. Central notions associated with Diaspora are those of imagination, consciousness, subjectivity, recognition. Diaspora functions as a utopic/dystopic vision to think of political subjectivities and communities not as epiphenomena of nation-states but as springboard for de-territorialised formations. Yet, many diasporic communities are still trapped in (albeit ever transforming) colonial forms of power and material dispossession, not only of their identity and culture, but also of their land and resources. Others are turning to their origins and roots along the Atlantic slave routes. This session will focus on the tensions, possibilities and hindrances offered by diasporic imaginations across colonial and post-colonial conditions. It will do so by focusing on the role played by the trope of "return" on diasporic cultures and visions.

Hartman, S., 2008. Lose your mother: A journey along the Atlantic slave route. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux. (read as much as you can of this book which is written in a highly accessible style)

Abu-Lughod, L. 2011. Return to Half-Ruins: Fathers and Daughters, Memory and History in Palestine. In Hirsch M. & Miller N. (Eds.), Rites of Return: Diaspora Poetics and the Politics of Memory (pp. 124-136). New York: Columbia University Press. doi:10.7312/hirs15090.11

Boyarin, D., & Boyarin, J. 1993. Diaspora: Generation and the Ground of Jewish Identity. Critical Inquiry, 19(4): 693-725. (warning: this is a complex text, focus on the main argument about the formation of diasporic Jewish identity and return)

NAKBA

PALESTINE, 1948, AND THE CLAIMS OF MEMORY

Edited by

AHMAD H. SA'DI & LILA ABU-LUGHOD

Figure 7 Postcard of Jaffa from the sea, 1930s.

3 Return to Half-Ruins

MEMORY, POSTMEMORY, AND LIVING HISTORY IN PALESTINE

Lila Abu-Lughod

'Awda means return. For diasporic Palestinians, the charged term evokes nostalgia for the homeland they were forced to flee in 1948 and a reversal of the traumatic dispersion that sundered families, ruined livelihoods, and thrust Palestinians into humiliating refugee camps or individual adventures to rebuild lives armed with little more than birth certificates, keys to the homes left behind, and the stigma of having somehow lost their country to an alien people. The political insistence on the "right of return" is a demand for righting a moral wrong. It is also a demand that the story of that expulsion not be erased.

Not everyone fled Palestine in 1948, of course. Some Palestinians stayed on the land within the expanding territorial control of the Israeli state declared on May 15, 1948. Hanging on to their own villages or setting up near them, or staying on in their cities, they would watch their world transform before their eyes. Dislodged socially and politically but in place physically, they would learn the language of their colonizers and work among them, often in menial jobs. Those who fled to the towns of the West Bank or to Gaza would not come under direct Israeli military and administrative control until nearly twenty years later, when Israel occupied, after the 1967 war, those remaining parts of historic Palestine.

The majority of Palestinian refugees, however, found themselves cut off from their homes and their pasts. In Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, the

United States, England, and even the countries of South America, they tried to make new lives. Some were successful, financially and culturally; many, generations later, still live in refugee camps that have become unsettlingly permanent. For them, memories of home were frozen.

Until 1991, my father was one of those exiles who had not been back to see what had happened to his country. His family had fled to Jordan, from where he had borrowed money for a shipboard passage to the United States, in search of an education. He had made a life there, working his way through college, marrying my mother, having children, and eventually going to Princeton to get a Ph.D. in Arab history. Eight years after his exodus he was finally able to make his first trip back to the Arab world to take a job with UNESCO in Egypt. But he could not return to Palestine. My mother tells me our family made occasional visits to the West Bank and Jerusalem. There he would gaze longingly across to his part of Palestine—coastal Jaffa. But after Israel's occupation of these areas in 1967, even this was impossible. My father was one of those who refused to go and see his former home even when, quite late, he obtained the American passport that would have entitled him to enter as a tourist what was now Israel. He tirelessly wrote, spoke publicly, and taught about Palestine. Twice, he went to live in Beirut to set up Palestinian projects. In 1982 he was driven out by Israeli firepower for a second time in his life, an experience that left him haunted and distant from us, his family, for some years. He could not imagine placing himself at the mercy of and under the authority of the state that had overrun his entire country; to come face to face with the people who continued to devastate the everyday lives of Palestinians living there and elsewhere. The military that had landed a cluster bomb on his balcony in Beirut had shattered more than his dream of setting up a Palestinian Open University.

Then something changed. After a sobering illness, he realized that he might die without ever having seen Palestine again. Recognizing a slight shift in policies that meant an easing of restrictions in the Occupied Territories, he decided he would go. I remember hearing his excited stories when he returned. On this first visit in 1991, he was nervous but curious. His first shock, he said, was arriving at what he knew as Lydda airport to find a huge sign saying "Welcome to Israel." Nevertheless, he was exhilarated. What followed was a decision in 1992 to move "back"—to return. He and my mother had already divorced. He retired from Northwestern University, where he had taught political science for twenty-five years. I could see, when he came to visit me in England after I gave birth to my twins, that he was energized by

being home, as he felt it to be. As I saw much later in an undated transcript from a conference that he had left in a pile on his desk, he explained, "Most people I had spoken with [who returned] felt sadness or loss. I felt quite the opposite. I was happy to be reconnected with my land, to know that despite the changes, much of Palestinian culture survived Israel's assault. It did so through the powerful efforts of those who remained on the land, whether that of 1948 or the West Bank and Gaza."[1]

This move, I was to learn when I nervously agreed to visit him in Israel/Palestine five months later, changed his experience of that cataclysmic and defining event known by Palestinians simply as the Nakba, "the catastrophe." He inserted his memories of Palestine directly into the present, into a living history. My father's insertion of memory into the historical present made possible a different knowledge and identification for his children as well. This essay will explore what happened to my father as well as what happened to me as a result of his 'awda. Marianne Hirsch, sensitive analyst of the transfer of traumatic memory across generations among Holocaust survivors, calls postmemory the experience of having one's everyday reality overshadowed by the memory of a much more significant past that one's parents lived through (Hirsch 1997: 22–24; 1999). But the situation she describes is of parental memories of events that have passed. The world has denounced that genocide and those horrors. What I, as the daughter of someone who lived through the Nakba learned from my father's return to Palestine, was that, for Palestinians, both memory and postmemory have a special valence because the past has not yet passed.

Storied Memories

My father was a talker and a storyteller. Because of this, there was no time when we, his children, did not know we were Palestinian. The stories I remember about his boyhood in the 1930s and early 1940s were nostalgic, both comic and bitter. Like anyone, I found it hard to imagine my grownup parent as himself a child. There was also the strangeness of a life so different from what I knew growing up in the United States, a life I could access only obliquely through some childhood years spent in Egypt and summer vacations with relatives in Jordan, and more vividly once I became an anthropologist and lived intimately with Arab communities. I loved to imagine the boy who was so excited about the new pair of shoes he got for the holidays that he slept with them under his pillow. I sympathized when he told the story

about the "number zero"—the buzz-cut his father forced on him as a punishment; he would beg for at least a "number one" from the barber, which left a little more than stubble. I wondered at the amused stories he told about himself as a religious boy of eleven, twelve, and thirteen, this resolutely secular father of mine who regularly denounced the "ayatollahs," as he called them—Christian, Muslim, or Jewish—and who always excused himself from fasting during Ramadan because he was "traveling"—in exile.[2] In his zeal to outdo his brothers and win his parents' favor, he said, he had eagerly agreed to help the lazy imam by climbing up the minaret of his neighborhood mosque in Jaffa to call people to prayer. If the motivations for this show of piety were mixed, the religious idiom was also deeply personal: he told us too about how he had presided over a full Muslim burial for his pet bird, Hudhud, when it passed away while they were summering at al-Nabi Rubin.

Stories of paternal tenderness and moral training gave us glimpses into the character of his father, the grandfather we had never known, and the nature of family life in pre-1948 Palestine. My father would recount how he, as a small boy, had once gone to the bathroom in the middle of the night. In the dark, he didn't realize his father was already there. His father, an imposing man, remained silent so as not to frighten his half-asleep son, despite the indignity he suffered. But my father also told a story about the day his mother sent him out to buy salt and he gambled away the coins in a street game. When he returned home very late with no salt for the night's cooking, his mother said, "Wait 'til your father hears about this." The stern punishment was that he was not allowed to go out the next day, the big feast day. My father spent the day crying at the window, watching his friends and relatives promenade up and down the street in their new clothes, buying treats, and enjoying the holiday. The moral lesson was for us too: He never gambled again.

There were more political stories though, that began to teach us what it had meant to be Palestinian under the British Mandate. According to my father, people were barely aware that they were on the eve of disastrous events that would make them refugees. They did not realize that the Zionists, not the British, were their real adversaries. Again, I found it hard to imagine my professorial and genial father, who smoked a pipe, loved to talk on the telephone, delighted in playing with children, read voraciously, and came alive when giving public lectures (where his Zionist hecklers would fill me with stinging tears of humiliation and protective anger), as a defiant young boy having run-ins with the British Army. A version of one of his stories was preserved on tape in 2000 by Hisham Ahmed-Fararjeh, who recorded his life

story. This was the well-rehearsed story of his first arrest that I myself had heard often:

> The British imposed curfews, as the Israelis do now. We were kids, aged nine or ten, and I remember we would go up to a soldier and insult him. Once my older brother was arrested by a British patrol and taken to the police station. They slapped him around and then released him. Everyone who got arrested became a hero. I wanted to be a hero too; I was competing with my older brother. So when we saw a policeman on a motorcycle, I insulted him. But the bastards came after me and my friends! We ducked into a bakery. I was so embarrassed going in there because it was shut and we had entered by a side door. One of the British soldiers came in and caught us, red-handed, as it were. Standing there doing nothing. They arrested four of us. They were on four motorcycles and they made us run in front of them. They had whips. I was dressed in robes, what we wore for ordinary street clothes, so I had to pull them up and hold them in my teeth to run. We got tired but they whipped us to keep us on the run. People called out to us from their homes, "Come in here Ibrahim! Come in here Muhammad!" But we were afraid they would come after us so went along with them.

After much crying, some genuine and some faked, he said, the police released them but not until they'd been scolded by the local collaborator and then chased all the way back by another motorcycle, the soldier whipping them again. The way my father told the story, you had to see the funny side of a scrawny kid desperate to outdo his brother running for his life with his robes in his teeth.

He would tell us that he learned more of a lesson the second time he was caught. Instead of releasing the kids this time, the British police made them work. My father and his friends were ordered to pull out by hand all the grass in a large courtyard at the police station, to turn it into a tennis court. As he told it late in life,

> There was a British police officer we called Abu-Niyab [the one with the big canines] who I now understand was a sadist. We used to fear him because he walked around with a baton in his hand. We were trying to pull out the grass, but the grass wouldn't come out. He beat us and told us to keep working. It took us two hours to finish the job. So now what could they do with us? The curfew was still on. So they told us to move the grass from one side of the garden to the other, just to keep us working. We were tired. We were being beaten continuously. I can never forget the face of Abu-Niyab, that son-of-a-bitch who beat the hell out of

me. We started crying. We didn't want to be imprisoned; what we had wanted was to be leaders. In retrospect I think, damn that kind of nationalism. We had to go through beating and torture to become leaders?[3]

Since then, my father said, he always used legal means—his mind, his pen, and his gift for oratory—to struggle against colonial occupation (by Zionists now, not the British). Enough beatings.

Yet I don't recall hearing while I was growing up his stories of 1948, the last months before the fall of his hometown, Jaffa. Were we too young to be told? Did it not mean anything to children who had never seen Jaffa? My mother tells me he often told those stories to her and to others. I heard them, and I think they took on special meaning and more regularity in telling, when he returned to live in Palestine and was able to see Jaffa again. As Maurice Halbwachs (1992 [1914]) has argued, memory requires a social framework. But as Halbwachs also suggested, as people get older and detach themselves from the urgencies of professional and family life, they often become interested guardians of an increasingly vivid past. My father was active in Palestine and anything but detached, but the stories began to flow once he moved there. My father's experiences of 1948 had fired his long efforts to comprehend and publicize what had happened to the Palestinians. But the peculiar thing that happened when my father returned to Palestine was that his memories now became the guide to a living history and a real place.

Memory Into History: Touring Jaffa

Jaffa was the heart of my father's Palestine. On the wall of his apartment in Ramallah, when I came to stay in 2001, was a large sepia poster: a historic photograph of an Arab man staring wistfully out to sea with a large town in the background. At the top, in Arabic, it said, "Jaffa 1937." Yet my father was living in Ramallah, not Jaffa, because it was in the West Bank where Palestinian institutions were haltingly functioning in the 1990s. It was here where he could work.

On my first visit to Palestine to see him in 1993, I sensed the thrill he felt at having mastered the new situation. The good part was embracing and being embraced by the community he had found, whether in the West Bank or in various parts of pre-1948 Palestine. The anxiety of being there was betrayed by his dry mouth and the beads of sweat on his forehead as he drove us around, approaching Israeli military checkpoints or getting lost because

he couldn't read Hebrew and was afraid to ask, a fear that rubbed off on me since I found it all so strange. The landscape was familiar from Lebanon and Jordan, which I had known well growing up. The barren highways and the cities full of Hebrew were menacing, though, especially when combined with the heavy presence of Israeli soldiers, reservists, and guns. He had become a little more accustomed to them.

He was eager to show me and my small family the whole of Palestine, from Jerusalem to Bethlehem, Nablus to Nazareth, Jericho to 'Akka. It was a hectic trip full of sights, sounds, and driving. I can barely remember my feelings or conjure images because I was a new mother managing five month old twins on the road. But I do recall that the visits to his friends across the country were warm and full of good food, even if I had that same shy feeling I often had growing up as I silently listened as talk turned to politics, or as I buried my fear of somehow embarrassing my father because, like so many of us in the diaspora, my Palestinian Arabic was not fluent and so much about me was obviously American. Though many we met had studied or worked in the United States or Britain, and all were effusively welcoming, I didn't feel I belonged effortlessly, as my father did.

He was especially keen to show off Jaffa. His tour of Jaffa was the same one, I was a little hurt to discover later, that he gave to many others. It was about claiming and reclaiming the city in which he had been born, the sea in which he had swum as a boy, and the home he had been forced to flee in 1948. On his own first visit in 1991, he'd asked friends to take him there first. Initially he was disoriented. Most of the landmarks weren't there. The neighborhood by the sea where he'd grown up had been razed by then, though twenty years earlier his brother had done what so many Palestinians have done and described: knocked on the door to find out which Jews—Russian, Moroccan, Yemeni, Polish—were now living in their old family homes.[4] Suddenly, my father said he had spotted the Hasan Bek Mosque where he had made the call to prayer as a boy. From there he had figured out where the coffee shop had been. He remembered this café because he used to hang around outside in the evenings, hoping to listen in on the storytellers and reciters of epics, only to be chased away because he didn't have the money for a glass of tea. Bit by bit, circling more widely around the mosque, he began to find his way.

It was a former student of his, someone who had become a professor of Middle East politics, who had made him rethink his refusal to go back. She often traveled to Israel and the West Bank. He recalled that she had told him once, "Ibrahim, Palestine is still there." He was happy, he said, to find this

to be true. On his first visit he had asked some Arab kids on the street if they knew where King Faysal Street was. They immediately took him there, though he could see that the street sign said something altogether different. From this, he knew that Palestinian parents were still teaching their children the old names of things even as Palestine was being buried, erased, and re-written by Israel.[5]

There is an image in one of Doris Lessing's *African Stories* (1981) that has never left me. I assigned the short story in 1985 to my students in a course on colonialism. A young girl, a white settler living in southern Africa, looks out over the savanna and acacia trees and sees the large gnarled oak trees of her English fairytales. My father did the opposite. Where I, who never knew anything else, could see only the deep gouges in green hillsides made for Israeli settlements with garish red tile roofs, or miles and miles of highways criss-crossing the rocky landscape and claiming it with modern green signs in Hebrew and English, or non-native evergreen forests to hide razed villages, my father saw beyond, between and behind them to the familiar landscapes of his youth.[6]

He explained that he used to travel as a boy all around Palestine with workers from his father's foundry as they delivered, installed, and repaired water pumps and olive presses. I discovered later that he had also traveled as a politicized high school student trying to organize fellow students, worrying his mother sick, as my mother tells me, as he set off by bus. As my father drove us, it was clear he still knew his way around though he had been denied access for more than forty years and everything looked so different. He showed us the orange groves where he might have stolen a fruit or two when young. (I associate oranges with him because of the loving way he always peeled them and then, after eating a few sections, would distribute the rest to his children; I knew it was hard for him to look at Jaffa oranges in the supermarket, with their provenance listed as Israel, when they were part of his youth.) He pointed out the stubborn cacti that still mark the boundaries of Arab fields that no longer exist. Tucked in and among the new structures that dominate the towns and cities, he would point out the arched windows of old Arab houses that had somehow escaped destruction. Half-ruins he built in his imagination, while I strained to make them out amidst the ugly concrete.

My father's tour of Jaffa actually began with the small factory on the outskirts of the city that his father founded in 1929. He remembered an old Afghani gentleman who was the guard for their foundry. With a big white mustache, he used to mesmerize them as kids by reading their palms. My

father told us that this man had had a premonition that they would all have to leave Jaffa, but that he himself would not. And in fact, my father would add, he never did leave; he was hit by a car before the events of 1948. I sensed that my father considered him lucky.

We parked across the busy road, at the water fountain of Abu-Nabbut, and he pointed to the shabby industrial structure that was in his day the Palestinian Iron and Brass Foundry Company Ltd., a name imprinted on manhole covers to be found even today in Jaffa. This foundry, he proudly explained, provided a service to the Palestinian farmers by manufacturing the diesel pumps, crushes, and presses they needed for their orange and olive orchards. Though his father learned his trade first from some Germans, who left when the British seized their factory during the First World War, he then went on to work for German Jews. Later, he decided to set up his own company, with relatives as shareholders, many giving five pounds here, five pounds there. This made it possible, he explained in retrospect, for Arabs not to have to depend on foreign or Jewish industry. Over the course of its almost twenty years, the factory was shut down several times by the British. In 1936–37, the time of the Palestinian rebellion, his father was accused of secretly manufacturing arms. Nationalism, I then understood, ran in the family. One time when they sealed his factory with red wax, he surreptitiously removed all the machinery, smuggling it piece by piece through the orange groves behind the foundry and carrying it on donkey carts to a new location.

My grandfather's nationalist activities got them into trouble. My father remembers the night raids of his house by British police and soldiers. These sounded surreal to me, conjuring violent images hard to reconcile with how I had known my father, a man who rode a bike, read books, mowed suburban lawns, and taught charismatically. The British would storm in, shouting for everyone to put their hands up, then head for the kitchen to rifle through the sacks of flour and rice looking for weapons. My father and his brothers learned early to identify as cousins the many visitors they harbored from the countryside. They learned early too about lawyers and British prison guards who could be bribed to smuggle in food and bedding to his father. In and out of prison, my grandfather died in 1944, when my father was only fifteen. His factory, though, went on producing until everything collapsed with the war in 1948.

A very important stop on the tour of Jaffa was his high school, the school that he wryly explained taught him the geography of England so well that when he finally set foot in London many years later, he knew every street

name. This was the school where he says he learned to use his mind, and where teachers politicized him. It now bears a plaque outside with the name Weizmann School and has bars around it. In his day it had been the 'Amiriyya Government Secondary School. He loved to talk about how one time when he went to show it to visitors, they found it guarded by young Ethiopian immigrants who knew so little history that they disbelieved that my father spoke no Hebrew, because he told them this had been his school. On his tours he would look through the gate and would try to talk his way in. He managed it once, accompanied by some friends from the United States. They had to leave their American passports with the guard. It was the same, he marveled, except that the drawings on the walls were made by Jewish kids. It was also now co-ed; they had had to climb a wall to look over at the girls' school, Al-Zahra.

Because Jaffa had been such a heterogeneous commercial city, he had no classmates from the old notable families. He and his friends were eager to learn, eager to achieve. Some of these friends were family friends now—Reja-e Busailah, the blind poet and professor of English literature who had landed in Kokomo, Indiana; Shafiq al-Hout, the smart, warm, writer who was later to head the PLO office in Beirut. They all still remember the teachers who held them to such high standards that when my father managed to get to the United States and began university, he placed out of courses in geography and European history. From the teachers, he said in an interview I read, they also learned the difference between breaking school rules and engaging in political work. The teachers spent time with them in the yard answering questions about imperialism, smiling when they went on strike, organized demonstrations, and founded the Palestinian student union. These were teachers of chemistry as well as history, so different from any I had had in high school (Ahmed-Fararjeh 2003: 37–41).

My father was incredulous when he thought back to his last year there, in 1948. Knowing that there would be trouble when they pulled out in May, the British announced that the final year examinations were going to be moved forward to March. My father and his friends studied hard. Fighting was going on across the country. It was going on right there between Jaffa and Tel Aviv. After school every day, he and his friends went to help out, telling their mothers they were going off to study together. Students were put in charge of the checkposts, he said, since they were presumed to know English and to be able to tell the difference between the British and the Jewish immigrant fighters. They didn't have a clue. Little imagining how radically their lives soon would

Figure 8 Ibrahim Abu-Lughod (fourth from right) and Reja-e Busailah (fourth from left) with classmates from Al-'Amiriyya Secondary School, Jaffa, 1947.

be changed, they felt it was critical that they pass the end of year examinations. Their future, they thought at the time, depended on it. So when Shafiq, my father's close friend, lost his brother, my father insisted that he forgo the funeral procession in order to take his exams. When they showed up to sit for their exams, they found that the roof had been blown off the school in which the Palestine matriculation exams were being administered. They carried on. By the time they heard the results on the radio several months later, it was the Jewish Education Department that announced them; there was no longer an Arab Department. My father was, by then, a refugee in Nablus, a West Bank town. He was soon to leave for Amman. He sent a telegram to Shafiq, now a refugee in Beirut. He remembers the irony: "It was such a thrill—we passed! But there we were, refugees with no future."

My father's tour of Jaffa took us down a boulevard where you passed a majestic colonial post office (where he had tried in vain to get his old post-box, just for the pleasure of being able to receive letters addressed to Jaffa); the law courts where he had dreamed of practicing law, modeling himself on Yusuf Wahbi, a star of Egyptian film whose eloquence could win people over; the spot where there had been an ice cream shop where he and his teenage friends would go, more to flirt with the European woman who worked there than to eat. They weren't used to seeing young women working, even though young girls in their section of town and women in the Christian section of the city went about unveiled. These buildings harbored meanings for

him that were opaque for me, who saw only the sort of colonial buildings that looked vaguely familiar from other parts of the Middle East—other places the British and French had set themselves up to rule. I had affection for these kinds of buildings in Egypt, as I felt at home and at ease there. Here I was a stranger and my father's memories, perhaps because so caught up in defeat and hostility, were not ones I could easily embrace.

There was also a nondescript apartment building on the tour, the last in which he had lived. Jaffa and Tel Aviv bordered each other, and as the tensions intensified in the 1940s, they split Arabs and Jews. The fighting in the winter of 1947 and 1948 was near this border, and my father's neighborhood, as he explained, suddenly became too dangerous, subject to mortar and gunfire. His family took shelter with a cousin who lived downtown. But after two weeks, they realized the battles were going to be longer than anticipated and that they wouldn't be going back home soon. When the Irgun and Hagana dynamited the Palace of Justice not far from their cousin's house, killing sixty young people who had been under the care of the Social Affairs Department along with a popular soccer player who was one of the social workers in charge of them, he thought it might be best to move the family to a different neighborhood. My father, the scholar and historian with a huge library and encyclopedic knowledge of the Palestinian-Israeli dispute, insisted that although Israeli historians continue to claim that the target was the National Committee headquarters, this could not be so. The National Committee had moved two weeks earlier and he is sure that this attack was meant to terrorize the people of Jaffa, which it did.

In the book he edited in 1971, *The Transformation of Palestine*, my father would publish an article by Erskine Childers, a distinguished Irish journalist who characterized the Zionist hope from the early part of the twentieth century that the Palestinians would disappear as "the wordless wish." Based on documentary sources including Zionist, British, and Arab radio broadcasts, Childers described what had happened in Jaffa in the weeks before it was overrun—a description that I had found shocking when I first read it. Again, it was so hard to imagine that this was what my father and his family had lived through—my grandmother had never talked about it to me, her only stories from the past being about her wedding night and other fragments of magic and everyday life in Palestine. The assault, Childers noted, began on April 25 with units of the underground Irgun followed by units of the official Hagana. Although Jaffa was not part of the Jewish allocation in the UN partition plan, it was bombarded by 3-inch mortars, highly inaccurate but

devastating psychologically; it was subjected to barrel bombs, described by an Israeli army-reserve officer to the U.S. Marine Corps professional magazine as especially designed for Arab towns and consisting of "barrels, casks or metal drums, filled with a mixture of explosives and petrol, and fitted with two old rubber tires containing the detonating fuse" which were rolled down the streets until they crashed into walls and doorways, bursting into flames and multiple explosions (Childers 1971: 187); its population was terrorized psychologically by loudspeaker vans with pre-recorded "horror sounds" including shrieks, wails and moans of women, sirens, fire-alarm bells and calls, in Arabic, to run for their lives (ibid. 188) and to remember the massacre at Deir Yassin; and there was even looting by Jewish forces (ibid. 191).

My father, a high school student, had volunteered for the hurriedly formed city-based National Committee to defend Jaffa. With no training, he, like the so many of the small fighting force of 1,500, was issued an old gun unfit for battle. It came in handy, he said, only once: during his search for an apartment. He knocked on doors looking for an empty apartment for his mother and sister to live in. Eventually, he heard about one. He explained politely to the agent their desperate situation. The man refused to rent it to them; the apartment belonged to a couple on their honeymoon. My father pleaded with him, assuring him that they wanted it only temporarily and would give it up as soon as the couple returned. But the man was stubborn. My father let the gun show beneath his jacket. The rental was agreed. This modern apartment with the first bathtub and upright toilet they had seen, was a place where his mother was unhappy. She didn't end up staying long because after more and more of Jaffa fell and news reached them of the massacre of the village of Deir Yassin, there was great panic.[7] It was decided that the women and children should go to Nablus to wait things out. Like the honeymooning couple, they were never to return.

My father spent his last days and nights "defending" Jaffa at the age of nineteen in various places that were also part of his tour of the city. With no sense of the geography, the streets and buildings meaning nothing to me, I again could not connect my white haired father with his black beret and his classical music playing on the car radio with this youth. I struggled to transpose those old black and white photographs of a young man with a dark mustache and bright eyes into this place. But how could I? His trauma in Palestine had lived on in me only as a wounded identification in a hostile United States where sympathy for Palestinians was scarce and aggressive lies about what had happened prevailed. My father recalled that at the end of that

fateful April, food was running out, the bakeries had closed, mortar from Tel Aviv was falling on the city. The streets of most neighborhoods were by then empty. The British were escorting convoys of fleeing people. But it was dangerous for young Palestinian men to try to leave the city by land because they were vulnerable to arrest or worse; the British were unable or unwilling to protect them. There was only the sea.

On his tour, then, my father pointed to the place where he and his school friend laid down their useless guns when they left. He had lost touch with this brother, on another front; the rest of his family was gone. On the morning of May 3, the two joined a throng on a small barge that was transporting people out of the harbor to a ship that was rumored to be the last ship to carry people to safety. Sent by the Red Cross, it was going to Beirut. But then they hesitated, asking themselves what they were doing. They went back ashore. After all, they had been part of the National Committee that had been urging people not to flee, insisting the city was safe, promising that reinforcements were on the way (they weren't). But when they did return, they realized that no one was left. The shooting, my father said, was all coming from the other side. Around three o'clock in the afternoon, they saw smoke billowing from the smoke stack of the ship. It was about to leave. They put down their guns and ran to catch the last dinghy out. The words of a Belgian sailor who confronted them on board echoed in my father's ears fifty years later: "How could you leave your country?" He was to repeat to himself these words many times, even though he knew there had been no choice.

The tour of Jaffa always ended with the sea. My father ignored the Hebrew being spoken all around him, the young couples in tight jeans flirting and laughing, the downmarket Oriental Jewish families having picnics. He refused to go to the Israeli beach café. Instead, he made himself a place on the sand and went in for his swim. As I held my infants, with their silly sun hats, I knew he wanted me to admire this glorious place. I had always known he loved the sea because he had grown up swimming. I found it interesting that he told a colleague in 1999, "Growing up by the sea, I was not confined to the city, I was not confined to my community but was part of a world that was really large; I dreamt about going out to see it" (Ahmed-Fararjeh 2003: 22). As it turned out, he had been forced to go out and see that world.

All my life I had watched him gaze out to sea—from Alexandria, from Beirut, from Spain, Morocco, New Jersey, and the Caribbean. I had seen him swim out, stretching his long fingers with his wedding band glinting in the sun, his broad shoulders breaking out of the water when he did the butter-

fly stroke he liked best. He had made us all love the sea. Yet here, in Jaffa, like the man in his sepia poster, he looked out from the place he somehow stubbornly considered home, even though I felt we were vulnerable intruders. His blue American passport allowed him to sit on the beach where he swam as a boy with dolphins and turtles, the beach his mother could see from her window as she drank her coffee. It was his unthreatening white hair and turtleneck shirts that allowed him to pass as a foreigner, not a dangerous or despised Arab "native." The yellow license plates that identified his car as Israeli and thus gave him freedom of movement allowed him to pull up unnoticed alongside the others in the parking lot at the beach. (Cars sold to temporary visitors who need not pay taxes always have this color license plates, like other Israeli cars, distinguishing them from the cars of the West Bank or Gaza.) These, not the sepia of his poster, were the vivid colors of his return to Jaffa.

Memories as History

As a scholar obsessed with Palestine, my father had long thought it critical to gather people's recollections of the forced exodus of 1948. His introduction to the extraordinary memoir he solicited from his old friend and high school classmate Reja-e Busailah began with a comment on the Nakba. "Powerful and shattering as it was," he wrote, "and although it constitutes an important aspect of the Palestinian legacy, it is the one event in Palestinian history that has gone essentially unrecorded from the standpoint of the victim."[8] An understanding of the exodus had to be obtained, "even at this late date," he wrote in 1981, to understand the Palestinian experience, to bear witness to a silenced history, and to reconstruct the event in its complexity. Always concerned with the wider picture, he wrote, "We know that the circumstances of the exodus differed considerably from one region of Palestine to another and from one social class to another." (Busailah 1981: 123)

Busailah's harrowing memoir of the exodus from Lydda in July 1948 is different from my father's stories of the doomed fight for Jaffa and the flight by sea. It brings together the political understandings of a young high school radical with vivid aural and physical descriptions of the bombardment, the city overrun by Zionist fighters, the rumors of massacres, and the forced march of the whole bewildered population of this town that had believed itself so permanent. Lydda had not been within the borders of the area allocated to the Zionists under the UN Partition Plan. It was attacked and its

inhabitants driven out in the second of the two short wars with Arab forces that the newly declared Israeli state fought. Busailah describes their expulsion in the summer and their long march into the unknown in Biblical terms— into the wilderness. At the end of that march on the terrible day turned out to be an Arab village called Ni'lin, fifteen miles away including the detours to avoid hostile areas. His recollections include moments of intense fear before the departure, as when he hid, shaking, behind a rolled up mat as the Jewish forces burst into houses, their shots accompanied by women's screams. They are haunted too by incidents of his own hard-hearted denial of others, as when after he had made it to Ni'lin, he pushed his way back through the stragglers to bring a little water to a close friend and his mother, hiding it from all those pitifully begging.

Busailah recalls events as he experienced them and as he heard about them from others. Being blind, the mingling of experience and hearsay that forms all our memories is perhaps more acute for him. His memoir describes the sun beating down, the clawing for water at muddy wells, the talk of grandfathers left behind because they could not go on, of "bodies that might have been without life," and of babies abandoned in ditches. "I was made aware," he writes, "slowly, by piecemeal, through exclamations or incoherent phrases, that some of those who lay dead had their tongues sticking out, covered with dust and down. I did not see. And that perhaps frightened me the more." Finally he writes, "Someone talked later—I think when we reached Ni'lin—of having seen a baby still alive on the bosom of a dead woman, apparently the mother. . . . (Mother and baby are not unlike the reverse of what was related later about the Deir Yassin mother seen in Jerusalem with her killed baby on her bosom.)"

Struggling for the right voice, later he would turn terse description into poetic image. He reworked this last story into a poem called "Remembering After Forty Years in the Wilderness," the wilderness now signifying not just the road to Ni'lin along which he stumbled, but his lifetime of exile in Kuwait, Jordan, and the United States.

> Over Europe there hung a strange mist,
> America was at the tree-breaking age,
> and God was ordering that there be light
>
> and when there was
> there was paraded on the road to Ni'leen

> as the wind played possum
> a pair of two dead breasts
> and a baby his face buried between them
> waiting to be nursed
>
> the July sun was pitiless then
> citing and reciting the incident when God that spring
> went merciful and ordered that there be light
>
> and when there was
> there was paraded from Deir Yaseen
> in the breath of the orange blossom
> in the view of God's City a baby lying on his tummy
> dead between two breasts that yearned to nurse.[9]

My father did not worry, as do the academic analysts of collective or social memory today, about the fragmentary outlines of personal memory, the silences, and the bending of memory by the present or by the mingling of the lived and the heard. He saw individual memoirs such as his friend's as the stuff of a history of the Palestinian experience. He encouraged people to write and recount, even if he focused more on his intellectual friends than on the former villagers who contributed to memorial books such as the ones discussed by Davis and Slyomovics or the women in refugee camps who gave their stories to researchers like Rosemary Sayigh, Diana Allan, or Laleh Khalili (all in this volume). He offered his own stories not just to his children but to newspapers, journals, and interviewers including Hisham Ahmed-Ferarjeh, who compiled them into a book. Some of his memory production, like that of other Palestinians, was heightened by projects undertaken on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Nakba. In the twilight of his life, he also worked on a proposal for a Palestinian Memory Museum, a project that seems even more quixotic now that Israeli tanks can drive by his old apartment and the waves of Israeli offensives since 2001 have destroyed what fragile hope there was when my father was alive for even moderate Palestinian sovereignty and calm. He wanted the museum's ethnographic, archaeological, and art exhibits to show the dynamic and continuous history of Palestinians. This was definitely not to be a Holocaust museum, he insisted. The Nakba was deliberately consigned a small space. These exhibits were to be complemented by an archive of the basic documents needed for research on Palestinian history.[10]

Memorializing Material Remains

For a daughter, a father's death is always hard. But when he is someone whose life has been tied up with something much larger than family, his death takes on much more than a merely personal meaning. My father died on May 23, 2001, surrounded by family and friends. For me, the first aftermath was intensely personal and fixated on objects. Draped over the back of the black wheelchair with its shiny red wheels were his khaki "bair of bants," as he used to joke, in his self-mocking caricature of an Arab accent. The belt dangled limply. On the bathroom counter was the untouched shaving mug, its water gone cold. Everywhere in his Ramallah apartment were the abandoned signs of his life. His Vivaldi CDs that my sisters and I would insist on playing rather than Qur'anic recitation, as one pious distant relative urged. The oxygen tanks, two big ones by the bed, four small ones lined up in the hall, the one on the trolley with a stenciled Star of David marking it as from "the other side." My father's room held so many small objects that would make a daughter cry: his watch, his glasses, his wallet, his sandals, his dried fruit, his piles of scholarly papers.

It had all stopped now, the routine of taking care of him. My aunt wasn't going to bring him his Arab coffee in the hand-painted aquamarine mug and hear his praise. My sisters and I, having left our families and jobs to come to Ramallah, weren't going to help him get dressed for the day. Encourage him to eat his breakfast. Open the door for his many visitors. Scold him for having so many guests. Tell him it wasn't time yet for his painkiller. Take directions on how to make correct chicken soup. We weren't going to get him the newspapers, Arabic and English, he insisted on having even though he didn't have the energy to read them.

We were now to be swept into an even more public world, as his friend Suheil had warned us, sitting us down and explaining seriously, as if we knew nothing about the Arab world, that there were certain customs that had to be followed. While we, his children with various levels of familiarity with Palestinian society but almost no experience in Palestine, grieved, my father's friends indeed took care of everything. They had to negotiate the complex world of a Palestinian community steeped in the political during an intifada, a world we were hardly prepared for. His death certificate was written; his burial certificate was obtained from the appropriate Israeli ministries. Plans for the funeral in Jaffa were made. Arrangements for the three days of condolence visits in Ramallah were made. Plastic chairs arrived at the apartment

and were set up in rows along the walls of the living room, dining room, and terrace. Counters were cleared and bitter coffee made. Posters with his photo on them appeared. Arab coffee, cases of water, and boxes of Kleenex were piled in the kitchen, compliments, I was surprised to learn, of the Palestine National Authority. Arafat would come straight from the airport among a flurry of bodyguards and commotion to offer brief condolences to this Palestinian academic who had given so much to the cause. Announcements were placed, newspaper interviews were done, and the speakers list for the memorial was drawn up. People came and went, dignitaries and neighbors, journalists and politicos, acquaintances and cultured friends. When my uncle and cousin arrived from Jordan, they relieved us from the duties of receiving condolences so we could escape into our father's bedroom, feeling for his presence, feeling the emptiness.

The next time we saw my father was on the day of the funeral. He was a frail body lying in a little concrete room with green metal doors set behind Maqasid Islamic Hospital in Jerusalem, ritually prepared for burial. Wrapped in white sheets and bound, he looked small and thin. When I went to look at his face, only a small bit of it uncovered, I had to turn away. He was lifeless—the finality so physical.

But he was at the same time now becoming a symbol for others. Already shrouded as a Muslim, he was also going to be a national hero of sorts. We began the long wait as people gathered for the drive to Jaffa, a very public affair. We were watching tensely for any unusual movement, wondering if "they" were going to prevent us from taking him. A man filmed us with a video camera. It was a relief to find out that he was from Al-Jazeera Television, the Arab satellite channel, not then well-known outside the Arab world because this was still May, a few months before the events of 9/11 thrust this news station into Western consciousness. The evening before, with the house full of mourners, we had received an unnerving phone call. The man spoke Arabic; after offering ritual condolences, he demanded to talk with the person in charge of the funeral arrangements. He identified himself as from Israeli intelligence, Shin Bet. My legs were weak and I could only think how glad I was that we were in an area under the Palestinian Authority. All this officer could do was telephone, not come knocking on/down the door. I could never think of Israelis without the sharp black and white images of the French colonial commandos in Pontecorvo's brilliant film Battle of Algiers kicking down doors. Had it been a few months later when Israeli tanks reoccupied Ramallah, he would indeed have been able to invade our private grief.

I had quickly passed the phone to my father's friends. I could hear heated discussion in the back bedroom. They were being told that they would not be permitted to bury my father in Jaffa. How had Israeli security known? It was all over Radio Palestine and in the local newspapers: the first Palestinian refugee to be buried back in his hometown. My father's colleagues insisted that we had all the proper documents: the death certificate from Jerusalem and the burial permit from the appropriate Israeli Ministry, thanks to our "Israeli Arab" friends who had grown up in the system. But the security officer was insistent. He said he would call back. We were agitated. The men went over possible scenarios, all terrible to me: of being halted as we tried to take the body from the hospital, or as we were on the road to Jaffa, or as we approached the cemetery. Could we really have a confrontation with the Israeli army while my father's body lay in the hot sun? What should we do? Someone suggested that I should call the U.S. consul general in Jerusalem. There was no other way. So I telephoned and explained that we had a problem. My father's wish had been to be buried in Jaffa and we had all the proper papers. The consul said some kind words about my father and assured me that he would call the ambassador in Tel Aviv. When we didn't hear back from the Shin Bet officer that night, we thought it was a good sign. I wanted what was best for my father; others were ready to use this occasion to assert their rights in the face of Israeli challenge.

So it was a relief that nothing was happening that Friday morning behind Maqasid Hospital except that people were milling about. More and more people. There were the familiar faces of his friends and those we knew, people we had seen at the house over the last months. I was glad to see a few people I considered friends, academics of the younger generation who spoke to us in English. There were many others we didn't know. People came to shake hands with us. Friends hugged each other. The men stood outside the emergency room entrance. Whispering started up when particular dignitaries or controversial figures arrived. We sat with some inside the hospital, under the bare cement ceilings with trailing wires. I couldn't help feeling sad about how different this tired underfunded Arab hospital was from the bustling corporate professionalism of Hadassah Hospital where my father had gone for his last difficult appointments with the smart pulmonologist and the unsympathetic oncologist.

Eventually it was time to move. An unmarked white van pulled up in front of the morgue and the coffin was loaded. My sisters and I clung to each other as we peered through the van window at that plain, lonely box.

The crowd got into cars and the bus that had come from Ramallah, forming a long cortege. Slowly we drove, looking right and left for Israeli army jeeps or police. But the road was clear. We had heard that the U.S. ambassador this morning had reassured someone that they would be monitoring the situation. I felt the irony—my father protected, as a citizen, by the same government that he always berated for supporting and arming the killers of his people. But I was grateful.

It was a long drive, on highways and through a back route into the industrial sector that led to the Arab part of Jaffa. In a crowded neighborhood, we parked and got out. Plastered on the walls were bills with newspaper articles about my father and his curriculum vitae. A professor, I realized, is a respected figure in this community. And he was special because of the way he'd come in fresh, breaking through the inertia of strikes, ignoring curfews, refusing all the borders between Palestinians—diasporic, in the occupied territories, and within Israel—and, as he had done in his years in the U.S., willing communities to take action.[11] We were at the center of the Jaffa Arab Association, a place where my father had spoken many times to a community he was exceedingly fond of, these remnants in what had been a Palestinian city. The association was headed by some men who had gone out of their way to help arrange for the burial. For them, my father's support and concern for their activities (squatting in condemned buildings, clearing paths to houses whose access had been blocked by the dumping of garbage for a Tel Aviv landfill, advocacy and social services for the downtrodden Arabs of a rundown neighborhood so different from the gentrified areas where Jews lived) had meant a lot.

The coffin was laid out on a large table in a small room to the left. There were wreaths of flowers. Now draped with the Palestinian flag, the coffin suddenly looked vibrant. My father was no longer the frail mummy we'd seen earlier. His death was being given great meaning. Eulogies I barely heard stopped in time for afternoon prayer. Everyone spilled out the doors and followed the coffin. Men carried it down the side streets to the 'Ajami mosque, jostling to take their turns. My nephew was among them, the only one with a ponytail, but the one who loved him best, having himself lived with him for two years in Ramallah. In the front of the procession some young men held the Palestinian flag as a banner. People looked out from the windows above.

At the mosque, they carried him upstairs. I wondered how long it had been since he had been in a mosque, but this was the way. He was being absorbed into a society and community. All the women stayed outside but I also noticed that there were many more men waiting outside the mosque than had gone

inside. I asked a colleague of his from Birzeit University, "Are all these Christians?" "No," he answered with a smile, "I see a lot of Marxist-Leninists!"

We stood around. The sun was strong but we were beginning to feel good now that we could see the sea. A young teenager with long hair, doe eyes, and a tee shirt and jeans struck up a friendship with my sister. She didn't know our father, she admitted. "But," she added, "for the first time in my life I feel proud to be from Jaffa." In fact, I suspect there were many people there who didn't know him. Those who did came from all corners of Palestine, but especially from the part of Palestine taken in 1948. There were a few Israeli Jews as well—anti-Zionists for whom my father was an important bridge. On the other hand, I came to understand there were many more people who couldn't be there: all those with West Bank or Gaza identity cards. None were permitted to cross the checkpoints into "Israel." Even a close friend of my father's, a professor who had been elected to the Palestinian legislature, had been refused a permit to leave Gaza for the occasion, though his American ex-wife had tried to intervene.

When prayers were over, we began to move. Carried on the shoulders of waves of men, the coffin swayed wildly. Far in front was a Palestinian flag, now defiantly waving. A large procession of people walked together up the hill, holding hands, talking, feeling part of the group. We passed the fish restaurants that my father liked to take people to. Like oranges, fish were for him part of the cherished tastes of home in Jaffa. Stronger tastes than Proust's famed madeleines. Bystanders watched, perplexed. Some children waved, thinking perhaps this was a parade. Many Israelis now live in the Arab neighborhoods of Jaffa, some enjoying tastefully restored houses with Arab tiles and arches, as my aunt would be devastated to discover when we returned to Jaffa a week later. The sea shimmered to our right below, the afternoon sun catching the windsurfers who were out enjoying the gentle breeze. The sense of exhilaration was intense—so many people walking together. Miraculously, it seemed, we were not being prevented from burying him as he wished, in the cemetery overlooking the sea in his hometown of Jaffa.

I had fallen behind but when I caught up I saw, in the cemetery, a cluster of men high up, to the right of three trees. I hurried up, my feet in their open heeled shoes catching on crumbled graves and twigs. My sisters and aunt stood at the edge of the crowd of men. We watched my father, wrapped in a flag, his small face now uncovered so we would see him for the last time, being hauled out of the coffin and dropped into the freshly dug earth. His

material remains put back into his land in the most beautiful of spots (save for the decaying houses, the empty lots, and the construction work on the "Peres Peace Center"), this bluff next to his favorite beach.

As we made our way down through the cemetery, a close friend of my father's asked, "Do you want to see your grandfather's grave?" My uncle had remembered where it was because he had, as a boy, gone every week to visit it. It was large and looked still new, standing out amongst the crumbling stones. The sea air is hard on most kinds of stone but it must have been of amazing quality. On the side was a poem carved in ornate calligraphy. Near the bottom we could see his name, 'Ali Khamis Abu-Lughod. He had died shortly after being released without charges from the last of his imprisonments by the British. Just nearby was the grave of my father's brother who had been killed by the British a year or so before they had to flee in 1948. We learned later that no one had been buried in this cemetery for twenty years.

When we emerged from the gate, stepping through the dust and rubble, people came, one by one, to shake our hands in condolence. How many people were there? It was overwhelming. Did all these people know my father? Or was he just a symbol—a son of Jaffa, a prominent Palestinian, a lover of Palestine, exercising, in the end, his right to return?

Memorializing my father a few days after his death, Mahmoud Darwish, Palestine's great poet, would say, "Every death is a first death—sudden as a thunderbolt, not familiar, not known." And yet my father's death was saturated with stories already known. He himself had surprised me by resorting in his illness to odd expressions with religious referents, likening the pain in his side to a kick by angels and half-jokingly remarking, as he stoically suffered the pain of cancer, "We [Palestinians] were born to suffer . . . like Jesus." Others were now bolder in their metaphors, Palestine and Jaffa offering particularly resonant "sites of memory" (Nora 1989). Darwish (2001) likened my father's Palestine to "heaven and hell entwined because the eternal tree of Paradise grows in the city of Jaffa." He described my father's presence in "the caravan of expulsion" from Jaffa as the original sin, not because he had approached the forbidden tree of knowledge but because he had been too far from it: this explained his lifelong commitment to research and intellectual pursuits. Darwish ended, as did so many, by talking about my father's return to Palestine. "He returned," he said, "to plant in it the tree of knowledge, and he was that tree." Playing on the Qur'anic language of return in death, he said, "He was born in Jaffa and to Jaffa he returned, to remain, there for eternity, close to the tree of Paradise."

A few years later I was struck by the passionate remarks of an old Jaffa refugee living in Gaza who also brought heaven and Jaffa together. Captured in Omar Al-Qattan's 1995 documentary film about the fall of Jaffa, *Going Home . . . A British Veteran in Palestine*, the old man argues with his son that he cannot and will not accept what happened. Almost blasphemously he insists, "On Judgment Day when God asks me to choose, saying, 'I want you to enter heaven, what do you say?' I'll say, 'No, return me to my country instead so I can go live in Jaffa.' You see, I would refuse heaven and say 'Please let me go live in Jaffa because it's my hometown (baladi).'"

The more common story to enfold my father in death was the one told by the Palestinian flag with which they covered him. My father was not a flag waver; he was dedicated to justice, he loved Palestine and its people, but he was not a crude nationalist and remained always critical, always scholarly, always independent politically. Yet they draped his coffin with the Palestinian flag as it lay in the Jaffa Arab Community Center Hall awaiting burial. I had never waved a flag either and found the politicization overbearing. Yet I felt that the flag charged the coffin with a strange charisma. Young men held high the Palestinian flag at the head of the funeral procession to the cemetery, a defiant gesture in a country where people have long been imprisoned for showing that flag, although also a trite move in a land of so many funerals of young "martyrs." Two days later a fiery speaker would commend my father for his decision to return to Palestine, leaving the comforts and advantages of life in America, because he had not set conditions for this return. "The nation," he approved, "is to be loved unconditionally."

Edward Said, brilliant scholar and close friend of my father's, who would outlive him by less than three years, was less romantic about the nation. At the same memorial service in Ramallah he countered this imposed image of the nationalist, the image that was carried also by hundreds of posters that appeared, in the name of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Palestine National Authority, and the Liberation Movement of Fatah, in what has become a tradition for marking the martyrs of the struggle for Palestine, by talk of my father's cosmopolitanism. He described my father's openness to the people and culture of the country in which he'd spent forty years, the United States, despite his opposition to its policies. He described his curiosity and wide travels—to China, Peru, India, and the countries of Africa. His was a subtle critique of the provincialism that can dog nationalism. To temper the megalomania that can also accompany patriotism, he quoted my father's latest bittersweet refrain, "We are a mediocre people. A good people, but

mediocre." Later Said would write about how, despite his return, my father "was still unfulfilled and unsettled." He noted, "The return didn't change him, though he was more contented at home than he had been in exile. For him, Palestine was an interrogation that is never answered completely—or even articulated adequately." But even Said could not help reading my father's life and death in terms of a larger story. Noting the swings from "his gregariousness to his moody introspection, from his optimism and energy to the immobilizing sense of powerlessness" he concluded: "His life simultaneously expresses defeat and triumph, abjection and attainment, resignation and resolve. In short, it was a version of Palestine, lived in all its complexity."[12]

What no one failed to mention was that he had made his *'awda*—his return, finally, to Jaffa.

The Past in the Present

For my father, return meant the insertion of honed stories into the roughness of history and a genuine confrontation with the present. Surprisingly, he had taken this on with enthusiasm. He who had for so long refused to come began encouraging every Palestinian to return, even if they had to suffer the offensive interrogations of Israeli authorities at the airport and the bridge, the shoes taken off for inspection, the notebooks confiscated, the suitcases emptied, the body searched, even the diaper bags and toiletries opened. When an interviewer on Al-Jazeera Television asked him if he wasn't bitter that his dream of return had brought him into a situation where Palestinians were faced with daily problems and herded into zones called A, B, and C, separated by Israeli military checkpoints, he answered, "I do not feel bitterness at all. I feel, rather, that the Israeli presence is a challenge to us. And it is impossible to meet that challenge with bitterness. It is a barrier—I struggle with it; I call for equality; I call for the removal of all these checkpoints. . . . Our task is to struggle together, in order to change this reality. My coming here, a big part of it, was in order to change this reality. Because I cannot fight far away from the field of struggle." He felt strongly at the end that the Palestinians had made a major mistake in 1948 when they fled in fear, though he, more than many, knew they could hardly have done otherwise. He had spent his life researching this history. But still he said, "It was incumbent on us to remain on the land, even if the Israelis arrived. It was incumbent upon us to stay, because the struggle requires confrontation by the resistors."[13]

I saw for myself that confrontation on the ground. I saw the armed riot soldiers facing the young boys throwing stones. But I also saw my father as he approached the Israeli checkpoints steeling himself nervously for the charade and forced smile of this gentleman flashing his American passport to get through. Later I experienced Israel through his illness and death. Through the inability to get anywhere on the West Bank the painkillers prescribed by the Israeli doctor. The unavailability of morphine patches, not to mention his favorite foods of broccoli and salmon, except on the "other side." The need to take an ambulance to go to doctors' appointments for fear his oxygen tank would run out while the car overheated at a slow checkpoint. The fear on his lively friend's face, an Israeli Palestinian from the north who knew Hebrew and came along to help him negotiate the hospital, as we approached a checkpoint. She was not technically allowed to cross into the West Bank, with her Israeli identity card, even though she and her husband and children lived there. And the telephone call from Israeli security, in the midst of grief, threatening our arrangements for the funeral.

The physical reality of my father's death was for me inseparable from the details of Israeli domination: from his blue fingertips to the Palestinian medics who rushed him down the stairs to the ambulance but couldn't guarantee that they'd be allowed to pass quickly, from the intrusive phone call of an Israeli officer to the inert flag draped over the coffin in the Jaffa Community Center, from the anxiety about surveillance to the inexpressible generosity of his community, from the fears about the fate of the lecture notes we had to throw into the dumpster as we cleaned out his apartment to the panic we felt the eerie day none of his friends came to visit—because they'd gathered their children early from school and were intently watching the news to find out whether, or where, Ariel Sharon would bomb in "retaliation" for some incident.

I had heard my father's stories all my life, but it is different to walk, orphaned, through a hot dusty checkpoint dragging your suitcases because they won't allow any Palestinian vehicles to cross. It is different to be held up by arrogant soldiers with reflective sunglasses and burnished muscles who willfully delay you. It is different to go to the airport in an Arab taxi. On your way to catch your plane they slowly search the car and disappear for a long time with the driver's identity card, humiliating you with their power to make you sit silent though you know you are perfectly innocent. Stories of the underground railroad and the smuggling of slaves to freedom, images of displaced refugees from the second world war trudging with their bundles of possessions—these came to me as I crossed over, out of the West Bank to the safety

of Jerusalem, then to catch my plane. But they can't capture this particular reality with its growling Hebrew arrogantly proclaiming ownership. With its guns and soldiers everywhere you turn. With its utter separation of Arab and Jew. These experiences, more than my father's stories, have made me want to write about the Nakba. For the Palestinian catastrophe is not just something of the past. It continues into the present in every house demolished by an Israeli bulldozer, with every firing from an Apache helicopter, with every stillbirth at a military checkpoint, with every village divided from its fields by the "separation" wall, and with every Palestinian who still longs to return to a home that is no more.

Author's Note

NOTES

1. Answer to Leila Fannous. I do not know the occasion.
2. This secularism extended to his minimization of religion and religious education in his controversial plan for a Palestinian national curriculum, a plan that was overturned. See Hovsepian 2004, ch.7.
3. All quotations from my father's stories are based on taped interviews conducted in English by Hisham Ahmed-Fararjeh. Where these were included in the publication by Ahmed-Fararjeh (2003), I indicate page numbers. Some other stories and sentiments can be found in a two-part interview by Zakariya Muhammad (1995). In this interview my father says he left Jaffa by boat on May 1, not May 3.
4. For descriptions of such visits, see Karmi 2002, Tamari and Hammami 1998, and Al-Qattan (this volume). For Edward Said's return to his family home, see the

documentary by Charles Bruce 1998. For an insightful discussion of films, includ-
ing "In Search of Palestine" about claims to houses and homes in Jerusalem, see
Bishara 2003 and Sa'di 2002.

5. For some of the ways this erasure and rewriting takes place, see Abu El-Haj 2001
and Benvenisti 2000.

6. For more on the forests, see Bardenstein 1999 and Bresheeth, Davis, and Slyomov-
ics in this volume.

7. Deir Yassin was a village whose inhabitants had a nonaggression pact with the
Hagana but was attacked by a joint Irgun-LEHI force that by conservative esti-
mates slaughtered about 115 men, women, and children and stuffed their bodies
down wells (Smith 2004: 194). Publicity about the massacre through Irgun and
Hagana mobile loudspeaker units in cities such as Jaffa and Haifa and through
Arab radio created enormous fear. For an account of the impact of the massacre
in Deir Yassin on Palestinians, based on interviews with refugees, see Nazzal 1978.
As Benny Morris (2004a) has shown, this was not the only massacre conducted by
Jewish forces; see also Abdel Jawad (2007) for documentation of sixty-eight mas-
sacres of Palestinians conducted in 1948 by Zionist and Israeli forces. A memorial
sculpture commemorating the victims of Deir Yassin by the Algerian-American
artist Khalil Bendib was erected in Geneva, New York in 2003. See also McGowan
and Ellis 1998.

8. Here he was perhaps echoing the title of his friend Edward Said's watershed
essay "Zionism from the Standpoint of its Victims" included in Said 1979.

9. Busailah explains matter of factly in a footnote to the poem that Ni'lin is a Pales-
tinian village to which some 60,000 Palestinians were marched by the Israelis in
July 1948.

10. A full outline of what they had planned for the Memory Museum can be found
in Mu'assasat al-Ta'awun 2000.

11. I am grateful to Roger Heacock for clarifying my father's role in Palestine in his
moving remarks at the workshop on "Al-Nakba in Palestinian Collective Mem-
ory" at the Sixth Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting of the
Mediterranean Program of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at
the European University Institute, Montecatini Terme, Italy, March 2005.

12. Said 2001. For more on their friendship, see L. Abu-Lughod 2005.

13. My father gave me an unlabeled videorecording of the interview, which I be-
lieve is with Muhammad Khrayshat on the program, *Dayf wa Qadiyya* (Guest
and Issue), Al-Jazeera Television, probably in 1999. Thanks to Lori Allen for
transcribing.

Part Two

MODES OF MEMORY

Diaspora: Generation and the Ground of Jewish Identity

Daniel Boyarin and Jonathan Boyarin

> In the field of rational analysis, a feeling of recognized kinship is
> more desirable than nationalism.
> —GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK[1]

Group identity has been constructed traditionally in two ways. It has
been figured on the one hand as the product of a common genealogical
origin and, on the other, as produced by a common geographical origin.
The first has a strongly pejorative value in current writing—having
become tainted with the name *race* and thus racism—while the second has
a generally positive ring. One of the reasons for this split in values is
undoubtedly the unfortunate usages to which the term and concept of

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race in the sense of genotype has been put in Europe since early modern times.[2] Another source, however, of our cultural disdain for genealogy as a value is undoubtedly the sustained attack on it that lies at the fountain-head of Christendom, the Letters of Paul. In this paper, we would like to interrogate the Pauline sources of Western discourse about generation, space, and identity, along with the rabbinic Jewish counterdiscourse around these terms. We will trace this fault line into the present as well, confronting claims of "pure theory" with our own discourses of critically grounded identity, speaking about paradoxes of individual and collective identity with reference to Jean-François Lyotard, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Walter Benn Michaels.

1

פּאָולוס איז געווען דער ערשטער באָלשעוויק
[Paul was the first Bolshevik.]

—HILLEL KEMPINSKY[3]

In early patristic writings and again in many quarters since the mid-nineteenth century, Paul's project has been understood as one of universalizing the Torah, breaking through the "particularism" of the Jewish religion. Galatians 3:26–29 is taken as the moral center of Paul's work: "For as many of you as were baptized into Christ have put on Christ [saying]: 'There is neither Jew nor Greek; there is neither slave nor free-

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2. It was not, of course, always used that way. Symptomatic perhaps of this shift is the following statement from Dio Cassius: "I do not know the origin of this name [Jews], but it is applied to all men, even foreigners, who follow their customs. This race is found among Romans" (quoted in John Gager, *The Origins of Anti-Semitism: Attitudes toward Judaism in Pagan and Christian Antiquity* [New York, 1983], p. 91). We see from this quotation that race once had much suppler and more complex connections with genealogy, cultural praxis, and identity than it has in our parlance.

3. Oral communication to Jonathan Boyarin. Hillel Kempinsky ז״ל was the archivist at the YIVO Center in New York.

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man; there is no male and female. For you are all one in Christ Jesus.' If, however, you belong to Christ, then you are Abraham's offspring, heirs according to the promise."

Paul cites the baptismal formula that the Galatians themselves recited or heard recited at the time of their baptism: "There is neither Jew nor Greek."[4] He interprets the text, and thus baptism itself, in the following fashion. The rite consists of a new birth that is understood as substituting an allegorical genealogy for a literal one. In Christ, that is, in baptism, all the differences that mark off one body from another as Jew or Greek (circumcision is considered a "natural" mark of the Jew [Rom. 2:27]), male or female, slave or free are effaced, for in the Spirit such marks do not exist.

Accordingly, if one belongs to Christ, then one participates in the allegorical meaning of the promise to the "seed of Abraham," an allegorical meaning of genealogy that is already hinted at in the biblical text itself, when it said that in "Abraham all nations would be blessed" (Gen. 12:3) and even more when it interpreted his name as "Father to many nations" (Gen. 17:5). The individual body itself is replaced by its allegorical referent, the body of Christ of which all the baptized are part.[5] This is what the "putting-on" of Christ means, which is certainly a reference to the topos of the body as a garment.[6] Paul is the vehicle of a certain distrust of corporeality that is characteristic of Christian culture as well as of the Western critique of ethnicity since his text is the material base of much of the discourse on ethnicity in Christian culture. Things of the body are less important than things of the spirit. The physical connection of common descent from Abraham and the embodied practices with which that genealogy is marked off as difference are rejected in favor of a connection between people based on individual re-creation and entry de novo into a community of common belief. Charles Mopsik has recently glossed the cultural effect of Paul's works as "the persistence of a split opened two millennia ago by the ideological victory over one part of the inhabited world of the Christian conception of carnal relation—and of carnal filiation—as separate from spiritual life and devalued in relation to it."[7]

In his authentic passion to find a place for the Gentiles in the Torah's

4. See Dennis Ronald Macdonald, *There Is No Male and Female: The Fate of a Dominical Saying in Paul and Gnosticism* (Philadelphia, 1987) and the classic paper by Wayne A. Meeks, "The Image of the Androgyne: Some Uses of a Symbol in Earliest Christianity," *History of Religions* 13 (Feb. 1974): 165–208.

5. The parallel citation of the formula in 1 Corinthians 12:13 makes this even more explicit: For in one spirit we were all baptized into one body.

6. As in the dominical saying identified plausibly by Macdonald as the source of the baptismal formula itself: "when ye trample on the garment of shame, when the Two become One, and Male with Female neither male nor female." See also Jonathan Z. Smith, "The Garments of Shame," *History of Religions* 5 (Winter 1966): 217–38.

7. Charles Mopsik, "The Body of Engenderment in the Hebrew Bible, the Rabbinic Tradition and the Kabbalah," in *Fragments for a History of the Human Body*, ed. Michel Feher (New York, 1989), p. 49.

scheme of things and the brilliance of the radically dualist and allegorical hermeneutic that he developed to accomplish this purpose, Paul had (almost against his will) sown the seeds for a Christian discourse that would completely deprive Jewish ethnic, cultural specificity of any positive value and indeed turn it into a "curse" in the eyes of Gentile Christians.[8] Elizabeth Castelli has focussed most sharply on the extent to which the drive for sameness was constitutive of Pauline discourse by analyzing the function of imitation and its political effects in his letters:

> the language of imitation, with its concomitant tension between the drive toward sameness and the inherent hierarchy of the mimetic relationship, masks the will to power which one finds in Pauline discourse. Paul's appropriation of the discourse of mimesis is a powerful rhetorical move, because this language identifies the fundamental values of wholeness and unity with Paul's own privileged position vis-à-vis the gospel, the early Christian communities he founded and supervises, and Christ himself. *Here is precisely where he makes his coercive move. To stand for anything other than what the apostle stands for is to articulate for oneself a place of difference, which has already implicitly been associated with discord and disorder.* To stand in a position of difference is to stand in opposition, therefore, to the gospel, the community, and Christ.[9]

8. This is not to deny the radically progressive intent nor even the radically progressive effect of Paul's utterance. Indeed, one of the larger points of Daniel Boyarin's forthcoming book *A Radical Jew: Paul and the Politics of Identity* is to show precisely that ideals of universal human equality that have given rise to the French Revolution, the emancipation of slaves, and the feminist movement also flow from the fountainhead of Galatians 3:28–39. For the nonce, see Daniel Boyarin, "Paul and the Genealogy of Gender," *Representations*, no. 41 (Winter 1993), in which this argument is expressly made. As Boyarin writes there:

> In any case, if on the one hand, Wire points to the devastating history of male oppression of women in the name of Paul, one can also cite at least a nascent discourse and real history of chastity as female autonomy also carried out in his name in what is, after all, the Acts of Paul and Thekla for notable example. Similarly with regard to the parallel issue of slavery. Philemon has been used (maybe misused) as a text in the service of slavery. It is just as true, however, that Galatians 3:28 has been mobilized in anti-slavery discourses. The failure of consistency here does not involve Paul's aspirations but his achievements. Others who come after may indeed be able to put into practice that which in Paul is fraught with contradiction. I think that the ultimate elimination of slavery in all of the Christian world is an eloquent case in point, although it took nearly two thousand years for Paul's vision to be realized here. [Pp. 32–33 n. 91]

Indeed, if anything, the ultimate point of the present paper is that the progressive elements of that Western universalism that we are locating in Paul are inescapably bound up in their very problematic coerciveness. If, as Etienne Balibar argues (see n. 23 below), the very discourse of "the Rights of Man" provides the form for a particularly French racism, this does not mean that the world would be better off not having had those principles articulated.

9. Elizabeth A. Castelli, *Imitating Paul: A Discourse of Power* (Louisville, Ky., 1991), p. 87; emphasis added.

Castelli describes the personal will to power implicit in the Pauline rhetorical drive toward sameness. The same analysis can be applied, however, to the politics of group relations even after the apostle's death. We suggest that as Paul gradually became not an embattled apostle for one kind of Christianity contending with others but the source of Christianity *tout court*, and as so-called pagans faded from the scene, the function of those who "stand in a position of difference" came to be filled almost exclusively in the discourse by the Jews, and the "coercive move" toward sameness came to be directed at the Jews.[10] The place of difference increasingly becomes the Jewish place, and thus the Jew becomes the very sign of discord and disorder in the Christian polity. That this is so can be shown from the fact that as other "differences" appear on the medieval European scene (the Lollards, for example), they are figured in literature as "Jews."

It is, however, important to emphasize that Paul is not "anti-Semitic" or even anti-Jewish. From his perspective, the drive toward sameness was precisely to be understood as the fulfillment of Judaism, for "true" Jewishness was not an affair of descent "according to the flesh" (Gal. 4:21–31); nor was it an affair of practice according to the flesh, like circumcision (Rom. 2:28–29).[11] True Jewishness lay, according to Paul, precisely in renunciation of difference and entry into the one body of Christ. Anyone at all can be Jewish, and those who "call themselves Jews" are not necessarily Jewish at all.

This double reading of the sign *Jew* by Paul as both signifier of unruly difference and symbol of universalism has had fateful consequences for the Jews in the Christian West. Once Paul succeeded, "real Jews" ended up being only a trope. They have remained such for European discourse down to the present and even in the writings of leftists whose work is *explicitly* opposed to anti-Semitism—and even in the writings of Jews. Although well intentioned, any such allegorization of *Jew* is problematic in the extreme for the way that it deprives those who have historically grounded identities in those material signifiers of the power to speak for themselves and remain different. In this sense the "progressive" idealization of *Jew* and *woman*, or more usually, *jew* and *Woman*, ultimately deprives difference of the right to be different.

2

Sometimes the reference to the allegorized Jew is implicit or made in passing; in other recent works it is an explicit and central trope. An exam-

10. At least until new "pagans" were discovered in the early modern period.
11. For a full discussion, see Daniel Boyarin, " 'This We Know to Be the Carnal Israel': Circumcision and the Erotic Life of God and Israel," *Critical Inquiry* 18 (Spring 1992): 474–506.

ple of the former is contained in Jean-Luc Nancy's recent *The Inoperative Community*. Nancy's central problem in that work is to formulate a notion of community that will not violate the standard of noncoercion. That standard holds that community is "the compearance [*comparution*] of singular beings." For Nancy, such singularity and the simultaneity that is a condition of it appear to imply an evacuation of history and memory. So many brutalities, so many violations of any notion of humanly responsible community have been carried out in the name of solidary collectives supposed to have obtained in the past, that Nancy seems to have renounced any possible recourse to memory in his attempt to think through the possibility of there ever being community without coercion. Of there ever *being:* the only community that does not betray the hope invested in that word, Nancy argues, is one that resists any kind of stable existence.[12]

The problem is that Nancy has in fact attempted a generalized model of community as *nonbeing*. Hence any already existing "community" is out of consideration by its very existence, relegated through philosophical necessity to a world we have lost or that never existed. Following Nancy's rhetoric, the only possible residues of that lost world are false community appearing as a serial, undifferentiated collective in the same analytic category as the fascist mass or, alternatively, an assemblage of unrelated individuals. The individual in turn "is merely the residue of the experience of the dissolution of community," and furthermore, "the true consciousness of the loss of community is Christian" (*IC*, pp. 3, 10).

Although Nancy is silent on the relations among history, memory, and community, he considers at some length the apparently tortured relation between "myth" and community. For Nancy, myth—that necessary fiction that grounds the insistent specialness of the existent communal group—is an irreducible component of community and at the same time is necessarily pernicious in its effects. Therefore Nancy asserts a search not for the eradication of myth but rather for its "interruption": "The interruption of myth is therefore also, necessarily, the interruption of community" (*IC*, p. 57). In a footnote, Nancy elaborates on a comment made in 1984 by Maurice Blanchot:

> "The Jews incarnate . . . the refusal of myths, the abandonment of idols, the recognition of an ethical order that manifests itself in respect for the law. What Hitler wants to annihilate in the Jew, in the 'myth of the Jew,' is precisely man freed from myth." This is another way of showing where and when myth was definitively interrupted. I would add this: "man freed from myth" belongs henceforth to a community that it is incumbent upon us to let come, to let write itself. [*IC*, p. 162 n. 40]

12. Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Inoperative Community,* trans. Peter Connor et al., ed. Connor (Minneapolis, 1991), p. 58; hereafter abbreviated *IC.*

We want to press, in a sense by literalizing, the opening offered here. The quote from Blanchot seems ambiguous if not contradictory: do the Jews literally "incarnate the refusal of myths," or is that one of Hitler's myths? Let us first pursue the first reading, which is both the more flattering and the more dangerous. This reading would tell us that community without myth was once the special possession of the Jews. Nancy's "addition" would then explore the consequences of the release of that secret to "us" as a result of the genocide. What else, after all, can *henceforth* mean? We deeply respect the fact that this and other work of Nancy's is explicitly motivated by the desire to understand and "unwork" the complicity between philosophy and twentieth-century violence.[13] Nancy would doubtless be horrified and/or furious at the suggestion that his rhetoric is complicit in perpetuating the cultural annihilation of the Jew, yet it seems clear that this is one potential accomplishment of his further allegorization of Blanchot. *That which the Jew represented before "he" was annihilated is that which "we" must let come, must let write itself.* The word *henceforth* indeed implies that the secret of freedom from myth has passed from the Jews to a community that does not exist, that is only imaginable in and by theory. The secret becomes potentially available to all who await a second coming of this sacrificed Jew. We insist that this plausible yet "uncharitable" reading cannot be stretched to an accusation of anti-Judaism. On the contrary, it is clear that Nancy and thinkers like him are committed to a sympathetic philosophical comprehension of the existence and annihilation of the Jews. Our claim is rather that within the thought of philosophers such as Nancy lies a blindness to the particularity of Jewish difference that is itself part of a relentless penchant for allegorizing all "difference" into a univocal discourse.

Now let us pursue the alternate reading of Blanchot, and of Nancy's gloss. Its implications are both more modest and more conducive to our project. According to this second reading of Blanchot, the Jews' freedom from myth was primarily, if not exclusively, significant as a myth that murderously irritated Hitler. Nancy would then be saying not that "we" have inherited the secret of the Jews but rather that it is incumbent upon us—the pronoun this time not excluding in any way Jews living after the Nazi genocide—to assume the challenge of the myth of freedom from myth, to let come a community that is free from myth. We will suggest below that living Jews may have a particular contribution to make to that general effort, especially in the experience of Diaspora that has constrained Jews to create forms of community that do not rely on one of the most potent and dangerous myths—the myth of autochthony.

The critical text that has gone furthest in employing "the jew" as an

13. See Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, "The Nazi Myth," trans. Brian Holmes, *Critical Inquiry* 16 (Winter 1990): 291–312.

allegorical trope for otherness is Jean-François Lyotard's recent *Heidegger and "the jews."* The title tells the story: *Heidegger* gets a capital *H,* but *the jews* are in lowercase. This is done, as the back cover blurb explains, "to represent the outsiders, the nonconformists: the artists, anarchists, blacks, homeless, Arabs, etc.—and the Jews."[14] The Jews are doubtless chosen as exemplary both because the voices of some Jews are so prominent in European modernism and because of the enormous challenge of Nazi genocide to Enlightenment thought. But the name as used here is *essentially* a generic term standing for the other. And indeed Lyotard's book is all about the danger of forgetting that one ("one" in a position of relative power, that is) has always already forgotten the Other.

But why does Lyotard feel free to appropriate the name *the jews?* What does it mean for David Carroll, the author of the introduction to the English translation of Lyotard's book, to write in reference to Lyotard's citation of "Freud, Benjamin, Adorno, Arendt, Celan" that "these are ultimately 'the jews' we all have to read and even in some sense to become, 'the jews' we always already are but have forgotten we are, 'the jews' that Heidegger forgets at great cost for his thinking and writing" (*H,* p. xxiv)?

What Lyotard refuses to forget, remembering the negative example of Heidegger, is not so much upper- *or* lowercase Jews as Christian European crimes against humanity. In other words, Lyotard takes history seriously as an implication of philosophy, doubtless a vital exercise. This sketch of a critique, therefore, is not intended as an exposé of Lyotard but as a further implication of the universalizing, allegorizing traditions of Hellenistic philosophy as absorbed in Christian culture.

Lyotard basically repeats Sartre's thesis about the production of the Jew by the anti-Semite: "What is most real about real Jews is that Europe, in any case, does not know what to do with them: Christians demand their conversion; monarchs expel them; republics assimilate them; Nazis exterminate them. 'The jews' are the object of a dismissal with which Jews, in particular, are afflicted in reality" (*H,* p. 3). Let us pause at the first words here and test a paraphrase. How would it work if a man or a woman said, "What is most real about real women is that men continually try to dominate them"? The condescension of Lyotard's statement immediately becomes evident.

It would have been quite different if Lyotard had written rather, "What matters most to me here about those usually called 'Jews' is that Europe does not know what to do with them." There is no gainsaying the power of his insight. Europe indeed does not know what to do with "real Jews." But what of European philosophy? Is Lyotard not Europe here? Might we not fairly say, "Europe does not know what

14. Jean-François Lyotard, *Heidegger and "the jews,"* trans. Andreas Michel and Mark S. Roberts (Minneapolis, 1990); hereafter abbreviated *H.*

to do with them," "philosophers allegorize them," and so on? To which one might comment that in doing so, they continue another particularly Christian practice with regard to uppercase Jews, one that begins with Paul.

Here we can see more analytically what is wrong with Carroll's rhetoric about us all becoming once again "the jews we always already are but have forgotten we are." We must resist the seduction of these sentiments, for like Paul's writing they deny, they *spiritualize* history. For some contemporary critics—indeed, those most profoundly concerned with the lessons of the encounter between Jewish identity and European self-adequation—it seems that the real Jew is the non-Jewish Jew. What does this say about the "reality" of those Jews—most of those who call themselves Jews, of course, are the untheorized, unphilosophical, unspiritualized Jews—who would think the phrase "non-Jewish Jew" to be nonsense? Is it politically correct, that is, ethical, to "forget" them and to fashion an imaginary dialogue with the other who is, in fact, the already sanctioned, official model of the "non-Jewish Jew," the Franz Kafkas and Walter Benjamins? For as we know, the vast majority of the Nazis' Jewish victims were unredeemed, "real" Jews.[15]

Against this incipient critique stands precisely the force implicit in Lyotard's act of allegorizing the name *jew.* Radiating out from the sun of philosophy, remembering the other by writing the "jew," Lyotard challenges all those who would fetishize their particular difference, insisting that we learn how to imagine ourselves as blacks, as Arabs, as homeless, as Indians. This is a political challenge, but Lyotard does not suggest how those who are themselves "real Jews" could respond to it. Indeed, he explains that one reason for his avoidance of the proper noun, of the uppercase "Jews," is to make clear that he is not discussing a particularly Jewish political subject, which he identifies as Zionism (*IC*, p. 3). We want to insist in response to Lyotard that there is a loss and a danger either in allegorizing away real, uppercase Jews or in regarding them primarily as a problem for Europe. Our claim entails in turn a responsibility to help articulate a Jewish political subject "other" than that of Zionism, which in fundamental ways merely reproduces the exclusivist syndromes of European nationalism. Zionism itself is predicated on a myth of autochthony. We will suggest that a Jewish subject-position founded on generational connection and its attendant anamnestic responsibilities and pleasures affords the possibility of a flexible and nonhermetic critical Jewish identity.

15. Lest there be confusion, we of course endorse Isaac Deutscher's actual point that modern Jewish radicals who do not practice the Jewish religion nevertheless can represent an appropriate way of enacting Jewishness in the contemporary world. See Isaac Deutscher, *The Non-Jewish Jew and Other Essays* (New York, 1968).

3

In a recent essay, Walter Benn Michaels criticizes the notion of a cultural retentionism that is not "race"-based. His text is of extraordinary theoretical importance for the analysis of both the ancient dialectic between Paul and the Rabbis on the status of Jewish ethnicity, as well as for the current debate over ethnicity and multiculturalism in the United States. Michaels argues that all conceptions of cultural ethnicity are dependent on prior and often unacknowledged notions of race. In a series of examples, including the work on African-American culture of anthropologist Melville Herskovits and a novel of Oliver La Farge, Michaels argues that although they insist they are only talking about culture and not something that is biologically innate, they nevertheless assume that someone who does not "have" the culture of his or her "People" is in some sense lacking something and that the lack can be repaired.[16] Michaels questions this assumption: if they do not already observe the practices of that culture, in what sense other than "racial" can it be said to be theirs? His conclusion is, "This is not to say, of course, that all accounts of cultural identity require a racial component; it is only to say that the accounts of cultural identity that do any cultural work require a racial component" ("RC," p. 682). By this Michaels means that one is already either doing "Navajo things" or not. If one is doing them, then there is no cultural work to be done; they are one's culture already. If one is not already doing them, then it can only make sense to call them one's culture that one ought to be doing on the basis of an assumed or imputed biological identity as Navajo. He concludes that "the modern concept of culture is not, in other words, a critique of racism; it is a form of racism" (p. 683).

Michaels's argument that any identification of culture with ethnicity is logically dependent on a genealogical connection for it to work at all seems correct. Yet by glossing as "racist" all claims for group identity based on genealogy (whatever the posture of that genealogy, rhetorical or biological, might be), he inscribes a particular ideology as natural. The residue of Michaels's critique of genealogically based identity as "racist" is a radically individualist, voluntaristic, and attenuated notion of something that can only with difficulty be called "identity." This valorization of any kind of elective and affective connection between people over against the claims of physical kinship is deeply embedded in the Platonic value system Europe has largely inherited from Paul. In opposition to a traditional Jewish culture, which, in virtually all of its varieties, considered literal descent from Abraham and thus physical kinship as of supreme value in establishing identity, Paul preached kinship in the spirit as the mark of identity. Secondly, where other Jewish groups insisted on the value of doing tradi-

16. Walter Benn Michaels, "Race into Culture: A Critical Genealogy of Cultural Identity," *Critical Inquiry* 18 (Summer 1992): 679–80; hereafter abbreviated "RC."

tional Jewish things—the Law—as the practice of Jewish identity, Paul asserted the doing of new things, "better" things, baptism for instance, as the marker of Christian identity. Both of these moves are, moreover, crucially founded on the hierarchical dualism of spirit and flesh, with anything having to do with flesh implicitly and explicitly devalued.

The attenuation of memory in Michaels's residual account of identity is shown by his remarks on Herskovits. Herskovits had argued that African practices were retained by house slaves who had been acculturated into the white culture through a process of "reabsorption" of "Africanisms." To this Michaels reacts, "if you were trained as a house slave, why would absorbing Africanisms count as reabsorbing them?" ("RC," p. 679). The function of this claim for Herskovits, as Michaels correctly argues, is precisely to avoid the necessity for assuming any "innate endowment" of cultural traits in order to bolster his argument for the African component of African-American culture. At this point, however, Michaels jumps from here to the following:

> To make what *they* did part of *your* past, there must be some prior assumption of identity between you and them, and this assumption is as racial to Herskovits as it is in Cullen or La Farge. The things the African Negro used to do count as the American Negro's past only because both the African and the American are "the Negro." Herskovits's anti-racist culturalism can only be articulated through a commitment to racial identity. ["RC," p. 680]

Indeed. But this demonstration, repeated over and over in Michaels's essay, does not in any way imply that cultural practices are "innately endowed," as racialist (and racist) theories of cultural differentiation had been wont to do before the intervention of culturalists like Franz Boas and his followers, whose work, as we have said, had been largely accomplished by the 1920s.[17]

Let us think for a moment how Herskovits's "house slaves" might have come to feel a sense of identity with the field slaves who had not been acculturated to the white norm. First of all, they might indeed have managed to *remember*—simply not forget—that their immediate ancestors had been Africans in Africa. Secondly, their bodies were marked as being different from the other people doing "white" things. Third, they shared a slave status with the field hands. Fourth, the notion of complete separation followed by reestablished contact is a pure fiction. Much more plausible would be a model of acculturation whereby these house slaves had been exposed to the culture of the other slaves that they had partially forgotten during the process of (presumably) early childhood "acculturation" to the house culture and that indeed they might reabsorb as adults.

17. For W. E. B. DuBois on this, see Anthony Appiah, "The Uncompleted Argument: DuBois and the Illusion of Race," *Critical Inquiry* 12 (Autumn 1985): 30–32.

Identity is not only reinvented, as Michaels would have it; it is at least partially given for different people in different ways and intensities. Bodies are marked as different and often as negatively different to the dominant cultural system, thus producing a dissonance or gap between one's practices and affects. Partly assimilated, partly repressed, early childhood acculturation reasserts itself as a sense of dissonance, or guilt, as well. Contact with other people who share the name of a given identity and seem to feel organically connected to a community can produce a sense of nostalgia even in one who has never been near the things that that community does. Michaels obscures all of this by eliding racism—the idea of an innate capacity or tendency for certain practices—and generation understood as a kinship with other people who happen to do certain things. Versions of this same argument can be constructed for all of Michaels's deconstructions of culturalism.[18]

Michaels's text thus implicitly inscribes as natural another characteristically Protestant theme, a radical individualism, in which a person sufficiently makes her- or himself. For Michaels, apparently belonging to a culture cannot determine a life trajectory. There can be no "mark of identity that transcends one's actual practices and experiences. . . . The fact . . . that something belongs to our culture, cannot count as a motive for our doing it since, if it *does* belong to our culture we *already* do it and if we don't do it (if we've stopped or haven't yet started doing it) it doesn't belong to our culture" ("RC," pp. 681 n. 36, 682–83). Does this apply to children? Is there no model of *learning* or *transmission* here? What happens if we substitute *language* for *culture*? Should we say that it is racist to speak of teaching children "their language" because "their language" is what they know already, so there is no reason for parents to speak a different language than that of the majority to small children in order that they will know "their" native language as well as the dominant one? What about a thirteen-year-old child whom we have allowed until now to concentrate on learning the language/culture of the dominant group? Is it racist to send him or her to a school to learn "our" language? What about a thirty-year-old long-lost cousin who wants to reconnect with his or her "roots"? Michaels's individualism allows him to slip in the problematic pronoun *our*, which he employs in fact to mean not only each and every one of us, separately, but—as this quote shows—each and every one of us separately from any possible identity with ourselves yesterday or tomorrow because that would be to prescribe in a racist way what "our" identity is, separately from anything that happened before we, as particular organisms, were born.

18. We do mean deconstruction precisely in the technical sense in which one of the terms of a binary distinction, in this case between race and culture, is shown to be dependent on that which it seeks to exclude. Once again, Michaels has indeed shown the weakness of notions of "culture" dependent on their assumption of binary opposition to a pernicious and discredited account of race.

Male Jewish circumcision provides a particularly sharp disruption of Michaels's statement that no "mark of identity . . . transcends one's actual practices and experiences," for it certainly can be a mark that transcends one's actual practices and (at least remembered) experiences, yet it is a mark that can reassert itself, and often enough does, as a demand (almost a compulsion) to reconnect, relearn, reabsorb, and reinvent the doing of Jewish things.[19] Indeed, one could understand circumcision precisely as the cultural construction of a genealogical differentiation, as a diacritic that symbolizes the biological status of Jewishness—not in the sense of a biological difference between Jews and others but in the sense of the biological connection that filiation provides. Further evidence that this connection has nothing to do with racism per se is the fact that one not Jewish can indeed adopt Jewish identity by taking on Jewish practices and through symbolic rebirth (and for men, physical marking) as a member of the Jewish People. It is thus not quite as obvious as Michaels claims it to be that a New York Jew cannot become a Mashpee Indian ("RC," p. 680 n. 36). Certainly a Mashpee Indian can become a Jew. Those Jewish subcultures that do promulgate racist or quasi-racist notions of Jewishness have great theological difficulty with conversion and ultimately retreat to the same kind of dualism of bodies and souls that characterizes Paul.

More revealingly, however, the convert's name is changed to "ben Avraham" or "bas Avraham," son or daughter of Abraham. The convert is adopted into the family and assigned a new "genealogical" identity, but because Abraham is the first convert in Jewish tradition, converts are his descendants in that sense as well. There is thus a sense in which the convert becomes the ideal type of the Jew. We not only do these things because we are this thing, but we are this thing because we do these things.

Michaels also marginalizes the political dimensions of cultural retention and loss: "Without race, losing our culture can mean no more than doing things differently from the way we now do them and preserving our culture can mean no more than doing things the same—the melodrama of assimilation disappears" ("RC," p. 685). He allows only that "the situation is entirely different with respect to compulsory assimilation; what puts the pathos back is precisely the element of compulsion" ("RC," p. 685 n. 41). However, as Michaels surely knows, power operates in many ways other than the exercise of actual compulsion. Ideological state apparatuses and discourses all press mightily on different identities to assimilate to the dominant culture. The pathos of notions such as assimilation, cultural demise, and cultural survival grows precisely out of the ways in which they are embedded in political processes of domination and exploitation. The insistence on the value of bodily connection and embodied practice that

19. See the analysis of the function of Daniel Deronda's circumcision in Sander Gilman, "'I'm Down on Whores': Race and Gender in Victorian London," in *Anatomy of Racism*, ed. David Theo Goldberg (Minneapolis, 1990), pp. 162–63.

is emblematic of Judaism since Paul thus has significant critical power vis-à-vis the isolating and disembodying direction of Western idealist philosophies.

4

> This feeling of identity between self and body, which, naturally, has nothing in common with popular materialism, will therefore never allow those who wish to begin with it to rediscover, in the depths of this unity, the duality of a free spirit that struggles against the body to which it is chained. On the contrary, for such people, the whole of the spirit's essence lies in the fact that it is chained to the body. To separate the spirit from the concrete forms with which it is already involved is to betray the originality of the very feeling from which it is appropriate to begin.[20]

Levinas's statement here is extremely significant. If, as he claims, writing in 1934, the philosophy of Hitlerism is a reaction to German idealism with its disembodied notions of universal spirit, then we have a startling and troubling analogy with the reaction of rabbinic Judaism to similar philosophical developments in the Rabbis' world, a reaction that also rejected the notion of "the duality of a free spirit that struggles against the body to which it is chained." Levinas argues that the philosophy of Hitlerism consists precisely of a struggle against this flight from the body so characteristic of Western culture, a protest against the disgust with corporeality that makes one ashamed of having parents, genealogical connections, or a native country. Like white cells gone wild and destroying healthy tissue, this reaction turned into the most destructive horror that human beings have ever invented. With a terrifying irony, then, the rabbinic reaction against dualism in late antiquity bears strong analogies to this modern one. If Lyotard continues Paul, does Heidegger continue the Rabbis?

The reaction against such idealism and disembodiment in "the philosophy of Hitlerism" produced the worst violence that human beings have ever perpetrated against each other, but Judaism, in a similar reaction, did not. The most violent practice that rabbinic Judaism ever developed vis-à-vis its Others was spitting on the floor in the synagogue or walking around the block to avoid passing a pagan or Christian place of worship. Something else was needed for the potential negative implications of the culture to become actualized. That necessity is power over others. Particularism plus power yields tribal warfare or fascism.

20. Emmanuel Levinas, "Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism" (1934), trans. Seán Hand, *Critical Inquiry* 17 (Autumn 1990): 68–69.

Christianity plus power has also yielded horror. If particularism plus power tends toward fascism, then universalism plus power produces imperialism and cultural annihilation as well as, all too often, actual genocide of those who refuse to conform. Our thesis is that Judaism and Christianity, as two different hermeneutic systems for reading the Bible, generate two diametrically opposed and mirror-image forms of racism—and also two dialectical possibilities of antiracism.[21] The genius of Christianity is its concern for all the peoples of the world; the genius of Judaism is its ability to leave other people alone.[22] And the evils of the two systems are the precise obverse of these genii. The genies all too easily become demons. Christian universalism, even at its most liberal and benevolent, has been a powerful force for coercive discourses of sameness, denying, as we have seen, the rights of Jews, women, and others to retain their difference. As Etienne Balibar has brilliantly realized, this universalism is indeed a racism:

> This leads us to direct our attention towards a historical fact that is even more difficult to admit and yet crucial, taking into consideration the French national form of racist traditions. There is, no doubt, a specifically French brand of the doctrines of Aryanism, anthropometry and biological geneticism, but the true "French ideology" is not to be found in these: it lies rather in the idea that the culture of the "land of the Rights of Man" has been entrusted with a universal mission to educate the human race. There corresponds to this mission a practice of assimilating dominated populations and a consequent need to differentiate and rank individuals or groups in terms of their greater or lesser aptitude for—or resistance to—assimilation. It was this simultaneously subtle and crushing form of exclusion/inclusion which was deployed in the process of colonization and the strictly French (or "democratic") variant of the "White man's burden."[23]

21. Etienne Balibar, in a quite different historical context, writes: "In fact racism figures *both* on the side of the universal and the particular" (Etienne Balibar, "Racism and Nationalism," trans. Chris Turner, in Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities* [London, 1991], p. 54).

22. Paula Fredriksen cites abundant evidence to the effect that in antiquity Jews permitted Gentiles to attend the synagogue without conversion and even if they continued to worship idols! See her *From Jesus to Christ: The Origins of the New Testament Images of Jesus* (New Haven, Conn., 1988), pp. 149–51.

23. Balibar, "Is There a 'Neo-Racism'?" in *Race, Nation, Class*, p. 24; hereafter abbreviated "I." To be sure, there are those who would locate the origins of this "universal mission to educate the human race" in the "imperialist" monotheism of the Hebrew Bible, and ultimately, of course, the Hebraic and Hellenic sources of Christianity cannot be neatly separated out. There are aspects of both the Israelite history and of the prophetic discourse that could give rise to such a reading. Rabbinic Judaism and Christianity—in their relation to peoplehood and universalism—are interpreted by us, in a sense, as mutual thesis and antithesis within the biblical system. See further discussion below, as well as our reach for a synthesis.

Thus paradoxically and tragically, at the very heart of those most truly progressive discourses of Europe, including Marxism, the inability to accommodate difference provides a fatal flaw. This inability was characteristic of German liberalism, as Marc Shell points out,[24] and still persists in the United States of today in such "liberal" expressions as "too Jewish."[25] Shell documents such notions in the discourse of the contemporary Russian ideologue Igor Sharevich, who argues that Jews must abandon their difference if they wish to be full citizens of Russia.[26] The paradox in such discourse is that nearly always, as Shell emphasizes, the justification for coercing Jews to become Christian Russian citizens of the world is the alleged intolerance of the Jews. The parallels between this modern liberal discourse and that of Paul seem obvious.

The Rabbis' insistence on the centrality of peoplehood can thus be read as a necessary critique of Paul, for if the Pauline move had within it the possibility of breaking out of the tribal allegiances and commitments to one's own family, as it were, it also contains the seeds of an imperialist and colonizing missionary practice. The very emphasis on a universalism expressed as the concern for all of the families of the world turns very rapidly (if not necessarily) into a doctrine that they must all become part of our family of the spirit with all of the horrifying practices against Jews and other Others that Christian Europe produced. The doctrine of the Apostle of the Free Spirit can be diverted, even perverted, to a doctrine of enslaving and torturing bodies. Paul had indeed written, with notorious ambiguity, "For though absent in body I am present in spirit, and if present I have already pronounced judgment in the name of the Lord Jesus on the man who has [lived with his father's wife]. When you are assembled and my spirit is present, with the power of our Lord Jesus, you are to deliver this man to Satan for the destruction of the flesh, that his spirit may be saved in the day of the Lord Jesus" (1 Cor. 5:3–5). It is surely Paul's own sense of self, divided into body and spirit so that this spirit can be where his body is not—and he means this literally—that permits him to suggest (if that is what is meant) and his followers to practice torturing and killing bodies to save the souls. As Henri Baudet has remarked concerning

24. "Moses Mendelssohn in his *Jerusalem* tried to steer the ideology of a universalist Enlightenment . . . away from what he took to be its probably inevitable course towards barbarism. . . . In the Germany of his day Jews were pressured to renounce their faith in return for civil equality and union with the Christian majority. The pressure was kindly, but it was also a form of intolerance towards non-kin" (Marc Shell, "Marranos [Pigs], or From Coexistence to Toleration," *Critical Inquiry* 17 [Winter 1991]: 331).

25. On this point see Gilman, *The Jew's Body* (New York, 1991), pp. 25–27. At Oxford University, the Centre for Advanced Hebrew Studies holds its dinners on Friday night (even though many of its participants cannot, therefore, attend) because "we are not a Jewish institution; we are an Oxford institution." This is, we submit, an example of the internalization of the racist demand for universalism.

26. See Shell, "Marranos (Pigs)," p. 332 n. 84.

late fifteenth-century Portugal, "although the bodies of Negroes might be held captive, this very fact made it possible for their souls to achieve true freedom through conversion to Christianity. And so the enslavement of Negroes took on a kind of missionary aspect. It was in keeping that christened Negro slaves should enjoy certain small privileges above their fellows."[27] Disdain for the bodies of others combined with concern for the souls can thus be even more devastating than neglect. From the retrospective position of a world that has, at the end of the second Christian millennium, become thoroughly interdependent, each one of these options is intolerable.

Critics of Zionism, both Arab and others, along with both Jewish and non-Jewish anti-Semites, have often sought to portray Jewish culture as essentially racist. This foundational racism is traced to the Hebrew Bible and is described as the transparent meaning of that document. Critics who are otherwise fully committed to constructionist and historicist accounts of meaning and practice abandon this commitment when it comes to the Hebrew Bible—assuming that the Bible is, in fact and in essence, that which it has been read to be and authorizes univocally that which it has been taken to authorize. Frederick Turner writes, "But the distinctions raised in the covenant between religion and idolatry are like some visitation of the khamsin to wilderness peoples as yet unsuspected, dark clouds over Africa, the Americas, the Far East, until finally even the remotest islands and jungle enclaves are struck by fire and sword and by the subtler weapon of conversion-by-ridicule (Deuteronomy 2:34; 7:2; 20:16–18, Joshua 6:17–21)."[28] The historically and materially defined local practices of a culture far away and long ago are made here "naturally" responsible (like the khamsin, the Middle Eastern Santa Ana) for the colonial practices of cultures entirely other to it simply because those later cultures used those practices as their authorization.[29] One effect of this sudden dehistoricization of hermeneutics has been an exoneration of European

27. Henri Baudet, *Paradise on Earth: Some Thoughts on European Images of Non-European Man*, trans. Elizabeth Wentholt (New Haven, Conn., 1965), p. 30. In California, certain missionaries had thousands of Indian babies killed so that their souls would be saved before their bodies could sin.

28. Frederick Turner, *Beyond Geography: The Western Spirit against the Wilderness* (New York, 1980), p. 45. In his book, *Storm from Paradise: The Politics of Jewish Memory* (Minneapolis, 1992), p. 134 n. 13, Jonathan Boyarin has provided a summary critique of Turner's book. See also on this theme Regina Schwartz, "Monotheism, Violence, and Identity," in *Religion and Literature*, ed. Mark Krupnick (forthcoming).

29. A particularly extreme and explicit version of this naturalizing and dehistoricizing move vis-à-vis biblical hermeneutics is found in Donald Harman Akenson, *God's Peoples: Covenant and Land in South Africa, Israel, and Ulster* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1992), who writes, "For certain societies, in certain eras of their development, the scriptures have acted culturally and socially in the same way the human genetic code operates physiologically. That is, this great code has, in some degree, directly determined what people would believe and what they would think and what they would do" (p. 9).

Christian society that has been, after all, the religious hegemonic system for virtually all of the imperialist, racist, and even genocidal societies of the West, but not, of course, Judaism. There were no Jewish missionaries in the remote islands and jungle enclaves. It is not the Hebrew Bible that impels the "Societies for the Propagation" but rather Pauline rhetoric like "For as in Adam all men died, so in Christ all men shall be made alive" (1 Cor. 15:22). Jews and Jewish culture will have to answer for the evil that we do (especially to the Palestinians), but it is absurd for "the Jews" to be implicated in practices in which they had no part and indeed have had no part even until now: forced conversion, deculturation, genocide.[30] Even the primitive command to wipe out the peoples of Canaan was limited by the Bible itself to those particular people in that particular place, and thus declared no longer applicable by the Rabbis of the Talmud.[31] It is precisely the very literalism of rabbinic/midrashic hermeneutics that prevented a typological "application" of this command to other groups. It should be clearly recognized, then, that the attempt of the integrationist Zionist Gush Emunim movement to refigure the Palestinians as Amalek and to reactivate the genocidal commandment is a radical act of religious revisionism and not in any way a continuation of historical rabbinic Judaism.

Does this mean that rabbinic Judaism qua ideology is innocent of either ethnocentric or supremacist tenets? Certainly not. What it argues is rather that Jewish racism, like the racism of other peoples, is a facultative and dispensable aspect of the cultural system, not one that is necessary for its preservation or essential to its nature. Perhaps the primary function for a critical construction of cultural (or racial or gender or sexual) identity is to construct it in ways that purge it of its elements of domination and oppression. Some, however, would argue that this is an impossible project not because of the nature of Jewishness but because any group identity is oppressive, unless it is oppressed.

In a recent Marxian analysis of both race and racism, Balibar has argued that "racism" has two dissymmetrical aspects. On the one hand, it constitutes a dominating community with practices, discursive and otherwise, that are "articulated around stigmata of otherness (name, skin colour, religious practices)." It also constitutes, however, "the way in which, as a mirror image, individuals and collectives that are prey to racism (its 'objects') find themselves constrained to see themselves as a community." Balibar further argues that destruction of racism implies the

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30. See Shell, "Marranos (Pigs)," for the argument that Jewish reluctance to convert others is built into the system and not merely a result of later material and historical conditions. We think, however, that Shell underestimates the potential for grounding racist thought in other aspects of biblical discourse.

31. See Jonathan Boyarin, "Reading Exodus into History," *New Literary History* 23 (Summer 1992): 523–54.

"internal decomposition of the community created by racism," by which he means the dominating community, as is clear from his analogy to the overcoming of sexism that will involve "the break-up of the community of 'males'" ("I," p. 18). This is, however, for us the crucial point, for the question is, obviously, if overcoming sexism involves the breaking up of the community of males, does it necessarily imply the breaking up of the community of females? And does this, then, not entail a breaking up of community, *tout court?* Putting it another way, are we not simply imposing a more coercive universal? On the other hand, if indeed the very existence of the dominant group is dependent on domination, if identity is always formed in a master-slave relationship, is the price not too high? What we wish to struggle for, theoretically, is a notion of identity in which there are only slaves but no masters, that is, an alternative to the model of self-determination, which is, after all, in itself a Western, imperialist imposition on the rest of the world. We propose Diaspora as a theoretical and historical model to replace national self-determination.[32] To be sure, this would be an idealized Diaspora generalized from those situations in Jewish history when Jews were both relatively free from persecution and yet constituted by strong identity—those situations, moreover, within which Promethean Jewish creativity was not antithetical, indeed was synergistic with a general cultural activity. Another way of making the same point would be to insist that there are material and social conditions in which cultural identity, difference, will not produce even what Balibar, after P. A. Taguieff, has called "differentialist racism," that is,

> a racism whose dominant theme is not biological heredity but the insurmountability of cultural differences, a racism which, at first sight, does not postulate the superiority of certain groups or peoples in relation to others but "only" the harmfulness of abolishing frontiers, the incompatibility of life-styles and traditions; in short, it is what P. A. Taguieff has rightly called a *differentialist racism*. ["I," p. 21]

To our understanding, it would be an appropriate goal to articulate a theory and practice of identity that would simultaneously respect the irreducibility and the positive value of cultural differences, address the harmfulness, not of abolishing frontiers but of dissolution of uniqueness, and encourage the mutual fructification of different life-styles and traditions. We do not think, moreover, that such possibilities are merely utopian. We would certainly claim that there have been historical situations in which they obtained without perfect success in this radically imperfect

32. To the extent that this diasporic existence is an actual historical entity, we ourselves are not prey to the charge of "allegorizing" the Jew. It may be fairly suggested, however, that the model is so idealized as to be in itself an allegory.

world. The solution of Zionism—that is, Jewish state hegemony, except insofar as it represented an emergency and temporary rescue operation— seems to us the subversion of Jewish culture and not its culmination. It represents the substitution of a European, Western cultural-political for- mation for a traditional Jewish one that has been based on a sharing, at best, of political power with others and that takes on entirely other mean- ings when combined with political hegemony.

Let us begin with two concrete examples. Jewish resistance to assimi- lation and annihilation within conditions of Diaspora, to which we will return below, generated such practices as communal charity in the areas of education, feeding, providing for the sick, and the caring for Jewish prisoners, to the virtual exclusion of others. While this meant at least that those others were not subjected to attempts to Judaize them—that is, they were tolerated, and not only by default of lack of Jewish power—it also meant that Jewish resources were not devoted to the welfare of humanity at large but only to one family. Within Israel, where power is concentrated almost exclusively in Jewish hands, this discursive practice has become a monstrosity whereby an egregiously disproportionate measure of the resources of the state is devoted to the welfare of only one segment of the population. A further and somewhat more subtle and symbolic example is the following. That very practice mentioned above, the symbolic expres- sion of contempt for places of worship of others, becomes darkly ominous when it is combined with temporal power and domination—that is, when Jews have power over places of worship belonging to others. It is this fac- tor that has allowed the Israelis to turn the central Mosque of Beersheba into a museum of the Negev and to let the Muslim cemetery of that city to fall into ruins.[33] Insistence on ethnic speciality, when it is extended over a particular piece of land, will inevitably produce a discourse not unlike the Inquisition in many of its effects. The archives of the Israeli General Secu- rity Services will one day prove this claim eminently, although already we "know" the truth.

We are not comparing Israeli practice to Nazism, for that would occlude more than it reveals and would obscure the real, imminent danger of its becoming the case in the future; the use of *Lebensraum* rhetoric on the part of mainstream Israeli politicians and the ascent to respectability and a certain degree of power of fascist parties in Israel certainly provide portents of this happening. Our argument is rather for an as yet un-

33. A highly ingenuous, or more likely egregiously disingenuous, claim by Abba Eban is given the lie in every page of Israeli history, particularly the last ones. Beersheba may have been "virtually empty," but that is little consolation to the Bedouin who were and con- tinue to be dispossessed there and in its environs. And the refugees in camps in Gaza, as well as the still-visible ruins of their villages, would certainly dispute the claim that Arab populations had avoided "the land of the Philistines in the coastal plain . . . because of insalubrious conditions" (Abba Eban, letter to W. D. Davies, in Davies, *The Territorial Dimension of Judaism* [1982; Minneapolis, 1992], p. 76; hereafter abbreviated *T*).

realized but necessary theoretical compatability between Zionist ideology and the fascism of state ethnicity. Capturing Judaism in a state transforms entirely the meanings of its social practices. Practices that in Diaspora have one meaning—for example, caring for the feeding and housing of Jews and not "others"—have entirely different meanings under political hegemony. E. P. Sanders has gotten this just right:

> More important is the evidence that points to Jewish pride in separatism. Christian scholars habitually discuss the question under the implied heading "What was wrong with Judaism that Christianity corrected?" Exclusivism is considered to be bad, and the finding that Jews were to some degree separatist fills many with righteous pride. We shall all agree that exclusivism is bad when practiced by the dominant group. Things look different if one thinks of minority groups that are trying to maintain their own identity. I have never felt that the strict Amish are iniquitous, and I do not think that, in assessing Jewish separatism in the Diaspora, we are dealing with a moral issue. (The moral issue would be the treatment of Gentiles in Palestine during periods of Jewish ascendancy. How well were the biblical laws to love the resident alien [Lev. 19:33–34] observed?)[34]

The inequities—and worse—in Israeli political, economic, and social practice are not aberrations but inevitable consequences of the inappropriate application of a form of discourse from one historical situation to another.

For those of us who are equally committed to social justice and collective Jewish existence, some other formation must be constituted. We suggest that an Israel that reimports diasporic consciousness—a consciousness of a Jewish collective as one sharing space with others, devoid of exclusivist and dominating power—is the only Israel that could answer Paul's, Lyotard's, and Nancy's call for a species-wide care without eradicating cultural difference.[35] Reversing A. B. Yehoshua's famous pronouncement that only in a condition of political hegemony is moral responsibility mobilized, we would argue that the only moral path would be the renunciation of Jewish hegemony qua Jewish hegemony.[36] This would involve first of all complete separation of religion from state, but even more than that the revocation of the Law of Return and such cul-

34. E. P. Sanders, "Jewish Association with Gentiles and Galatians 2:11–14," in *The Conversation Continues: Studies in Paul and John in Honor of J. Louis Martyn*, ed. Robert T. Fortna and Beverly R. Gaventa (Nashville, Tenn., 1990), p. 181.

35. See Jonathan Boyarin, "Palestine and Jewish History," chap. 7 of *Storm from Paradise*.

36. Shell argues, following Spinoza, that temporal power is necessary for toleration ("Marranos [Pigs]," p. 328 n. 75). We are suggesting the opposite, that only conditions in which power is shared among religions and ethnicities will allow for difference with common caring.

tural, discursive practices that code the state as a Jewish state and not a multinational and multicultural one. The dream of a place that is ours founders on the rock of realization that there are Others there just as there are Others in Poland, Morocco, and Ethiopia. Any notion, then, of redemption through Land must either be infinitely deferred (as the Neturei Karta understands so well) or become a moral monster. Either Israel must entirely divest itself of the language of race and become truly a state that is equally for all of its citizens and collectives or the Jews must divest themselves of their claim to space. Race and space together form a deadly discourse.

Genealogy and territorialism have been the problematic and necessary (if not essential) terms around which Jewish identity has revolved. In Jewish history, however, these terms are more obviously at odds with each other than in synergy. This allows a formulation of Jewish identity not as a proud resting place (hence not as a form of integrism or nativism) but as a perpetual, creative, diasporic tension. In the final section of this paper, then, we would like to begin to articulate a notion of Jewish identity that recuperates its genealogical moment—family, history, memory, and practice—while it problematizes claims to autochthony and indigenousness as the material base of Jewish identity.

5

> The Tanak and other sources of Judaism reveal certain ideas concerning The Land that reflect, or are parallel to, primitive Semitic, other Near Eastern, and, indeed, widespread conceptions about the significance of their land to a particular people. Israel is represented as the center of the Earth. . . . The religious man desires to live as near to this sacred space as possible and comes to regard it, the place of his abode, his own land, as the centre of the world. [T, p. 1; see also p. 87]

There are two diametrically opposed moments in the Jewish discourse of the Land. On the one hand, it is crucial to recognize that the Jewish conception of the Land of Israel is similar to the discourse of the Land of many (if not nearly all) "indigenous" peoples of the world. Somehow the Jews have managed to retain a sense of being rooted somewhere in the world through twenty centuries of exile from that someplace (organic metaphors are not out of place in this discourse, for they are used within the tradition itself).

It is profoundly disturbing to hear Jewish attachment to the Land decried as regressive in the same discursive situations in which the attachment of native Americans or Australians to their particular rocks, trees, and deserts is celebrated as an organic connection to the Earth that

"we" have lost.[37] The uncritical valorization of indigenousness (and particularly the confusion between political indigenousness and mystified autochthony) must come under critique, without wishing, however, to deny the rights of native Americans, Australians, and Palestinians to their Lands precisely on the basis of real, unmysterious political claims. If, on the other hand, Jews are to give up hegemony over the Land, this does not mean that the profundity of our attachment to the Land can be denied. This also must have a political expression in the present, in the provision of the possibility for Jews to live a Jewish life in a Palestine not dominated by one ethnic group or another.

On the other hand, the biblical story is not one of autochthony but one of always already coming from somewhere else. As Davies has so very well understood, the concept of a divine promise to give this land that is the land of Others to His People Israel is the sign of a bad conscience for having deprived the Others of their Land (see *T,* pp. 11–12).[38] Thus at the same time that one vitally important strain of expression within biblical religion promotes a sense of organic, "natural" connectedness between this People and this Land—a settlement in the Land—in another sense or in a counterstrain, Israelite and Jewish religion is perpetually an unsettlement of the very notion of autochthony.

Traditional Jewish attachment to the Land, whether biblical or post-biblical, thus provides a self-critique as well as a critique of identities based on notions of autochthony. Some myths about "the tree over there from which the first man sprung," along with European nationalist myths about Atlantis,[39] have been allowed to harden into a confusion of "indigenous" (the people who belong here, whose land this rightfully is—a political claim, founded on present and recently past political realities) and "autochthonous" (the people who were never anywhere else but here and

37. An aboriginal Australian recently began her lecture at a conference with greetings from her people to the indigenous people of the United States, of whom there were two representatives in the audience and whom she addressed by name. Much of her lecture consisted of a critique of the rootlessness of Europeans. Daniel Boyarin had a sense of being trapped in a double bind, for if the Jews are the indigenous people of the Land of Israel, as Zionism claims, then the Palestinians are indigenous nowhere, but if the Palestinians are the indigenous people of Palestine, then Jews are indigenous nowhere. He had painfully renounced the possibility of realizing his very strong feeling of connection to the Land (this connection having been co-opted by the state) in favor of what he and Jonathan Boyarin take to be the only possible end to violence and movement toward justice. Are we now to be condemned as people who have lost their roots?

38. Davies remarks that this sense of "bad conscience" can be found in texts as late as the first century B.C.E. We think he underestimates this. The classical midrash on Genesis, Bereshith Rabba, a product of the fourth and fifth centuries C.E., begins with the question, "Why does the Torah open with the creation of the world?" It answers, "So that when the Nations will call Israel robbers for their theft of the Land, they will be able to point to the Torah and say: God created the earth and can dispose of it at his will!" (our trans.).

39. See Pierre Vidal-Naquet, "Atlantis and the Nations," trans. Janet Lloyd, *Critical Inquiry* 18 (Winter 1992): 300–326.

have a natural right to this land). The Jewish narrative of the Land has the power of insisting on the connection without myths of autochthony, while other narratives, including the Zionist one, have repressed memories of coming from somewhere else. The confusion between indigenousness and autochthony is of the same kind as the confusion in Michaels's text between any kind of genealogically based racism belonging to a people and modern scientific racism.

These very conflations are complicitous with a set of mystifications within which nationalist ideologies subsist. Harry Berger argues that "the alienation of social constructions of divinity and cosmos by conquest groups resembles the alienation of socially constructed kinship and status terms from domestic kin groups to corporate descent groups—in anthropological jargon, from the ego-centered kinship system of families to the more patently fictional ancestor-centered system of lineages."[40] Distinguishing between forms of "weak transcendence" and "strong transcendence," Berger argues that "family membership illustrates weak kinship; tribal membership, strong kinship." Strong transcendence is more aggressive because it is more embattled and does more ideological work, that is, according to Berger, serves to justify land control. "Status that depends on land is generally more precarious and alienable than status inscribed on the body; mobile subsistence economies tend to conceptualize status in terms of the signifying indices of the body—indices of gender, age, and kinship—rather than of more conspicuously artificial constructions, and are closer to the weak end of the weak-to-strong scale" ("L," p. 121). The place of the first of these alienations can, however, be taken by the alienation of a socially constructed connection to a land by myths of autochthony and the unique belonging of this land to a people, an alienation that can serve the interest of conquerors, as easily as by the transcendental legitimation of kings. Thus if Berger, following Walter Brueggemann, contrasts two covenants, one the Mosaic, which rejects "the imperial gods of a totalitarian and hierarchic social order" ("L," p. 123), and one, the Davidic, which enthrones precisely those gods as the one God, we could just as well contrast two trajectories, the one toward autochthony and the one against it, in the same way. The first would support the rule of Israelite kings over territory; the second would serve to oppose it.[41]

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40. Harry Berger, Jr., "The Lie of the Land: The Text beyond Canaan," *Representations*, no. 25 (Winter 1989): 121; hereafter abbreviated "L."

41. For an even more nuanced reading of tensions within the Davidic stories themselves, see Schwartz, "Nations and Nationalism: Adultery in the House of David," *Critical Inquiry* 19 (Autumn 1992): 142. Schwartz's forthcoming book will deal with many of the themes of identity in the Bible that this essay is treating, albeit with quite different methods and often with quite different results.

> The dialectical struggle between antiroyalism and royalism persists throughout the course and formative career of the Old Testament as its structuring force. It sets the tent against the house, nomadism against agriculture, the wilderness against Canaan, wandering and exile against settlement, diaspora against the political integrity of a settled state. ["L," p. 123]

Our argument, then, is that a vision of Jewish history and identity that valorizes the second half of each of these binary systems and sees the first as only a disease constitutes not a continuation of Jewish culture but its final betrayal.

Berger, however, has also implicated "ancestor-centered systems of lineages" as ideological mystifications in the service of the state power of conquest groups while we have held up such an organization as one feasible component of an alternative to statism. Empirically, tribal organization, with its concomitant myths of the eponymous ancestor, is nearly emblematic of nomadic peoples. Berger's own discourse, however, is inconsistent here, for only a page later he will refer to the premonarchic period of Israel ("roughly from 1250 to 1000 B.C.") as a sociological experiment in "the rejection of strong transcendence in favor of a less coercive and somewhat weaker alternative, the tribal system that cuts across both local allegiances and stratificational discontinuities" ("L," p. 123). Thus Berger first puts tribalism on the side of "strong transcendence" and then on the side of "weak." Against Berger's first claim on this point and in favor of his second, we would argue that talk of the eponymous ancestors, of the patriarchs, is conspicuously less prominent in the "Davidic" texts of the settlement than in the "Mosaic" texts of the wandering. As Berger himself writes, David "tried to displace the loyalties and solidarity of kinship ties from clans and tribes to the national dynasty" ("L," p. 124). We suggest that descent from a common ancestor is rather an extension of family kinship and not its antithesis and thus on the side of wilderness and not on the side of Canaan. Even the myth of descent from common ancestry belongs rather to the semantic field of status through the body and not to the semantic field of status through land. Diaspora, in historical Judaism, can be interpreted then as the later analogue to nomadism in the earlier set of material conditions and thus as a continuation of the sociological experiment that the Davidic monarchy symbolically overturns.[42] With the

42. It is important to emphasize that this analysis is indifferent to the historical question of whether there were nomadic Israelite tribes to begin with or the thesis (made most famous by the work of Norman K. Gottwald, *The Tribes of Yahweh: A Sociology of the Religion of Liberated Israel, 1250–1050 B.C.E.* [Maryknoll, N.Y., 1979]) that ascribes them to a "retribalization" process taking place among "native" Canaanites. For a discussion of this thesis, see "L," pp. 131–32. For our purposes, the representations of the tribes as nomadic and the ideological investments in that representation are indifferent to the "actual" history.

rabbinic "invention" of Diaspora, the radical experiment of Moses was advanced. The forms of identification typical of nomads, those marks of status in the body, remained, then, crucial to this formation. Race is here on the side of the radicals; space, on the other hand, belongs to the despots.

One modernist story of Israel, the Israeli Declaration of Independence, begins with an imaginary autochthony—"In the Land of Israel this people came into existence"—and ends with the triumphant return of the People to their natural Land, making them "re-autochthonized," "like all of the nations." Israeli state power, deprived of the option of self-legitimation through appeal to a divine king, discovered autochthony as a powerful replacement. An alternative story of Israel, closer, it would seem, to the readings of the Judaism lived for two thousand years, begins with a people forever unconnected with a particular land, a people that calls into question the idea that a people must have a land in order to be a people. "The Land of Israel was not the birthplace of the Jewish people, which did not emerge there (as most peoples have on their own soil). On the contrary it had to enter its own Land from without; there is a sense in which Israel was born in exile. Abraham had to leave his own land to go to the Promised Land: the father of Jewry was deterritorialized" (*T*, p. 63).[43] In this view, the stories of Israel's conquest of the Land, whether under Abraham, Joshua, or even more prominently under David, are always stories that are compromised with a sense of failure of mission even more than they are stories of the accomplishment of mission, and the internal critique within the Tanakh (Hebrew Bible) itself, the dissident voice that is nearly always present, does not let us forget this either. Davies also brings into absolutely clear focus a prophetic discourse of preference for "exile" over rootedness in the Land (together with a persistent hope of eschatological restoration), a prophetic discourse that has been totally occluded in modern Zionist ideological representations of the Bible and of Jewish history but was pivotal in the rabbinic ideology (see *T*, pp. 15–19).

The Rabbis produced their cultural formation within conditions of Diaspora, and we would argue that their particular discourse of ethnocentricity is ethically appropriate only when the cultural identity is an embattled (or, at any rate, nonhegemonic) minority. The point is not that the Land was devalued by the Rabbis but that they renounced it until the final redemption; in an unredeemed world, temporal dominion and ethnic particularity are impossibly compromised. Davies phrases the position just right when he says, "It was its ability to detach its loyalty from 'place,'

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43. Also: "The desert is, therefore, the place of revelation and of the constitution of 'Israel' as a people; there she was elected" (*T*, p. 39). Davies's book is remarkable for many reasons, one of which is surely the way that while it intends to be a defense and explanation of Zionism as a deeply rooted Jewish movement, it consistently and honestly documents the factors in the tradition that are in tension with such a view.

while nonetheless retaining 'place' in its memory, that enabled Pharisaism to transcend the loss of its Land" (*T*, p. 69).[44] Our only addition would be to argue that this displacement of loyalty from place to memory of place was necessary not only to transcend the loss of the Land but to enable the loss of the Land. Political possession of the Land most threatened the possibility of continued Jewish cultural practice and difference. Given the choice between an ethnocentricity that would not seek domination over others and a seeking of political domination that would necessarily have led either to a dilution of distinctiveness, tribal warfare, or fascism, the Rabbis chose ethnocentricity. Zionism is thus a subversion of rabbinic Judaism, and it is no wonder that until World War II Zionism was a secular movement to which very few religious Jews adhered, seeing it as a human arrogation of a work that only God should or could perform.[45] This is,

44. We think that Davies occasionally seems to lose his grip on his own great insight by confusing ethnic identity with political possession (see *T*, pp. 90–91 n. 10). The same mixture appears also when he associates, it seems, deterritorialization and deculturation (p. 93). It is made clear when he writes, "At the same time the age-long engagement of Judaism with The Land in religious terms indicates that ethnicity and religion . . . are finally inseparable in Judaism" (p. 97). We certainly agree that ethnicity and religion are inseparable in Judaism, but we fail to see the necessary connection between ethnicity, religion, and territoriality. Moreover, a people can be on their land without this landedness being expressed in the form of a nation-state, and landedness can be shared in the same place with others who feel equally attached to the same land. This is the solution of the Neturei Karta, who live, after all, in Jerusalem but do not seek political hegemony over it.

45. Davies states that "for religious Jews, we must conclude, The Land is ultimately inseparable from the state of Israel, however much the actualities of history have demanded their distinction" (*T*, p. 51). Yet clearly many religious Jews have not felt that way at all. Although we do not deny entirely the theological bona fides of religious Zionism as one option for modern Jewish religious thought, the fact that they are the historical "winners" in an ideological struggle should not blind us to the fact that their option was, until only recently, just one option for religious Jews, and a very contested one at that. Even the theological "patron saint" of religious Zionists, the holy Rabbi Loewe (Mahara"l) of Prague, who, as Davies points out, "understood the nature and role of nations to be ordained by God, part of the natural order," and that "nations were intended to cohere rather than be scattered"; even he held that "reestablishment of a Jewish state should be left to God" (*T*, p. 33). Rabbi Nahman of Bratslav's desire to touch any part of the Land and then immediately return to Poland hardly bespeaks a proto-Zionism either (ibid.). Davies nuances his own statement when he remarks, "Zionism cannot be equated with a reaffirmation of the eternal relation of The Land, the people, and the Deity, except with the most cautious reservations, since it is more the expression of nationalism than of Judaism" (*T*, p. 64). Davies is right, however, in his claim that J. J. Petuchowski's statement—that there can be a "full-blooded Judaism which is in no need to hope and to pray for a messianic return to Palestine" (J. J. Petuchowski, "Diaspora Judaism—An Abnormality?" *Judaism* 9 [1960]: 27)—is missing something vital about historical Jewish tradition. The desire, the longing for unity, coherence, and groundedness in the utopian future of the messianic age is, as Davies eminently demonstrates, virtually inseparable from historical Judaism (*T*, p. 66). There is surely a "territorial theological tradition." At issue rather is its status in premessianic praxis.

moreover, the basis, even to this day, for the anti-Zionist ideology of such groups as Neturei Karta.

The dialectic between Paul and the Rabbis can be recuperated for cultural critique. When Christianity is the hegemonic power in Europe and the United States, the resistance of Jews to being universalized can be a critical force and model for the resistance of all peoples to being Europeanized out of particular bodily existence. When, however, an ethnocentric Judaism becomes a temporal, hegemonic political force, it becomes absolutely, vitally necessary to accept Paul's critical challenge—although not his universalizing, disembodying solution—and to develop an equally passionate concern for all human beings. We, including religious Jews—perhaps especially religious Jews—must take seriously the theological dimension of Paul's challenge. How could the God of all the world have such a disproportionate care and concern for only a small part of His world? And yet, obviously, we cannot even conceive of accepting Paul's solution of dissolving into a universal human essence, even one that would not be Christian but truly humanist and universal, even if such an entity could really exist.[46] Somewhere in this dialectic a synthesis must be found, one that will allow for stubborn hanging-on to ethnic, cultural specificity but in a context of deeply felt and enacted human solidarity. For that synthesis, Diaspora provides a model, and only in conditions of Diaspora can such a resolution be even attempted. Within the conditions of Diaspora, many Jews discovered that their well-being was absolutely dependent on principles of respect for difference, indeed that, as the radical slogan goes, "no one is free until all are free." Absolute devotion to the maintenance of Jewish culture and the historical memory was not inconsistent with devotion to radical causes of human liberation; there were Yiddish-speaking and Judeo-Arabic-speaking groups of Marxists and anarchists, and some even retained a commitment to historical Jewish religious practice.[47] The "chosenness" of the Jews becomes, when seen in this light, not a warrant for racism but precisely an antidote to racism. This is a Judaism that mobilizes the critical forces within the Bible and the Jewish tradition rather than mobilizing the repressive and racist forces that also subsist there and that we are not denying.

Within conditions of Diaspora, tendencies toward nativism were also materially discouraged. Diaspora culture and identity allows (and has historically allowed in the best circumstances, such as in Muslim Spain),

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46. Judith Butler asks, "How is it that we might ground a theory or politics in a speech situation or subject position which is 'universal' when the very category of the universal has only begun to be exposed for its own highly ethnocentric biases?" (Judith Butler, "Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of 'Postmodernism,'" *Praxis International* 11 [July 1991]: 153).

47. Lenin's minister of justice, I. N. Steinberg, was an orthodox Jew.

for a complex continuation of Jewish cultural creativity and identity at the same time that the same people participate fully in the common cultural life of their surroundings. The same figure, a Nagid, an Ibn Gabirol, or a Maimonides, can be simultaneously the vehicle of the preservation of traditions and of the mixing of cultures. This was the case not only in Muslim Spain, nor even only outside of the Land. The Rabbis in Diaspora in their own Land also produced a phenomenon of renewal of Jewish traditional culture at the same time that they were very well acquainted with and an integral part of the circumambient late antique culture. Diasporic cultural identity teaches us that cultures are not preserved by being protected from "mixing" but probably can only continue to exist as a product of such mixing. Cultures, as well as identities, are constantly being remade. While this is true of all cultures, diasporic Jewish culture lays it bare because of the impossibility of a natural association between this people and a particular land—thus the impossibility of seeing Jewish culture as a self-enclosed, bounded phenomenon. The critical force of this dissociation among people, language, culture, and land has been an enormous threat to cultural nativisms and integrisms, a threat that is one of the sources of anti-Semitism and perhaps one of the reasons that Europe has been much more prey to this evil than the Middle East. In other words, diasporic identity is a disaggregated identity. Jewishness disrupts the very categories of identity because it is not national, not genealogical, not religious, but all of these in dialectical tension with one another. When liberal Arabs and some Jews claim that the Jews of the Middle East are Arab Jews, we concur and think that Zionist ideology occludes something very significant when it seeks to obscure this point. The production of an ideology of a pure Jewish cultural essence that has been debased by Diaspora seems neither historically nor ethically correct. "Diasporized," that is, disaggregated, identity allows the early medieval scholar Rabbi Sa'adya to be an Egyptian Arab who happens to be Jewish and also a Jew who happens to be an Egyptian Arab. Both of these contradictory propositions must be held together. Similarly, we suggest that a diasporized gender identity is possible and positive. Being a woman is some kind of special being, and there are aspects of life and practice that insist on and celebrate that speciality. But this does not imply a fixing or freezing of all practice and performance of gender identity into one set of parameters. Human beings are divided into men and women for certain purposes, but that does not tell the whole story of their bodily identity. Rather than the dualism of gendered bodies and universal souls, or Jewish/Greek bodies and universal souls—the dualism that the Western tradition offers—we can substitute partially Jewish, partially Greek bodies, bodies that are sometimes gendered and sometimes not. It is this idea that we are calling diasporized identity.

Crucial to this construction of Jewish history and identity is the simple

fact, often consciously or unconsciously suppressed, that Diaspora is not the forced product of war and destruction—taking place after the downfall of Judea—but that already in the centuries before this downfall, the majority of Jews lived voluntarily outside of the Land.[48] Moreover, given a choice between domination by a "foreign" power who would allow them to keep the Torah undisturbed and domination by a "Jewish" authority who would interfere with religious life, the Pharisees and their successors the Rabbis generally chose the former (see *T,* p. 68).[49]

The story we would tell of Jewish history has three stages. In the first stage, we find a people—call it a tribe—not very different in certain respects from peoples in similar material conditions all over the world, a people like most others that regards itself as special among humanity, indeed as the People, and its land as preeminently wonderful among lands, the Land. This is, of course, an oversimplification because this "tribe" never quite dwelled alone and never regarded itself as autochthonous in its Land. In the second stage, this form of life increasingly becomes untenable, morally and politically, because the "tribe" is in cultural, social, and political contact with other people. This is, roughly speaking, the Hellenistic period, culminating in the crises of the first century, of which we have read Paul as an integral part. Various solutions to this problem were eventually adopted. Pauline Christianity is one; so perhaps is the retreat to Qumran, while the Pharisaic Rabbis "invented" Diaspora, even in the Land, as the solution to this cultural dilemma.

The third stage is diasporic existence. The rabbinic answer to Paul's challenge was to renounce any possibility of domination over Others by being perpetually out of power:

> Just as with seeing the return in terms of the restoration of political rights, seeing it in terms of redemption has certain consequences. If the return were an act of divine intervention, it could not be engineered or forced by political or any other human means: to do so would be impious. That coming was best served by waiting in obedience for it: *men of violence would not avail to bring it in.* The rabbinic aloofness to messianic claimants sprang not only from the history of disillusionment with such, but from this underlying, deeply engrained attitude. It can be claimed that under the main rabbinic tradition Judaism condemned itself to powerlessness. But recognition of powerlessness (rather than a frustrating, futile, and tragic resistance) was effective in preserving Judaism in a very hostile Christendom, and therefore had its own brand of "power." [*T,* p. 82]

48. Davies is one scholar who does not suppress this fact but forthrightly faces it. See *T,* p. 65.

49. Once again, the Neturei Karta, in their deference to Palestinian political claims on the Land of Israel, are, it seems, on solid historical ground.

As before, our impulse is only slightly to change the nuance of Davies's marvelously precise reading. The renunciation (not merely "recognition") of temporal power was to our minds precisely the most powerful mode of preservation of difference and, therefore, the most effective kind of resistance. The Neturei Karta, to this day, refuse to visit the Western Wall, the holiest place in Judaism, without PLO "visas" because it was taken by violence.

This response has much to teach us. We want to propose a privileging of Diaspora, a dissociation of ethnicities and political hegemonies as the only social structure that even begins to make possible a maintenance of cultural identity in a world grown thoroughly and inextricably interdependent. Indeed, we would suggest that Diaspora, and not monotheism, may be the most important contribution that Judaism has to make to the world, although we would not deny the positive role that monotheism has played in making Diaspora possible.[50] Assimilating the lesson of Diaspora, namely that peoples and lands are not naturally and organically connected, could help prevent bloodshed such as that occurring in Eastern Europe today.[51] In Eastern Europe at the turn of the century, the Jewish Workers' Bund, a mass socialist organization, had developed a model for national-cultural autonomy not based on territorial ethnic states. That program was effectively marginalized by the Bolsheviks and the Zionists. Diaspora can teach us that it is possible for a people to maintain its distinctive culture, its difference, without controlling land, a fortiori without controlling other people or developing a need to dispossess them of their lands. Thus the response of rabbinic Judaism to the challenge of universalism that Paul, among others, raised against what was becoming, at the end of one millennium and the beginning of the next, increasingly an inappropriate doctrine of specialness in an already interdependent world may provide some of the pieces to the puzzle of how humanity can survive as another millennium draws to a close with no messiah on the horizon. The renunciation of difference seems both an impoverishment of human life and an inevitable harbinger of oppression. Yet the renunciation of sovereignty (justified by discourses of autochthony, indigenousness, and territorial self-determination), combined with a fierce tenacity in holding onto cultural identity, might well have something to offer to a world in which these two forces, together, kill thousands daily.

50. Sidra Ezrahi has recently argued that monotheism and Diaspora are inextricably intertwined (oral communication with Daniel Boyarin).

51. Our point is not to reallegorize the Jew as wanderer but simply to point to certain aspects of the concrete realities of Jewish history as a possible, vital, positive contribution to human political culture in general. The implicitly normative call on other Jews to participate in our image of Jewishness is, we admit, ambivalent and potentially coercive, but how could it be otherwise? Even coercions can be ranked.

Appendix: Statement of the Neturei Karta[52]

We the Neturei Karta (Guardians of the City—Jerusalem), presently numbering in the tens of thousands, are comprised of the descendants of the pioneer Jews who settled in the Holy Land over a hundred years before the establishment of the Zionist State. Their sole motive was to serve G-d, and they had neither political aspirations nor any desire to exploit the local population in order to attain statehood.

Our mission, in the capacity of Palestinian advisers in this round of the Middle East Peace Conference, is to concern ourselves with the safeguarding of the interests of the Palestinian Jews and the entire Jewish nation. The Jewish people are charged by divine oath not to seek independence and cast off the yoke of exile which G-d decreed, as a result of not abiding by the conditions under which G-d granted them the Holy Land. We repeat constantly in our prayers, "since we sinned, we were therefore exiled from our land." G-d promised to gather in the exiled Jews through His messiah. This is one of the principles of the Jewish faith. The Zionist rebelled against this divine decree of exile by taking the land away from its indigenous inhabitants and established their state. Thus are the Jewish people being exposed to the divine retribution set down in the Talmud. "I will make your flesh prey as the deer and the antelope of the forest" (Song 2:7). Our advice to the negotiating contingent of the Palestinian delegation will remain within the framework of Jewish theology.

Zionist schoolings dictate a doctrine of labelling the indigenous Palestinian population "enemies" in order to sanction their expansionist policies. Judaism teaches that the Jew and non-Jew are to coexist in a cordial and good neighbor relationship. We Palestinian Jews have no desire to expand our places of residence and occupy our neighbors' lands, but only to live alongside non-Jewish Palestinians, just as Jews live throughout the world, in peace and tranquility.

The enmity and animosity toward the non-Jewish population, taught to the Zionist faithful, is already boomeranging. King Solomon, in Parables 27:19, describes reality "as one's image is reflected in water: so one's heart toward his fellow man"—so an enemy's heart is reflected in his adversary's heart. The Intifada is "exhibit A" to this King Solomon gem of wisdom. We hope and pray that this face-

52. This statement was made by the Palestinian Jewish (Neturei Karta) members of the Palestinian delegation to the Middle East Peace Conference in Washington, D.C., 1992, and has been translated here from the New York Yiddish weekly *Di yidishe vokhnshrift*, 4 Sept. 1992. We are not including this statement with our essay in order to advance Neturei Karta as an organization, nor are we members of Neturei Karta, some of whose policies we are in sympathy with and others of which we find violently objectionable. We include it because we consider it to be eloquent evidence of the kind of radical political rhetoric available within a highly traditional diasporic Jewish framework and in particular for its insight into what could be called the construction of the demonized Other.

to-face meeting with imagined adversaries will undo the false image created and that both Jew and Arab in Palestine can once again live as good neighbors as was the life of yesteryear, under a rule chosen by the indigenous residents of the Holy Land—thus conforming with G-d's plan for the Holy Land.

   Inchallah![53]

   Three members of the Neturei Karta posing with Hanan Mikhail Ashrawi (left), head of the Palestinian delegation to the Middle East peace talks. Photo: *Di yidishe vokhnschrift,* 4 Sept. 1992.

53. The word is the traditional Muslim prayer, "May it be God's [Allah's] will."

Lecture VII

THE AFFECTIVE PRODUCTION OF OTHERNESS. EMOTIONAL ECONOMIES OF FEAR

Emotions and feelings in relation to migration (as well as perceptions of threats triggered by "politics of lying") seem to have been crucial in recent years particularly with Trump's election and Brexit. In this class, we reflect on how migration and diaspora as threats can be re-read through affect and economies of fear. These lenses help to complicate mainstream approaches to and debates around migration, which rely on cognitive and rational forms of deliberation and understanding. Instead, we explore the role of the uncanny and the visceral, feelings such as fears, desires, suffering and aspirations - as well as the ethical moral and political dimensions of emotions- to nuance our understanding of the contemporary politics and perceptions of selves and otherness.

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On Resentment and Ressentiment: The Politics and Ethics of Moral Emotions

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On Resentment and *Ressentiment*

The Politics and Ethics of Moral Emotions

by Didier Fassin

Whereas the anthropology of morality and ethics has been mostly focused on values and actions oriented toward the good and the right, and has generally assumed that its object could be separated from the political, the purpose of this article is to apprehend reactive attitudes in response to an injury or an injustice, therefore displacing these common presumptions. A distinction based on ethnographical findings is proposed between two such attitudes. On the one hand, *ressentiment*, in the Nietzschean lineage, corresponds to a condition related to a past of oppression and domination: it is exemplified through the South African blacks in the context of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the AIDS controversies. On the other hand, resentment, in the Smithian tradition, amounts to a situation in which a social position generates frustration and acrimony: it is illustrated via the French policing of poor neighborhoods and immigrant populations in the context of the 2005 riots. *Ressentiment* as historical alienation and resentment as ideological alienation characterize two forms of moral sentiments and modes of political subjectivation. Their study, in reference to Jean Améry's work on survivors of the Nazi regime, contributes to an anthropology of what Primo Levi called "grey zones."

To speak of "resentment" in English is sometimes to speak of "ressentiment" (Thomas Brudholm, *Resentment's Virtue*)

In the introduction of his remarkable edited volume on *Ordinary Ethics*, Michael Lambek (2010:1) writes: "Ethnographers commonly find that the people they encounter are trying to do what they consider right or good, are evaluated according to criteria of what is right and good, or are in some debate about what constitutes the human good. Yet anthropological theory tends to overlook all this in favor of analyses that emphasize structure, power, and interest." The recent development of a rich field of anthropological research on morality (Zigon 2008) and ethics (Faubion 2011) can be viewed as an endeavor to seriously address, from various theoretical perspectives, this challenge of studying the ways people try to act morally and be ethical subjects rather than approaching them primarily as rational or strategic agents driven by power and interest. This field has been structured along two main theoretical lines, one following the classical Durkheimian-Kantian (Durkheim 1974 [1906]) definition of moral codes and duties (Ladd 1957; Read 1955), the other adopting the recent Foucauldian-Aristotelian (Foucault 1990 [1984]) turn on ethical subjectivities and virtues (Mahmood 2005; Widlok 2004)—what James Laidlaw (2002) describes

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as the theoretical opposition between an anthropology of obligation and an anthropology of freedom.

Although it would certainly be reductive to limit the scope of this body of work to the sole consideration of the good or to a bipolarity merely contrasting good and evil, and although one should not consider the delimitation of moralities and ethics in various cultures as a priori excluding politics, I would like to suggest that, on the one hand, not enough attention has been provided to ambiguous moral forms and ethical positions, and that, on the other hand, the boundaries between the moral or the ethical and the political are empirically more confused than what one usually believes. In the following pages, I will therefore strive to explore moral sentiments that escape the alternative between good and evil and make sense in relation to political issues. They belong to a sort of gray territory that obliges us to rethink what we take for granted about the distinction between the bright side and the dark side of our moral world and about the separation of the ethical from the political. The affects I am interested in are rancor, bitterness, acrimony, anger, ire, and indignation, which have in common to be a response to what is experienced or imagined as an injury or an injustice. More precisely, I will concentrate my reflection on what Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (2000) calls the "dramas of resentment," or rather on what I propose to analytically distinguish as "resentment," to use the English word, and "*ressentiment*," which corresponds to the French term.

The reason I am interested in resentment and *ressentiment* is primarily empirical. During the past 10 years, in two very different contexts, I have been confronted with situations in

which these deeply entrenched "reactive attitudes and feelings," as Peter Strawson (1974:6) calls them, were shared by certain groups, publicly expressed by some of their members, and often served to justify discourses and conducts that were difficult to comprehend. The first one concerns post-apartheid South Africa, the impressive work undertaken by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and yet the nagging persistence of tensions and divisions exemplified by the AIDS controversies. The second one involves policing in France, the politics of security developed by the state in the past 2 decades, and the contested activity of anticrime squads in the housing projects where poor and immigrant populations are concentrated. Despite the obvious differences between the two contexts, I contend that to understand the violence of the polemics in South Africa and of the police in France one has to consider the moral justifications of the agents, which in both cases are grounded in a profound rancor. However this affect does not have the same factual premises among South African blacks and French law enforcement. Their distinct historical and sociological backgrounds imply a divergent political signification. This is why, in interpreting the two scenes, I will differentiate *ressentiment*, in the first case, and, in the second one, resentment.

Two precisions should be provided here to avoid misunderstandings. First, my endeavor to construct this departure between the two terms and the realities they represent should be taken as a theoretical argument to identify moral ideal-types accounting for empirical situations. I am conscious of the possible blurring of lines and overlap of meanings in certain concrete situations. Second, the sort of subjectivity I try to analyze is not so much psychological as political. I am interested in the formation of subjects engaged in actions they justify on moral grounds rather than in the depths of their unconscious, to which the ethnographer has little access. These limits being acknowledged, I am nevertheless convinced of the importance for social scientists and of the significance for social agents to recognize this linguistic and conceptual distinction much more clearly than translators usually do.

To carry out this intellectual project, I will start with a brief philosophical evocation of Jean Améry's reflection, which I consider seminal for my argument, in the light of Adam Smith, for resentment, and of Nietzsche, for *ressentiment*. I will then present and discuss the two case studies, that is, the *ressentiment* of blacks in South Africa linked to their experience of apartheid and the resentment of the police in France in relation to the function assigned to them. I will conclude by discussing the relevance of the two categories for the program of a political anthropology of morality and the comprehension of contemporary societies.

The Life of Concepts

In 1966, the Belgian philosopher Jean Améry published *Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne* (Beyond guilt and atonement).

Born Hans Mayer in Austria, Améry changed his identity after the Second World War, merely translating his first name but ironically using the anagram of his last name, as a way of distancing himself from the people and places that brought to his mind the Nazi regime, which had tortured and later deported him to the concentration camps of Auschwitz and Bergen-Belsen, where he miraculously survived. Composed in German, the volume is a series of essays written 2 decades after the fact and proposing a phenomenological analysis of the experience, during and after the war, of the victims of the persecutions by the Third Reich: "To the extent that the reader would venture to join me at all he will have no choice but to accompany me in the same tempo, through the darkness that I illuminated step by step," Améry (1980 [1966]:xiv) writes in the preface to the 1966 edition. The first text provides the title of the American translation of the whole book: *At the Mind's Limits*, but the most troubling chapter is simply entitled: "*Ressentiments*," which regrettably becomes "Resentments" in the English version, as if the use of the French word in an essay in German was not significant and as if the explicit reference to the Nietzschean theory of *ressentiment* by Améry could be ignored (in the quotations, I will replace the English word with the French original, faithfully to the author's intention). Addressed to the German people, the text was read on German radio.

Instead of discussing, as have other philosophers, including Hannah Arendt, the political and judicial aspects of the postwar developments, Améry (1980 [1966]:64) provides a sort of confession, which he thinks of some value to comprehend, beyond his own case, the feelings of many survivors of the camps: "What matters to me is the description of the subjective state of the victim. What I can contribute is the analysis of the resentments, gained from introspection." This is not an easy undertaking, though, since it exposes the author to misunderstandings and criticisms on moral as well as psychological grounds: "My personal task is to justify a psychic condition that has been condemned by moralists and psychologists alike. The former regard it as a taint, the latter as a kind of sickness." Investigating the depths of his rancor, Améry (1980 [1966]:72) attempts to exhibit and legitimize his reluctance toward all forms of obliteration of the past: "In two decades of contemplating what happened to me, I believe to have recognized that a forgiving and forgetting induced by social pressure is immoral." To those who claim that one should not turn to the past but look toward the future, invoking the supposedly natural work of time, he opposes that "man has the right and privilege to declare himself to be in disagreement with every natural occurrence, including the biological healing that time brings about" (72). Time can never be a sufficient argument in favor of the obligation to forget and forgive.

Yet this refusal of oblivion and this attitude of defiance have nothing to do with a desire for vengeance or the pleasure of punishing, as some would assume: not to forget and not to forgive does not imply that one is nourishing the base urge

to inflict suffering on those from whom one has suffered. For Améry (1980 [1966]:77), the response to what happened "can be a matter neither of revenge on the one side nor of a problematic atonement on the other"; it is rather a question of "permitting *ressentiment* to remain alive in the one camp and, aroused by it, self-mistrust in the other." Society always tends to protect itself or, at best, prevent similar acts from happening again. But the victims should be the only ones who can decide what to do about the deeds of the criminals. Remembrance and rancor have, in Améry's view (70), the moral function of keeping alive for the perpetrators the meaning of what they have done: "My *ressentiment* is there in order that the crime become a moral reality for the criminal, in order that he be swept into the truth of his atrocity." The philosopher is conscious, however, of his belonging to a moral community doomed to shortly disappear, and he concludes by asking for patience with regards to those like himself whose rest is still disturbed by rancor. Twelve years after writing these essays and a few months after their republication in German with a new preface, he committed suicide.

Although Améry strictly limits his reflection to the survivors of the Nazi regime, I believe his defense and personal illustration of *ressentiment* have a broader meaning, which will survive their death—in the sense of *überleben* highlighted by Walter Benjamin (1968 [1923])—since it concerns issues at the heart of current situations in which countries have to deal with the aftermath of mass atrocities or extreme oppression. As Thomas Brudholm (2008:160) writes in his penetrating discussion of the text, "Seen as a rejoinder to common understandings of what is appropriate, laudable, and healthy with regard to victims' responses to past violations, the essay is as timely and stimulating today as it was fifty years ago. In relation to the emergence of the rhetoric of healing and closure and the new prominence accorded to forgiveness in psychological counseling, as well as contemporary thinking about reconciliation after mass atrocity, Améry proposes a valuable cautionary view to be taken into consideration." Actually, not only does he offer a counterpoint to the consensual valuation of empathy and pardon as personal virtues, but he also defends an antithesis to the contemporary politics of amnesty and atonement as universal paradigms. To the almost unanimous celebration of Christian moral sentiments over the past 2 centuries and its recent revival through humanitarianism and reconciliation in international relations, he offers a solitary resistance by introducing this linguistic and ethical differentiation between resentment and *ressentiment*. The genealogy of this distinction can be traced through the history of moral philosophy.

For the eighteenth-century Scottish Enlightenment movement, resentment is generally viewed as a noxious emotion. Most notably, in his *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Adam Smith (1976 [1759]:34–40) describes it as an "unsocial passion," which he opposes to sympathy as a "social passion," a contrast he illustrates through a literary reference: "We detest Iago as much as we esteem Othello." The former is a resentful man,

the latter a noble heart. Certainly, Smith concedes that resentment is a "necessary part of human nature," and he admits that "a person becomes contemptible who tamely sits still, and submits to insults, without attempting either to repel or to revenge them." But he adds: "Though the utility of those passions to the individual, by rendering it dangerous to insult or injure him, be acknowledged; and though their utility to the public, as guardians of justice, and of the equality of its administration, be no less considerable; yet there is something disagreeable in the passions themselves, which makes the appearance of them in other men the natural object of our aversion." Thus resentment, "the greatest poison to the happiness of a good mind," is a negative and undesirable emotion, even when it has the justified grounds of a response to an unjust wrong.

According to Smith (1976 [1759]:94–97), resentment is indeed a reaction to the pain inflicted by another agent. But "the object, which resentment is chiefly intent upon, is not so much to make our enemy feel pain in turn, as to make him conscious that he feels it upon his past conduct, to make him repent of that conduct, that the person whom he injured did not deserve to be treated in that manner." Vengeance should have no place here, and resentment can never justify any form of brutality. Rather Smith considers that "we ought always to punish with reluctance, and more from a sense of the propriety of punishing, than from any savage disposition to revenge" (172). If resentment is a normal—although "disagreeable"—passion, its consequences must be moderated by a sense of mercy and controlled by an imperative of duty. Actually, for Smith, the measure of the righteousness of the punishment is determined by what any "impartial person" would consider to be fair. Resentment is therefore an unsocial but legitimate passion, which must be tamed by the moral principles that regulate retribution. It puts human beings at risk of resembling animals when it leads to mere retaliation, but it can be disciplined as long as a sense of justice prevails, and it can therefore be viewed as an indispensable component of self-defense in social life.

This dual dimension of resentment had been even more emphasized 3 decades earlier by Joseph Butler (1827 [1726]: viii), who entitled two of his 15 sermons "Upon Resentment," attempting to answer the question: "Since general benevolence is the great law of the whole moral creation, why had man implanted in him a principle, which appears the direct contrary to benevolence?" Distinguishing "hasty and sudden" anger, "frequently raised without apparent reason," from "settled and deliberate" resentment, due to our "representing to our mind injustice or injury," Butler considers the former as "natural" and the latter as "moral." For the Presbyterian theologian, resentment is the indignation one feels when confronted with injustice inflicted on others or to oneself and the "desire having it punished." Using a finalist argument that was customary in his time, he asserts that "to prevent and remedy such injury, and the miseries arising from it, is the end for which this passion was implanted in man." Resent-

ment is consequently "one of the common bonds, by which society holds itself." It must be viewed as a weapon against "vice and wickedness," permitting the punishment of the guilty, whereas compassion or pity would make retribution impossible. Henceforth the "moral consideration" one should have for resentment is due to the "good influence" it exerts "upon the affairs of the world," since it serves to prevent or correct the human tendency to do wrong.

With the concept of *ressentiment* introduced in the *Genealogy of Morals*, a completely different perspective is adopted. According to Nietzsche (1989 [1887]:3), not only is it the historical origin of morality; it is also its psychological foundation. It provides the answer to the question: "Under what conditions did man devise these value judgments good and evil? And what value do they themselves possess?" Contrasting the "slave morality" with the "noble morality," Nietzsche (10) argues that, whereas the latter "develops from a triumphant affirmation of itself," the former "directs one's view outward instead of back to oneself" and "needs a hostile external world." On one side, "the man of *ressentiment,*" focused on his personal world and problems, "understands how to keep silent, how not to forget, how to wait, how to be provisionally self-deprecating and humble." On the other side, "the noble man," impervious to *ressentiment* and apt to forget, is "incapable of taking his enemies, his accidents, even his misdeeds seriously for very long." The construction of a moral adversary is crucial here, since the man of *ressentiment* "has conceived 'the evil enemy,' 'the Evil One,' and this is his basic concept, from which he then evolves, as an afterthought and pendant, a 'good one'—himself!" This is exactly the contrary of what characterizes the noble man who, according to Nietzsche (11), "conceives the basic concept 'good' in advance and spontaneously out of himself and only then creates for himself an idea of 'bad'!" Values thus proceed from diametrically opposite logics: the "bad of noble origin" and the "evil out of the cauldron of unsatisfied hatred" have nothing in common, except the fact that their antonym, the "good," is deceivingly the same. This is why one can affirm that *ressentiment* transforms the couple "good" and "bad" into the couple "good" and "evil," a new duality in which "good" has changed its signification, becoming properly moral, rather than practical or aesthetic.

In fact, although he opposes slaves and nobles in his analysis of morality, Nietzsche (1989 [1887]:7) makes another distinction, which seems even more crucial to his argument, between the "priests" and the "knights," who both belong to the superior class but do not share the power, which is monopolized by the latter, therefore causing the frustration of the former. Unable to rule and conscious of their weakness, but aching for power, the priests elicit a "radical revaluation of their enemies' values, that is to say, an act of the most spiritual revenge," by which they systematically reverse the knights' values based on the equation: "good = noble = beautiful = happy = beloved of God." Guided by the "hatred of impotence," these "most ingenious haters" declare that "the

wretched alone are the good; the poor, impotent, lowly alone are the good; the suffering, deprived, sick, ugly alone are pious, alone are blessed by God, blessedness is for them alone—and you the powerful and noble are on the contrary the evil, the cruel, the lustful, the insatiable, the godless of all eternity." And this is how "begins the slave revolt in morality, that revolt which has a history of two thousand years behind it and which we no longer see because it has been victorious" (7). One recognizes in this inversion of values, through which the weakness of the oppressed becomes a virtue, a fundamental feature of the Christian doctrine: the devaluation of the values of the dominant and the revaluation of the values of the dominated, as formulated in the Beatitudes pronounced in the Sermon on the Mount, by "this Jesus of Nazareth, the incarnate gospel of love, this 'Redeemer' who brought blessedness and victory to the poor, the sick and the sinners," in Nietzsche's words (8). For him, the genealogy of morals is inseparable from its sociology and theology.

This approach of *ressentiment* was further developed in an eponym book by one of Nietzsche's most prominent followers, Max Scheler (2003 [1913]:25–27), who characterizes it as the "self-poisoning of the mind caused by the systematic repression of certain emotions and affects" leading to "a tendency to indulge in certain kinds of value delusions and corresponding value judgments." The source of *ressentiment* is the "thirst for revenge" that erupts as the result of a reaction of frustration provoked by a combination of envy for what one does not have and of impotence to obtain it, but it is neither mere anger nor pure emotion: it supposes the work of time and of consciousness. The realization of vengeance would annihilate *ressentiment*, which "can only arise if these emotions are particularly powerful and yet must be suppressed because they are coupled with the feeling that one is unable to act them out—either because of weakness or because of fear." Hence the fact that *ressentiment* is a feature characterizing the experience of "those who serve and are dominated, who fruitlessly resent the sting of authority." This is the case at least at a sociological level, since for Scheler (2003 [1913]:59–68), there is also a theological dimension. A converted Catholic himself, he differentiates two opposite attitudes in the "way of stooping to the small, the lowly, and the common": "love entirely free from *ressentiment*," which is not moved by the desire of these "negative values, but despite them"; and "the 'altruistic' urge, which is a form of hatred, of self-hatred," since its "interest in 'others' and their lives" is only motivated by a form of "*ressentiment* morality." In the first case, one does not cherish misery or sickness, but the person behind them, whereas in the second case, one recognizes the dominated and the suffering ones only through their weakness. This idealized distinction between love and *ressentiment* is further developed by Scheler (2003 [1913]:79–83) via a reflection on what he calls "modern humanitarianism," that is, the universal love of mankind, which he distinguishes from Christian love.

From this brief outlook through almost 3 centuries of moral

philosophy, it is clear that, in the views of Smith and most of the Scottish Enlightenment, and even more of Nietzsche and his follower Scheler, resentment and *ressentiment*, respectively, are negative moral emotions. But they are so in a very different sense and with a different intensity. For Smith, resentment represents a passion, which can be a legitimate response to a wrong committed against the person and lead to a fair punishment of the perpetrator. There is a moderate tone in his criticism of resentment, which he assimilates to a form of indignation related to an injury. For Nietzsche, *ressentiment* defines a condition that characterizes the repressed feelings of the dominated and legitimizes their reaction against the dominant. There is a radical stance in his critique of *ressentiment*, which he views as a vengefulness based on envy and impotence. The difference between the two theories and the two words is even more profound, though. With Smith, we are in the realm of the psychological and within the limits of morality: the objective is to explain and justify social interactions involving injuries. With Nietzsche, we are in the domain of the genealogical and at the foundations of morality: the goal is to interpret and shake the obviousness of our moral certainties.

To return to Améry, it is remarkable that he explicitly—and reluctantly—inscribed his path in that of Nietzsche's, when one considers his gruesome posterity. "The man who dreamed of the synthesis of the brute with the superman must be answered by those who witnessed the union of the brute and the superman," writes Améry (1980 [1966]:68). "They were present as victims when a certain humankind joyously celebrated a festival of cruelty." The project here is to invert the perspective on *ressentiment*—from the strong to the weak, from the dominant to the dominated. This inversion is, however, a complex phenomenon. On the affective side, it retains its negative dimension of hostile sentiment, at the risk of creating misunderstanding in a time when forgiveness and reconciliation seem consensual. On the political side, it rehabilitates the will not to forget and not to pardon, simply because one cannot erase the wrong that was done, especially when the perpetrators and those who let their crimes happen are still alive, sometimes occupying official functions in the new political regime. The choice of the word "*ressentiment*," rather than "resentment," thus indicates affirming an anthropological, rather than psychological, signification to his position, but legitimizing it from a moral, instead of emotional, perspective. The man who invokes *ressentiment* as a personal stance toward his former torturers is neither the man of *ressentiment*, whom Nietzsche associates with revenge, nor merely a resentful man, whom Smith would be willing to absolve: he is a man defending a form of dignity that is increasingly censored and that has become unintelligible.

It is these conceptual as well as ethical distinctions that I want to apply to the analysis of two quite different situations, which may have only in common the moral incomprehension they have both raised. But unlike the philosophers I have discussed, my stance is not normative: it is not to judge whether it is right or good to feel and express resentment or *ressentiment;* nor is it to decide whether social agents should rather be forgiving than rancorous. I simply try to account for these reactive attitudes that are so common and yet so little analyzed.

Ressentiment and the South African Experience

"As if nothing ever happened." This inscription tagged on a wall in Johannesburg long intrigued me. Although I had no way to ascertain what the author of this graffiti really meant by this enigmatic sentence, I soon came to consider it as a sort of magic sign that had been put in my way to help me understand the South African scene after 1994. I interpreted it as the obliteration of the past and the contestation of this erasure, as I could perceive them during my fieldwork in Soweto and Alexandra, the two main townships of Johannesburg, and in the former homelands of Lebowa and Gazankulu, in the Northern Province recently renamed Limpopo, as well as in the medical worlds, scientific arenas and public sphere, which were also parts of my ethnography between 2000 and 2005 (Fassin 2007). One of my friends, a renowned professor of public health, once confided to me how his childhood had been painfully complicated, because he was torn between the two sides of his father's family, respectively classified as "Coloured" and "African," and therefore spatially separated, and how, doing his internship in a rural area, he was denied entry to a hotel where he was supposed to stay overnight while his white colleagues were welcomed by the owner, a situation which reminded him of his years at the university, where, not having access to the medical residence, he had to spend 3 hours daily commuting to attend his courses. Even in the Soweto hospital where he later worked as a resident, he explained that the white doctors would ignore or despise him and his friends of color. Then came the first democratic elections, which sounded the death knell for the apartheid regime and the beginning of the politics of reconciliation. The attitudes of his colleagues toward him changed from one day to the next. "They would now greet me and shake hands," he commented; "they would talk to me and laugh with me. As if nothing ever happened."

A common narrative to account for that period of dramatic transformations goes as follows. For almost 5 decades the apartheid regime imposed a racist and inhuman treatment of the nonwhite population, especially the most numerous so-called racial group the Africans, who were discriminated against, frequently abused, harshly exploited, dispossessed of their lands, expelled from their neighborhoods, and segregated in urban townships and rural homelands, all in the name of white supremacy. At some point, the conjunction of the struggles led in the country by the Mass Democratic Movement and abroad by the African National Congress, of the revolts of the youth in the townships and the international boycott of the economy, precipitated the collapse of this oppressive system. Soon after the liberation of Nelson Mandela,

the unbanning of political organizations, and the negotiations for the transition toward democracy, despite a context of violence and plots against African leaders, and under the threat of a civil war between ethnic groups fueled by the white power, the 1994 elections took place peacefully and gave birth to a government of national unity. As the dismantling of the apartheid regime occurred at an accelerated pace in most domains of public life, the project of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission took shape, and the audiences started under the authority of Archbishop Desmond Tutu. Seven thousand individuals applied for amnesty for gross violations of human rights committed in the previous decades, the most horrendous crimes being left to the work of regular tribunals. When the Commission officially ended its activities in 1998, one could consider that in only 4 years the new government had managed to replace the white supremacist regime by the "rainbow nation" promoted by Tutu. It dealt with its past in an apparently consensual manner while intensely working on the remaking of a multicultural world under the banner of the "moral regeneration" movement initiated by Mandela. So went the story usually told or simply imagined, acknowledging the truly remarkable achievement of the South African people and their leaders. However, the collective desire—both internationally and locally—to see this uniquely harmonious political transition succeed obscured the profound tensions that continued to divide the South African society.

These tensions were dramatically revealed by the controversies about the HIV epidemic, most spectacularly at the time of the Thirteenth International AIDS Conference, in July 2000, when the South African President, Thabo Mbeki, publicly unveiled his doubts about the cause of the disease and the efficacy of its treatment (Schneider 2002). While much has been written on what was designated as denialism on the part of the government, and more specifically on the consequences of this position in terms of public health, little attention has been given to the discourse of the chief of state and his supporters as well as to the larger context of the polemics. First, interpreting the disease as a result of poverty rather than the action of a virus explicitly raised the question of the negation of socioeconomic factors by most specialists of the infection, who insisted not only on its biological origins but also its supposed behavioral and cultural components: speaking of sexual promiscuity or of traditional practices, not to mention the virgin-cleansing myth supposed to account for the frequency of sexual abuse via a belief in the purifying power of raping young women, was a way of negating the role of inequalities and violence inherited from the past in the expansion of the infection, and more generally of not recognizing the political economy of the disease as a legacy of apartheid. Second, declaring antiviral drugs as ineffective at best, toxic at worst, openly manifested a suspicion regarding not only the pharmaceutical industry but also medicine, public health, and more broadly whatever could be viewed as emanating from the white world: for more than a century, indeed, epidemics of plague, flu, tuberculosis, and syphilis,

successively, had served to justify the exclusion and segregation of the Africans, from the construction of the first so-called native locations to the generalization of townships and homelands; more recently, the discovery of a program of chemical and biological warfare developed in the last years of the apartheid as a deadly weapon to be used against African leaders and population, including the dissemination of lethal microbes, finally cast doubts on the assumed benevolence of scientists and physicians. In sum, the heterodoxy of the president and his followers was nourished by a profound mistrust resulting from past experiences, which were largely denied by orthodox scientists as having anything to do with the present situation.

This mistrust found its most expressive form in the speech Thabo Mbeki delivered on October 12, 2001, for the centenary of the birth of Z. K. Matthews, who had been the first African to obtain a BA from a South African university and who later became a prominent figure of the African National Congress in the struggle against apartheid (http://www.thepresidency .gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=2727). Evoking the stigmatizing representations of Africans transmitted by the educational system during the past century, and referring to their recent echoes in the comments publicly made about AIDS, the president denounced those who affirm that Africans are "natural-born, promiscuous carriers of germs" and "human beings that cannot subject their passions to reason," predicting that "our continent is doomed to an inevitable mortal end because of our unconquerable devotion to the sin of lust." The tirade targeted the trivialization of a racist discourse on African AIDS, both in international spheres (Bibeau 1991) and on the national scene (Van der Vliet 2001), which had a longer history on the continent (Packard and Epstein 1991). Unsurprisingly, this unusual language for a chief of state, full of acrimony, elicited virulent reactions from his political opponents as well as from liberal intellectuals, who saw new evidence of what they viewed as a cynical instrumentalization of history. Let us turn our back to the past and direct our attention toward the future, they would say. These criticisms prompted Mbeki to reply on August 9, 2002, in his speech at the funeral of Saartje Baartman, a Khoikhoi woman who had been exhibited as a freak show attraction in nineteenth-century Europe and whose long-claimed remains had finally been repatriated from France to be buried in her home country (http://www.thepresidency .gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=2948). Calling for the courage to confront her tragic story, which had become emblematic of the South African history, the president added: "I speak of courage because they are many in our country who urge constantly that we should not speak of the past. And they are so bold as to say that the past is no longer, and all that remains is a future that will be." This comment is echoed by the great South African novelist, Zakes Mda, in his preface to the play *Nothing but the Truth* (2002:viii): "There is a demand from some of my compatriots that, since we have now attained democracy, we should have collective amnesia, because memory does not contribute to reconciliation. We should there-

fore, not only forgive the past, but also forget it. However, it is impossible to meet this demand, for we are products of our past. We have been shaped by our history." For Mbeki or Mda, lucid memory is a condition for the remaking of the nation, whether it is called reconciliation or merely coexistence.

Indeed, during all his years of political leadership, the most notable element of Mbeki's remarkably crafted speeches was his recurrent reference to history—a particular history, in light of the suffering endured by the African people. The contrast with his predecessor was certainly striking. Whereas Nelson Mandela is a man of reconciliation, Thabo Mbeki appears to be a man of *ressentiment*. The past is mobilized by the former to unite the nation under a timeless philosophical bantu notion of *ubuntu*, meaning the necessary connection with and generous relation to others, while it is resurrected by the latter to emphasize divisions, as in the famous 1998 "Two Nations" speech (http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/1998/mbek0529 .htm), in which he opposes one nation "white, relatively prosperous," and the other "black and poor," a reality he describes as "underwritten by the perpetuation of the racial, gender and spatial disparities born of a very long period of colonial and apartheid white domination." The fact that Mandela served 27 years in prison in South Africa while Mbeki lived 28 years in exile, mostly in Britain, has been used as an argument to discredit the latter, who obviously suffered less directly from the apartheid regime than the former. A sociological interpretation seems, however, more relevant to account for this paradox, since it can be argued that, for political leaders, exile, because of the absolute distance it builds with the enemy, is more propitious to the development of rancor than is presence, which allows, even under harsh conditions, more complex social interactions with foemen, especially when one has to negotiate with them. But this relativization of the situation and its consequences in terms of reconciliatory dispositions were definitely not accessible to the majority of Africans living in townships and homelands, who essentially had contacts with whites through the uncontrolled brutality of the security forces or the distant contempt of their employer. Hence the banality of bitterness and animosity toward the former oppressor I encountered among those who had this experience of segregation, humiliation, violence, and fear.

In the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the Amnesty Committee crystallized the tensions between the official politics of national absolution and the victims' reluctance to pardon. Desmond Tutu himself tried to convince those who presented their harrowing cases in the hearings to forgive their perpetrators. For him, the act of pardon is a spiritual sublimation that permits the construction of the individual and collective future. As Thomas Brudholm (2008:52–53) argues, though, this politics of reconciliation promoted by the archbishop "was both blurred and maximalist." It was blurred, because forgiveness did not only imply renouncing revenge, but also, as a result of the acceptation of the principle of amnesty, abandoning potential legal procedures. It was max-

imalist, because it supposed the possibility of unilateral forgiveness, when criminals would not exhibit signs of repentance. It thus exerted an almost untenable pressure on the victims, especially when, during the hearings, they were physically and emotionally confronted with the chasm existing between their experience and that of the perpetrators—not only in the past but also in the present.

Sylvia Dlomo, an old African woman who thought her son Sicelo had been killed by the security forces, decided to testify before the Commission, although she would have preferred a prosecution and punishment in a regular tribunal (Pigou 2002:106). At the hearing, she realized to her despair that the alleged criminals expressed no genuine contrition: "These people are coming forward to ask for forgiveness, just because they want to get away with it and not to say they are really sorry for what they did. You can see them smiling all over the place. You can see others chewing gum right inside the court. What does that mean? You are crying, mourning for your loved one who died in a gruesome way, but they are laughing?" Antje Krog (2002:90), an Afrikaner poet who wrote a literary report on her 2 years of observing the work of the Commission, also manifested an emotional reaction of incredulity regarding the men applying for amnesty: "It's them! It's truly them. . . . I go cold with recognition. That specific salacious laughter, that brotherly slap on the hairy shoulder, that guffawing circle using a crude yet idiomatic Afrikaans. The *manne*. . . . We all know: they were the doers. Their task was not to make speeches or shuffle papers. Their task was to murder. I find myself overcome with anger." Between the two women, though—one who has lived through not only the killing of her son but the decades of oppression, the other who has been a lucid critic of the racist social group to which she belonged—the affects aroused by the casual and provocative attitudes of the alleged criminals are different.

On the one hand, Sylvia Dlomo experiences *ressentiment*, in the sense that she does not want to forgive, but does not seek revenge either: she is in search of the truth about the circumstances and reasons for the death of her son and aspires to a just retribution of the criminals, while the Commission is trying to provide a reasonable agreement between the parties in the perspective of an amnesty which would settle the case. Eventually, when she is informed that the murderers of Sicelo are not the white men who have appeared before her, but friends of his and members like him of the armed resistance against the regime who killed him because they suspected him of being a spy, she feels not only disgraced by this supposed revelation, which taints the memory of her son, but betrayed by the commissioners, who seem unwilling to investigate further this astoundingly improbable turnaround. On the other hand, Antje Krog feels indignation against those men whose vulgarity and ruthlessness she recognizes too well and profoundly rejects: they may belong to the same ethnic group, yet they do not share the same moral world. Thus, *ressentiment* is on the side of the victims, indignation on the side of their advocates. One has to have personally experi-

enced the violence and humiliation of domination, including the shame of one's submission and impotence to respond, to feel the aches of *ressentiment*, which is the reaction to injustice and injury as well as to the sense of indignity resulting from one's involvement in one's condition—an experience those who are objectively on the side of the dominant have not been exposed to, whatever sympathy they may harbor for the victims and hatred they may feel toward the perpetrators.

One can therefore understand the practical and theoretical complications posed by the "moral equalizing of suffering," which Richard Wilson (2000:80) views as a crucial feature of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission: "In the hearings, commissioners repeatedly asserted that all pain was equal, regardless of class or racial categorization or religious or political affiliation. Whites, blacks, ANC comrades, IFP members, and others all felt the same pain. No moral distinction was drawn on the basis of what actions a person was engaged in at the time." Actually, the difference that people felt and acknowledged did not only have to do with the actions that were presented in the hearings: it was also, and probably even more decisively, related to the sort of everyday experience of apartheid in which they were embedded. The experience of the whites was definitely not that of the blacks, and equalization of their suffering barely made sense.

A story to which Desmond Tutu particularly liked to refer concerns a white woman who was severely injured and whose friends were killed as the result of a hand grenade attack by the member of a liberation movement (Brudholm 2008:55). When the woman was released from the hospital, she stated that she would like to meet the perpetrator "in a spirit of forgiveness," adding remarkably: "I hope he forgives me." For the archbishop, her magnanimity illustrated the power of human goodness and her suffering showed that everyone endured the regime and its consequences. However, he overlooked how different these ordeals might have been, depending on whether they were inscribed in the "history (*Geschichte*) of the victor" or the "history (*Historie*) of the vanquished," in Reinhart Koselleck's words (2002). This white woman could legitimately have felt anger or even resentment toward the criminal—which in fact she did not. But she could not have experienced the *ressentiment* felt by many black people, since she had not been exposed all her life to the violence of inferiorization and stigmatization from those who had injured her. The attack caused her a terrible physical and psychological injury, yet it had little in common with the moral injury of being abused without any possibility to respond and even under the obligation to submit to it.

In parallel to this story, one could evoke that of a young African woman who was brutalized and gang raped by the security forces, who were searching her house for an anti-apartheid activist (Dube 2002). She testified before the Commission but had no intention of having her attackers granted amnesty if they were to be found: "One of my rapists had said they were going to humiliate me until I hated myself. 'You won't even look into a white man's face again.' I realized

how true he was." This experience of degradation and culpability was meaningful to her in the larger context of her life in the township under the oppressive regime and its continuation in the present through the impunity of the perpetrators and the lack of significant reparation. It is certainly what Antje Krog (2002:iv) had in mind when she dedicated her book to "every victim who had an Afrikaner surname on her lips." *Ressentiment* is more than an affect: it is an anthropological condition related to a historical situation of victim—a description that does not suit the ordinary experience of resentment as it is encountered among the police.

Resentment in French Policing

"It's always the fault of the police." During my fieldwork conducted between 2005 and 2007 in an urban area near Paris (Fassin 2013), I would frequently hear from officers that expression of discontent as a comment on news items or local events involving deviant acts committed by their colleagues. This grievance toward the public had two implications: first, that the police were constantly suspected; second, that they were never guilty. Factually, these assertions could be seen as correct. In effect, although the excessive use of force was ordinary, particularly in the poor neighborhoods and housing projects, these acts had very little consequence. Only a small proportion of the deviant acts of the police led to complaints from citizens, since those most frequently abused knew that their word would carry little weight against that of the officers in a tribunal, and furthermore, barely one out of 10 charges that were lodged gave rise to an administrative or judicial sanction, which consequently remained exceptional and, moreover, appeared to be seldom enforced (Jobard 2002). Thus, viewed from the perspective of the institutions in charge of assessing and possibly punishing abuses, the police were almost never guilty, whereas, regarded from the side of the inhabitants, this impunity prompted a confused sentiment of suspicion. The only conflicting voice to disturb this lenient consensus was that of the National Commission for the Deontology of Security, an independent authority that reviewed cases submitted by citizens via their representatives and expressed public advice to the ministry of the interior: its assessments were generally less indulgent than those of the disciplinary committees and the court system, but this rigor eventually caused its suppression by the government. The protection of police deviance by official institutions was therefore ensured, even in apparently obvious cases. In November 2005, two adolescents died in an electric transformer where they had hidden to escape the anticrime squad that was chasing them. The immediate response of the Minister of the Interior, Nicolas Sarkozy, was to accuse the youth of having committed a robbery and to exonerate the police from any responsibility. The prosecution did not open an inquiry. However, it was later substantiated that the two boys were not deserving of any blame and that the officers were conscious of the deadly risk but did not try to intervene. Still the judge

dismissed the case. A young police officer I was accompanying in his night patrols a few weeks after this tragedy, which provoked the most spectacular riots of the past 20 years, told me his impression: "I don't think the police were even chasing them. Actually, these kids might have simply been playing hide and seek among themselves. But once more everybody attacked our colleagues." It is always the fault of the police.

This vision of the public as hostile, which fuels a profound resentment among law enforcement, is certainly not new. In his pioneering study of the police of a US Midwestern city, presented as his dissertation in 1950, the sociologist William Westley (1970:108–110) highlights the performative function of this imaginary. In effect, it is characterized by "first, an adverse definition of the police on the part of the public and a consequent hostility toward the police and, second, the fact that the policeman's occupation selects interactional situations in which this hostility is intensified." The construction of this image thus contributes to the production of reality: the police are all the more aggressive since they view their public as hostile and through their aggressiveness render the public hostile. But this representation has also a social function. According to the author of *Violence and the Police* (Westley 1970:110), "Since they see the public as hostile to the police and feel that their work tends to aggravate this hostility, they separate themselves from the public, develop strong in-group attitudes, and control one another's conduct, making it conform to the interests of the group." Indeed, this cohesion does not only rely on positive images, such as their maintaining security and promoting peace in society, but also on negative ones, such as the hostility of the public, which allows them to build a world apart, immunized of attacks coming from the outside and preserved from insiders' possible betrayals. As the psychologist Penny Dick (2005:1372) observes: "To protect and defend the ideological boundaries of the profession requires in-group affirmation and both spatial and moral distanciation from out-groups, who pose a potential threat to their identity." This representation of the public as hostile has therefore a long history in the forging of the professional culture of the police.

Yet four elements singularize contemporary France in this regard. First, contrary to what is generally believed, polls invariably indicate the popularity of the police, which is one of the most respected public institutions, far more so than education, justice, and employment agencies: even recent affairs of corruption have not substantially altered this relation of trust. Second, the social construction of the public as enemy has been part of a strategy by the government during the past decade to regain the favor of the far right constituency: more specifically, the population of the housing projects, mostly comprised of working-class immigrants and minorities, has been targeted as well as undocumented aliens and Roma people, with a bellicose language being used against them by the President and his successive ministers of the interior, allegedly in the name of the war on crime. Third, the judicial system has been increasingly under pressure and even under attack

from the executive authority: legislation has been passed producing more and more severe sanctions against petty crime, constraining the judges' decisions, at the same time as the magistrates were also publicly accused of leniency, despite the empirical evidence to the contrary; justice has therefore been considerably weakened in a period when its resources were diminished, contributing to its discredit. Fourth, the victimization of the police appears to be an even more recent invention orchestrated as a state policy to transform their image: significantly, during the 2005 national riots, regardless of the fact that several hundred policemen were injured, no violence was publicly reported, as the vulnerability of the security forces was not supposed to be displayed; by contrast, since the 2007 local riots of Villiers-le-Bel, prompted by the death of two young men who were knocked down by a patrol car, the publication and prosecution of even minor wounds suffered by the police have become systematic, for they are now considered to facilitate the subsequent work of repression; rather than the youth killed by the police being the victims, it is henceforth the police injured by the youth who are victimized; paradoxically, this evolution occurred during a time when casualties among law enforcement reached a historic low, with a national average of two deaths per homicide each year, four times less than 4 decades ago.

These various ingredients constitute a politics of resentment, eliciting animosity against certain segments of the population and rancor regarding the magistrates, while transforming the police into victims, entirely at odds with objective facts, including polls concerning the trust they inspire in the public. This production of resentment via political discourses and public policies is deliberate. It makes possible and acceptable what Everett Hughes (1958) describes as the "dirty work" characteristic of certain professions, taking various forms: "It may be simply physically disgusting. It may be a symbol of degradation, something that wounds one's dignity. Finally, it may be dirty work in that it in some way goes counter to the more heroic of our moral conceptions." In the case of the police, the dirty work includes something of these three components, but the last one is certainly the most common. The officers with whom I spoke had entered the profession, they said, to "arrest thieves and thugs"—probably not acknowledging that they had also chosen it for the security of employment. However, confronted with a relative scarcity of accessible crime and the pressure of a government anxious to demonstrate its efficacy, they found themselves reduced to the unsatisfactory task of apprehending undocumented immigrants, whom they had to separate from their family, and marijuana smokers, while ignoring the dealers who were under special investigation by the narcotics squad. These two categories of offenders presented the dual advantage of being easy prey, increasing their statistics of arrests, and of being easy cases, augmenting their proportion of elucidation—which are the two main criteria to assess their activity. But many among the police were unhappy with their designated role. "I refuse to get into that, it's just too simple: you go to

a migrants' hostel, and you're sure to find illegals," one officer told me. "If it's to pick up stoners, that's not what I did this job for," another complained. Many admitted that had they known what their activity would be like they would not have chosen this profession—if, in fact, they would have really had the choice. The work they considered dirty resulted from this discrepancy between expectations and reality, not only in terms of heroic representation of their role, but also, and perhaps even more, from the perspective of the moral rationalization of their action.

In reference to the famous detective film, the criminologist Carl Klockars (1980) has conceptualized the "Dirty Harry problem," which he depicts as a "moral dilemma" of having to use or not "dirty means" for "good ends." In my fieldwork experience, this alternative seemed a romanticized version of the work of the police: most of the time the recourse to dirty means did not have the excuse of good ends. In the case of discrimination, which was as systematically denied as it was commonly practiced, racial profiling was in part the logical consequence of the so-called politics of the figure, meaning quantified objectives of arrests to be reached by each squad. The "stop-and-frisk" had a greater likelihood of being successful when checking nonwhites, especially in terms of finding undocumented immigrants, who were easy targets to attain the fixed goals. Most law enforcement officials did not view this statistical discrimination as dirty means: it was mere pragmatism, they argued. In the case of violence, it was also encouraged by the government, which had given instructions to use with much more liberality the judicial procedure named "outrage and rebellion," signifying the possibility of prosecuting individuals for any behavior that could be construed as talking back to or physically resisting the police. This possibility considerably reinforced the officers' power and legitimized brutal interventions either as provocations or as reactions, markedly in the poor neighborhoods and the housing projects, where it was most often utilized to exert a social control over the population, particularly the youth. But again the police did not consider these abuses as dirty means: it was simply the use of coercive force to accomplish their professional duty. Yet, to account for the deviant practices, one cannot limit the analysis to this rhetoric of denial. Patrol officers are not only submitted to the injunctions of national policies, they demonstrate their agency. They are not only subjected to government manipulation, they are engaged in subjectivation processes. To understand their capacity or even propensity to develop ordinary practices of discrimination and violence, one has to apprehend more profound reasons. Resentment is crucial to this interpretation.

Not being able to make reality correspond to their expectations, they are facing the frustration of inaction and the ambiguity of their role. The squad I was working with had decorated their office with several posters of the hero of *The Shield*, the fictional television series that narrates the story of the Rampart Division of the Los Angeles Police Department, whose brutality and corruption caused a major scandal in the late 1990s. In fact, their everyday life resembled much more a softer version of *The Wire*, which Anmol Chaddha and William Julius Wilson (2011:164) rightly praise as a pedagogic introduction to "systemic urban inequality" but insufficiently recognize as a didactic instrument to approach the "crisis in blue," as the author of the fiction program, David Simon, entitled a series of articles in the *Baltimore Sun* (cited in Williams 2011:211). To comprehend the sociological grounds of the moral experience of patrol officers I am analyzing, one has to consider the fact that the French Police is a state institution, which implies a national recruitment 80% composed of young men and rarely women from rural areas and small towns, mostly from the deindustrialized North of France, which is heavily hit by the decline of coal mining. These recruits, who have no experience of the urban environment, receive training that often deepens the cultural gap between them and the inhabitants of the areas where they will have to work: neighborhoods are depicted as a "jungle" and their residents as "savages," facilitating the development of racial prejudices. "These bastards—they don't like us! But I don't like them either," commented the head of the anticrime squad as we drove near young African and Arab men. When confronted with the hardships of the housing projects and their populations, massively composed of immigrants and minorities, who actually belong like them to the working class, they tended to distance themselves by accentuating differences. Their resentment can thus be regarded as related to what Pierre Bourdieu (1999 [1993]:4) designates as a "positional suffering," that is, the misery emanating from the social location occupied and the frustrations it elicits. It is displaced from the state, which subjects the police to the degrading situation of having to deal with a stigmatized population, to this public and those who are viewed as being on its side. This is a shift all the easier to make as the representation of the public as hostile is part of their identity building.

But the resentment felt by the police is exacerbated by the depressing sentiment they usually have that, as I heard them comment during our patrols night after night, they "work for nothing," since the judges often release the suspects they arrest. Actually, the most lucid among them recognize that frequently the cases they present for arraignments are not convincing for lack of proof, but the majority fails to accept this self-criticism and holds the magistrates responsible for their supposed leniency, a perception not corroborated by empirical data, as we have seen. But acrimony against the judicial system, which is a federating affect among officers, serves to justify what one can call, paraphrasing Michael Lipsky (1980), street-level justice. "Since the judges don't do their job, let's do it in their stead," implicitly argue the police. This informal substitution takes three forms: immediate punishment, delegated retribution, and punitive expedition.

Immediate punishment corresponds to the brutality and humiliation exerted on a suspect either in his neighborhood, in front of friends, neighbors, and relatives, or back at the police station, where he is the most vulnerable. It can be inflicted as a supplement to what he will later get in the court.

But it can be carried out when the police know they will not be able to proffer sufficient evidence of culpability and are nevertheless persuaded that the individual is guilty or, even if he is not, has been in the past and did not receive adequate sanction. Delegated retribution consists in randomly sanctioning the member of a group, knowing that he may have no personal implication in the act committed but considering him a suspect by proxy. This happens in particular when youth throw stones from a distance, often in the dark and sometimes hidden, and the police accuse the one they have been able to stop, who is simply the less fast or the less lucky. In one such case, the officers I was accompanying ran after a group who quickly disappeared in the housing project; a few minutes later, they discovered a young African man in one of the stairwells and arrested him; he was presented to the judge the next day, under the accusation of being the stone-thrower, but during the confrontation between the suspect and the officers, the description they provided of his clothing did not correspond to what he was wearing when he was caught. Punitive expeditions are conducted when the police are chasing someone whom they think is a culprit and who has escaped them, generally in a context of verbal provocations or violent interactions. Several patrol cars, sirens wailing, hurry to the site of the altercation, and the intervention turns into a collective retaliation, with neighbors shoved, doors broken, insults proffered, witnesses sometimes injured, and in the end, unlucky people present on the scene arrested, although they did not necessarily have any connection with the initial search. A commissioner explained to me how difficult it was for her to restrain her "men" from blindly avenging themselves on the spot, as opposed to undertaking an inquiry which could lead to a much more judicially effective procedure the following day. These behaviors, which correspond to what Jerome Skolnick (1966) phrases as "justice without trial," and the tolerance they benefit from their hierarchy cannot be understood if one simply considers them as deviance. One has to take into account the self-justification in terms of fair sanction by substitution, which allows them not to be condemned as pure vengeance, but rather to be legitimized as justice.

Resentment, which underlies these practices, does not correspond to any form of oppression or stigmatization suffered by the police. Indeed, with very few exceptions, they have not personally been the victims, either directly or indirectly, of the population on which they exert their force and sometimes their reprisals. They professionally and institutionally nourish their rancor toward the public in general, through the representation of its hostility, and toward the underprivileged in particular, via common prejudices fueled by government discourses: the first dimension has been described as characteristic of their professional culture (Crank 2004:61), and the second defines what is often called institutionalized discrimination (Kamali 2009:42). Considered from the perspective of power relations, one can say that the police are not dominated or dominant. On the one hand, they are subjected to the authority of the state, which delegates to them its monopoly of legitimate violence. On the other hand, they are subjectivized through their interactions with their public, upon which they exert their coercive force. Although the spectrum is wide from hardened rancor to softer disillusionment, their resentment is diffused, neither related to a specific experience, since they seldom have been exposed to a particular ordeal, nor focused on a special group, as it includes the poor, immigrants, minorities, magistrates, superiors, and society at large. It corresponds to a sociological position causing them frustration and discontent, which they displace from the system that gives them an ambivalent mission toward certain populations and individuals whom they have been socialized to consider as their enemies.

Conclusion

In his essay dedicated to patriotism from the collection entitled *The Persistence of the Color Line*, Harvard Professor of Law Randall Kennedy (2011:182–183) evokes his father's relationship with his country. Having grown up in Louisiana, he "attended segregated schools, came to learn painfully that because of his race certain options were foreclosed to him despite his intelligence, industry and ambition, and witnessed countless incidents in which blacks were terrorized and humiliated by whites without any hint of disapproval from public authorities." This experience concerned more specifically one institution: "He bore a special grudge against the police—municipal police, military police, all police, because in his experience, a central function of police was to keep blacks in their 'place.' I saw with my own eyes why he developed such a loathing." Indeed, when traveling with his family through the country, and especially the South, he was frequently stopped, "not because he had committed any legal infraction but simply because he was a black man driving a nice car," as the police officers would openly tell him, adding that he "should take care to behave himself," since things there were not like in the North: "'Okay, boy?' Then there would be a pause. It seemed as though the policeman was waiting how my father would respond. My dad reacted in a way calculated to provide the maximum safety to himself and his family: 'Yassuh,' he would say with an extra dollop of deference." Referring to these recurrent interactions with white people, Kennedy analyzes them as the reason why his father could never "view the United States as 'his country.'" Whereas he was apparently "a vivid embodiment of the American dream," having become a respected man who owned a home and sent his sons to a prestigious university (where they significantly all became lawyers), he had a different perspective: "Like Malcolm X, he believed himself to be the victim of a terrible and ongoing injustice that white America refused to acknowledge satisfactorily." For Kennedy, his father's reaction is representative of a common attitude among black people who have endured the experience of racial segregation and consider that little recognition is granted not only to the realities of the

past but also to their continuation in the present. This is how, according to him, one must understand the "God damn America!" pronounced by Reverend Wright, Barack Obama's former pastor, which infuriated the white constituency and threatened the election prospects of the senator from Illinois. It was not mere remembrance of things past but reference to the present of continuous discrimination, increasing impoverishment, and massive incarceration that affects African Americans. While disapproving of the pastor's hyperbolic stance, Kennedy insistently strives to make sense of his position.

This is also what I have attempted to do here: make sense of resentment and *ressentiment*—but in addition establish a difference between them. Certainly, one could say, following the classical line of moral philosophy and even much of its contemporary extensions, that Kennedy's father and the Southern policeman both manifest the reactive attitude composed of animosity and rancor that is usually designated as resentment. Perhaps it is true for the psychologist who considers that the psychic effects of an injury are indifferent to the fact that it is real (the racial discrimination regarding the father) or imagined (the affront caused by black presence for the policeman). I contend that it is not, though, if one displaces the analysis from psychological subjectivity to moral and political subjectivation. Discussing my own ethnographic studies, I have therefore proposed to analyze the process of moral and political subjectivation of the black man in South Africa and the police officer in France—or their counterparts in the United States, in Kennedy's account—as, respectively, *ressentiment* and resentment. Drawing a parallel with earlier research I conducted, I would like to suggest that to introduce this linguistic and moral difference is as critical for resentment as it is for trauma. On the basis of the identity of symptoms, it has indeed been established that not only the consequences of surviving a sexual abuse or a genocide could be classified under the same clinical category of post-traumatic stress disorder but also that this suffering could affect in a similar way the victim and the perpetrator of violence (Young 1995). This reduction of experiences to either symptoms or suffering obliterates, however, the moral experience of the subjects and the political signification of their subjectivation, as I have shown in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Fassin 2008). In an analogous way, I predicate that the social sciences must account for the difference between the reactive attitudes of the black man harassed by law enforcement and of the police officer who harasses him, even though they are both felt as responses to an injury, whether real or imagined.

The establishment of this difference is not the result of an a priori theoretical construction. It is an a posteriori conceptual elaboration based on an empirical observation: my approach has been resolutely inductive. Inspired by Améry's affirmation (1980 [1966]:81) that he believed in the "moral value" and "historical validity" of his *ressentiment*, I have attempted to distinguish the experience of the blacks in post-apartheid South Africa and the police in poor urban French

neighborhoods—not all the blacks and not all the police, of course, but in both cases a quite common experience that was indifferently referred to as resentment. I therefore propose two ideal-types of moral and political subjectivation. *Ressentiment* is a reaction to historical facts, which generate an anthropological condition: victims of genocide, apartheid, or persecutions experience this condition. It implies not primarily revenge but recognition. It signifies the impossibility to forget and the senselessness to forgive. The man of *ressentiment* may have been directly exposed to oppression and domination, or indirectly, through the narratives of his parents or grandparents, for instance. By contrast, resentment is a reaction to a relational situation, which results from a sociological position: police officers, far right constituents, and long-term unemployed workers may find themselves in such a position. It involves diffuse animosity and tends toward vindictiveness. It shifts its object of discontent from specific actors toward society at large and vulnerable groups in particular, via imaginary projections. The resentful man is not directly or indirectly exposed to oppression and domination, but he expresses discontent about a state of affairs that does not satisfy him. *Ressentiment* results from a historical alienation: something did happen, which had tragic consequences in the past and often causes continuing hardship in the present. Resentment amounts to an ideological alienation: the reality is blurred, leading to frequently misdirected rancor. Circumstances often bring together the man of *ressentiment* and the resentful man, the South African blacks socialized in the apartheid and the South African whites frustrated by the new rules of the post-apartheid, the French youth belonging to Arab and sub-Saharan minorities and the French police sent to poor neighborhoods with their inhabitants of African origins. These asymmetrical confrontations are moments of truth for society, as have been the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in the first case and the 2005 urban riots in the second one: they unveil the difference between the two experiences.

To try to comprehend these attitudes is not to justify them, though. Accounting for the *ressentiment* of the South African blacks—or of many of them—is not to contest the importance of the reconciliation process and the significance of the politics of forgiveness: it is interpreting a form of resistance to the current dominance of amnesty and oblivion, which has generally been dismissed. Analyzing the resentment of the French police officers—or again of many among them—is not to exonerate them from their responsibility in the unfair treatment of their public: it is explicating what they do and how they act from their perspective, rather than merely condemning or conversely obliterating their deviance. If it is true that both emotions should be taken seriously as a political and moral "address," that is, a "communicative display that sends a message and invites a kind of response," as Margaret Walker (2006:134) cogently puts it, differentiating the two has substantial implications for the understanding of this address. It is precisely because these sentiments are often not seen as

moral and because their political meaning is frequently ignored that one should give them one's attention. *Ressentiment* and resentment are part of contemporary moral economies (Fassin 2009): they represent what Primo Levi (1988 [1986]) analyzes as "grey zones" that require a rejection of our Manichean propensity and ethical comfort.

Acknowledgments

Comments

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Thinking, as practiced by Jean Améry, meant to always proceed from a concrete event, but never get lost in it. As a philosopher trying to live up to this ideal, I am sympathetic to the development within anthropology of a focus on morality and the emotions. Even more so, when the "ethical turn" engages a brilliant scholar like Didier Fassin who elegantly brings together ethnographical study and conceptual analysis. The need of the latter—with regard to the moral emotions—first became clear to me when confronted with unsubtle and disparaging approaches to anger and resentment among advocates of forgiveness and reconciliation after mass atrocity. Not being a social scientist, my aim was both to aid comprehension and to contribute to a rehabilitation of resentment and the refusal to forgive (as sometimes morally justifiable and perhaps even admirable; cf. Brudholm 2008). I argued that distinguishing between resentment and *ressentiment* is important, not only for the translation and interpretation of Jean Améry (not that he made the distinction; he tried to rethink *ressentiment*) but also for our more general understanding of the moral and political significance of emotional responses to past and ongoing wrongs.

Fassin presents a somewhat different take on the distinction between resentment and *ressentiment*, relates it to his own fieldwork, and urges social scientists to acknowledge the ideal type distinction in studies of emotionally inflected subjectivation. I endorse the proposal and would like to suggest continuous expansion of its scope. Think, for example, of the prominence today of references to hatred—in criminal law, in popular culture, in notions of what drives ethnic violence and what hinders reconciliation. I am sure that our modern understanding of hatred—mainly as prejudice and pathology—should be challenged. What needs reflection is not only the normative issue

of whether hatred can ever be morally justified. It is even more important that we get as clear as we can about the very concept and possible varieties of hatred. Revitalizing a classical philosophical distinction between anger and hate could prove worthwhile, not least in relation to the understanding of victims, for whom the difference between being (or being seen as) hateful or resentful matters morally and politically. Hatred is not in the gray zone, but perhaps we should do more to pull it in there? Rethinking hatred, as one of the most disagreeable features within our moral universe, would certainly represent a challenge to what Fassin describes as "our Manichean propensity and ethical comfort."[1]

Pleas to distinguish between resentment and *ressentiment* (even though they are typically granted to overlap and although the latter might be seen as a peculiar instance of the former) are reiterated in several recent philosophical works on the moral emotions. The interesting question is on what grounds and for what purpose the distinction is made. At stake might be a distinction between different degrees of epistemic reliability and moral justifiability, between different kinds of prototypical beliefs and intentional objects, or between different kinds of etiologies and action-tendencies. In my own case, I argued that resentment and *ressentiment* are not two of a kind, and I pinpointed the difference between a specific moral emotion and a moral-political-existential predicament. Most importantly, *ressentiment* is not referring to any specific emotion, and it is not always and not necessarily about the processing of emotions that are in themselves base and irrational. Thus, among the emotions that can be processed, or painfully endured, in *ressentiment* we find, for example, resentment. Now, what is the basis for the distinction proposed by Fassin? He invokes the philosophies, but to what degree is his own proposal and use of the distinction informed by them? (Not that it necessarily should be!) It seems to me that what matters to Fassin is a difference between distinct etiologies (historical and sociological backgrounds) and different historical and/or structural agent positions. I find that interesting, but I would like a more systematic elaboration.

Finally, I laud the attempt to bring together ethnographical study and conceptual analysis. In limited space, Fassin is able both to invoke a philosophical tradition and to provide the concepts with voice and face. Struggling myself with how to write about emotions in politics and morality, I am intrigued by the example set by Fassin. As a disciplinary outsider, I would like to hear more about the thoughts behind the anthropological approach. In my own reading of Améry, I emphasized the concrete case as a challenge to given vocabularies, and I am weary of philosophers treating the concrete merely as illustration. Then, I wonder, what is the function of the concrete case in the anthropology of emotion? Last, we hear that "Dlomo experiences *ressentiment*." But, frankly, how do we know? And if the evidence is imponderable (Wittgenstein), or if corroboration of the specific empirical claim is beside

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1. For a more elaborate presentation of the issue, see Brudholm 2010.

the point, where—in the gray zone between philosophy and empirical science—do we find the moral-political anthropology of the emotions?

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An argument in ordinary language philosophy was that in turning to the words inherited in our everyday language and used un-self-consciously, we could become aware of the acute moral evaluations we make on an ongoing basis. But sometimes ordinary language may not be sufficient to produce or capture fine discriminations; indeed, it may serve to conveniently cover them up. Didier Fassin makes a tremendously important contribution in this paper by illuminating the difference between resentment and *ressentiment* (and incidentally the difference between resentment and indignation) analogous to the kind of fine-tuned work philosopher J. L. Austin (1961) provided for the ordinary language of excuses.

At the risk of sounding condescending, Fassin is the perfect successor to the office at the Institute for Advanced Study held by Clifford Geertz. Although in no sense intending to follow or imitate him, the comparisons between what Fassin accomplishes in this paper and some of Geertz's essays are striking. Among other things, like Geertz, Fassin is interested in exploring the deep relationships between the ethical and political, addressing what Geertz referred to as "moods and motivations," understood in their public and social, rather than their private, psychological reality, and doing so by means of the comparison of closely examined cases. Like Geertz, Fassin draws on philosophy with a light and effective touch. But Fassin goes further than Geertz; in his penetrating analysis of the French police, Fassin is *engagé* in a manner that Geertz for his own reasons resisted.

The specific ethnographic and historical accounts aside, Fassin's paper raises several issues of general relevance. First, he shows that what we discuss under the label of ethics and what we discuss under the label of emotions or sentiments need to be brought together. The early anthropology of the emotions literature pointed out that assigning a particular emotion to a person in context had ethical implications or entailed a form of ethical interpretation or judgment but did not take the analysis much further. Here we need to be cognizant of the advances made in philosophy and political theory. Baker's (2010) essay on Strawson is a good place to start, as is the collection by political theorists Kingston and Ferry (2008). Fassin, for the most part, avoids the word "affect," which is probably a good thing. Affect can be precisely a way to circumvent the ethical dimension (Leys 2011, 2007).

Second, we need to be more rigorous in our language of public sentiment or states of feeling. While some writers on ethics think there has been too much of a concern with language, as noted in my first remark Fassin shows precisely why this is not the case.

Third, Fassin makes a signal contribution to the somewhat tired anthropology of memory. He illustrates how historical events and changes leave emotional wakes and conversely how public sentiment can shape or constrain social and political action. I would invite Fassin to think further about a point implicit near the end of the paper, namely, that resentment could be partly or sometimes a mirror of the *ressentiment* of the other, that is, that they are complementary and related responses by people on two sides of a historical process, products and producers of a kind of schizmogenesis.

Fourth, Fassin points to the fact that in taking ethics on board for social theory we do so at our peril if we take our informants' remarks at face value, mistaking highly mediated justifications for direct motivations. The trick is how to simultaneously acknowledge and critique the positions of people whose actions we agree or disagree with.

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Didier Fassin's essay "On Resentment and *Ressentiment*" is conceptually subtle, ethnographically detailed, and politically astute. It is a philosophically informed analysis of two densely described cases of resentment/*Ressentiment*. Although Fassin distances himself from normative judgments of post-apartheid South Africa and recent French practices of "security politics and policing," his "political anthropology of morality" implicitly delivers a political moral. We know where he finds cause for indignation and where he finds grounds for sympathy.

As his condensed history of philosophical analyses of resentment/*ressentiment* demonstrates, Butler, Adam Smith, Nietzsche, Scheler, and Améry not only developed different accounts of the origins and structures of these attitudes but also formed quite different diagnoses of their dangers. The terminology—which attitudes we should call resentment, which *ressentiment*—doesn't matter: there are important distinctions at stake.

Following Butler and Améry, Fassin rightly reminds us that when resentment is linked with indignation, it is an indication of perceived injustice. This type of resentment begins with a sense of injury at an unjust distribution of goods, rights, respect, and privileges; it may—but need not—target those who are suspected to be responsible for the injustice. Groups as well as individuals may be indignantly resentful; they may be mistaken about whether they have actually been injured; while they are typically the subjects of the perceived injury, they may be indignantly resentful on behalf of others. They may—but need not—set themselves to redress the perceived

injury. In its indignant mode, resentment can be a useful weather vane, helping us to become aware of injustice, to locate it, and even sometimes to diagnose its sources. A society whose entrenched practices are expressed in the commonplaces of its moralizing ideology may have difficulty recognizing, let alone diagnosing, its injustices. Just as the experience of pain serves as an index of disease, so resentment—as an expression of pain—can serve as a signal of social or political disease. To be sure, just as pain does not itself indicate its cause, so too resentment may be misplaced, deflected from its proper target. The focus—the intentional object—of indignant resentment is a state of affairs: it may be a person; it may be a distribution of power; it may a condition that seems unjust or offensive. The resentful person (call him Malcolm) may or may not himself have been directly injured. It is enough that he feels some identification with the matter at hand. The main thing is that his attention is on the situation—the state of affairs—that prompts his object-oriented attitude. Very often he wants to publicize the offense, to call attention to it, even to organize others to remedy it.

By contrast, someone (call him Fyodor) in the grips of Nietzschean *ressentiment* is focused on his own condition. It haunts him, directs his imagination; he obsessively replays and reenacts his injury; it eats him. He is passive in relation to it, and he is very often further shamed by it. Like Dostoyevsky's Underground Man, he attempts to hide his *ressentiment* from others, as if the very fact of his having it fuels it further. He is too weak, too self-destructive, to combine his *ressentiment* with indignation. Resentment can be fleeting and corrigible; *ressentiment* lingers. Even when its grounds are gone or have been corrected, it has permanently marked the person.

Although neither resentment nor *ressentiment* are necessarily phenomenologically experienced as affects, and although neither need be recognized or categorized as such, they function in the person's thoughts and actions: they direct and interpret his experience. Even when they simply consist of obsessive thoughts, they are a species of pain. And it is precisely as pain that they can be morally and politically useful. Like pain, resentment can call our attention to something gone wrong: its presence can signify disease in the body politic. Malcolm's resentment implies, and carries the presumption of, agency and entitlement that has been denied, either overtly or structurally. In principle, its sources and injuries can be cooperatively overcome. As we would not choose to be incapable of pain, we would not choose to be incapable of resentment as an index of injustice that is sometimes difficult to discern except by a reactive attitude of this kind. By contrast, Fyodor's *ressentiment* further weakens him. He can only redress it indirectly, subversively in ways that engender a dialectical momentum of increasing injuries. Because it festers, his pain tends to be expressed in a cycle of further destruction.

As Fassin's history and analysis of resentment/*ressentiment* shows, responses to perceived injustice and injury can be experienced and diagnosed in quite different ways, as their history, contexts, and cultural categories of their occurrence

differ. Like analyses of injustice, analyses of politically focused affects cannot proceed piecemeal. They occur—they hunt their prey—in groups. Indignant resentment is quite different from envious resentment; helpless *ressentiment* is quite different from entitled *ressentiment*. And, of course, political anthropologists themselves have an agenda; their own background indignations and assumptions have prompted and continue to fuel their analyses. Fassin's persuasive essay appropriately directs our own responses to post-apartheid South Africa and French police-enforced security measures.

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Inasmuch as we can acknowledge advances, I think Fassin's essay marks an advance within the emerging field of the anthropology of ethics. Fassin reminds us that ethics is not only about moral striving for the good but also about more ambiguous feelings such as negativity and rancor, occasioned by historical and everyday forms of wounding. To reconsider such sentiments as moral sentiments, Fassin sets up a distinction between *ressentiment* and resentment, showing us how potential and actual tensions in many parts of the world express a violent coupling, a confrontation between *ressentiment*, borne by those living in the aftermath of terrible historical injuries, who find their present locked at times in daily battles against others, for instance at the lower levels of sovereignty, whose social position is productive of deep resentments. What shades of gray might we offer to this tragic illumination?

The first thought I would offer Fassin is for us to think more carefully about what we understand as the counterconcept/s to *ressentiment*/resentment. I do not see this as external to an analysis of rancor but as part of its constitution. Intensities of pain may wax and wane, even as the injury is not "forgotten." Perhaps Fassin does not extract enough from Nietzsche's concept of forgetting. For Nietzsche forgetting is not a form of erasure but a possible way of protecting oneself from the poisonous secretions of a wound. As such one could remember and "forget" at the same time, comparable to what Veena Das has called "the work of time" (2000) in relation to violence.

Or from the angle of so-called realpolitik, if we consider figures like Mandela and Desmond Tutu, then I find a simple idea of "reconciliation" somewhat impoverished as the counterconcept to *ressentiment*. Here we are at a fork between ethics and politics. Not all political actions would count as *ethical*. Where would we draw the line that separates, or joins? In my own work in the anthropology of ethics (Singh 2011), I offer *agonistics* as the moving spectrum between ethics and politics. I try to analyze political "peacemakers," such as Gandhi in my case (Singh 2010), or as Mandela and Desmond Tutu would be here, as creative

agonists, and not only as reconcilers. One may attempt to dissolve an agon or to reconstitute it differently. Exploitation is a situation where no agon is possible, except perhaps in the mode of "hidden transcripts."

Once this situation of blatant exploitation shifts (never wholly so, but maybe to some extent in the postcolony), what forms does the agon take? This we might say is politics. And then what is ethics? Some would define politics as "war by other means," while ethics strives for peace ("a perpetual peace"). In contrast, in Nietzschean terms, ethics is not necessarily about peace, but about the fluctuation of the agon between nobler and baser forms. An attentive diagnostician, such as an ethnographer, may show how the agon is ennobled through political gestures (such as Gandhi or Mandela or Desmond Tutu attempt), or transmuted through aesthetics (including agonistic cultural forms such as hip-hop), or rendered more habitable, in imperceptible everyday forms.

Does rancor then debase agonistics? In Fassin's terms *ressentiment* seems to involve an element of endurance, while resentment is more reactive. Can we say which is nobler and which is baser? This would seem to be a deeply normative question. Our descriptions may be implicitly imbued with such judgments, even if we do not explicitly acknowledge them. Then again Fassin says that he wants to avoid Manichean dichotomies. He goes so far as to say that "unlike the philosophers . . . my stance is not normative." Ignoring the innumerable critiques of anthropological objectivity, is Fassin claiming an objective stance? I don't think "objective" would be the correct synonym here for nonnormative. More accurately, this essay expresses a tragic worldview that shows us the necessities and conditions within which hate and rancor are intensified, as with Fassin's analysis of the "positional suffering" of the French police. This cannot be equated with the suffering of those who bore the brunt of colonialism and apartheid, but the tragic element is the acknowledgement of degrees of powerlessness, even among the relatively powerful, such as the police. Fassin had done this differently, and equally richly, in his analysis of state power as a fluctuation between "compassion and repression" (2005).

Here, too, then, in the analysis of rancor, I am asking for some room for fluctuations. This may involve fluctuations within: for instance, can the genuine *ressentiment* of a victim turn into resentment with a subsequent generation, or a subsequent self? Or is the mode of injury relatively static? What other sentiments might these negative charges transmute into? Perhaps these transmutations could show us other routes (not only those of "forgiveness" or "reconciliation"), through which questions of nobility or generosity or "the good" (not necessarily as the "peaceful") may reenter the anthropology of ethics, even in the company of rancor and hatred. This is not to ask for a more "optimistic" analysis, or to suppress the invaluable question of rancor. Rather, while acknowledging these sentiments as moral, we might ask how they continue to become something else, for good and for ill, and how tragedy stands beside other genres of life, such as comedy and banality, and

how the affects of negation may be mixed with those of cohabitation.

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Contributing to the recent "ethical turn" in anthropology, this excellent article significantly extends Fassin's previous engagement with the field. In much of his earlier work, Fassin has sought to explore morality not as sphere onto its own, but instead in terms of its points of contact with political processes. This article furthers this agenda through an exploration of two distinct moral sentiments experienced in the wake of perceived political injustices, resentment and *ressentiment*.

As Fassin suggests, these sentiments reside in an ambivalent space between good and evil, right and wrong, and obligation and freedom. Each also arises in the wake of divergent political positionalities, contexts, and perspectives. Fassin suggests that these two differing moral sensibilities are only made properly visible once the complex points of contact between the political and moral processes at play in each are adequately distilled. In my estimation, it is this lattermost analytical intervention, as much as the ethnographic tracing of these particular moral sentiments in their specific social contexts, that constitutes the most powerful contribution of this article to the field.

Drawing from Adam Smith, Fassin explains that resentment is a form of moral indignation experienced by those who wish perpetrators to be made aware of the pain they have caused others in an effort to have them repent for their actions. In true Smithean fashion, such repentance is born of recognition on the part of the transgressor of the feelings of the victim who has been harmed by their actions. It is this special brand of "fellow-feeling" that potentiates possibilities for repairing previously severed social bonds arising from moral transgressions. What Fassin importantly adds to Smith's philosophical account is a foregrounding of the distinct power relations necessarily embedded within it. To feel resentment, Fassin argues, one must be in a place of relative privilege. One must be able to embody an expectation, even in the face of the violation itself, that justice can still be sought out and realized.

Ressentiment, in contrast, is characterized as a moral sentiment experienced by the powerless, weak, and dominated. It is associated with those victims of exploitation, marginalization, and violence who may indeed wish for justice but who have little hope that it can ever be actualized. On the affective side, *ressentiment* retains hostile sentiments, is not based on the need for mutual understanding between perpetrator and victim, and runs counter to consensual calls for

forgiveness and reconciliation. On the political side, it generates a will not to forgive, not to forget, and not to pardon, even in the face of a wrongdoer's repentance.

In bringing our attention to important points of articulation between political and moral dimensions of resentment and *ressentiment*, Fassin foregrounds the existence of asymmetries of moral perspective that cannot simply be set aside, washed away, flattened out, or made equal. This is not a call to justify or apologize for those who may hold such asymmetrical moral sensibilities. Nor is it an argument to dispense with efforts at reconciliation, forgiveness, and apology. It is instead a powerful reminder that social scientific work on morality must be careful to avoid the erasure of such distinctive moral perspectives and the differing political consequences they bring to bear on social life. For some members of society, a moral orientation to forgiveness calls for a shared orientation to possible futures in which we can all go on "as if nothing ever happened." For others, such an ethic of forgiveness is nothing but a morally problematic erasure entailing an unwanted forgetting of injustices done.

Greatly inspired by this piece, I am left, however, with two questions/concerns. First, while Fassin chooses to explore each of these sentiments in distinctive social contexts—resentment in the context over policing in France and *ressentiment* in the wake of efforts at truth and reconciliation in post-apartheid South Africa—is it possible that both sentiments are complexly at play within each locale? Or perhaps even in the perspectives of particular individuals as they move through differing contexts, situations, and interactions through time?

A second and perhaps not unrelated concern is tied to my desire to hear more about how Fassin situates his approach in relation to other recent anthropological attempts to examine the political life of morality and the moral life of the political. In particular, I am thinking here of Jarrett Zigon's (2007, 2011) work on "moral breakdowns" and "moral assemblages" in post-Soviet Russia, James Faubion's (2011) views on the composite nature of ethical subjects and the transformative possibilities of "organizationally open" systems, and Cheryl Mattingly's (2010) attempt to trace the paradoxical and ethical nature of hope in the context of African American families struggling with issues of poverty, illness, disability, and pain.

Reply

My publications on AIDS in South Africa and law enforcement in France having sometimes exposed me to adverse reactions and even personal attacks, I welcome the generous and insightful comments gathered here about a text that has for empirical source the same material, although analyzed from an entirely new theoretical perspective. As the discussants rightly point out, my endeavor is part of a broader project, which consists in exploring the frontiers between philosophy and anthropology, more specifically at the interface of morality and politics. This exploration supposes, as suggested by Thomas Brudholm, a form of inductive approach in which ethnography comes first, revealing an unsettling question that philosophical thinking illuminates but about which anthropology has the last word. The dialogue between the two disciplines therefore implies the recognition of their distinct intellectual enterprises. Whereas philosophers should do better than find in the anthropological corpus illustrations for their arguments about relativism, anthropologists should expect more from philosophy than conceptual frames they could place on a social reality. In the present case, my reflection started with the disturbing observation of apparently similar negative affects in two entirely different historical and sociological contexts, for which Jean Améry's meditation on *ressentiment* offered a possible clue.

The clue was of two kinds. First, against the contemporary tendency to value the apology of perpetrators and the forgiveness of victims as a necessary step toward reconciliation, at the risk of forgetting the past, renouncing the work of justice and disqualifying manifestations of rancor, a space was opened for the expression of a moral sentiment based on the refusal to pardon and the persistence of memory: hence, resentment and *ressentiment* could be acknowledged. Second, against a common confusion between the various significations of this moral emotion, which contributed to make it both incomprehensible and illegitimate, a possible differentiation was introduced depending on the presence of a historical wound: *ressentiment* was thus separated from resentment. It is therefore correct to assert, in Amelie Rorty's words, that my "'political anthropology of morality' implicitly delivers a political moral." It does so through the rehabilitation of an emotion not only discredited but also repressed in the current moral economy of reconciliation, and through the legitimacy attributed to a sentiment grounded in an experience of actual injury, as opposed to diffuse discontent. Here, one should note that, following Améry, the implicit moral hierarchy I am proposing between resentment and *ressentiment*—or between Malcolm and Fyodor in Amelie Rorty's evocative interpretation—is opposite to what is usually assumed, since, in the Smithian tradition, the former is generally conceived as the normal and useful response to injustice, whereas, according to the Nietzschean theory, the latter is often seen as the negative and sterile reaction of the dominated. *Ressentiment*, I contend, is not the dark side of resentment, its pathological or deviant form, which would only reinforce the powerlessness of the powerless. Such a view ultimately seems to have for sole function to stigmatize the dominated, instead of rendering intelligible some of their reactions otherwise incomprehensible.

Indeed, my claim is less normative than analytical. The crucial point is for me to recognize the existence of resentment and *ressentiment* while distinguishing their meaning and implications. The first part of this project—recognition—does not pose too much problem, but the second one—distinc-

tion—raises more difficulties, which are rightly identified by my commentators. As Michael Lambek notes, my intention in providing this differentiation is to use the resources of language to refine our understanding of ethical questions, and for instance, as he suggests, to think about the sort of interaction and perhaps emulation generated between the *ressentiment* of some and the resentment of others: the black South Africans and the French youth of the projects, on one side, the white South Africans, especially the most relegated, and the French police officers, on the other side. Whereas the former correspond to historically dominated groups, the latter cannot be qualified as dominant and should rather be viewed as socially downgraded. *Ressentiment* and resentment often fuel each other in these situations, sometimes leading to violence such as hate crimes or urban disorders in my two case studies.

But, observes Thomas Brudholm, "the interesting question is on what grounds and for what purpose the distinction is made" between resentment and *ressentiment*. To answer this important question, I will start with the understandable doubt he expresses about my interpretation of Sylvia Dlomo's case, and one could also have the same interrogation concerning my reading of Desmond Tutu's story. Of the black woman tragically confronted to the cynicism of the murderers of her son during the Truth and Reconciliation Commission hearings, I state that she experiences *ressentiment*, while of the white woman who admirably forgives the member of a liberation movement who has injured her and killed several of her friends during an attack, I assert that she could have experienced anger but not *ressentiment*. This can be seen as highly debatable if one thinks in terms of psychological subjectivity: what can I know about what these women feel and endure? However the distinction I propose is of another nature: it is between two political subjectivities. I argue that there is a political difference to be made when the individual who is a victim of violence inscribes this violence in a lifetime experience of inferiorization, humiliation, and oppression, not because she would suffer more—who could tell?—but because the meaning she can give to violence and more generally the way she can make sense of the world is distinct.

The two case studies exemplify and perhaps radicalize my assertion, since, for South African blacks, *ressentiment* is the result of an obvious historical injustice (the injury is profound and indisputable), whereas for French police officers, resentment is the product of a constructed sociological position (the injury is surely questionable and partially imaginary). These contrasted situations help me establish two ideal-typical frames. However, as Jason Throop suggests, "is it possible that both sentiments are complexly at play within each locale," even among given individuals "as they move through differing contexts, situations, and interactions?" In a similar vein, Bhrigupati Singh asks, "Can the genuine *ressentiment* of a victim turn into resentment with a subsequent generation, or a subsequent self?" and "What other sentiments might these negative charges transmute into?" I consider these remarks and

interrogations relevant. More generally, I am quite sympathetic to this call for more flexibility, and I do credit anthropology for its capacity to provide complexity in our understanding of societies and lives. Yet I believe that it is necessary to draw lines before blurring them, and this is what I attempt to do here. Perhaps more than in flexibility and complexity, though, I am interested in possibilities. I am not affirming that all South African blacks experience *ressentiment* and that all French police officers express resentment, as some have caricatured my analyses in the past. I am simply arguing that both moral emotions are in the realm of possibilities and that, when they exist, they need recognition and call for interpretation, instead of being ignored or disqualified. But I am also sensitive to Jason Throop's concern for "hope" and Bhrigupati Singh's attention to "cohabitation," and in both my books on South Africa and France I have left these perspectives open and even given ethnographic evidence for them.

One last difficult question remains, formulated by Michael Lambek, "how to simultaneously acknowledge and critique the positions of people . . . we agree or disagree with." In the present case, how to articulate the moral justifications provided by the agents, in good or bad faith, and the moral interpretation elaborated by the researcher? This dialectical tension has recently been the matter of heated debates in sociology, perhaps more than in anthropology. Significantly, a shift has occurred during the past 2 decades from a position considering that the role of the social scientists was to unveil truths hidden from the agents to a position viewing the former as mere translators into scholarly language of the truths expressed by the latter. I contend that one does not have to choose between the blindness and the lucidity of the agents. Instead, one should try to account as faithfully as possible for their side of the story while exploring other sides that they wittingly or unconsciously disregard or misrepresent. This is what I have done here, but with a substantial difference between the two case studies of which I was perhaps not completely aware. For the South African blacks, indeed, my interpretation of their condition reinforces their justifications by displaying the historical reasons for their *ressentiment*: the memory and legacy of apartheid. For the French police officers, by contrast, my interpretation of their situation contradicts their justifications by showing the falseness of the arguments on which they ground their resentment: the hostility of the public and the leniency of the judges. I think that, rather than betraying my own bias, this difference reflects the distinction I intended to make between the two concepts.

—Didier Fassin

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Introduction: Feel Your Way

> Every day of every year, swarms of illegal immigrants and bogus
> asylum seekers invade Britain by any means available to them . . .
> Why? They are only seeking the easy comforts and free benefits in
> Soft Touch Britain. All funded by YOU – The British Taxpayer!
> (British National Front Poster)[1]

How does a nation come to be imagined as having a 'soft touch'? How does
this 'having' become a form of 'being', or a national attribute? In *The
Cultural Politics of Emotion*, I explore how emotions work to shape the 'sur-
faces' of individual and collective bodies. Bodies take the shape of the very
contact they have with objects and others. My analysis proceeds by reading
texts that circulate in the public domain, which work by aligning subjects with
collectives by attributing 'others' as the 'source' of our feelings. In this quote
from the British National Front, 'the others', who are named as illegal immi-
grants and bogus asylum seekers, threaten to overwhelm and swamp the
nation. This is, of course, a familiar narrative, and like all familiar narratives,
it deserves close and careful reading. The narrative works through othering;
the 'illegal immigrants' and 'bogus asylum seekers' are those who are 'not us',
and who in not being us, endanger what is ours. Such others threaten to take
away from what 'you' have, as the legitimate subject of the nation, as the one
who is the true recipient of national benefits. The narrative invites the reader
to adopt the 'you' through working on emotions: becoming this 'you' would
mean developing a certain rage against these illegitimate others, who are rep-
resented as 'swarms' in the nation. Indeed, to feel love for the nation, whereby
love is an investment that should be returned (you are 'the taxpayer'), is also
to feel injured by these others, who are 'taking' what is yours.

It is not the case, however, that anybody within the nation could inhabit
this 'you'. These short sentences depend on longer histories of articulation,

which secure the white subject as sovereign in the nation, at the same time as they generate effects in the alignment of 'you' with the national body. In other words, the 'you' implicitly evokes a 'we', a group of subjects who can identify themselves with the injured nation in this performance of personal injury. Within the British National Front, the 'we' of the nation is only available to white Aryans: 'We will reinstate the values of separatism to our racial kindred. We will teach the youth that one's country is the family, the past, the sacred race itself . . . We live in a nation that is historically Aryan'.[2] This alignment of family, history and race is powerful, and works to transform whiteness into a familial tie, into a form of racial kindred that recognises all non-white others as strangers, as 'bodies out of place' (Ahmed 2000).[3] The narrative is addressed to white Aryans, and equates the vulnerability of the white nation with the vulnerability of the white body. 'YOU' will not be soft! Or will you?

What is so interesting in this narrative is how 'soft touch' becomes a national character. This attribution is not specific to fascist discourses. In broader public debates about asylum in the United Kingdom, one of the most common narratives is that Britain is a 'soft touch': others try and 'get into' the nation because they can have a life with 'easy comforts'.[4] The British Government has transformed the narrative of 'the soft touch' into an imperative: it has justified the tightening of asylum policies on the grounds that 'Britain will not be a soft touch'. Indeed, the metaphor of 'soft touch' suggests that the nation's borders and defences are like skin; they are soft, weak, porous and easily shaped or even bruised by the proximity of others. It suggests that the nation is made vulnerable to abuse by its very openness to others. The soft nation is too emotional, too easily moved by the demands of others, and too easily seduced into assuming that claims for asylum, as testimonies of injury, are narratives of truth. To be a 'soft touch nation' is to be taken in by the bogus: to 'take in' is to be 'taken in'. The demand is that the nation should seal itself from others, if it is to act on behalf of its citizens, rather than react to the claims of immigrants and other others. The implicit demand is for a nation that is less emotional, less open, less easily moved, one that is 'hard', or 'tough'. The use of metaphors of 'softness' and 'hardness' shows us how emotions become attributes of collectives, which get constructed as 'being' through 'feeling'. Such attributes are of course gendered: the soft national body is a feminised body, which is 'penetrated' or 'invaded' by others.

It is significant that the word 'passion' and the word 'passive' share the same root in the Latin word for 'suffering' (*passio*). To be passive is to be enacted upon, as a negation that is already felt as suffering. The fear of passivity is tied to the fear of emotionality, in which weakness is defined in terms of a tendency to be shaped by others. Softness is narrated as a proneness to

injury. The association between passion and passivity is instructive. It works as a reminder of how 'emotion' has been viewed as 'beneath' the faculties of thought and reason. To be emotional is to have one's judgement affected: it is to be reactive rather than active, dependent rather than autonomous. Feminist philosophers have shown us how the subordination of emotions also works to subordinate the feminine and the body (Spelman 1989; Jaggar 1996). Emotions are associated with women, who are represented as 'closer' to nature, ruled by appetite, and less able to transcend the body through thought, will and judgement.

We can see from this language that evolutionary thinking has been crucial to how emotions are understood: emotions get narrated as a sign of 'our' pre-history, and as a sign of how the primitive persists in the present. The Darwinian model of emotions suggests that emotions are not only 'beneath' but 'behind' the man/human, as a sign of an earlier and more primitive time. As Darwin puts it:

> With mankind some expressions, such as the bristling of the hair under the influence of extreme terror, or the uncovering of the teeth under that of furious rage, can hardly be understood, except on the belief that man once existed in a much lower and animal-like condition. (Darwin 1904: 13–14)

Such an evolutionary model allows us to return to the 'risk' of emotions posited through the attribution of 'soft touch' as a national characteristic. The risk of being a 'soft touch' for the nation, and for the national subject, is not only the risk of becoming feminine, but also of becoming 'less white', by allowing those who are recognised as racially other to penetrate the surface of the body. Within such a narrative, becoming less white would involve moving backwards in time, such that one would come to resemble a more primitive form of social life, or a 'lower and animal like condition'.

The hierarchy between emotion and thought/reason gets displaced, of course, into a hierarchy between emotions: some emotions are 'elevated' as signs of cultivation, whilst others remain 'lower' as signs of weakness. The story of evolution is narrated not only as the story of the triumph of reason, but of the ability to control emotions, and to experience the 'appropriate' emotions at different times and places (Elias 1978). Within contemporary culture, emotions may even be represented as good or better than thought, but only insofar as they are re-presented as a form of intelligence, as 'tools' that can be used by subjects in the project of life and career enhancement (Goleman 1995). If good emotions are cultivated, and are worked on and towards, then they remain defined against uncultivated or unruly emotions, which frustrate the formation of the competent self. Those who are 'other'

to me or us, or those that threaten to make us other, remain the source of bad feeling in this model of emotional intelligence. It is not difficult to see how emotions are bound up with the securing of social hierarchy: emotions become attributes of bodies as a way of transforming what is 'lower' or 'higher' into bodily traits.

So emotionality as a claim *about* a subject or a collective is clearly dependent on relations of power, which endow 'others' with meaning and value. In this book, I do not want to think about emotionality as a characteristic of bodies, whether individual or collective. In fact, I want to reflect on the processes whereby 'being emotional' comes to be seen as a characteristic of some bodies and not others, in the first place. In order to do this, we need to consider how emotions operate to 'make' and 'shape' bodies as forms of action, which also involve orientations towards others. Emotions, for the British National Front, may pose a danger to the national body of appearing soft. But the narrative itself is an emotional one: the reading of others as bogus is a reaction to the presence of others. *Hardness is not the absence of emotion, but a different emotional orientation towards others.* The hard white body is shaped by its reactions: the rage against others surfaces as a body that stands apart or keeps its distance from others. We shouldn't look for emotions 'in' soft bodies.[5] Emotions shape the very surfaces of bodies, which take shape through the repetition of actions over time, as well as through orientations towards and away from others. Indeed, attending to emotions might show us how all actions are reactions, in the sense that what we do is shaped by the contact we have with others. In Spinoza's terms, emotions shape what bodies can do, as 'the modifications of the body by which the power of action on the body is increased or diminished' (Spinoza 1959: 85).

So rather than asking 'What are emotions?', I will ask, 'What do emotions do?' In asking this question, I will not offer a singular theory of emotion, or one account of the work that emotions do. Rather, I will track how emotions circulate between bodies, examining how they 'stick' as well as move. In this introduction, my task will be to situate my account of the 'cultural politics' of emotion within a very partial account of the history of thinking on emotions. I will not offer a full review of this history, which would be an impossible task.[6] It is important to indicate here that even if emotions have been subordinated to other faculties, they have still remained at the centre of intellectual history. As a reader of this history, I have been overwhelmed by how much 'emotions' have been a 'sticking point' for philosophers, cultural theorists, psychologists, sociologists, as well as scholars from a range of other disciplines. This is not surprising: what is relegated to the margins is often, as we know from deconstruction, right at the centre of thought itself. In the face of this history, my task is a modest one: to show how my thinking has been informed by my contact with some work on emotions.

EMOTIONS AND OBJECTS

One way of reflecting on this history of thinking about emotion is to consider the debate about the relation between emotion, bodily sensation and cognition.[7] One could characterise a significant 'split' in theories of emotion in terms of whether emotions are tied primarily to bodily sensations or to cognition. The former view is often ascribed to Descartes and David Hume. It would also be well-represented by the work of William James, who has the following formulation: 'The bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact . . . and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion' (James 1890: 449). Emotion is the feeling of bodily change. The immediacy of the 'is' suggests that emotions do not involve processes of thought, attribution or evaluation: we feel fear, for example, *because* our heart is racing, our skin is sweating. A cognitivist view would be represented by Aristotle, and by a number of thinkers who follow him (Nussbaum 2001: 10). Such theorists suggest that emotions involve appraisals, judgements, attitudes or a 'specific manner of apprehending the world' (Sartre 1962: 9), which are irreducible to bodily sensations. Some theorists have described emotions as being judgements (Solomon 1995), whilst others might point to how they involve judgements: the emotion of anger, for example, implies a judgement that something is bad, although we can be wrong in our judgement (Spelman 1989: 266). Of course, many theorists suggest that emotions involve sensations or bodily feeling as well as forms of cognition. But as Alison M. Jaggar has suggested, the shift towards a more cognitive approach has often been at the expense of an attention to bodily sensations (Spelman 1989: 170). Or when emotions are theorised as being about cognition as well as sensation, then these still tend to be presented as different aspects of emotion (Jaggar 1996: 170).

To begin a rethinking of the relation between bodily sensation, emotion and judgement we can turn to Descartes' 'The Passions of the Soul'. Whilst this little book may be full of problematic distinctions between mind and body, its observations on emotions are very suggestive. Descartes suggests that objects do not excite diverse passions because they are diverse, but because of the diverse ways in which they may harm or help us (Descartes 1985: 349). This is an intriguing formulation. Some commentators have suggested that Descartes argues that emotions are reducible to sensations insofar as they are caused by objects (Brentano 2003: 161; Greenspan 2003: 265). But Descartes offers a critique of the idea that objects have causal properties, suggesting that we don't have feelings for objects because of the nature of objects. Feelings instead take the 'shape' of the contact we have with objects (see Chapter 1). As he argues, we do not love and hate because objects are good or bad, but rather because they seem 'beneficial' or 'harmful' (Descartes

1985: 350). Whether I perceive something as beneficial or harmful clearly depends upon how I am affected by something. This dependence opens up a gap in the determination of feeling: whether something is beneficial or harmful involves thought and evaluation, at the same time that it is 'felt' by the body. The process of attributing an object as being or not being beneficial or harmful, which may become translated into good or bad, clearly involves reading the contact we have with objects in a certain way. As I argue in Chapter 1, whether something feels good or bad *already* involves a process of reading, in the very attribution of significance. Contact involves the subject, as well as histories that come before the subject. If emotions are shaped by contact with objects, rather than being caused by objects, then emotions are not simply 'in' the subject or the object. This does not mean that emotions are not read as being 'resident' in subjects or objects: I will show how objects are often read as the cause of emotions in the very process of taking an orientation towards them.

If the contact with an object generates feeling, then emotion and sensation cannot be easily separated. A common way of describing the relation between them is as a form of company: pleasure and pain become companions of love and hate, for example, in Aristotle's formulation (2003: 6, see also Spinoza 1959: 85). The idea of 'companions' does not do the trick precisely, given the implication that sensation and emotion can part company. Instead, I want to suggest that the distinction between sensation and emotion can only be analytic, and as such, is premised on the reification of a concept. We can reflect on the word 'impression', used by David Hume in his work on emotion (Hume 1964: 75). To form an impression might involve acts of perception and cognition as well as an emotion. But forming an impression also depends on how objects impress upon us. An impression can be an effect on the subject's feelings ('she made an impression'). It can be a belief ('to be under an impression'). It can be an imitation or an image ('to create an impression'). Or it can be a mark on the surface ('to leave an impression'). *We need to remember the 'press' in an impression.* It allows us to associate the experience of having an emotion with the very affect of one surface upon another, an affect that leaves its mark or trace. So not only do I have an impression of others, but they also leave me with an impression; they impress me, and impress upon me. I will use the idea of 'impression' as it allows me to avoid making analytical distinctions between bodily sensation, emotion and thought as if they could be 'experienced' as distinct realms of human 'experience'.

So how do we form such impressions? Rethinking the place of the object of feeling will allow us to reconsider the relation between sensation and emotion. Within phenomenology, the turn away from what Elizabeth V. Spelman calls the 'Dumb View' of emotions (Spelman 1989: 265), has

involved an emphasis on intentionality. Emotions are intentional in the sense that they are 'about' something: they involve a direction or orientation towards an object (Parkinson 1995: 8). The 'aboutness' of emotions means they involve a stance on the world, or a way of apprehending the world. Now, I want to bring this model of the object as 'about-ness' into dialogue with the model of contact implicit in Descartes.[8] Emotions are both about objects, which they hence shape, and are also shaped by contact with objects. Neither of these ways of approaching an object presumes that the object has a material existence; objects in which I am 'involved' can also be imagined (Heller 1979: 12). For example, I can have a memory of something, and that memory might trigger a feeling (Pugmire 1998: 7). The memory can be the object of my feeling in both senses: the feeling is shaped by contact with the memory, and also involves an orientation towards what is remembered. So I might feel pain when I remember this or that, and in remembering this or that, I might attribute what is remembered as being painful.

Let's use another example. The example that is often used in the psychological literature on emotions is a child and a bear.[9] The child sees the bear and is afraid. The child runs away. Now, the 'Dumb View' would be that the bear makes the child afraid, and that the bodily symptoms of fear are automatic (pulse rate, sweating, and so on). Functionalist models of emotion, which draw on evolutionary theory, might say that the fear has a function: to protect the child from danger, to allow survival. Fear in this situation could be an *instinctual reaction* that has enhanced successful adaptation and thus selection.[10] Fear would also be an action; fear would even be 'about' what it leads the child to do.[11] But the story, even in its 'bear bones', is not so simple. Why is the child afraid of the bear? The child must 'already know' the bear is fearsome. This decision is not necessarily made by her, and it might not even be dependent on past experiences. This could be a 'first time' encounter, and the child still runs for it. But what is she running from? What does she see when she sees the bear? We have an image of the bear as an animal *to be feared*, as an image that is shaped by cultural histories and memories. When we encounter the bear, we already have an impression of the risks of the encounter, as an impression that is felt on the surface of the skin. This knowledge is bodily, certainly: the child might not need time to think before she runs for it. But the 'immediacy' of the reaction is not itself a sign of a lack of mediation. It is not that the bear *is* fearsome, 'on its own', as it were. It is fearsome *to* someone or somebody. So fear is not in the child, let alone in the bear, but is a matter of how child and bear come into contact. This contact is shaped by past histories of contact, unavailable in the present, which allow the bear to be apprehended as fearsome. The story does not, despite this, inevitably lead to the same ending. Another child, another bear, and we might even have another story.

It is not just that we might have an impression of bears, but 'this bear' also makes an impression, and leaves an impression. Fear shapes the surfaces of bodies in relation to objects. Emotions are relational: they involve (re)actions or relations of 'towardness' or 'awayness' in relation to such objects. The bear becomes the object in both senses: we have a contact with an object, and an orientation towards that object. To be more specific, the 'aboutness' of fear involves a reading of contact: the child reads the contact as dangerous, which involves apprehending the bear as fearsome. We can note also that the 'reading' then identifies the bear as the cause of the feeling. The child becomes fearful, and the bear becomes fearsome: the attribution of feeling to an object (I feel afraid because you are fearsome) is an effect of the encounter, which moves the subject away from the object. Emotions involve such affective forms of reorientation.

Of course, if we change the bear to a horse, we might even get to the father.[12] If the object of feeling both shapes and is shaped by emotions, then the object of feeling is never simply before the subject. How the object impresses (upon) us may depend on histories that remain alive insofar as they have already left their impressions. The object may stand in for other objects, or may be proximate to other objects. Feelings may stick to some objects, and slide over others.[13] In this book, I offer an analysis of affective economies, where feelings do not reside in subjects or objects, but are produced as effects of circulation (see Chapter 2). The circulation of objects allows us to think about the 'sociality' of emotion.

INSIDE OUT AND OUTSIDE IN

What do I mean by the sociality of emotion? Before I can answer this question, we must firstly register what might seem too obvious: the everyday language of emotion is based on the presumption of interiority. If I was thinking about emotions, I would probably assume that I need to look inwards, asking myself, 'How do I feel?' Such a model of emotion as interiority is crucial to psychology. Indeed, the emergence of psychology as a discipline had significant consequences for theories of emotion: by becoming an 'object lesson' for psychology, emotions have been psychologised (White 1993: 29). In a psychological model, I have feelings, and they are mine. As K. T. Strongman states, 'Above all, emotion is centred internally, in subjective feelings' (Strongman 2003: 3). I may express my feelings: I may laugh, cry, or shake my head. Once what is inside has got out, when I have expressed my feelings in this way, then my feelings also become yours, and you may respond to them.[14] If you sympathise, then we might have 'fellow-feeling' (Denzin 1984: 148). If you don't understand, we might feel alienated from each other

(Scheff 1994: 3).[15] The logic here is that I have feelings, which *then* move outwards towards objects and others, and which might then return to me. I will call this the 'inside out' model of emotions.

In critiquing this model, I am joining sociologists and anthropologists who have argued that emotions should not be regarded as psychological states, but as social and cultural practices (Lutz and Abu-Lughod 1990; White 1993: 29; Rosaldo 1984: 138, 141; Hochschild 1983: 5; Kemper 1978: 1; Katz 1999:2; Williams 2001: 73; Collins 1990: 27). I want to offer a model of sociality of emotion, which is distinct from this literature, as well as informed by it. Take Durkheim's classic account of emotions. He argues in *The Rules of Sociological Method* that sociology is about recognising constraint: 'Most of our ideas and our tendencies are not developed by ourselves but come to us from without. How can they become a part of us except by imposing themselves upon us?' (Durkheim 1966: 4). Here, the sociological realm is defined as the imposition of 'the without' on the individual subject. This demarcation of 'the sociological' becomes a theory of emotion as a social form, rather than individual self-expression. Durkheim considers the rise of emotion in crowds, suggesting that such 'great movements' of feeling, 'do not originate in any one of the particular individual consciousnesses' (Durkheim 1966: 4). Here, the individual is no longer the origin of feeling; feeling itself comes from without. Durkheim's later work on religion suggests that such feelings do not remain 'without'. As he notes: 'This force must also penetrate us and organise itself within us; it thus becomes an integral part of our being and by that very fact this is elevated and magnified' (Durkheim 1976: 209). For Durkheim, then, emotion is not what comes from the individual body, but is what holds or binds the social body together (Collins 1990: 27).

This argument about the sociality of emotions takes a similar form to the psychological one, though with an obvious change of direction. The 'inside out' model has become an 'outside in' model. Both assume the objectivity of the very distinction between inside and outside, the individual and the social, and the 'me' and the 'we'. Rather than emotions being understood as coming from within and moving outwards, emotions are assumed to *come from without and move inward*. An 'outside in' model is also evident in approaches to 'crowd psychology', where it is assumed that the crowd *has* feelings, and that the individual gets drawn into the crowd by feeling the crowd's feelings as its own. As Graham Little puts it: 'Emotions run the other way, too: sometimes starting "out there" – and Diana's death is a prime example of this – but linking up with something in us so that we feel drawn in and become personally involved' (Little 1999: 4). The example of Diana's death is useful. An outside in model might suggest that feelings of grief existed in the crowd, and only then got taken on by individuals, a reading which has led to accusations that such grief was inauthentic, a sign of being 'taken in'.[16]

Indeed the 'outside in' model is problematic precisely because it assumes that emotions are something that 'we have'. The crowd becomes like the individual, the one who 'has feelings'. Feelings become a form of social presence rather than self-presence. In my model of sociality of emotions, I suggest that emotions create the very effect of the surfaces and boundaries that allow us to distinguish an inside and an outside in the first place. So emotions are not simply something 'I' or 'we' have. Rather, it is through emotions, or how we respond to objects and others, that surfaces or boundaries are made: the 'I' and the 'we' are shaped by, and even take the shape of, contact with others. To return to my argument in the previous section, the surfaces of bodies 'surface' as an effect of the impressions left by others. I will show how the surfaces of collective as well as individual bodies take shape through such impressions. In suggesting that emotions create the very effect of an inside and an outside, I am not then simply claiming that emotions are psychological *and* social, individual *and* collective. My model refuses the abbreviation of the 'and'. Rather, I suggest that emotions are crucial to the very constitution of the psychic and the social as objects, a process which suggests that the 'objectivity' of the psychic and social is an effect rather than a cause.

In other words, emotions are not 'in' either the individual or the social, but produce the very surfaces and boundaries that allow the individual and the social to be delineated as if they are objects. My analysis will show how emotions create the very surfaces and boundaries that allow all kinds of objects to be delineated. The objects of emotion take shape as effects of circulation. In suggesting emotions circulate, I am not offering a model of emotion as contagion (see Izard 1977: 106). The model of emotional contagion, which is often influenced by Silvan S. Tomkins' work, is useful in its emphasis on how emotions are not simply located in the individual, but move between bodies.[17] After all, the word 'contagion' derives from the Latin for 'contact'. In this model, it is the emotion itself that passes: I feel sad, because you feel sad; I am ashamed by your shame, and so on. In suggesting that emotions pass in this way, the model of 'emotional contagion' risks transforming emotion into a property, as something that one has, and can then pass on, as if what passes on is the same thing. We might note that the risk is not only a theoretical one. I have experienced numerous social occasions where I assumed other people were feeling what I was feeling, and that the feeling was, as it were, 'in the room', only to find out that others had felt quite differently. I would describe such spaces as 'intense'. Shared feelings are at stake, and seem to surround us, like a thickness in the air, or an atmosphere. But these feelings not only *heighten tension*, they are also *in tension*. Emotions in their very intensity involve miscommunication, such that even when we feel we have the same feeling, we don't necessarily have the same relationship to the feeling. Given that shared feelings are not about feeling the same

feeling, or feeling-in-common, I suggest that it is the objects of emotion that circulate, rather than emotion as such. My argument still explores how emotions can move through the movement or circulation of objects. Such objects become sticky, or saturated with affect, as sites of personal and social tension.

Emotions are after all moving, even if they do not simply move between us. We should note that the word 'emotion' comes from the Latin, *emovere*, referring to 'to move, to move out'. Of course, emotions are not only about movement, they are also about attachments or about what connects us to this or that. The relationship between movement and attachment is instructive. What moves us, what makes us feel, is also that which holds us in place, or gives us a dwelling place. Hence movement does not cut the body off from the 'where' of its inhabitance, but connects bodies to other bodies: attachment takes place through movement, through being moved by the proximity of others. Movement may affect different others differently: indeed, as I will suggest throughout this book, emotions may involve 'being moved' for some precisely by fixing others as 'having' certain characteristics. The circulation of objects of emotion involves the transformation of others into objects of feeling.

My argument about the circulation of objects draws on psychoanalysis and Marxism (see Chapter 2). I consider, for example, that the subject does not always know how she feels: the subject is not self-present and emotions are an effect of this splitting of experience (Terada 2001: 30). From Freud onwards, this lack of self-presence is articulated as 'the unconscious'. Working with Freudian psychoanalysis, I will show how objects get displaced, and consider the role of repression in what makes objects 'sticky'. But I also suggest that the lack of presence does not always return to the subject, or to the 'scene' of trauma (castration), upon which much psychoanalytic theory rests. Drawing on Marx, I argue that emotions accumulate over time, as a form of affective value. Objects only seem to have such value, by an erasure of these histories, as histories of production and labour. But whilst Marx suggests that emotions are erased by the value of things (the suffering of the worker's body is not visible in commodity form), I focus on how emotions are produced.[18] It is not so much emotions that are erased, as if they were already there, but the processes of production or the 'making' of emotions. In other words, 'feelings' become 'fetishes', qualities that seem to reside in objects, only through an erasure of the history of their production and circulation.

Holding together these different theoretical traditions is a challenge.[19] There is no glue, perhaps other than a concern for 'what sticks'. Indeed, the question, 'What sticks?', is one that is posed throughout this study. It is a reposing of other, perhaps more familiar, questions: Why is social transfor-

mation so difficult to achieve? Why are relations of power so intractable and enduring, even in the face of collective forms of resistance? This book attempts to answer such questions partially by offering an account of how we become invested in social norms. The work to which I am most indebted is the work of feminist and queer scholars who have attended to how emotions can attach us to the very conditions of our subordination (Butler 1997b; Berlant 1997; Brown 1995). Such scholars have shown us how social forms (such as the family, heterosexuality, the nation, even civilisation itself) are effects of repetition. As Judith Butler suggests, it is through the repetition of norms that worlds materialise, and that 'boundary, fixity and surface' are produced (Butler 1993: 9). Such norms appear as forms of life only through the concealment of the work of this repetition. Feminist and queer scholars have shown us that emotions 'matter' for politics; emotions show us how power shapes the very surface of bodies as well as worlds. So in a way, we do 'feel our way'.

This analysis of how we 'feel our way' approaches emotion as a form of cultural politics or world making. My argument about the cultural politics of emotions is developed not only as a critique of the psychologising and privatisation of emotions,[20] but also as a critique of a model of social structure that neglects the emotional intensities, which allow such structures to be reified as forms of being. Attention to emotions allows us to address the question of how subjects become *invested* in particular structures such that their demise is felt as a kind of living death. We can see this investment at work in my opening quote: the nation becomes the object of love precisely by associating the proximity with others with loss, injury and theft (see also Chapter 6). The presence of non-white others is even associated by the British National Front with death: 'Britain is Dying: How long are you just going to watch?'[21] To become the 'you' addressed by the narrative is to feel rage against those who threaten not only to take the 'benefits' of the nation away, but also to destroy 'the nation', which would signal the end of life itself. Emotions provide a script, certainly: you become the 'you' if you accept the invitation to align yourself with the nation, and against those others who threaten to take the nation away.

THE EMOTIONALITY OF TEXTS

But there is still more. For a book on emotions, which argues that emotions cannot be separated from bodily sensations, this book may seem very orientated towards texts.[22] I offer close readings of texts, with a concern in particular with metonymy and metaphor: my argument will suggest that 'figures of speech' are crucial to the emotionality of texts. In particular, I examine

how different 'figures' get stuck together, and how sticking is dependent on past histories of association that often 'work' through concealment. The emotionality of texts is one way of describing how texts are 'moving', or how they generate effects.

I will also consider the emotionality of texts in terms of the way in which texts name or perform different emotions. Naming emotions often involves differentiating between the subject and object of feeling. When we name an emotion we are not simply naming something that exists 'in here'. So a text may claim, 'the nation mourns'. We would pause here, of course, and suggest the 'inside out/outside in' model of emotion is at work: the nation becomes 'like the individual', a feeling subject, or a subject that 'has feelings'. But we would also need to ask: *What does it do to say the nation mourns?* This is a claim both that the nation has a feeling (the nation is the subject of feeling), but also that generates the nation as the object of 'our feeling' (we might mourn on behalf of the nation). The feeling does simply exist before the utterance, but becomes real as an effect, shaping different kinds of actions and orientations. To say, 'the nation mourns' is to generate the nation, *as if it were a mourning subject*. The 'nation' becomes a shared 'object of feeling' through the orientation that is taken towards it. As such, emotions are performative (see Chapter 4) and they involve speech acts (Chapter 5), which depend on past histories, at the same time as they generate effects.

When we talk about the displacement between objects of emotion, we also need to consider the circulation of words for emotion. For example, the word 'mourns' might get attached to some subjects (some bodies more than others represent the nation in mourning), and it might get attached to some objects (some losses more than others may count as losses for this nation). The word 'mourns' might get linked to other emotion words: anger, hatred, love. The replacement of one word for an emotion with another word produces a narrative. Our love might create the condition for our grief, our loss could become the condition for our hate, and so on (see Chapter 6). The emotion does its work by 'reading' the object: for example, others might get read as the 'reason' for the loss of the object of love, a reading which easily converts feelings of grief into feelings of hate (see Chapter 7).

So I am not discussing emotion as being 'in' texts, but as effects of the very naming of emotions,[23] which often works through attributions of causality. The different words for emotion do different things precisely because they involve specific orientations towards the objects that are identified as their cause. As such, my archive is full of words. But the words are not simply cut off from bodies, or other signs of life. I suggest that the work of emotion involves the 'sticking' of signs to bodies: for example, when others become 'hateful', then actions of 'hate' are directed against them (see Chapter 2). My archive is perhaps not 'an archive of feelings' to use Ann Cvetkovich's beau-

tiful formulation. Cvetkovich's method involves 'an exploration of cultural texts as repositories of feelings and emotions' (2003b: 7). Feelings are not 'in' my archive in the same way. Rather, I am tracking how words for feeling, and objects of feeling, circulate and generate effects: how they move, stick, and slide. We move, stick and slide with them.

The texts that I read circulate in the public domain, and include web sites, government reports, political speeches and newspaper articles. Although the book involves close readings of such texts, it is not 'about' those texts. They do not simply appear as texts in my reading. Clearly, I have chosen these texts and not others. The texts evoke what we could call 'cases'. Three cases inform my choices of texts: reconciliation in Australia (Chapters 1 and 5 on pain and shame); responses to international terrorism (Chapters 3 and 4 on fear and disgust), and asylum and immigration in the UK (Chapters 2 and 6 on hate and love). Each of these cases shows us the very public nature of emotions, and the emotive nature of publics.[24] They are also cases in which I am involved, which matter to me, in my contact with the world.

To name one's archive is a perilous matter; it can suggest that these texts 'belong' together, and that the belonging is a mark of one's own presence. What I offer is a model of the archive not as the conversion of self into a textual gathering, but as a 'contact zone'. An archive is an effect of multiple forms of contact, including institutional forms of contact (with libraries, books, web sites), as well as everyday forms of contact (with friends, families, others). Some forms of contact are presented and authorised through writing (and listed in the references), whilst other forms of contact will be missing, will be erased, even though they may leave their trace. Some everyday forms of contact do appear in my writing: stories which might seem personal, and even about 'my feelings'. As a 'contact writing', or a writing about contact, I do not simply interweave the personal and the public, the individual and the social, but show the ways in which they take shape through each other, or even how they shape each other. So it is not that 'my feelings' are in the writing, even though my writing is littered with stories of how I am shaped by my contact with others.[25]

The book has a shape of its own, of course. It does not take shape around each of these cases, as if they could be transformed into objects, or moments in the progression of a narrative. I have instead taken different emotions as points of entry. Even though I am challenging the idea that there simply 'are' different emotions, 'in here', or 'out there', I also want to explore how naming emotions involves different orientations towards the objects they construct. In this sense, emotions may not have a referent, but naming an emotion has effects that we can describe as referential. So each chapter takes a different emotion as a starting point, or point of entry, and does not 'end' with the emotion, but with the work that it does.

The book begins with pain, which is usually described as a bodily sensation. I begin here in order to show how even feelings that are immediate, and which may involve 'damage' on the skin surface, are not simply feelings that one has, but feelings that open bodies to others. My analysis introduces the concept of 'intensification' to show how pain creates the very impression of a bodily surface. I also consider how pain can shape worlds as bodies, through the ways in which stories of pain circulate in the public domain, with specific reference to the report on the stolen generation in Australia, *Bringing Them Home*. The second chapter turns to hate, exploring how feelings of injury get converted into hatred for others, who become read as causing 'our injury'. In examining this conversion, I consider how hate circulates through signs, introducing the concept of 'affective economies'. I show how hate works by sticking 'figures of hate' together, transforming them into a common threat, within discourses on asylum and migration. My analysis examines how hate crime works within law, and asks how the language of hate affects those who are designated as objects of hate.

The following four chapters work to refine and develop these concepts about emotions in embodiment and language, showing how fear, disgust, shame and love work as different kinds of orientations towards objects and others, which shape individual as well as collective bodies. In Chapter 3, I show how fear is attributed to the bodies of others, and how fear is intensified by the possibility that the object of fear may pass us by. My analysis examines the spatial politics of fear and the way fear restricts the mobility of some and extends the mobility of others. Responses to terrorism work as 'an economy of fear', in which the figure of the terrorist gets associated with some bodies (and not others), at the same time as the terrorist 'could be' anyone or everywhere. In Chapter 4, I analyse how disgust works to produce 'the disgusting', as the bodies that must be ejected from the community. Working with a model of disgust as stickiness, I suggest that disgust shapes the bodies of a community of the disgusted through how it sticks objects together. My analysis examines speech acts, which claim 'that's disgusting!' in response to September 11, exploring how cohesion (sticking together) demands adhesion (sticking to), but also how the object of disgust can get unstuck.

In Chapters 5 and 6 on shame and love, I show how objects of emotion not only circulate, but also get 'taken on' and 'taken in' as 'mine' or 'ours'. In Chapter 5, I examine how expressions of shame, in speech acts of 'apologising', can work as a form of nation building, in which what is shameful about the past is covered over by the statement of shame itself. Shame hence can construct a collective ideal even when it announces the failure of that ideal to be translated into action. With reference to reconciliation in Australia, and the demand that governments apologise for histories of slavery

and colonialism, I also show how shame is deeply ambivalent: the exposure of past wounds can be a crucial part of what shame can do. In Chapter 6, I examine how love can construct a national ideal, which others fail. By considering how multiculturalism can work as an imperative to love difference, I show that love can work to elevate the national subject insofar as it posits the other's narcissism as the cause of injury and disturbance. Love is conditional, and the conditions of love differentiate between those who can inhabit the nation, from those who cause disturbance. In both these chapters, I examine how the objects of emotions can be 'ideals', and the way in which bodies, including bodies of nations, can take shape through how they approximate such ideals.

The final two chapters ask how emotions can work within queer and feminist politics, as a reorientation of our relation to social ideals, and the norms they elevate into social aspirations. Different feelings seem to flow through these chapters: discomfort, grief, pleasure, anger, wonder, and hope. The focus on attachments as crucial to queer and feminist politics is itself a sign that transformation is not about transcendence: emotions are 'sticky', and even when we challenge our investments, we might get stuck. There is hope, of course, as things can get unstuck.

This book focuses on emotions. But that does not make emotions the centre of everything. Emotions don't make the world go round. But they do in some sense go round. Perhaps, unlike the saying, what goes round does not always come round. Focusing on emotions is what will allow me to track the uneven effects of this failure of return.

NOTES

1. The poster was downloaded from the following web site: http://members.odinsrage.com/nfne/nf_bogus_asylum_nfne.a6.pdf The British National Front web site can be found on: http://www.nf.co.uk Accessed 30 September 2003.
2. See http://www.nfne.co.uk/intro.html Accessed 21 February 2004.
3. In *Strange Encounters* (2000), I offer an approach to 'othering' by examining how others are recognised as strangers, as 'bodies out of place', through economies of vision and touch. I will be building on this argument in *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*, by focusing on how relations of othering work through emotions; for example, othering takes place through the attribution of feelings to others, or by transforming others into objects of feeling. In making such claims, I am drawing on a long history of Black and critical race scholarship, which contests the model of race as a bodily attribute, by examining discourses of racialisation in terms of othering (hooks 1989; Lorde 1984; Said 1978; Fanon 1986; Bhabha 1994).
4. We might assume that in government rhetoric in the UK, the nation is not imagined as being white in the way that it is in the British National Front, especially given the

official endorsement of a policy of multiculturalism. The differences between fascism and neo-liberalism should be acknowledged, but we should not assume the difference is absolute. As I will argue in Chapter 6, the nation is still constructed as 'being white' in multiculturalism, precisely as whiteness is reimagined as the imperative to love difference ('hybrid whiteness').

5. It also follows that we should not look for emotions only where the attribution of 'being emotional' is made. What is posited as 'unemotional' also involves emotions, as ways of responding to objects and others. I will not be equating emotionality with femininity. See Campbell (1994) for an important critique of how women are 'dismissed' through being seen or 'judged' as being emotional.

6. I can direct you to the following texts, which I found useful. For an interdisciplinary collection on emotions see Lewis and Haviland (1993). For an interdisciplinary approach to emotions see Lupton (1998). For a review of psychological approaches, see Strongman (2003). For sociological collections on emotions, see Kemper (1990) and Bendelow and Williams (1998). For an anthropological approach to emotions see Lutz (1988). For a philosophical collection see Solomon (2003). And for a historical approach to emotions, see Reddy (2001).

7. The analysis in this paragraph simplifies the debate for the purpose of argument. I should acknowledge that the meaning of each of the crucial terms – sensation, emotion, affect, cognition and perception – is disputed both between disciplines and within disciplines.

8. Solomon argues that emotions are caused (as reactions), but that objects of emotion must be distinguished from the cause (Solomon 2003: 228). I am making a different claim, which is made possible by my distinction of 'contact' from the attribution of causality: the object with which I have contact is the object that I have a feeling 'about'. *The 'aboutness' involves a reading of the contact.*

9. This is a 'primal scene' in the psychology of emotions (for a recent review of this literature see Strongman 2003). The fact that the subject of the story is a child is crucial; the figure of the child does important work. 'The child' occupies the place of the 'not-yet subject', as the one whose emotions might allow us to differentiate between what is learnt and what is innate. The investment in the child's 'innocence' is vital to this primal scene. See Castañeda (2002) for an excellent reading of how the figure of 'the child' is produced within theory.

10. My critique of the 'Dumb View' of emotions, which follows from the work of Alison Jaggar (1996) and Elizabeth V. Spelman (1989) is also a critique of the assumption that emotions are innate or biological. I have avoided positioning myself in the debate between biological determinism and cultural or social constructionism, as the posing of the debate along these terms had delimited the field by creating false oppositions (aligning the biological with what is fixed, universal and given, and the cultural with what is temporary, relative and constructed). I would argue that emotions involve the materialisation of bodies, and hence show the instability of 'the biological' and 'the cultural' as ways of understanding the body. See Wilson (1999) for an interesting account of the importance of the biological to understanding emotions. Whilst I offer a different approach, which does not identify 'the biological' or 'the cultural' as separate spheres, I support her emphasis on the importance of the bodily dimensions of emotions, which she elaborates through a careful reading of Freud's model of the role of somatic compliance in hysteria.

11. To this extent, functionalist approaches would share my preference for the question, 'What do emotions do?', rather than 'What are emotions?' (Strongman 2003: 21–37). In

such approaches, which consider emotions in terms of their physiological effects, the function of fear may be flight, and with it, the survival of the individual organism, and the survival of the species. In my account, however, the 'doing' of emotions is not reducible to individual actions (though it involves action) and is not governed by the logic of reproduction of the human.

12. In Freud's reading of the little Hans case, the fear of the horse is read as a displacement of the fear of the father (see Chapter 3).

13. It may be useful to compare my approach on the relation between emotions and objects to Tomkins' (1963) theory of affect. As others have commented, Tomkins' attention to affect as opposed to drive emphasises the 'freedom' of emotion from specific objects (Izard 1977: 52; Sedgwick 2003: 19). I am also suggesting that emotions are 'free' to the extent that they do not reside within an object, nor are they caused by an object. But the language of 'freedom' is not one I will use in this book. I will argue instead that the association between objects and emotions is contingent (it involves contact), but that these associations are 'sticky'. Emotions are shaped by contact with objects. The circulation of objects is not described as freedom, but in terms of sticking, blockages and constraints.

14. My critique of the 'inside out' model is also an implicit critique of the expressive model of emotions, which assumes that emotional expressions comprise the externalisation of an internal feeling state, which is distinct and given (see Zajonc 1994: 4–5).

15. Both Denzin and Scheff are writing about emotions as social and not psychological forms. Despite this, both use an 'inside out' model. The former suggests emotions are 'self-feelings' (Denzin 1984: 50–1), even though others are required to experience the feeling. Scheff has a very problematic account of the sociality of emotions. He describes emotions in terms of the social bond, and suggests pride involves a 'secure bond' and shame a 'damaged bond'. He uses war and divorce as examples of alienation (see Chapter 5, and the conclusion to this book, which critique this idealisation of the social bond). Scheff's model not only idealises the social bond, but also creates a model of 'the social' premised on a liberal model of the self, as 'being whole', or 'at one with itself'.

16. The critique of the inauthenticity of grief for Diana was clear in public commentary around her death as Graham Little (1996) shows in his analysis of public emotions. As he argues, such critiques are also by implication critiques of femininity and hysteria, in which women in particular are seen as having been 'taken in'. It is important to note here that 'the crowd' is itself an unstable object: early work on crowds considers the crowd as a mob, which is physically co-present 'on the street'. More recent work considers 'the crowd' not necessarily as a physical mass, but as the perception of a mass, which is affected by the media, and other technologies of connection, which allow 'feelings with', without physical proximity. For a summary of debates in crowd psychology, see Blackman and Walkerdine 2002.

17. See Gibbs (2001) for an excellent example of the use of 'emotional contagion' to understand political affect.

18. In his early writings, Marx describes 'man's feeling' as 'truly ontological affirmations of his essence' (Marx 1975: 375). In this view, alienation is a form of estrangement: the transformation of labour into an object (the objectification of labour) hence effects an estrangement from the material realm of feelings. See Cvetkovich (1992) for a reading of Marx and emotion.

19. The challenge is also to work across or between disciplines, many of which now claim emotions as a sub-discipline. It is a rather frightening task. Doing interdisciplinary

work on emotions means accepting that we will fail to do justice to all of the intellectual histories drawn upon by the texts we read. It means accepting the possibility of error, or simply getting some things wrong. For me, this is a necessary risk; emotions do not correspond to disciplinary objects (the social, cultural, historical and so on), and tracking the work of emotions means crossing disciplinary boundaries.

20. Emotions are also relegated to the private sphere, which conceals their public dimension and their role in ordering social life. For an excellent analysis of the publicness of emotions see Berlant (1997).

21. 'Britain Suffers from Alien-Made Laws – the Flame', http//:www.nfne.co.uk/aleinlaws.html Accessed 12 January 2004.

22. It might be tempting to contrast this model of 'the emotionality of texts' with sociological, anthropological or psychological research, which involves interviewing people about their emotional lives. A good example of such work is Katz (1999). The difference between my research and interview based work is not that I am reading texts. It is important to state that interviewing people about emotions still involves texts: here, interviewees are prompted to talk before an interviewer ('the interview'), as a form of speech that is translated or 'transcribed' into a written text; the researcher then becomes the reader of the text, and the writer of another text about the text. The distinction between my research and interview based research on emotions is in the different nature of the texts generated; the texts I read are ones that already exist 'out there' in the public, rather than being generated by the research itself. My own view is that research on emotions should embrace the multiple ways emotions work, whether in public culture or everyday life, and this means working with a range of different materials, which we can describe in different ways (as texts, data, information). We need to avoid assuming that emotions are 'in' the materials we assemble (which would transform emotion into a property), but think more about what the materials are 'doing', how they work through emotions to generate effects.

23. Importantly, words that name a specific emotion do not have to be used for texts to be readable in terms of that emotion. The 'publicness' of emotions means that we learn to recognise their signs, which can include actions, gestures, intonation. So my opening quote did not have to name its rage: the physicality of how the statement 'rejects' the presence of others, and names that presence as injury, is a performance of rage. In particular, Chapter 4 on disgust explores how words can involve forms of action, by showing how statements of disgust are physical acts of recoiling from alien bodies.

24. But just as I argue that we shouldn't look for emotions in soft bodies, I would also suggest we shouldn't assume emotional publics are a particular kind of public; emotional publics are not only publics that display emotions in ways that we recognise as emotional. So, for instance, it is not that publics become emotional when politicians cry or 'express their feelings'. Publics organised around the values of thought or reason, or indeed of 'hardness' or detachment, also involve emotional orientations towards objects and others.

25. Thanks to Mimi Sheller for encouraging me to think again about the personal nature of archive.

Lecture VIII

THE PREDICAMENT OF "RACE" IN AND ACROSS DIASPORIC SPACES

In this session we explore the various understanding of 'race' as a system of meaning-making across diasporic spaces, places and historical times. Analysing the crucial ways in which 'race' and diasporic subjectivities intersect we engage with important work by scholars such as Wekker, Pierre, Hall.

Watch the 2019 Holberg Lecture by Paul Gilroy: "Never Again: Refusing Race and Salvaging the Human".
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ta6UkmlXtVo

Wekker, G. (2016) White innocence: Paradoxes of colonialism and race. Durham: Duke University Press. Introduction and Chapter 4

Hall, S. (1997). 'Race: the floating signifier'
http://www.mediaed.org/transcripts/Stuart-Hall-Race-the-Floating-Signifier-Transcript.pdf

Read this article on the Guardian
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/02/the-unwelcome-revival-of-race-science?
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Race, The Floating Signifier
Featuring Stuart Hall

Transcript

INTRODUCTION

CLIP: Spike Lee's "Do the Right Thing"

SUT JHALLY: As the previous clip from Spike Lee's film, "Do the Right Thing" shows, racial slurs and insults trip easily from people's lips. More and more, it seems, the dividing lines within our society are being drawn along how we are physically different from one another. What W.E.B. Du Bois called the differences of color, hair, and bone; what everyone understands as visible racial differences. This program examines the inner workings of the system and tries to unlock the secret of how and why race matters so much to people. We are going to do this by talking and listening to a leading expert in the field. Stuart Hall is a professor of sociology in Britain and is a key figure in the development of what has come known as cultural studies. His many writings now enjoy an international and global audience. On the subject of race, culture, and society we could not be in better or more insightful hands. I should point out, that in what follows hoards of principal focus is not on the effects of racism. He takes those as his starting point. Now, as a result, some people have accused him of not paying enough attention to the practical outcomes and violence associated with racism. Nothing could be further from the truth. Hall is passionately concerned with the psychological, cultural, and physical violence that racism inflicts, but he believes that's a better fight against it we have to first understand the logic of how it works. He wants to understand how racism is cultivated in our imaginations, of how it works in our heads, so that we can better combat it on the streets.

What racism, as a philosophy, contends is that there is a natural connection between the way people look, the differences of color, hair, and bone, and what they think and do. With how intelligent they are, with whether they are good athletes or not, good dancers or not, good workers, civilized or not. Racists believe that these characteristics are not a result of our environment, but of our biological genes. Blacks, for instance, are born not as intelligent as whites. Hall's basic argument is that all attempts to show this scientifically, that blacks are not as intelligent as whites, have failed. And yet, there is a persistent and widespread

belief in the inferior mental capacities of black folk. To understand why this should be the case Hall argues that we have to pay attention, not the objective facts of the situation alone, but to the stories the culture spins for us about what the physically differences we are born with mean. This involves examining the discourses that surround race. Taking what he calls a "discursive position". That is, analyzing the metaphors, the antidotes, the stories, the jokes that are told by culture about what physical racial differences mean. In fact, when we do this, we see that historically things like skin color have been given many different meanings over the years. There is nothing solid or permanent to the meaning of race. It changes all the time. It shifts and slides. That's why the title of this program is <u>Race: The Floating Signifier</u>. What racial difference signifies is never static or the same. This sounds very theoretical and abstract but Hall's motivation for insisting on this strategy are not at all academic. It is only once we understand how racism works that we can struggle against it and understanding it takes hard, analytical work.

The lecture that Hall delivered on this subject at Goldsmiths College in London, which we'll see shortly, is a starting point for this work. But first we are going to see an interview I conducted with him where I asked him to talk a little bit about why classification, putting people into different groups, is so important to human beings and how race fits into that. I also asked him to address the political implications of his analysis.

STUART HALL: As you, you know, in human culture, I would say, the propensity to classify sub-groups of human types; to break up the diversity of human society into very distinct typings according to essentialized characteristics, whether physical characteristics or intellectual ones, or characteristics of the body and so on. This is a very profound kind of cultural impulse. In a way, it's a very positive cultural impulse because we now understand the importance of all forms of classification to meaning. Until you classify things, in different ways, you can't generate any meaning at all. So, it's an absolutely fundamental aspect of human culture. What is, of course, important for us is when the systems of classification become the objects of the disposition of power. That's to say when the marking of difference and similarity across a human population becomes a reason why this group is to be treated in that way and get those advantages, and that group should be treated in another. It's the coming together of difference, or categorization of our classification and power. The use of classification as a system of power, which is really what is very profound and one then sees that across a range of different characteristics. You see it in gender, the ascription of clear masculine and feminine identities and the assumption from that that you can predict whole ranges of behavior and aspirations and opportunities from this classification. Classification is a very generative thing once you are classified a whole range of other things fall into place as a result of it. But, another important point about classification is that it awakens, well let me put it another way, it is a

way of maintaining the order of any system, and what is most disturbing is that anything that breaks the classification. So, you know, its not just that you have blacks and whites, but of course one group of those people have a much more positive value than the other group. That's how power operates. But then, anything that attempts to ascribe to the black population, characteristics that used to be used for the white ones, generates enormous tension in the society. Mary Douglas, the anthropologist, describes this in terms of what she calls "matter out of place". She says every culture has a kind of order of classification built into it and this seems to stabilize the culture. You know exactly where you are, you know who are the inferiors and who the superiors are and how each has a rank, etc. What disturbs you is what she calls "matter out of place". What she means by that is you don't worry about dirt in the garden because it belongs in the garden but the moment you see dirt in the bedroom you have to do something about it because it doesn't symbolically belong there. And what you do with dirt in the bedroom is you cleanse it, you sweep it out, you restore the order, you police the boundaries, you know the hard and fixed boundaries between what belongs and what doesn't. Inside/outside. Cultured/uncivilized. Barbarous and cultivated, and so on.

And races, of course, one of the principle forms of human classification, which have all of these negative and positive attributes kind of built into it. So, in a way, they function as a common sense code in our society. So, in a way, you don't need to have a whole argument, you know, about "are blacks intelligent?" The moment you say that blacks, already the equivalences begin to trip off peoples mind. Blacks then, sound bodies, good at sports, good at dancing, very expressive, no intelligence, never had a thought in their heads, you know, tendency to barbarous behavior. All these things are clustered, simply in the classification system itself. What I'm interested in then is how these definitions of race come to operate, how they function. I'm interested partly of how they function, of course, in the systems of classification, which are used in order to divide populations into different ethnic or racial groups and to ascribe characteristics to these different groupings and to assume a kind of normal behavior or conduct about them. Because they are this kind of person, they can do that sort of thing, and we'll believe that sort of thing, and we'll suffer from that set of problems, etc. Everything is kind of inscribed in their species being, they're very being because of their race. So, I think that ones seeing there is a kind of essentializing of race and a whole range of, diverse range of characteristics ultimately fixed or held in place because people have been categorized in a certain way, racially.

These are very big cultural principals we're talking about and a whole lot in terms of power and exclusion results from having the system of classification. So, in the lecture I want to talk about how this, how race as a principal of classification operates to sort out the world into its superiors and inferiors along some line of

biological or genetic race and how as a consequence of that all the conduct of society towards black people is inflicted and shaped by that system of classification.

I end the lecture with the phrase, "politics without guarantees", and what I mean by that is that in a funny way race itself, if you think that race is a fixed biological characteristic, and that a whole number of other things: cultural qualities, intellectual qualities, emotional and expressive qualities follow from the fact of being genetically one race or another, if that is your image of race. You will think, then, that the very fact of race can actually guarantee a whole range of things including, just to name two, whether the works of art produced by a person who biologically belongs to that race is good or not. So, you know, if they're black it means that they're also very expressive, it also means they'll produce a certain kind of work of art and it'll be good because it's black. And similarly, a certain kind of politics that defends the race, tries to protect us against discrimination, etc. In which all black people will be figured as people who are holding the correct position and when you ask what positions do they hold what you will respond is not the normal political argument: "well they believe in the following things which I think are viable and progressive things for black people to vie for now in order to change their circumstances". You will say well they're like that, they think like that because that's how black people think, its right that black people should --. So it's right that these functions act as a kind of guarantee that the work of art will be good because it's black and will be politically progressive because it's black. Now, we actually know that the word does not come out like that. Some of the words are not good. Though black, made with the best of positive intentions to reverse negative stereotypes, to praise the diversity of black people, they just don't work aesthetically. And similarly, we know black people have a range of different political positions: conservative, reactionary, progressive, and so on. And that these fall out in a way in which is not defined by their genetic or biological disposition. So, I'm trying to end the notion that our politics is to cure. We know it's correct entering the very, very difficult debate. Are we correct? What is the right strategy now? What are the tactics we ought to adopt? Who can we be in alliances with? What is the strategic thing, in this moment, to go for? You know, the normal game of politics. It sort of in a way prevents us from having to play that difficult game because we have another guarantee. We know it is because we wrote it and I think in a way it leads to a kind of mechanistic anti-racist politics, not a thoughtful one, not a self critical one, not a reflexive one. So, by ending the guarantee, I don't mean by that of course that it's black people or black politics that's involved. The reason why it matters is not because what's in our genes it's because of what is in our history. It's because black people have been in a certain position in society, in history, over a long period of time that those are the conditions they're in and that's what they're fighting against. And of course that matters, but then black, the term black, is referring to this long history of political and historical oppression. It's not referring

to our genes. It's not referring to our biology. And in order to fight a politics, which is effective in ending the oppression of black people, you have to ask what is the right politics to do. You can't depend on the fact that it's blacks doing it; that this will guarantee in heaven that you're doing the right thing. So I want blacks to enter into what I think they've been reserved in doing, which is, you know the hard graft of having arguments with their own fellows, men and women who are black, about it. And that's a difficult thing because in a way you have to mobilize effectively, you can't depend on just the race to take you to your political objective. And it's not therefore that I have a counter-politic to the existing politics of racism to put into the space but its rather a sort of approach to the political which I always see as not a practice which has any guarantees built into it, its not, there is no law of history which tells you we will win, we may lose. Just as there is no law of history, which will human beings won't blow themselves to bits, they probably will. So one has to act in the notion that politics is always open. It's always the contingent of failure and you need to be right because there is no guarantee except good practice to make it right to mobilization, to having the right people on your side committed to the program. So I want people to take politics a bit more seriously and to take biology less seriously.

LECTURE AT GOLDSMITHS COLLEGE New Cross London

What More is There to Say About 'Race'?

STUART HALL: I want, at what you might think a rather late stage in the game, to return to the question of what we might mean by saying, what are the implications of saying as I've done in a rather provocative title to this lecture, that race is a discursive construct, that it is a sliding signifier. Statements of this kind of acquired a certain status in advanced critical circles these days, but it's very clear that critics and theorists don't always mean the same thing or draw the same inference from the statement when they make it. What's more, the idea that race might be described as a signifier is not one which in my experience has penetrated very deeply into or done very effectively the work of unhinging and dislodging what I would call common sense assumptions and every-day ways of talking about race and of making sense about race in our society today. And I'm really talking in part about that great untidy, dirty world in which race matters, outside of the Academy as well as what light we may throw on it from inside.

More seriously, the dislocating effects on the world, of political mobilization around issues of race and racism, the dislocating effects on the strategies of anti-racist politics and education of thinking of race as a signifier have not been adequately charted or assessed. Well, you may not be persuaded by the story yet but that's my excuse for returning at this late date to a topic about which I

know many people feel that after all, or that can usefully be said about race has already been said.

The 'Formal' Rejection of Biological Racism

STUART HALL: What do I mean by a floating signifier? Well to put it crudely, race is one of those major concepts, which organize the great classificatory systems of difference, which operate in human society. And to say that race is a discursive category recognizes that all attempts to ground this concept scientifically, to locate differences between the races, on what one might call scientific, biological, or genetic grounds, have been largely shown to be untenable. We must therefore, it is said, substitute a socio-historical or cultural definition of race, for the biological one. As the philosopher Anthony Appiah put it succinctly in his now renowned and elegantly argued contribution in a book, which I think many of you will know, it's the critical inquiry book called *Race, Writing and Difference* edited by Henry Louis Gates. He argues that, "…it is time, as it were, that the biological concept of race was sunk without trace". As we know, human genetic variability between different populations, normally assigned a racial category, is not significantly greater than it is within those populations. And what WEB Du Bois, who is a great African-American thinker and writer on these questions, a figure not necessarily known in the United Kingdom as well as he should be, who wrote a wonderfully moving text called *The Souls of Black Folk.* But what Du Bois argues in his essay called *The Conservation of Races*, what he called "…the differences of color, hair, and bone". Though, as he observed, and I quote, "…clearly defined to the eye of the historian and the sociologist" – it's a good thing, because there's a lot of things sociologists don't see, but he thought that racial difference was something they might just make out – "…that such things are on the whole, poorly correlated with genetic difference and on the other hand, impossible to correlate significantly with cultural, intellectual, or the cognitive characteristics of people. Quite apart from being a subject to extraordinary variation within any one family, let alone within any one so-called family of races."

The Survival of Biological Thinking

STUART HALL: I want to note four things at once about this general position. First, it represents the by now common and conventional wisdom among leading scientists in the field. Second, that fact has never prevented intense scholarly activity being devoted by a minority of committed academics to attempting to prove a correlation between racially defined genetic characteristics and cultural performance. In other words, we are not dealing with a field, in which, as it were,

the scientifically and rationally established fact prevents scientists from continuing to try to prove the opposite.

Thirdly, I observe that though the radicalized implication of this continuing scientific work into for example, race and intelligence, are vociferously refused and condemned by large numbers of people, certainly by most liberal professionals and especially by Black groups of all kinds. In fact, a great deal of what is said by such groups, amongst themselves, is predicated precisely on some such assumption, i.e. that some social, political or cultural phenomenon, like the rightness of a political line or the merits of a literary and musical production or the correctness of an attitude or belief, can be traced to and explained by and especially fixed and guaranteed in its truth by the racial character of the person involved. I deduce from this intense scholarly activity that the awkward lesson that diametrically opposed political positions can often be derived from the same philosophical argument. And that though the genetic explanation of social and cultural behavior is often denounced as racist, the genetic, biological, and physiological definitions of race are alive and well in the common sense, discourse is of us all. The fact that the biological, physiological, or genetic definition, having been shown out the front door, tends to sidle around the veranda and climb back in through the window.

This is the paradoxical finding, which I want to explore and address in what follows. Why should this be so?

The Badge of Race

STUART HALL: In an article in *Crisis* of August 1911, we find DuBois moving decisively towards writing and I quote "of civilizations where we can now speak of races," adding that "even the physical characteristics including skin color are to no small extent the direct result of a physical and social environment. In addition to being too indefinite and too elusive," he says, "to serve the basis for any origin, classification, or division of human groups." Now on the basis of this recognition in *Dusk of Dawn*, DuBois abandons the scientific definition of race in favor of the fact that he's writing about Africans, that Africans and people of African descent have what he calls a common racial ancestry, because – its important to note this – "they have a common history, have suffered a common disaster, and have one long memory of disaster". Because color, though of little meaning in itself, is really important, DuBois argues, "as a badge for the social heritage of slavery, the dissemination and the insult of that experience".

A badge, a token, a sign, here indeed is the idea, hinted at in the title of my talk, that race is a signifier, and that racialized behavior and difference needs to be understood as a discursive, not necessarily as a genetic or biological fact.

Race as a Language, a 'Floating Signifier'

STUART HALL: I don't want to deviate here with a long theoretical disposition about the terms that I'm using, to bore you to tears, I simply want to remind you that the model being proposed here is closer to that of how a language works than of how our biology is or our physiologies work. That race is more like a language, than it is like the way in which we are biologically constituted. You may think that's an absurd and ridiculous thing to say, you may even now be surreptitiously glancing around the room, just to make sure that you know your visual appearances are in full working order – I assure you they are, people do look rather peculiar, some of them are brown, some of them are quite black, some of you are pretty brown, some of you are really disgustingly pink in the current light. But, there's nothing wrong with your appearances, but I want to insist to you that nevertheless, the argument that I want to make to you is that *race works like a language*. And signifiers refer to they systems and concepts of the classification of a culture to its *making meaning* practices. And those things gain their meaning, not because of what they contain in their essence, but in the shifting relations of difference, which they establish with other concepts and ideas in a signifying field. Their meaning, because it is relational, and not essential, can never be finally fixed, but is subject to the constant process of redefinition and appropriation. To the losing of old meanings, and the appropriation and collection on contracting new ones, to the endless process of being constantly re-signified, made to mean something different in different cultures, in different historical formations, at different moments of time.

The meaning of a signifier can never be finally or trans-historically fixed. That is, it is always, or there is always, a certain sliding of meaning, always a margin not yet encapsulated in language and meaning, always something about race left unsaid, always someone a constitutive outside, who's very existence the identity of race depends on, and which is absolutely destined to return from its expelled and objected position outside the signifying field to trouble the dreams of those who are comfortable inside.

But What About the Reality of Racial Discrimination and Violence?

STUART HALL:
I address this point directly because I believe this is exactly where the more skeptical amongst you may be beginning to think, "Alright, you might say perhaps race is not after all a matter of genetic factors, of biology, of physiological characteristics, of the morphology of the body, not a matter of color, hair, and bone, that chilling threesome that DuBois frequently quotes." But you may say,

"can you seriously be claiming that it is simply a signifier, an empty sign, that it is not fixed in its inner nature, that it cannot be secured in its meaning, that it floats in a sea of relational differences – is that the argument that you're advancing?" And isn't it not only wrong, but a trivial and I hear the word being rustled in the audience, an idealist approach to the brute facts of human history, which after all have disfigured the lives, and crippled and constrained the potentialities of literally millions of the world's dispossessed? After all why don't we use the evidence of our eyes? If race was such a complicated thing why would it be so manifestly obvious everywhere we look? I have to say it again because I can feel the sense of relief that after skirting around through these various structures we have come to know after all what we all know about race. It's reality. You can see its effects, you can see it in the faces of the people around you, you can see people pulling the skirts aside as people from another racial group come into the room. You can see the operation of racial discrimination in institutions and so on. What is the need of this entire scholarly hullabaloo about race, when you can just turn to its reality?

What trail through history is more literally marked by blood and violence, by the genocide by the Middle Passage, the horrors of plantation servitude, and the hanging tree? A signifier, a discourse, yes, that is my argument.

Two Positions: The Realist & the Textual

STUART HALL: Since we are concerned here not with abstract theoretical critique but with an attempt to unlock the secrets of the functioning in modern history of racial systems of classification, let me turn to this question of how indeed one sees this functioning around the troubling question of the gross physical differences of color, bone, and hair, which constitute the material sub-stratum, the absolute final common denominator of racial classifying systems. When all the other refinements have been wiped away, there seems to be a sort of irreducible, ineradicable minimum there, the differences, which are palpable among people, which we call race. Where on earth do they come from, if they are simply as I want to claim, discursive?

Broadly speaking, as I understand it there is really three options here. First, we can hold that the differences of a physiological kind or nature really do provide the basis for classifying human races into families, and once they can be proved to do so, they can adequately be represented in our systems of thought and language. That's a kind of realist position, it really is there, and all we have to do is reflect what is out there in the world, adequately in the systems of language and knowledge, which we use to conduct investigations into its effects.

Well, a second possibility is to hold what is sometimes called the purely textual or linguistic position. Race here, is autonomous of any system reference, it can only be tested, not against the actual word of human diversity, but within the play of the text, within the play of the differences that we construct in our own language.

A Third Position: The Discursive

STUART HALL: But there is a third position, the third position is the one to which I subscribe, its often the third position I often subscribe to it as it turns out, (I don't know what you want to make of that but there it is). The third position is that there are probably differences of all sorts in the world, that difference is a kind of anomalous existence out there, a kind of random series of all sorts of things in what you call the world, there's no reason to deny this reality or this diversity. I think its sometimes, not always, what Foucault means when he talks about the extra discursive…I don't want to stir up the Foucaultians there…It's only when these differences have been organized within language, within discourse, within systems of meaning, that the differences can be said to acquire meaning and become a factor in human culture and regulate conduct, that is the nature of what I'm calling the discursive concept of race. Not that nothing exists of differences, but that what matters are the systems we use to make sense, to make human societies intelligible. The system we bring to those differences, how we organize those differences into systems of meaning, with which, as it were, we could find the world intelligible. And this has nothing to do with denying that, as I say, the audience test – if you looked around, you'd find we did after all look somewhat different from one another.

I think these are discursive systems because the interplay between the representation of racial difference, the writing of power, and the production of knowledge, is crucial to the way in which they are generated, and the way in which they function. And I use the word discursive here to mark the transition theoretically from the more formal understanding of difference to an understanding of how ideas and knowledge's of difference organize human practices between individuals.

Religion: A First Go at Radical Classification

STUART HALL: Racially classifying systems themselves have a history and their modern history seems to emerge where peoples of very different kinds first encounter and have to make sense of peoples of another culture who are significantly different from them, and that we can date when that historical encounter occurred (I don't want to talk about that at the moment).

When the Old World first encountered the New, peoples of the New World, they put to them a question; it's the famous question that Sepulveda put to Las Casas when the subject was debated within the Catholic Church of, "what is the nature of the peoples that we have found in the New World?" Now, they didn't say what I think the religious amongst you would like to hear them say, "well, these are, are they not, men like us, and our brothers? Are they not women like us, and our sisters?" No, they didn't say that, that took a very, very long time to come – about two or three hundred years before the Abolitionist movement thought of putting a question like that. No, what they said are, "Are these true men?" That is to say, do they belong even to the same species as we do, or are they born of another creation? And here for centuries it was not science, but religion, religion standing as the signifier of knowledge and truth. Where the human science is, and then science itself was later destined to stand, which would ground the truth of human difference and diversity in some fact which was controllable which could put them over there, and us over here; them in the boats and us on top of the civilization that we had conquered and so on.

Sleeping Easier: The Cultural Function of Knowledge

STUART HALL: It is that act of organizing people through their differences into different social groups, which is the act of social human classification, that is what is being sought – first in a religious discourse, then in an anthropological discourse, and finally in a scientific discourse – here, each of these knowledge's are functioning not as the provision of the truth, but as what makes men and women sleep well in their beds at night. They're kind of soothers – they're knowledge soothers, they're tucking in you know the soother in the mouth; first you pop in the religious one, and you hope to find that after all, when after all is said and done, god actually created two kinds of men, he had two goes at it – one weekend and then another weekend, and they were over there and we were over here and its only long afterwards that we happen to stumble across one another. But there's no thought that we both came from the same place. And that soother doesn't work, you take that out, you pop in another one: an anthropological would say, well they're sort of really like us, that's because we all really come from monkeys, but some of them are much closer to monkeys than we are and although that may not be an absolute difference, you know this is enough to find differences in university departments, publishing, etc. And then finally when that anthropology itself finally gives up, along comes, you know James Clifford, and he gives up this sort of knowledge of what anthropology can do, sort out the sheep from the goats. Then science comes along and says, "I can do it, and I can do it." Higher genetics, you can't see genetics, it's a wonderful, internal system, we have the clue to it, we can look at it in the laboratory – but human beings can't see, what they see are the *effects* of the genetic code operating. So it's a wonderfully secret code that only a small

number of people have at their disposal, which can do exactly what religion didn't manage to do, and anthropology didn't quite bring off. It can tell you why these people do not belong in the same camp, why they are very different from one another, why they really are a different species. And wouldn't it be good to know that instead of, you know trying to work out whether the ones that are your friends are so closer to you than the ones who are not, all that complicated map of alliances, etc, which constitute human relations – wouldn't it be good if you just had something simple to say, I'll just pop into the lab and I'll tell you whether they are or not. And that's what it'll do.

Fixing Difference: The Cultural Function of Science

STUART HALL: Science has a function, a cultural function in our society. Let me pause before I get carried away. I'm not suggesting that there's nothing to science; that's not my business today, and talking about the function which science performs within human cultural system, I'm talking about the *cultural* function of science, and I'm saying that the cultural function of science, in the languages and discourses of racism, have been to provide precisely that guarantee and certainty of absolute difference which no other systems of knowledge up until that point have been able to provide. And that is why the scientific trace remains such a remarkably powerful instrument in human thinking, not only in the Academy but everywhere in people's ordinary common sense discourse. For centuries, the struggle was to establish a binary distinction between two kinds of people. But once you get to the Enlightenment, which says or recognizes everybody is one species, then you have to begin to find a way which marks the difference *inside* the species; not two species, but how, why, one bit of the species is different – more barbarous, more backwards, more civilized – than another part. And you get into a different marking of difference, the difference that is marked *inside* the system. You know, I mean, listen to the way in which Edmund Burke once wrote to wrote to Robertson in 1877, "we need no longer go to history," he said, "to trace the knowledge of human nature in all its stages and periods. Why? Because now the great map of mankind is on a road all at once and there's no state or gradation of barbarism and no mode of refinement which we do not have at the same instant under our view." That is the panoptic glance of the Enlightenment – everything, all of human creation, is now, as it were, under the eye of science. And within that, can be marked, the differences that very much matter. And what are they? "The very different civility of Europe and of China. The barbarism of Tartary and of Arabia; and the savage state of North America and New Zealand."

The point I'm making is it is not science as such, but whatever is in the discourse of a culture, which grounds the truth about human diversity, which unlocks the secret of the relations between nature and culture. Which unties the puzzling fact

of human difference, which matters. And what matters is not that they contain the scientific truth about difference, but that they function foundationally in the discourse of racial difference. They fix and secure what else otherwise cannot be fixed or secured. They warrant and guarantee the truth of differences, which they discursively construct.

Nature = Culture

STUART HALL: The relationship here then, is that culture is made to follow on from nature, to lean on it for its justification exactly nature and culture here operate as metaphors for one another. They operate metonymically. It is the function of the discourse and the race as a signifier, to make these two systems – nature and culture – correspond with one another, in such a way that it is possible to read off the one against the other. So that once you know where the person fits in the classification of natural human races, you can infer from that what they're likely to think, what they're likely to feel, what they're likely to produce, the aesthetic quality of their productions, and so on. It is constituting a system of equivalencies between nature and culture, which is the function of race as a signifier.

The biological trace in my view as a discursive system is required so long as this essentializing, naturalizing function, this way of as it were, taking racial difference out of history, out of culture, and locating it as it were beyond the reach of change, so long as that function is part of what racial systems are about.

Seeing is Believing

STUART HALL: However this is not the only reason in my view why biological reasoning, wild functioning as it were, as if its largely untrue but still somehow hangs around in the conversation which we conduct around race. That's not the only reason why that is so. What DuBois started with was precisely the grosser physical differences of color, hair, and bone.

Which despite the fact of there remain anomalous fractural populations that they transcend scientific definition. They are, what finally, when we come down to it, providing the foundation for the languages of race that we speak everyday. The stubborn gross physical facts, of color, hair, or bone. Now, the central fact about these gross physical differences is not that they are based on genetic differences, but they are clearly visible to the eye. They are what palpably to the untutored, unscientific eye, which makes race thing, which we continue to talk about. They are in a sense beyond dispute. They are brute, physical biological

facts about human vision that appear in the field of vision. Where seeing is believing.

When Franz Fonul in ' Black skin White Masks', who has you know was transfixed by this inscription of racial difference on the surface of the black body itself. What he called the dark and unarguably evidence of his own blackness. "I am a slave," he said, "not of an idea that others have of me, but of my own appearance, I am fixed by it." For what indeed, of course, what can people be transfixed by others by that which is so powerfully and evidently concretely undeniable there. A racial difference which writes itself indelibly on the script of the body.

Genetics: Making Sense of Difference

STUART HALL: What gives rise to these evident and visible signs of racial difference? Fuzzy hair, big noses, thick lips, large behinds. And as the French writer, Michelle Curnow, once delicately put it, " penis's as big cathedrals." What gives rise to all that is of course the genetic code. I mean its not just that those things are there because nobody ever conducted the experiment and tried to actually sort out a part of a group of people who contain some these differences, you know, carefully and discreetly into two opposing groups. It just simply cannot be done. Just simply can't be done. You get some people of there and a few people over there, and then they are all those wishy-washy things in the middle that keeps slipping and sliding from inside to outside. It's just not quite possible to actually fix it. So, actually, though races are something that you can plainly see. What fixes it, is because we all know, we scientific folk, what is behind these is the genetic code, which regrettable you can't see. But which you can infer from the fact that some have large behinds and some people have fuzzy hair and some people have big noses and some people for all I know have penis's as big as a cathedral. But you can't set about organizing the population, you know if I say drop your pants and if I tell you whether you are this or that, because the thing is just to anomalous for that. But you can be sure, that genetically some code has actually given at the level of the surface of appearances these differences. And we poor mortals have to work with this confusing surface of appearances because we can't get access to the genetic code.

Reading the Body

STUART HALL: Well, this is quite true, but what I am afraid that your saying, what your telling me is that actually, these things, which you can see, are also signifiers! You are reading them as signs of a code of which you can't see. You assume that it is the genetic code creating these gross differences of color, hair,

and bone. And only because of that can you use that as a way of distinguishing between one group of people or another. If I were to say. ' It happened by chance', that is not the answer we are looking for we are looking for the fact that you can read the body as a text. It is a text. Now my friends you know, I know you will say. " If you hit me, cut me, I'll bleed. You run over me in the street, as is a frequent of a case in front of, you know, the new cross. You know, I will be flattened. It may be, but in so far as what we are talking about is the system of classifying difference. The body is a text. And we are all readers of it. And we go around, looking at this text, inspecting it like literary critics. Closer and closer for those very fine differences, such small these differences are, and then when that does work we start to run like a true structuralist, we start to run the combinations. Well if I perm, you know, not so big nose, with rather fuzzy hair, and a sort of largish behind and goodness knows what, I might sort of come out. We are readers of race, that what we are doing, we are readers of social difference. And the body hair, which you know is sighted as if, this is what terminates the argument. When you say race is a signifier. No it is not! See the folks out there they are different! You can tell they are different. Well, that very obviousness, the very obviousness of the visibility of race is what persuades me that it functions because it is signifying something; it is a text, which we can read.

Why We Have to Move Beyond 'Reality'

STUART HALL: Now this notion that even the genetic code then, is only imprinted on us as it were through the body rather than on the body. That you can't stop at the surface of the black body itself, as if that, well, I was going to say, as if that, brought the argument to a close. But that is exactly why the body is invoked in the discourse in that way. In the hope that it will bring the argument to a close, that if you invoke reality itself, if you say "the blackest person in the room step this way" Somehow pointing to him or her will destroy all my argument. Just look there. That is exactly what the function of invoking the body as if it is the ultimate transcendental signifier. As if this is the marker beyond which all arguments will stop, all language will cease, all discourse will fall away before this reality. I think we can't turn to the reality of race because the reality of race itself is what is standing in the way of our understanding, in a profound way. What the meaning is of saying that race is cultural system.

Analyzing the Stories of the Body

STUART HALL: You know, in Fanon's book *Black Skin White Masks* whereas I said he's entranced and he's obsessed by the trauma of his own appearance and what it means he is driven wild by the fact that he is caught, caught and locked in this body which the other the white other knows just by looking at him that the

other can see through him just by reading the text of the black body. He's obsessed by that fact. And yet, as I am sure you know, when it came to it, the power and importance of *Black Skin White Masks* is that Fanon understood that beneath what he called the bodily and corporeal schema is another schema. A schema composed of the stories and the anecdotes and the metaphors and the images, which is really, really he says, what constructs the relationship between the body and its social and cultural space. These stories, not the fact itself. The fact itself is just exactly that trap of the surface, which allows us to rest with what is obvious. It's so manifestly there. The trap in racism is precisely to allow what is manifestly there what offers it to us as a symptom of appearance to stand in the place of what is in fact one of the most profound and deeply complex of the cultural systems which allow us to make a distinction between inside and outside between us and them between who belongs and who doesn't belong. That apparently simple, obvious and banal fact requires the invocation of territories of knowledge in order to produce it as a simple, obvious, visible fact. In this way race is more like sexual difference, racial difference is more like sexual difference than it is like the other systems of difference precisely because anatomy, physiology appears to wind the question up and what we know about and have learned gradually about sexual difference that is to say the profundity of the depth that lies behind the making of that distinction is what we need now to begin to learn about the languages of race which we speak.

Why Does it Matter? Battling Racism

STUART HALL: Though race cannot perform the function it was asked to do by providing the truth and fixing that truth beyond the shy of a doubt. It is difficult to get rid of because it is so difficult in the languages of race to do without some kind of foundation or guarantee. And the point I am making there, about the necessity of a foundation or guarantee, is not a theoretical argument, or not a theoretical argument only, it is a political argument; because so much of the politics both of race and anti-race are founded on the notion that somehow, somewhere, by the biology or genetics or physiology or color or something other then human history and culture, will guarantee the truth and authenticity of the things we believe and want to do. It is the search for that guarantee, as much in the politics of anti-racism, as in the politics of racism, which makes us, which addicts us, to the preservation of a biological trait. It is hard to give up because in the end, we don't know what it is like to try to conduct a politics, especially a politics of anti-racism without a guarantee, we don't know what it is like to conduct the politics without a guarantee. We want somehow to be told something which tells us that the contingent open ended usually wrong politically choices we make, can in the end read off against some other more scientific theoretical template which if we only had hold of the beginning would have told us what was right and what was not. We need the guarantee, we need to have in the sleep of

reason, that which says, "Yes do it" because it not only feels like and looks like and is the right thing as far as your calculations can take it, but in the end it will be right, there is something which will make it right. That is because the people holding it, after all, these are the people you know, these are good people, how in the name of people come together around this common form of identification, how could they be wrong? But the truth is that like all ordinary human beings they could. We could all be wrong. And often are. Quite usually are in fact and in our politics almost always are you might say. The one thing we are not is guaranteed in the truth of what we do. Indeed, I believe that without that kind of guarantee we would need to begin again, begin again in another space, begin again from a different set of presuppositions to try to ask ourselves what might it be in human identification, in human practice, in the building of human alliances, which without the guarantee, without the certainty of religion or science or anthropology or genetics or biology or the appearance of your eyes, without any guarantees at all, might enable us to conduct an ethically responsible human discourse and practice about race in our society. What might it be like to conduct that, without having at our backs just a touch of a certainty that even if we look as if we were wrong if we only had access to the code something would have told us in the beginning what we should do.

And this is an uncomfortable truth. It's an uncomfortable truth, of course, for those who would have liked to invoke the biological or genetic traits as a way of stopping the argument. But it is also a very difficult truth to come to terms with amongst those people who feel as it were the reality of race gives a kind of guarantee or under pinning to their political argument and their aesthetic judgments and their social and cultural beliefs. Once you enter the politics of the end of the biological definition of race you are plunged headlong into the only world we have. The maelstrom of a continuously contingent guaranteed political argument, debate, and practice. A critical politics against racism, which is always a policy of criticism.

[END]

WHITE INNOCENCE

Paradoxes of Colonialism and Race

Gloria Wekker

CONTENTS

All the energies poured into critical theory, into novel
and demystifying theoretical praxes—have avoided the
major, I would say the determining political horizon
of modern Western culture, namely imperialism.

Edward Said, "Secular Interpretation"

"A Particular Knowledge . . . "

This book is dedicated to an exploration of a strong paradox that is opera-
tive in the Netherlands and that, as I argue, is at the heart of the nation: the
passion, forcefulness, and even aggression that race, in its intersections
with gender, sexuality, and class, elicits among the white population, while
at the same time the reactions of denial, disavowal, and elusiveness reign
supreme. I am intrigued by the way that race pops up in unexpected places
and moments, literally as the return of the repressed, while a dominant
discourse stubbornly maintains that the Netherlands is and always has
been color-blind and antiracist, a place of extraordinary hospitality and
tolerance toward the racialized/ethnicized other, whether this quintessen-
tial other is perceived as black in some eras or as Muslim in others. One of
the key sites where this paradox is operative, I submit, is the white Dutch
sense of self, which takes center stage in this book. I strongly suspect that
with national variations, a similar configuration is operative in other inter-
national settings that have an imperial history. It is my—admittedly am-
bitious and iconoclastic—aim to write an ethnography of dominant white

Dutch self-representation. In a Dutch context this is iconoclastic because whiteness is not acknowledged as a racialized/ethnicized positioning at all. Whiteness is generally seen as so ordinary, so lacking in characteristics, so normal, so devoid of meaning, that a project like this runs a real risk of being considered emptiness incarnate. My main thesis is that an unacknowledged reservoir of knowledge and affects based on four hundred years of Dutch imperial rule plays a vital but unacknowledged part in dominant meaning-making processes, including the making of the self, taking place in Dutch society.

In this exploration, I am guided by the concept of the cultural archive (Said 1993), which foregrounds the centrality of imperialism to Western culture. The cultural archive has influenced historical cultural configurations and current dominant and cherished self-representations and culture. In a general nineteenth-century European framework, Edward Said describes the cultural archive as a storehouse of "a particular knowledge and structures of attitude and reference . . . [and,] in Raymond Williams' seminal phrase, 'structures of feeling.' . . . There was virtual unanimity that subject races should be ruled, that there *are* subject races, that one race deserves and has consistently earned the right to be considered the race whose main mission is to expand beyond its own domain" (1993, 52, 53).

Importantly, what Said is referring to here is that a racial grammar, a deep structure of inequality in thought and affect based on race, was installed in nineteenth-century European imperial populations and that it is from this deep reservoir, the cultural archive, that, among other things, a sense of self has been formed and fabricated. With the title *White Innocence*, I am invoking an important and apparently satisfying way of being in the world. It encapsulates a dominant way in which the Dutch think of themselves, as being a small, but just, ethical nation; color-blind, thus free of racism; as being inherently on the moral and ethical high ground, thus a guiding light to other folks and nations. During the colonial era, the match of the Netherlands with the Dutch East Indies, its jewel in the crown, was in self-congratulatory fashion thought of like a match made in heaven: "The quietest people of Europe brought together with the quietest people of Asia" (Meijer Raneft, cited in Breman 1993). I attempt a postcolonial, or rather a decolonial,[1] intersectional reading of the Dutch cultural archive, with special attention for the ways in which an imperial racial economy, with its gendered, sexualized, and classed intersections, continues to

underwrite dominant ways of knowing, interpreting, and feeling. I argue that in an "ethnography of dominant white Dutch self-representation" (cf. Doane 1991), sexual racism turns out to play a prominent role. I offer an exploration of the ways in which race, which by dominant consensus has been declared missing in action in the Netherlands, became cemented and sedimented in the Dutch cultural archive, and how race acquired gendered, sexualized, and classed meanings during more than four hundred years of "colonialism of the exterior" (Brah 1996).

In a U.S. context, where decidedly more work has been done on the cultural archive than in Europe, Toni Morrison has insightfully addressed what slavery did to the white psyche.[2] In an interview with Paul Gilroy, Morrison states, "Slavery broke the world in half, it broke it in every way. It broke Europe. It made them into something else, it made them slave masters, it made them crazy. You can't do that for hundreds of years and it not take a toll. They had to dehumanize, not just the slaves but themselves. They have had to reconstruct everything in order to make that system appear true" (Gilroy 1993, 178).

I, too, am interested in "the dreamer of the dream" (Morrison 1992a, 17), what the system of oppression did to the subject of the racialized discourses constructing blacks as inferior, intellectually backward, lazy, sexually insatiable, and always available; that is, I am oriented toward the construction of the white self as superior and full of entitlement. I offer my reading of the consequences of slavery in the western part of the empire, Suriname and the Antilles, on white Dutch self-representation. The bulk of the book is dedicated to an investigation of how these complex configurations have become intertwined with current dominant regimes of truth, with an emphasis on cultural productions in the past two decades.

The book's main thesis is thus that an unacknowledged reservoir of knowledge and feelings based on four hundred years of imperial rule have played a vital but unacknowledged part in the dominant meaning-making processes taking place in Dutch society, until now. This insight has already been ominously and forcefully formulated by one of the forefathers of postcolonial studies, Martiniquan Aimé Césaire (1972) in his much-overlooked *Discourse on Colonialism*. Césaire, writing immediately after World War II, courageously chastised Europe: "What am I driving at? At this idea: that no one colonizes innocently, that no one colonizes with impunity either; that a nation which colonizes, that a civilization which justifies colonization—

and therefore force—is already a sick civilization, a civilization that is morally diseased, that irresistibly, progressing from one consequence to another, one repudiation to another, calls for its Hitler, I mean its punishment" (1972, 39).

Césaire drew intimate connections between the racist methods used in the colonies to discipline the "natives"—the Arabs in Algeria, the coolies of India, and the blacks of Africa—and the Nazi methods later used and perfected against the Jews and other others in Europe. The memory of the Holocaust as the epitome and model of racist transgression in Europe erases the crimes that were perpetrated against the colonized for four centuries. This excision coincides with the representation that the history and reality of Europe are located on the continent and that what happened in the colonies is no constitutive part of it. This frame of mind—splitting, displacement, in psychoanalytical terms—is still operative to this day, for instance, in the way that the memory of World War II is conceptualized. It is the memory of what happened in the metropole and of the many Jews who were abducted and killed, not about what happened in the colonies at the time (Van der Horst 2004). Trying to insert those memories into the general memory often meets with hostility and rejection.[3]

At the same time, this regime of truth has enabled Europe to indulge in the myth of racial purity, as homogeneously white. The statement "no one colonizes innocently; no one colonizes with impunity either" points to the deeply layered and stacked consequences colonization has had for the European metropoles and their sense of self, which also forms my point of departure. It is noteworthy that while the concept of race finds its origin in Europe and has been one of its main export products, still it is generally the case that race is declared an alien body of thought to Europe, coming to this continent from the United States or elsewhere. In *European Others*, Fatima El-Tayeb powerfully states, "To reference race as native to contemporary European thought, however, violates the powerful narrative of Europe as a colorblind continent, largely untouched by the devastating ideology it exported all over the world. This narrative, framing the continent as a space free of 'race' (and, by implication, racism), is not only central to the way Europeans perceive themselves, but also has gained near-global acceptance" (2011, xv).

Discussions in different disciplinary areas, including gender studies,

about the appropriateness of race as an analytic in Europe often reach untenable conclusions that other categories like class are more pertinent to the European reality or that the supposed black-white binary of U.S. race relations makes it unfit as a model for studying European societies (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1999; Griffin with Braidotti 2002; Lutz, Vivar, and Supik 2011). In this introductory chapter, I first sketch three long-standing paradoxical features in dominant Dutch self-representation, which collectively point to white innocence (Wekker 2001). Next, I outline the three central concepts I use in this study—innocence, the cultural archive, and dominant white Dutch self-representation—and subsequently I lay out the theoretical and methodological stakes of the project; finally, I map the chapters.

Paradoxes in White Dutch Self-Representation

In trying to capture some significant features of white Dutch self-representation, a good place to start is three paradoxes that immediately present themselves to the eye of the outsider (within).[4] The dominant and cherished Dutch self-image is characterized by a series of paradoxes that can be summed up by a general sense of being a small but ethically just nation that has something special to offer to the world. Current exceptionalism finds expression in aspirations to global worth, which are realized in The Hague being the seat of several international courts of justice, such as the Rwanda and Srebrenica tribunals. Just as during the imperial era, Our Indies, that vast archipelago of Indonesian islands known as "the emerald belt," were what set the small kingdom of the Netherlands apart and made it a world player, now the Netherlands prides itself on its role as an adjudicator of international conflicts. Thus, the mid-twentieth-century trauma of losing Our Indies,[5] which fought for their independence from the Netherlands during two wars, finds a late twentieth-century parallel in the fall of Srebrenica (1995), in former Yugoslavia, when at least six thousand Muslim men and boys under the protection of a Dutch UN battalion were killed by Serbians under the command of General Ratko Mladić. Together with his superior, Radovan Karadzic, a Bosnian-Serbian leader, Mladić has been on trial in The Hague since 2012, with various postponements and reopenings of the tribunal. The two events, thoroughly different as they are, have significantly shaken the cherished Dutch self-representation.

A first paradox is that the majority of the Dutch do not want to be identified with migrants, although at least one in every six Dutch people has migrant ancestry. Whether it is Spanish and Portuguese Jews, Huguenots, Belgians, Hungarians, people from Indonesia, Suriname, Antilleans, or Turks and Moroccans, the Netherlands is a nation of (descendants of) migrants. Of course there are different ways to identify for elite migrants—Huguenots, Sephardic Jews (among others, Spinoza), Flemings, English, and Scottish— who came with capital and know-how and who helped launch Dutch prosperity, and for other, lumpen migrants, especially Germans and Scandinavians. But my point is exactly that the class positionings of one's migrant ancestors are less significant than their places of origin, specifically whether their heritage in terms of visible difference in skin color could be shed as fast as possible. While several migratory movements, mainly from surrounding or nearby countries, such as Germany, France, Portugal, Spain, and Italy, occurred from the sixteenth century on, the country remained overwhelmingly white until the middle of the twentieth century. Postwar migration to the Netherlands consisted of three major groups: postcolonial migrants from the (former) empire,[6] labor migrants from the circum-Mediterranean area and recently from Eastern Europe,[7] and refugees from a variety of countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. All in all, of a total population of 16.8 million people, 3.6 million (21.4 percent) are allochthonous (i.e., coming from elsewhere), 2 million of which are "non-Western" (12 percent) and 1.6 million (9.4 percent) Western (CBS 2014, 26). If one goes back further in history than three generations, probably the percentage of migrants would be even higher. The specific use of the term "migrant" is problematical in a Dutch context, because, depending on the country of birth, interpellating especially the four largest migrant groups—Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese, and Antilleans—the children and grandchildren of migrants remain migrants until the fourth generation. I return to this and related terminology in the section on theory and methodology.

The ubiquitousness of migrant pasts is, however, not the dominant self-image that circulates in dominant Dutch self-representation. Whereas in the private sphere stories may be woven about a great-grandmother who came from Poland, Italy, or Germany, in the public sphere such stories do

not add to one's public persona; they are rather a curiosity. There is a popular TV program *Verborgen Verleden* (Hidden past), in which well-known Dutch people go in search of their ancestry. Almost invariably, foreign ancestors show up, as well as the other way around, ancestors who went to Our Indies or Suriname. Invariably, this comes as a great surprise to the protagonists. I read this phenomenon as saying something significant about Dutch self-representation, for instance, in comparison with North American self-representation, where everyone knows and seemingly takes pride in their ancestry: in the Netherlands there is minimal interest in those elements that deviate from Ur Dutchness, which might mark one as foreign, or worse, *allochtoon*, that is, racially marked.

Belonging to the Dutch nation demands that those features that the collective imaginary considers non-Dutch—such as language, an exotic appearance, *een kleurtje hebben*, "having a tinge of color" (the diminutive way in which being of color is popularly indicated), outlandish dress and convictions, non-Christian religions, the memory of oppression—are shed as fast as possible and that one tries to assimilate. For new immigrants, for instance, the test for entrance into the Netherlands, the so-called integration exam, turns "the right of citizenship into a demand for cultural loyalty" (De Leeuw and van Wichelen 2014, 339), whereby cultural values, such as gender and gay equality, which are at least contested in Dutch circles, are presented as normative and nonnegotiable to newcomers. In the public sphere the assimilation model of monoethnicism and monoculturalism is so thorough that all signs of being from elsewhere should be erased. Of course, those who can phenotypically pass for Dutch, that is, those who are white, are in an advantageous position. It is migrants with dark or olive skin who do not succeed in enforcing their claim on Dutchness or have it accepted as legitimate. The main model for dealing with ethnic/racial difference is assimilation and those who cannot or will not be assimilated are segregated (Essed 1994). Thus, notwithstanding the thoroughly mixed makeup of the Dutch population in terms of racial or ethnic origins, the dominant representation is one of Dutchness as whiteness and being Christian. This image of Dutchness dates from the end of the nineteenth century, with the centralization and standardization of Dutch language and culture (Lucassen and Penninx 1993).[8]

My own family migrated to the Netherlands in December 1951, when my father, who was a police inspector in the Surinamese force (Klinkers 2011), qualified to go on leave for six months to the "motherland," where we eventually stayed permanently. I admire my parents for having made the decision to migrate, both of them twenty-nine years old, with five children under eight years of age, because migration at the time, given the price of passage by boat, meant that they would most likely never see their families and country of birth again. The regulation for leave in the motherland was of course meant for white Dutch civil servants only, who should not "go native," losing their sense and status of being Dutch, but my father had risen to a rank where he qualified for that perk. He had already started to learn Latin on his own in Paramaribo, wanting to study law in Amsterdam, which was not possible in Suriname. The highest secondary educational level in Suriname at the time was MULO or more extended lower education (Gobardhan-Rambocus 2001), and he had to pass an exam in Latin, *colloquium doctum*, to be admitted to the University of Amsterdam. In one of our family albums, there is a photo of the five Wekker siblings in Artis, the wonderful zoo that we lived practically next door to (figure I.1). It was only decades later that I realized that the reason why we found our first house in the old Jewish neighborhood of Amsterdam was that 70 percent of Jews in the Netherlands were abducted during World War II.

On a sunny day in the summer of 1952, the Wekker siblings, of which I was the youngest at the time,[9] were sitting on and standing by a donkey in Artis. At the edges of the photo are postwar white, Dutch people, in simple summer clothes, looking at us, enamored because we were such an unusual sight: "just like dolls." My mother, in later years, would often speak of the uncomfortable sensation that wherever we went, we were the main attraction. She drew the line at curious strangers touching our skin and hair. My mother was deeply disillusioned about the fact that, having come to the motherland, we did not have an indoor shower and had to bathe in a tub in the kitchen, as was usual at the time. We had had an indoor shower in Suriname and now had to go to the communal bathhouse every Saturday (Wekker 1995). We were one of the first Afro-Surinamese families to migrate to the Netherlands, where previously mostly single men and women had come to seek opportunity in the motherland. My family became subject to the same postwar disciplining regime that was meant for

Figure I.1   The Wekker siblings in 1952.
Photo from the collection of the author.

"weakly adjusted," white lower-class people and orientalized Indonesians (Indos) coming from Indonesia in the same period (Rath 1991). Indos are the descendants of white men and indigenous women, who formed an intermediate stratum between whites and indigenous people in the colony, and for whom it was no longer safe, after World War II, to stay in Indonesia, which was fighting for its independence from the Netherlands. The postwar uplifting regime consisted of regular unexpected visits from social workers, who came to inspect whether we were duly assimilating, that is, whether my mother cooked potatoes instead of rice, that the laundry was done on Monday, that we ate minced meatballs on Wednesday, and that the house was cleaned properly. I imagine that if we had not measured up, we would have fallen under the strict socialization regime meant for

those postwar, working-class families, who failed the standards and were sent to resocialization camps. Clearly, a gendered regime was operative, where, as in all families at the time, men were supposed to work outside the home and women were good housewives. What has remained firmly in our family lore of those early years is that the Dutch were curious but helpful; an atmosphere of benevolent curiosity toward us reigned (Oostindie and Maduro 1985).

Let's briefly fast-forward and juxtapose this situation to an event five decades later in May 2006, the fateful night when Minister Rita Verdonk of Foreigners' Affairs and Integration, white and a former prison director, representing the VVD (the conservative People's Party for Freedom and Democracy), repeatedly told Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a black female member of parliament for the same party and a former refugee from Somalia, that since she had lied about her exact name and her date of birth in order to obtain Dutch citizenship, the minister was now forced to revoke it.[10] Playing on the time-honored expression *gelijke monniken, gelijke kappen* (equality for all),[11] this could also mean that Hirsi Ali would lose her seat in parliament. This night has etched itself into my consciousness and that of many others, as a traumatic wake-up call to our precarious existence as people of color in the Dutch ecumene. For many white Dutch people, the event was shocking and deeply unsettling, too, because it brought the German occupation back to mind, of being witness to a frightening display of authoritarian rule that brought back the *Befehl ist Befehl* ethos of the war years, that is, rules exist to be obeyed (Pessers 2006). Thus, the differing cultural imaginaries—World War II for the white majority versus an existential feeling of being unsafe for people of color as eternal foreigners—that different parts of the population experienced were brought home forcefully that night. Although race was not mentioned at all, Verdonk was frightening in her lack of imagination and lack of intellectual agility in presenting her arguments for the decision to revoke Hirsi Ali's citizenship.[12] She just read out loud, over and over, what her civil servants had written down for her. A deeply existential fear overtook many of us, sitting mesmerized through the televised spectacle, which went on all night: For if this could happen to Hirsi Ali, who was then seemingly at the top of her game, having injected the debate on multicultural society with her radical anti-Islam positions, seeing Islam as basically incompatible with a modern society and with women's and gay emancipation (Ghorashi 2003), then what about the rest of us? Who among

us, black, migrants, and refugees, would ever be able to feel safe again in the Netherlands? She was at the height of her popularity among a circle of some influential white feminists, but especially among middle- and upper-class white men, and she basked for a while in their enamoration; they called themselves "friends of Ayaan" and dubbed her "the new Voltaire." Her popularity was, in my reading, to a large extent due to a toxic combination of the exoticization of a noble, enlightened black African princess and the fact that Hirsi Ali's teachings—it is not "we" who have to change, but "them," the Muslim barbarians, who do not fit into the modern Dutch nation—gave license to many of her followers to say things out loud about Muslims that had been unspeakable before. The element of sexual racism was abundantly present. Her figuration acted, on an emotional and sexual plane, as the catalyst for releasing the pent-up feelings brewing in the cultural archive; an intelligent black woman, beautiful, attractive, with a mysterious, wounded sexuality that would supposedly be healed by white male intervention. Apart from the well-known white male rescuer fantasy, the entire configuration is consonant with an often-invoked white man's dream to be with an intelligent black woman, who always already has the sexual capital of wildness and abandon at her disposal that has traditionally been associated with black women (Bijnaar 2007). This is the dream that the male protagonist of Robert Vuijsje's (2008) best-selling novel *Alleen maar nette mensen* (Only decent people) entertains. The spectacle staged on and around Ayaan Hirsi Ali also brings to mind the hypothesis of Jan Nederveen Pieterse (1990) that Europe is more fascinated by black women, while the United States is obsessed with black men. These fantasies were intimately connected to the Dutch cultural archive, and they were reduced to ashes and smoke once Hirsi Ali found her bearings at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, DC. She found herself a new lover, a couple of academic notches above the old one, and generally had little use for the Netherlands and her old admirers anymore, who were left by the wayside like jilted lovers. In the spring of 2013, she obtained U.S. citizenship.

From the benevolence embedded in a 1952 snapshot to the public abjection of a powerful black woman, I am interested in the self that constructs these hysterical, excessive, repressed projections. Throughout the text, I use such thickly descriptive and analytical vignettes to make sense of the Netherlands, having lived through such widely diverging attitudes, climates, and discourses toward the black, migrant, and refugee other.

A second marked paradox in dominant Dutch self-representation involves the recent past. The dominant self-image is that of innocent victim of German occupation during World War II. This representation has for a long time overlooked other populations that were intimately involved in the horrors of the time and who are more correctly conceptualized as (co)victims of the Dutch, and the gradual realization of this omission has thrown a less favorable light on the preparedness of the Dutch to protect and defend their fellow citizens, the Jews, than had earlier been imagined. Although a fourteen-volume standard work was published, *The Kingdom of the Netherlands during World War II* (De Jong, 1969–1991), it is only in the past three decades that the fate of the majority of Dutch Jews, who were transported to and killed in German concentration camps, has taken a more central place in the historiography of and the literature about World War II (Leydesdorff 1998; Withuis 2002; Hondius 2003; Gans 2014). Whether it was because of the excellent administrative system that kept track of the particulars of the citizenry, and that served the Germans well in their deadly mission, or because of lack of empathy with the Jews, from no other Western country, with the exception of Poland, were as many Jews abducted and murdered in German concentration camps as from the Netherlands. As in other nations, unidirectional memory has focused on the Holocaust (Rothberg 2009), seemingly erasing all other traumas.[13]

The second overlooked aspect, which lasted until the end of the 1960s and still regularly rears its head and is then conveniently forgotten again, is that the Netherlands perpetrated excessive violence against Indonesia, which was fighting for its independence in roughly the same period and which had been fully expected to return to the imperial fold after its occupation by the Japanese. This violence hardly forms part of the Dutch self-image, much less the more than 100,000 victims of "pacification" outside of Java, at the turn of the twentieth century (Schulte Nordholt 2000). It is only in periodical, temporary flares that the historical connections between the Netherlands and Indonesia are lit up, the latest episode of which is the widows of Rawagede, West Java, who have sued the Dutch state for compensation for the massacre of their 431 husbands, fathers, and children in 1947. The euphemistic term "police actions" for two wars speaks volumes about a self-image that embraces innocence, being a small but just and

ethical guiding nation, internationally. The title *White Innocence* bespeaks this feature of Dutch self-representation.

THIRD PARADOX:
THE DUTCH IMPERIAL PRESENCE IN THE WORLD

The third, overriding paradox involves the more distant past: There was, until the last decade of the twentieth century, a stark juxtaposition between the Dutch imperial presence in the world, since the sixteenth century, and its almost total absence in the Dutch educational curriculum, in self-image and self-representations such as monuments,[14] literature, and debates about Dutch identity, including the infamous debates about multicultural society in the past two decades, which have resulted in the almost unanimous conclusion that multiculturalism has failed. Judging by curricula at various educational levels, from grade school to university level, it is the best-kept secret that the Netherlands has been a formidable imperial nation. Students in my classes are always surprised and appalled when they hear about the Dutch role in the slave trade and colonialism, often for the first time. In the last decades some change in consciousness of the Dutch imperial past has come about. In 2006, a national committee composed a national historical canon with fifty windows, or separate items, that covered the aspects of Dutch national history that students were supposed to know about: "those valuable elements of our culture and history that we would like through education to transmit to new generations" (Van Oostrom et al. 2006, 4). Six of these fifty windows have something to do with colonialism, slavery, and the slave trade. Although slavery has been a part of the compulsory core goals of history education since 1993, it is up to the individual teacher to decide how much time to devote to the topic. Research on sixteen secondary schools in Amsterdam showed that the number of hours varied from less than one school hour to more than twelve hours, depending on the racial positioning of the teacher and the composition of the school population (Mok 2011).

An earlier noteworthy event in the breaking of silence around the Dutch imperial past was the establishment of a monument to commemorate slavery in Amsterdam in 2002, which was initiated by the Afro-European women's organization Sophiedela and a briefly favorable political climate, with a national government including the Labor Party and D66 (Democrats 66). These parties were favorably inclined to honor the requests of Sophiedela

and other black organizations for a monument. Subsequently a counterpart was established: NiNsee, the National Institute of Dutch Slavery and Heritage past and present, also founded in 2002.[15] This institute, subsidized by the government and the city of Amsterdam, sadly did not live to celebrate its tenth birthday, because it was, like other memorials to the past such as the library of the Royal Tropical Institute and other institutions in the cultural field, abolished by the government Rutte-I, 2010–2012, in which the Conservative Democrats, VVD, in coalition with the Christian Democrats, were supported by Geert Wilders's xenophobic and populist Party for Freedom, PVV. This unholy trinity managed, despite the protected status of NiNsee and guarantees for its continued existence and growth, to end its subsidized status as of January 1, 2013. In an ethno-nationalist frenzy and on the attack against cultural "leftist hobbies," fueled by PVV, against "everything that is of value,"[16] the infrastructure to produce and disseminate knowledge about Dutch slavery past and present was almost annihilated. That anything, the barest shell, is left standing of NiNsee is due to the city of Amsterdam, traditionally led by the Labor Party and other leftist parties, which continues to subsidize the offices and a minimal staff. Professor of sociology Abram de Swaan raised a rare voice when he spoke at the 150-year Commemoration of the Abolition of Slavery on July 1, 2013:

> NiNsee was a gesture of contrition, an institutional way to apologize for past crimes of the Netherlands towards its Afro-Caribbean population. That is no small matter. It is about restoring one's own honour by honouring the humanity of the other. It is about a debt of honour. You cannot just withdraw that gesture when it happens to be a convenient way to cut costs. To retract that gesture is dishonourable. It was and is a mortal insult to all Africans they once enslaved. (2013, 6)

He lucidly remarked that the fate of NiNsee mirrors how the Netherlands looks at its postcolonial citizens: "still not taken seriously, not their past of slavery, nor their present presence in this country" (De Swaan 2013, 6). And I would add: disposable, with nothing meaningful to contribute in terms of knowledge production, nothing that "we" would want or need to know about, who should assimilate and quit moaning about the past. Thus, what we see in the fate of NiNsee is not merely a cutting of costs in dire economic times, but, in light of the cultural archive, an active excision

of a fledgling knowledge infrastructure that might have produced valuable knowledge about "us."

<p style="text-align:center">□———————□</p>

We are still a long way away from understanding the complex relationships between the Dutch global, imperial role, on the one hand, and the internal erasure of this role and the current revulsion against multiculturality, on the other. The past forms a massive blind spot, which barely hides a structure of superiority toward people of color. As long as the Dutch imperial past does not form part of the common, general store of knowledge, which coming generations should have at their disposal, as long as general knowledge about the exclusionary processes involved in producing the Dutch nation does not circulate more widely, multiculturalism now cannot be realized, either. People of color will forever remain *allochtonen*, the official and supposedly innocuous term meaning "those who came from elsewhere," racializing people of color for endless generations, never getting to belong to the Dutch nation. The counterpart of "allochtonen" is *autochtonen*, meaning "those who are from here," which, as everyone knows, refers to white people. Thus, the supposedly most innocent terms for different sections of the population are racializing, without having to utter distasteful racial terms (Wekker and Lutz 2001). I return to this terminology in the section on theory and methodology.

Forgetting, glossing over, supposed color blindness, an inherent and natural superiority vis-à-vis people of color, assimilating: those are, broadly speaking, the main Dutch models that are in operation where interaction with racialized/ethnicized others is concerned. Persistently, an innocent, fragile, emancipated white Dutch self is constructed versus a guilty, uncivilized, barbaric other, which in the past decades has been symbolized mostly by the Islamic other, but at different times in the recent past blacks (i.e., Afro-Surinamese, Antilleans, and Moluccans) have occupied that position. It is within this dominant context that black, migrant, and refugee communities have had to come to self-actualization in the past seventy years. Black Dutch people (and other racialized/ethnicized others) are confronted with an enormous paradox. The implicit and infernal message, the double bind we get presented with all the time is: "If you want to be equal to us, then don't talk about differences; but if you are different from us,

then you are not equal" (Prins 2002). This basic but deep-seated knowledge and affect, stemming from an imperial cultural archive, will have purchase too in other former imperial nations, where a now near other has to be dealt with in proximity.

Three Central Concepts

INNOCENCE

It is heartening to see, with a number of recent publications, the first sign in three decades (Balkenhol 2014; Essed and Hoving 2014; Hondius 2014a and b) that older and younger scholars are—against all odds and certainly not making it easy on themselves, in terms of a propitious mainstream academic career—engaging with the history and the present of Dutch race relations.[17] It seems—to use an apt watery metaphor—as if a long-blocked-off stream has suddenly found the proverbial hole in the dyke and is now rushing forth. In this section, I want to lay out how I understand and use the three central concepts in this book, that is, innocence, the cultural archive, and white Dutch self-representation. Let's first consider innocence. Amid the complexity and the manifold understandings of Dutch racism that are unfolding, I am foregrounding the notion of white innocence, although I certainly do not contest nor erase the other approaches that have been put forward, and I invoke them whenever appropriate. Innocence, in my understanding, has particular resonance in the Dutch landscape, not only because it is such a cherished self-descriptor, but also because it fits with a chain of other associations that are strongly identified with: First, there is innocence as the desired state of being that is invoked in the Christian religion. While since the end of the 1960s Christian churches as institutions have crumbled, the underlying worldview has not. Jesus is the iconic innocent man. He does not betray others; he shares what little he possesses; he does not use violence nor commit sins; he lives in poverty; he cures the sick, turns the other cheek, and is goodness incarnate—yet he is sentenced to death.[18] He undergoes this treatment for the good of humanity, selflessly putting others' interests before his own. Unquestionably, there is a nobility in Jesus that is to be emulated and that many people, notwithstanding widespread secularism, subscribe to. Second, there is the association of innocence with being small: a small nation, a small child. Being small, one might easily and metaphorically be looked upon as a child, not able to play

with the big guys, either on the block or in the world, but we have taken care of the latter predicament by being a trustworthy and overeager U.S. ally.[19] An undisputed corollary of being a small child is, in our located, cultural understanding, its undiluted innocence and goodness. Being small, we need to be protected and to protect ourselves against all kinds of evil, inside and outside the nation. Third, in a traditional worldview, innocence also carries feminine connotations, as that which needs to be protected, that which is less strong and aggressive but more affectionate and relational. Fourth, innocence, furthermore, enables the safe position of having license to utter the most racist statements, while in the next sentence saying that it was a joke or was not meant as racist.[20] The utterer may proclaim to be in such an intimate, privileged relationship to the black person addressed, that he or she is entitled to make such a statement. I pay attention to this preferential mode of bringing across racist content by means of humor and irony in chapter 1. Fifth, the claim of innocence is also strong in other European, former imperial nations, such as Sweden. It is striking that we still lack studies of whiteness, within a European context, that would also enable intra-European comparisons (but see Griffin with Braidotti 2002). The case of Sweden is interesting, because characteristics comparable to the Dutch case come to the fore, that is, the widespread and foundational claim to innocence, Swedish exceptionalism, and "white laughter" (Sawyer 2006; Habel 2012). This commonality might point to innocence, not knowing, being one of the few viable stances that presents itself when the loss of empire is not worked through, but simply forgotten. The anger and violence accompanying innocence may be understood as a strand within the postcolonial melancholia syndrome (Gilroy 2005), and I return to it in chapter 5.

Innocence, in other words, thickly describes part of a dominant Dutch way of being in the world. The claim of innocence, however, is a double-edged sword: it contains not-knowing, but also not wanting to know, capturing what philosopher Charles W. Mills (1997, 2007) has described as the epistemology of ignorance. Succinctly stated, "the epistemology of ignorance is part of a white supremacist state in which the human race is racially divided into full persons and subpersons. Even though—or, more accurately, precisely because—they tend not to understand the racist world in which they live, white people are able to fully benefit from its racial hierarchies, ontologies and economies" (Sullivan and Tuana, 2007, 2). This not-understanding, which can afflict white and nonwhite people alike, is

connected to practices of knowing and not-knowing, which are forcefully defended. Essed and Hoving also point to "the anxious Dutch *claim of innocence* and how disavowal and denial of racism may merge into what we have called *smug ignorance*: (aggressively) rejecting the possibility to know" (2014b, 24). Using the r-word in a Dutch context is like entering a minefield; the full force of anger and violence, including death threats, is unleashed, as the case of Zwarte Piet or Black Pete shows so clearly (chapter 5).[21] The behavior and speech acts of his defenders do not speak of innocence but rather of "*an ignorance militant, aggressive, not to be intimidated, an ignorance that is active, dynamic, that refuses to go quietly—not at all confined to the illiterate and uneducated but propagated at the highest levels of the land, indeed presenting itself unblushingly as* knowledge" (Mills 2007, 13, emphasis in original).

I expressly mean innocence to have this layered and contradictory content, this tongue-in-cheek quality: notwithstanding the many, daily protestations in a Dutch context that "we" are innocent, racially speaking; that racism is a feature found in the United States and South Africa, not in the Netherlands; that, by definition, racism is located in working-class circles, not among "our kind of middle-class people"; much remains hidden under the univocality and the pure strength of will defending innocence. I am led to suspect bad faith; innocence is not as innocent as it appears to be, which becomes all the more clear, again as the case of Zwarte Piet/Black Pete illuminates.

In sum, innocence speaks not only of soft, harmless, childlike qualities, although those are the characteristics that most Dutch people would wholeheartedly subscribe to; it is strongly connected to privilege, entitlement, and violence that are deeply disavowed. Loss of innocence, that is, knowing and acknowledging the work of race, does not automatically entail guilt, repentance, restitution, recognition, responsibility, and solidarity but can call up racist violence, and often results in the continued cover-up of structural racism.[22] Innocence also includes the field that has become the center of my explorations: sexual racism. There is denial and disavowal of the continuities between colonial sexuality and contemporary sexual modalities. Since innocence is not monolithic, nor fixed or immutable, and since it involves psychic and cultural work, in all the chapters I am concerned with the question of how innocence is accomplished and maintained.

Often when I have given presentations in the Netherlands on the topics in this book, people have asked me where this cultural archive is located: is it in Amsterdam or in Middelburg, the capital of the province of Zeeland, the site from which slavers left for Africa, their first stop on the triangle trade route? My answer is that the cultural archive is located in many things, in the way we think, do things, and look at the world, in what we find (sexually) attractive, in how our affective and rational economies are organized and intertwined. Most important, it is between our ears and in our hearts and souls. The question is prompted by a conception of an archive as a set of documents or the institution in which those documents are housed.[23] My use of the term refers to neither of those two meanings, but to "a repository of memory" (Stoler 2009, 49), in the heads and hearts of people in the metropole, but its content is also silently cemented in policies, in organizational rules, in popular and sexual cultures, and in commonsense everyday knowledge, and all of this is based on four hundred years of imperial rule. I read all of these contemporary domains for their colonial content, for their racialized common sense. The content of the cultural archive may overlap with that of the colonial archive, in which the documents, classifications, and "principles and practices of governance" (Stoler 2009, 20) pertaining to the colonies are stored. Knowledges in different domains have travelled between colonies and metropoles and vice versa, but with the cultural archive I expressly wish to foreground the memories, the knowledge, and affect with regard to race that were deposited within metropolitan populations, and the power relations embedded within them.

I stay close to the spirit in which Edward Said used the concept of cultural archive, as outlined above, although he does not give many clues as to how to operationalize it, outside the domain of culture, taken as poetry and fiction, that is, the body of novels metropolitan authors produced during imperialism. Said convincingly shows how those novels were not insulated from "the prolonged and sordid cruelty of such practices as slavery, colonialist and racial oppression and imperial subjection" (1993, xiv), but helped fuel imperial expansion and subjecthood in the metropole. My objects of study pertain to dominant white self-representation, to policies, principles, and practices, and to feelings. In my reading, the transmitting of racialized knowledge and affect between the colonial and the metropolitan parts of empire took place within what can be conceptualized as one

prolonged and intense contact zone (Pratt 1992). It helps to conceptualize the cultural archive along similar lines as Bourdieu (1977) does for habitus, that is, "that presence of the past in the present," a way of acting that people have been socialized into, that becomes natural, escaping consciousness. The habitus of an individual springs forth from experiences in early childhood, within a particular social setting, often a family, and Bourdieu understands such processes in terms of class. Habitus is "history turned into nature" (Bourdieu 1977, 78), structured and structuring dispositions, that can be systematically observed in social practices. In a comparable fashion, racial notions must also have been transmitted to following generations, sometimes above, often below the level of consciousness. I am not implying that the cultural archive or its racialized common sense has remained the same in content over four hundred years, nor that it has been uncontested, but those historical questions, important as they are, are not, cannot be my main concern. Standing at the end of a line, in the twenty-first century, I read imperial continuities back into a variety of current popular cultural and organizational phenomena.

WHITE DUTCH SELF-REPRESENTATION

What does it mean to think in terms of dominant white Dutch self-representation? I understand the Dutch metropolitan self, in its various historical incarnations, as a racialized self, with race as an organizing grammar of an imperial order in which modernity was framed (Stoler 1995; McClintock 1995). Racial imaginations are part and parcel of the Dutch psychological and cultural makeup; these imaginations are intertwined with our deepest desires and anxieties, with who we are.[24] Although the project does not aim to be predominantly historical, it cannot escape addressing certain historical questions, because it offers such a different reading of Dutch history than dominant versions of that history rehearse. "To account for racism is to offer a different account of the world," as Sara Ahmed (2012, 3) aptly remarked. Amid the grand narratives that mediate Dutch self-understanding—the perennial struggle against the water, the eighty-year armed resistance against being part of the Spanish Empire, the Golden Age, the struggle for religious freedom and pillarization—i.e. living within a Catholic, a Protestant, a socialist or a Humanist pillar as a way for people of different religious convictions to live peacefully together, the centrality of a way of negotiating to solve disputes, called *polderen*[25]—none evokes

race (e.g., Schama 1987; Israel 1998; Shorto 2013). Most often, religious, class and regional differences have been foregrounded as the primary differences that need to be taken into account when examining our culture. It is intriguing that imperial cultural figurations have stayed impervious to scrutiny for so long, in spite of rare voices to the contrary. I am operating on the assumption that race has been sorely missing from dominant accounts of the Netherlands and that this racial reign began with the Dutch expansion into the world in the sixteenth century. The construction of the European self and its others took place in the force fields of "conquest, colonisation, empire formation, permanent settlement by Europeans of other parts of the globe, nationalist struggles by the colonised, and selective decolonisation" (Brah 1996, 152). Contemporary constructions of "us," those constructed as belonging to Europe, and "them," those constructed as not belonging, though the specific groups targeted vary over time, still keep following that basic Manichean logic. This entails the fundamental impossibility of being both European, constructed to mean being white and Christian, and being black-Muslim-migrant-refugee.

Theoretical and Methodological Stakes of the Project

The kind of analysis that I undertake here, postcolonial and intersectional, builds on insights that unfortunately have not found much fertile ground yet in a Dutch context. My approach has three innovative aspects, which together will show the purchase of the model that I propose.

RACE, GENDER, AND SEXUALITY

First, I am simultaneously bringing together the central analytical concepts of race, gender, and sexuality, that is, intersectionality, in approaching white self-representation. Intersectionality is a theory and a methodology, importantly and initially based on black feminist thought, which not only addresses identitarian issues, as is commonly thought, but also a host of other social and psychological phenomena. It is a way of looking at the world that takes as a principled stance that it is not enough merely to take gender as the main analytical tool of a particular phenomenon, but that gender as an important social and symbolic axis of difference is simultaneously operative with others like race, class, sexuality, and religion (Crenshaw 1989; Wekker and Lutz 2001; Botman, Jouwe, and Wekker eds.

2001; Phoenix and Pattynama eds. 2006; Davis 2008; Lutz, Vivar, and Supik eds. 2011; Lykke 2010 and 2011; Lewis 2013; Cho, Crenshaw and McCall 2013). In fact, these grammars of difference coconstruct each other. The concepts of race, gender, and sexuality are lodged in different disciplinary academic fields, pointing to the alienness of thinking intersectionally in the traditional academic organization. Let's start with the more straightforward concepts: gender is located within the interdisciplinary field of gender studies. The school of thought called intersectionality finds a home in the interdiscipline of gender studies, although it has increasingly been taken up in other disciplines in the social sciences and the humanities as well. Sexuality, as another important axis of signification, finds a home in sexuality studies, where first gay and lesbian studies were initiated, later to be followed by queer studies, which takes distance from a fixed, immutable, inner sexual identification. It bears noting at this point that both of these (inter)disciplines behave as if their central objects of study—gender and sexuality—can be studied most intensely if other axes of signification are firmly kept out of sight. For both gender studies and sexuality studies or queer studies, this means that, a commitment to intersectionality notwithstanding, race is mostly evacuated.

Race presents a more complicated case in a Dutch context. It is a term that is not commonly utilized, since World War II, except to indicate varieties of animals and potatoes (Nimako and Willemsen 1993). Ethnicity is the term more often used, and it indicates the social system that gives meaning to ethnic differences between people—to differences based on origin, appearance, history, culture, language, and religion. Ethnicity, culture, and culturalization, supposedly softer entities, which, again supposedly, operate on cultural rather than on biological terrain, have been used in such hardened ways that biology and culture have become interchangeable in the stability that is ascribed to the cultures of others. In Dutch commonsense thought, but also in many academic discourses, the remarkable thing is that when ethnicity is invoked, it is "they," the other, allochthones, who are referenced, not autochthones. Just as within gender it is most often women and femininity that are called up, not men or masculinity, so within the realm of ethnicity being white is passed off as such a natural, invisible category that its significance has not been a research theme. As in many other places, such as the United States, "ethnic," as in ethnic cuisine, ethnic music, is everything except white. There is thus a systematic asym-

metry in the way we understand these dimensions, where the more powerful member of a binary pair—masculinity, whiteness—is consistently bracketed and is thereby invisibilized and installed as the norm (Wekker and Lutz 2001).

In the move to ethnicity and subsequently to culture and culturalization (Ghorashi 2006), the work that race used to do, ordering reality on the basis of supposed biological difference (although the term was banished), is still being accomplished. There is a fundamental unwillingness to critically consider the applicability of a racialized grammar of difference to the Netherlands. However, in the main terms that are still circulating to indicate whites and others, the binary pair autochtoon-allochtoon/autochthones-allochthones, race is firmly present, as well as in the further official distinction in the category of allochtoon: Western and non-Western. Both concepts, allochtoon and autochtoon, are constructed realities, which make it appear as if they are transparent, clearly distinguishable categories, while the cultural mixing and matching that has been going on cannot be acknowledged. Within the category of autochtoon there are many, as we have seen, whose ancestors came from elsewhere, but who manage, through a white appearance, to make a successful claim to Dutchness. Allochtonen are the ones who do not manage this, through their skin color or their deviant religion or culture. The binary thus sets racializing processes in motion; everyone knows that they reference whites and people of color respectively. The categories are not set in stone, however: In the past decades, some groups have been able to move out of the construction allochtoon. For example, Indos have firmly moved out and Surinamese people are on their way out, and it is now Islamic people, constructed as the ultimate other, who seem firmly lodged within it.

However much it is disavowed and denied in a Dutch context, I take race to be a fundamental organizing grammar in Dutch society, as it is in societies structured by racial dominance. I view race as a "socially constructed rather than inherently meaningful category, one linked to relations of power and processes of struggle, and one whose meaning changes over time. Race, like gender, is 'real' in the sense that it has real, though changing, effects in the world and real, tangible, and complex impacts on individuals' sense of self and life chances" (Frankenberg 1993, 11). I use the term "race" in this book, sometimes merely as race or racialization, sometimes in the combination race/ethnicity. That is, following Stuart Hall

(2000), I use race and ethnicity as two sides of the same coin, subsuming and merging a more natural, biological understanding of race with a more cultural view.

Finally, let me say something about the terms "black" and "white." I use them not as biological categories but as political and cultural concepts. As Stuart Hall remarks about "black": "The moment the signifier 'black' is torn from its historical, cultural and political embedding and lodged in a biologically constituted racial category, we valorize, by inversion, the very ground of racism we are trying to deconstruct. In addition, as always happens when we naturalize historical categories (think about gender and sexuality), we fix that signifier outside of history, outside of change, outside of political intervention" (1992, 29, 30). I follow Frankenberg's conceptualization of whiteness, in that whiteness refers to "a set of locations that are historically, socially, politically, and culturally produced, and, moreover are intrinsically linked to unfolding relations of domination. Naming 'whiteness' displaces it from the unmarked, unnamed status that is itself an effect of its dominance" (Hall 1992, 6).

When we finally, then, look at the location of the study of race in the academy, we have to conclude that race is not studied in the Netherlands, while ethnicity is, but only in the limited sense that it pertains to the other, as I lay out in more detail in chapter 2. The study of whiteness is strongly underilluminated. Thus, multitudes of studies on Surinamese, Antillean, Moroccan, and Turkish Dutch people, their positionings in the labor market, in education, and in housing are being done in academic institutes for ethnic studies. Popular, recently, are studies on ethnic profiling by the police, especially on men of color, which, as can be expected, is vehemently denied by academic institutes. Equally the recent deaths of young Antillean and Surinamese Dutch men at the hands of the police are downplayed. Other axes of signification, such as gender and sexuality, are in a familiar manner bracketed, put at a distance. In this book, I am breaking with the persistent tradition of foregrounding a single axis, in that I bring race, gender, and sexuality into conversation with each other, on the understanding that they all are part of each other's histories and representations and are refracted through each other (Somerville 2000; Alexander 2005).

The second innovative aspect is that I bring the history of the metropole and of the colonies into conversation with each other. Knowledge about Dutch overseas expansion is, not incidentally, in quarantine in a separate special- ization of the discipline of history; it is not an element of Dutch national history. General common and academic sense is the idea that colonialism- of-the-exterior (Brah 1996) has created a sufficiently convenient distance to the former Dutch colonies to make it possible to never have to take per- sistent imperial patterns of thought and affect into account when studying the Netherlands. It is noteworthy that it was Ann Laura Stoler, an American historical anthropologist who specializes in the Dutch East Indies (Indo- nesia until 1945), who first made the important observation in *Race and the Education of Desire* (Stoler 1995) that, compared to other European colonial nations like France and Great Britain, it is remarkable that in the Dutch academy, historical research and general ways of knowing have been set up in a way that the history of the metropole is structurally set apart from the history of the colonies. This was evident in the Dutch academy through the fact that within departments of history, the discipline was centrally structured such that there was a preponderance of majors, courses, and specializations that dealt with national history, while a small, separate mi- nority of curricular materials was devoted to the Dutch expansion in the world, meaning colonial history. While this is still the case in Leiden, other history departments have taken different routes in the past decades,[26] but that is not to say that there is an automatic engagement between historical developments that took place in the metropole, say policies on care for the elderly, the destitute, and orphans, and what repercussions these had in the East and the West, or the other way around. The metropolitan and co- lonial parts of Dutch colonial empire are still overwhelmingly treated, both inside and outside the academy, as separate worlds, the metropolitan and the colonial, that did not impinge upon each other. Stoler's challenge has, with a few exceptions (Waaldijk and Grever 2004; Van Stipriaan et al. 2007; Stuurman 2009; Legêne 2010) not been taken up by Dutch historians. In- deed, Caribbeanist and historian Gert Oostindie (2010, 260–65) is not alone when he argues that postcolonial studies have, with good justification, not found an eager reception nor many practitioners in the Netherlands, and he deems that not much is lost by that fact.

Third and finally, another breach with tradition is that in this book, I confront the very different reception and memories that the eastern and western parts of empire evoke in the Netherlands and how this difference still plays a part in current configurations. Comparison between the eastern part, Our Indies, and the western part of the Dutch empire, Suriname and the Dutch Antilles, is seldom undertaken. Almost by default, when the colonies are invoked, it is the Indies that are meant and foregrounded, usually without giving much attention to the active disappearance of the West. There is not much interaction between scholars specializing in the study of the Indies, on the one hand, and of Suriname and the Antilles, on the other.

Methodologically, I use what Judith Halberstam (1998) calls a scavenger methodology, making use of insights from gender and sexuality studies, discourse and narrative analysis, post- and decolonial theory, and psychoanalysis. I work with interviews, watching TV and reading novels, analyzing e-mail correspondence, my own and others' experiences and organizational structures, rereading historical texts, and doing close readings of various kinds, to eventually and jointly be able to sketch a picture of the cultural archive, the dominant white Dutch self and its representation.

Content of the Book

The first chapter, "Suppose She Brings a Big Negro Home," is devoted to a series of case studies of everyday racist events, taking its inspiration from popular culture, including everyday TV content, experiential accounts, and a novel. One case study deals with racial difference, featuring among others Martin Bril, a popular journalist who uttered a racist statement. Three experiential vignettes collectively point to characteristic, commonly occurring patterns in racism when dealing with black (men and) women in everyday encounters and discourses in the Netherlands: sexualization, relegation to the category of domestic servant/nanny, general inferiorization, and criminalization. To the average Dutch person, there is nothing wrong with any of these events; they are often seen as merely funny. One of the characteristic ways to bring racist content across is by using humor and irony. I will do close readings—Freudian, Fanonian, Du Boisian, and

postcolonial—of these meaningful moments and reflect on possible connections with the cultural archive.

Chapter 2, "The House That Race Built," addresses how race does its work in Dutch public policy and in the academy, pertaining to women's issues. More fundamentally, I explore the nature of the fear and aggression that is called up in many white people when they (have to) deal with racial or ethnic issues. I argue that at the root of the attention to the emancipation of women in the sphere of policy is a widespread and deep-seated, racialized conception that suffuses the object of policy making and seemingly naturally and self-evidently divides women into white, allochthonous, and Third World women. Race is at the basis of the division (Wekker 1994), and the same silent racialized ordering is also operative in the academy, in the division of labor within and between disciplines. I am taking up the discipline that I know best and where I was located for almost twenty years: the discipline of women's/gender studies is my special object of exploration, in trying to uncover what the fear of engaging with race/ethnicity consists of, among both students and faculty. Here we are in allied territory, mostly white women who are deeply driven by feelings of social justice, yet, notwithstanding the public claim to be doing intersectionality, they are deeply reluctant to truly grapple with race/ethnicity.

Chapter 3, "The Coded Language of Hottentot Nymphae," analyzes a psychoanalytical case study from 1917, in which three apparently white middle- or upper-class women in analysis in The Hague tell their psychoanalyst that they are suffering from "Hottentot nymphae," the contemporary term for enlarged labia minora, which are commonly associated with black women. Two features are intriguing about this case study: first, while the women use a racialized grammar to understand themselves, the psychoanalyst Dr. J. W. H. van Ophuijsen dismisses their claim and understands them as suffering from Freud's "masculinity complex," thus in terms of gender. I want to explore the meaning of this substitution of gender for race, which sites in society would provide these women with knowledge about race, and, finally, what the stakes are for the women and for the psychoanalyst. A second feature of this case study is that it shows that, contrary to what is commonly assumed, race was firmly present as a discourse in upper-class circles of the metropole, without black people being present in significant numbers. The fact that these women use a racialized

discourse to make sense of themselves runs counter to the commonly held view that race was absent in the Netherlands until the late 1940s, when the first postcolonial migrants started to arrive from the East Indies. I analyze the case study in terms of what it can tell us about the cultural archive.

The next chapter, "Of Homo Nostalgia and (Post)Coloniality," addresses gay politics in the Netherlands in the past decade. Starting from the jolting realization that at the penultimate national elections in 2010, white gay men voted overwhelmingly for PVV—the Party for Freedom, led by Islamo- and xenophobe Geert Wilders—I am interested, first, in tracing the history of the Dutch white gay movement in comparison with the women's liberation movement. This leads me, second, to explore how government policy in the field of gay liberation underwrites and sets up one particular, located conceptualization of homosexuality as universal, and how this thinking has become entwined with Islamophobia and nationalism. The strong Dutch version of homonationalism (Puar 2007) forcefully foregrounds the acceptance of homosexuality as the litmus test for modernity, while rejecting Islam. In this exploration, third, the figuration of Pim Fortuyn with his contradictory desires—rejecting Muslims and at the same time preferring them as his sexual partners in dark rooms—plays a pivotal role. His contradictory desires are straight from the colonial past and connect intimately to colonial sexual practices that were stored in the cultural archive.

Chapter 5 engages with popular culture again. I analyze the voluminous e-mail or hate mail addressed by members of the Dutch public to the Van Abbemuseum in Eindhoven, after a project in 2008 initiated by German and Swedish artists Annette Krauss and Petra Bauer critically interrogated the phenomenon of Zwarte Piet. This figuration, a black man with thick lips and golden earrings, clad in a colorful Moorish costume, and wielding deplorable grammar, is imagined to be a servant of a white bishop, Sinterklaas, who hails from Spain. The pair of them come to visit every year at the end of November, culminating in a merry evening on 5 December, when presents are given to children. Zwarte Piet is considered by many white Dutch people to be at the heart of Dutch culture, an innocent and thoroughly pleasant children's traditional festivity, but its critical reception since the 1970s, mainly by black people, precipitates a strong reaction in the majority of Dutch people. Critique of the phenomenon of Zwarte Piet elicits vehemently aggressive and defensive reactions, as expressed in the e-mail bombardment to the museum. I investigate the precise nature of

these reactions, the themes the correspondents brought up and the discourses they used to convey their unhappiness. Connecting this vehement affect to Gilroy's (2005) "postcolonial melancholia," I do a reading of the place of Zwarte Piet in white Dutch self-representation, in which innocence, in manifold senses, turns out to be central. What does all of this tell us about the cultural archive and Dutch self-perception?

Collectively these chapters, visiting different social and cultural domains, attempt a critical, intersectional, and decolonial reading of white Dutch self-representation, with special attention to the ways in which the racial economy, with its gendered, sexualized, and classed intersections, continues to underwrite dominant, racist ways of knowing and feeling. A characteristic of the Netherlands is, for those with eyes to see and some reflective capital, a particularly virulent form of racism, prominently displaying itself as sexualized racism, which is immediately denied and disavowed, all against a general background of national self-flattery and collective benevolent readings of the self.

Of Homo Nostalgia and (Post)Coloniality

Or, Where Did All the Critical White Gay Men Go?

"Haunting," the way in which abusive systems
of power make themselves known and their impacts
felt in everyday life, especially when they are
supposedly over and done with.

Avery F. Gordon, *Ghostly Matters*, 2008

Our times are suffused with nostalgia; from different corners our desires for the past, for better, clearly delineated, and "normal" times, are kindled. The Netherlands has attractively been constructed and represented as free, emancipated, tolerant, a beacon of civilization in the rising tide of Islamic and immigrant barbary coming ever closer. There is nostalgia for a time when religion faded from the public sphere and an autonomous, neoliberal self could be constructed. The sudden confrontation with Islam in the public sphere reminded the Dutch painfully of the Christian religion that they had just, within one generation from the end of the 1960s, gotten rid of, and they did not want to return to it (Van der Veer 2006). Others cherish a nostalgia for the 1950s when demographically the Netherlands were still unproblematically white and gender relations were clear, with men as breadwinners and women staying at home. In gay circles nostalgia is rampant, too: for the times when we were safe, could kiss and hold hands in public, before Muslims came and rained on our parade. When we could still live in our neighborhoods without being harassed by Moroccan boys, when the inexorable march of progress toward sexual liberation could proceed, without being hampered by uncivilized others. In none of these versions of nostalgia

is there any remembrance or accounting for an imperial past. The lament against Muslims was summed up by Pim Fortuyn (2002), icon of many white gay males, when he said in a much-quoted interview in *De Volkskrant*, headlined "Islam Is a Backward Religion," that he "does not feel like doing the emancipation of women and gays over again." It is clear at whose doorstep the blame is laid for the backlash against gays and lesbians, and the gains of women's emancipation are also deemed to be in grave danger.

I, too, am plagued by nostalgia. But it is not imperialist nostalgia that I long for (Rosaldo 1989). Imperialist nostalgia is a condition in which colonizers mourn the passing of what they themselves have altered, destroyed, or transformed; "it uses a pose of 'innocent yearning' both to capture people's imaginations and to conceal its complicity with often brutal domination" (Rosaldo 1989, 70). Imperialist nostalgia is so effective because it invokes a register of innocence; the responsible imperial agent is transformed into an innocent bystander, masking his involvement with processes of domination. Rather, I am driven by a critical nostalgia, with nonnormative sexualities as a basis upon which a politics of solidarity can take off, and for which hard work will be required. This nostalgia longs for a time when there was critical reflection and action upon the question of which alliances could be made between different categories of minority groups, migrants and gays, hetero women and lesbians. That attitude now is hard to come by, when we witness the retrograde and Islamophobic statements even at academic conferences, such as one held at the University of Amsterdam in January 2011, dedicated to the exploration of various sexual nationalisms (cf. Haritaworn 2012).

This chapter addresses gay politics in the Netherlands in the past decades, but also attempts a more in-depth excavation of homosexuality's genealogy, that is, its entanglement with race. A driving force for writing this chapter, one that has widely been swept under the carpet, was the—to me—jolting realization that at the national parliamentary elections on June 9, 2010, white gay men voted overwhelmingly for PVV, the Party for Freedom, under the leadership of Islamophobe and xenophobe Geert Wilders. The most popular political party among white Dutch gay men was PVV, while white lesbian women tended to vote more traditionally for leftist parties, like the Labor Party and the Green Left.[1] The strongest characteristics of PVV are an anti-European agenda, opposition to multiculturalism, especially advocacy for anti-Islamic measures, policies, and un-

derstandings, and support for women's and gay rights. Apart from its rare, antidemocratic political structure, which concentrates power in the hands of Wilders alone,[2] PVV stands out for an extraordinary coarseness in its political-rhetorical style, "telling things as they are," expressly seeking to insult and humiliate Muslims by using derogatory expressions like *kopvod-dentax*, which is a tax on the wearing of headscarves,[3] "hate palaces" to indicate mosques, and "street robbers and bandits" to refer to young Moroccan Dutch men. By constantly proposing ideas for the solution of the "Muslim problem" that are, as Wilders well knows, unconstitutional—such as his often-repeated proposal to send young offenders of Moroccan descent back to Morocco, though they have Dutch citizenship—he effectively helps to produce an atmosphere of fear and exclusion among Moroccan Dutch people, and he feeds the mind-set among the white Dutch population that finds Muslims inassimilable in the Netherlands and that favors their deportation. On March 12, 2014, on the evening of the municipal elections, Wilders asked his followers: "Do you want more or fewer Moroccans?" "Fewer, fewer, fewer," the crowd chanted. Wilders: "Then we are going to arrange that." In December 2014, The Public Prosecutor decided to sue Wilders for this statement.[4] PVV is Fortuyn's electoral heir, after his murder in June 2002, and it supports gay and women's liberation since these issues have become the litmus test for modernity, for who qualifies as belonging to the nation. In their electoral program of 2012, PVV stated explicitly, "We defend our gays against advancing Islam."[5]

In 2010, PVV showed enormous growth, expanding from nine to twenty-seven seats in parliament, thereby becoming the third largest party at the time. This electoral success led PVV to give extracoalitional support to the new government Rutte-I, consisting of VVD, Conservative Democrats, and Christian Democrats, which stayed in office until April 2012. The fact that these parties accepted PVV support in order to govern was unprecedented, lending credibility to this party, which had hitherto been politically shunned in a quasi-*cordon sanitaire*. After PVV wreaked considerable political havoc, putting pressure especially on Gerd Leers, the Christian Democrat minister responsible for immigration and integration policy, the upshot of this experiment was a swing to the right of the entire political spectrum.

I am interested, first, in tracing the history of the Dutch white gay movement in comparison with the women's liberation movement. These two major social movements of the second half of the twentieth century form

the backdrop of the developments I want to describe in this chapter. The existing historiography of these two movements is largely white, although women and gays and lesbians of color were already present when they took off.[6] To a very limited extent, I suggest some material that would have to be included in an inclusive gay and lesbian history. This will lead me, second, to explore governmental gay policy and which understandings of homosexuality it privileges, embraces, and defends. In other words, not just any form or manifestation of homosexuality will do, to be recognized by the government. Third, I want to investigate the political economy of desire that Pim Fortuyn was embedded in. One of the most forceful explanations is that gay liberation became entwined with Islamophobia through homonationalism, which forcefully foregrounds the acceptance of homosexuality as the litmus test for modernity, while rejecting Islam (Puar 2007). My exploration is a different one, a cultural archival one, although it will eventually also invoke homonationalism. I am interested in the figure of Pim Fortuyn with his contradictory desires—rejecting Muslims and at the same time allegedly preferring them as his sexual partners in dark rooms. I am arguing that Fortuyn's contradictory desires are not uniquely and idiosyncratically his; they are more widespread among white gay men. They come straight from the colonial past and connect intimately to the Dutch cultural archive. This chapter also and obviously is an exercise in thinking gender, race, sexuality, and nation together, in a country that prides itself on its progressive sexual politics.

Major Social Movements

As a general backdrop to this chapter, I want to zoom in on the two major Dutch social movements for emancipation that have been operative since the 1960s, the women's movement and, somewhat later, the gay liberation movement. Traditionally, the government has played an important role in emancipation movements, such as those of Catholics and Labor earlier in the twentieth century, which took place on a massive scale in the framework of pillarization. Actually, coalition governments were the expression of the balancing act between various societal groups, whereby power was divided for the sake of equality between the groups. From the end of the 1960s, the government also supported women and gays and lesbians, on a much smaller scale, by subsidizing their activities, doing research, and

designing policies to stimulate the aims of the groups. For the movements, the connection with the government not only means recognition but also a legitimization of their issues. When the black lesbian literary group of which I was a cofounder, Sister Outsider, asked the Directorate of Emancipation Affairs in 1984 and 1986 to incidentally subsidize the journey and visit of African American poet, essayist, and activist Audre Lorde to Amsterdam, it meant a major recognition of our activities (Wekker 1992; Hermans 2002; Ellerbe-Dueck and Wekker 2015).

A Short Excursion

Audre Lorde arrived on Friday, July 13, 1984, and all of Sister Outsider went to welcome her at Schiphol Airport. We had an elaborate lunch at my place. I had set the table with linen and a giant bouquet of sunflowers; we had white wine and I had baked coconut and chocolate pies. Audre was not supposed to eat rich foods, but she did anyway, displaying naughtiness and willfulness and making it clear that she was in charge of her own life. What struck me most about her was how full of life and joy she was. Whether it was good food, smart conversations, dancing, gossiping, taking notes, as she was continually doing, she was totally present. When she encountered someone, she gave that person the feeling that she really wanted to know her, without delay, as if she was saying, "Tell me your story; there is no time to lose." She had an incredible intensity and focus. It felt like basking in her light, and she made me feel beautiful and smart. On Saturday morning she had woken up early, before me, and had taken inventory of my bookshelves. When I woke up, she was ready to be enlightened about the history and sociology of Suriname. I talked to her for hours, while she was taking notes. I had just finished an article on "beautiful Joanna," a light-skinned enslaved woman who has been immortalized by her lover, the Scottish captain John Gabriel Stedman ([1790] 1988), who had come to Suriname to defeat the Maroons, who, in the view of the colonial government and the planters, were bringing the colony to ruin. During his sojourn in Suriname (1772–1777), Stedman kept a diary, in which Joanna features prominently; he also made numerous sketches of her, with her curly locks. Joanna refused to go to Europe with him after his period of service was over. Audre was mesmerized by the story and later wrote in her diary, "Learned more

about Suriname in an hour with Gloria Wekker" (based on my diary and on Ellerbe-Dueck and Wekker 2015).[7]

Returning to government funding of activist groups, the downside, of course, of this dependency on government funding is that organizations may cease to exist when policy changes, which is what happened to the larger women's movement, lately to a host of cultural institutions, and, as we saw in the introduction, to NiNsee, the National Institute of Dutch Slavery and Heritage. Thus, the government has considerable power to keep movements intact, to slow them down, or even undermine them.

The hegemonic Dutch reading is that the women's and gay movements have largely accomplished their aims, as is abundantly clear from the national pride taken in their accomplishments by politicians and the media, and in everyday discourses. One does not have to engage in the hyperbolic rhetoric of Pim Fortuyn (1997, 69–70) that the liberation of women and gays is "the greatest mental and cultural achievement after the creation of the welfare state in the modern history of mankind" to ascertain that this general sentiment has broad purchase in Dutch society and even that national identity, from left to right in the political spectrum, is bound up with a progressive, ultramodern, liberated self-image, in which the embrace of women's and gay liberation has increasingly become pivotal. In debates about Dutch multicultural society, there is in general a self-congratulatory national tone that the Netherlands is a paradise of emancipation. In order to sustain this fiction, one needs to overlook the still widely divergent income levels of men and women; the widespread sexual violence against all women, and the disproportionate presence of women from the south and eastern Europe in sex work.

It is striking that a vocal part of the women's movement was inspired, certainly in the early decades, by a radical difference agenda, an *Umwertung aller Werte*, a rejection of the reigning sexual morality, against monogamy and marriage, and against the limiting roles of men and women. Against the background of a very traditional division of labor between men and women, where women were supposed to be full-time homemakers, giving up paid work after marriage so that only single women worked outside the home, which lasted well into the 1970s, paid work became a spearhead of the women's movement. Other issues that were embraced and that, to this day, still have not been satisfactorily resolved include a more equitable

participation of women in the higher sectors of business and in the academy, equal pay for equal work, affordable child care, and combating sexual violence against women. In fact, it takes an exceptionally rosy outlook to claim that the emancipation of women has been accomplished, especially when, to consider but one indicator, paid work, we take into account that the usual 1.5 model, with men working full time and women usually half of the time, has increasingly become unassailable and the sign of progressive gender relations. Many women defend it as their personal choice, expressive of a neoliberal, hyperindividual outlook on life that has distinct blinders. It overlooks the often steep loss of income that they will suffer in case of a divorce, which happens in one out of every three marriages, and, in addition, the almost negligible pensions they will have built up over their working lives. In the case of black, migrant, and refugee women, the combination of divorce and pension loss takes even more dramatic forms (Wekker 2009b). The current minister of emancipation affairs, Dr. Jet Bussemaker, stresses the importance of women working (as close to) full time as possible, not only to avoid such a deplorable economic future, but also to encourage women to benefit society with their education, until recently largely financed by the state. The minister reaps mostly disdain and rejection, which points to the metamorphosis that emancipation has undergone in the past decades: from a collective struggle to increase women's autonomy in all domains of life, to emancipation as an individual choice, in which the government is seen as undesirably meddling in people's personal lives, which is experienced by many as superfluous.

Importantly, inserting an intersectional perspective, the women's movement was more prepared—at least in principle—than the gay movement to reflect on race as a social and symbolical grammar as important as gender. Although the debates about race in the women's movement, from the end of the 1970s on, were never satisfactorily resolved, and many black, migrant, and refugee women split off from the larger (white) women's movement in their own organizations, the introduction of intersectionality in the Dutch context acted as a dea ex machina; a dominant part of the women's movement and women's studies now interpreted race as a voluntary axis of signification: one could engage with it but did not have to. Meanwhile, (a part of) the women's movement accommodated itself to government policies and was able to erect an elaborate patchwork of women's institutions during the 1970s and 1980s. In the first decade of the

twenty-first century this quilt was all but destroyed, when the government in the person of Christian Democrat minister de Geus declared in 2003 that women's emancipation, except for that of black, migrant, and refugee women, was accomplished. Notwithstanding the many indications to the contrary—whether in terms of income and pensions, sexual violence predominantly directed at women or the steeply gendered yearly lists charting powerful and influential persons in the Netherlands—this move not only allowed the government to cut severely into women's subsidized organizations and networks, it also firmly reinstalled and reaffirmed racialized hierarchizations among women: It again positioned white women at the apex of emancipation, with their less fortunate "sisters," women of color and Third World women, in a lower station, as we saw in chapter 2. Many of the debates in the domain of women's emancipation, and the most heated ones, are dialogues between men about topics that have to do with black, migrant, and refugee women and their sexuality: clitoridectomy, the veil, the burka, the locking up of women, young women forcefully being married to men of their parents' choice, rather than reflecting on the usual subjects: equal pay for equal work, and so on. A subtext of these debates is a desire on the part of men to control the sexuality of women, including lesbian women of all hues. Or, as Gayatri Spivak famously remarked in "Can the Subaltern Speak?," the debates are about "white men rescuing brown women from brown men" (1994, 93).

The gay movement—and white men have populated this movement more thickly and thus have been at the forefront here—has from its inception been more interested in equality: equal rights, gay marriage, the right to adopt children, the right to copious consumption of all manner of material goods, and has pursued a more assimilationist agenda with the social, political, and cultural powers that be. It is noteworthy that the largest gay organization, COC, publicly supported the position of PVV as extra-coalitional partner to the government in 2010. Its chairperson, Vera Bergkamp, stated, "We will not be hijacked by the left or the right, but we look where our interests are best met. PVV indeed touches a chord with gays. We cannot afford to look the other way when people are under duress. Violence against gays has increased according to the police in the past years. Among the perpetrators Moroccan boys are overrepresented" (Akkermans 2011). With this statement, which rehearses and reproduces "common knowledge," COC, whose task supposedly is to defend the in-

terests of all gays and lesbians, made it abundantly clear in which limited way it conceives of its duties. Implicitly, gays are conceived as white, while the perpetrators are Moroccan. The pernicious binary "the homosexual other is white; the racial other is straight" is reinstalled. Misrepresenting and stressing the role of Moroccan gay bashers overlooks the part of white attackers, who, according to research by the police, are in the majority: 68 percent (Politie 2013, 33).

Race was never a significant part of the agenda of the gay movement, although it has always seemed to me that there were more than enough reasons to look into issues like the self-flattering erasure of race in policy and everyday understandings about homosexuality; the widespread but never interrogated number of interracial relationships, with partners of color from either near or far, which repeat traditional dependency patterns; the unproblematized adoption of black children by white gay couples;[8] the sexualized imagery that surrounds gays of color. The move to the right, evident in the overwhelming vote for PVV in 2010, may be less improbable if we see it in light of the blindness to race and the depoliticization that had always already characterized white gay politics.[9] I fully agree with Mepschen, Duyvendak, and Tonkens, who state that "paradoxically, it is the depoliticized character of Dutch gay identity, 'anchored in domesticity and consumption' . . . that explains its entanglement with neo-nationalist and normative citizenship discourses. Dutch gay identity does not threaten heteronormativity, but in fact helps shape and reinforce the contours of 'tolerant' and 'liberal' Dutch national culture" (2010, 971).

Turning to gay organizations, including the AIDS industry, gendered and racialized relations often go unnoticed. Within COC, which is largely white in personnel, board, and directorship, race is dealt with by subsidizing several youth organizations, such as Respect2love and Foundation Malaica, to cater to gays of color. In another part of the gay organizational world, the HIV/AIDS conglomerate, white gay men, in collaboration with the Dutch state, were able to carve out some significant institutional niches in the struggle against HIV/AIDS, which still exist to this day (Duyvendak 1996). Oftentimes in research studies in the field of sexual health, attention is only or predominantly paid to how STI/HIV can be prevented in men, not in women. Questions like who is deemed qualified to work as an official employee in an organization and who can only render services as a volunteer need our attention. A division of labor often takes place in the

AIDS organizational field in which people of color are the objects of care, not independent knowers, and white people are the subjects of knowledge, the experts, even when the target populations are people of color. However, such questions hardly ever surface in the gay movement.

In comparing the two movements, I arrive at some of the same conclusions as Foucault does: homosexual movements had no choice but to focus on the "sexual centering of the problem, since it was their sexual practice which was attacked, barred and disqualified as such, the need to limit their claims to their sexual specificity made it much more difficult to escape the 'trap' of power. Women's liberation movements, on the other hand, had much wider economic, political and other kinds of objectives" (Foucault, cited in Scott 2011, 16). The long march through the institutions of the respective movements has, measured in the terms they themselves have set, been more successful for the gay movement, in that they have been able to reach more public visibility, attention for their specific problems, and a separate niche, the HIV/AIDS conglomerate and events like the Gay Parade, which have become firm power bases. Especially the Gay Parade has become thoroughly enmeshed in commercialism and self-congratulation. The women's movement, while initially much more massive, radical, and visible, has also made important strides, but its main goals have not been reached, and institutionally it has not proven too difficult to break it up, fuse it into two remaining national bodies and some local and regional agencies.

Public visibility of gay life has its limitations. The dominant representation of homosexuality after sixty years of intense postcolonial, labor, and refugee migration to the Netherlands still is that gays and lesbians belong to the dominant racial group; that is, in the public eye gays are white. Diversity in sexual cultures, including same-sex cultures, has, by now, with the multiracialization of Dutch society, become an irreversible fact, but there is no diversity in dominant representations of gay and lesbian life. Most visible in the public domain, through media content, a commercial entertainment industry, and yearly events like the Gay Parade, are white gay men of a certain type—entertainers, TV personalities, businessmen, politicians. In the past decades, as evident in polls, they have come to be embraced and accepted by the majority of the straight population. Black, migrant, and refugee gays, the gay Other, do not get much attention, but Islamic gays—for instance, the visitors of the first Arab gay café in the world, Habibi Ana

in the center of Amsterdam,[10] who also participate in the Gay Parade—are cherished too, because they seem to adhere at least to some of the do's and don'ts of the habitus of white Dutch gays: They have, to a certain extent, come out of the closet. Furthermore, they are embraced because they need to be protected against their barbaric, aggressive hetero brothers.

White and black, migrant and refugee lesbians are virtually invisible in the current landscape. This has not always been the case. Under the influence of black lesbian thought from the United States and the United Kingdom, in the early 1980s a movement became visible that was predominantly made up of Indo, Moluccan, Surinamese, and Antillean Dutch lesbians. We developed our own organizations and activities, having come to a heightened consciousness regarding cultural and political differences with the white lesbian movement and the racism extant within it. Black and migrant lesbians realized that their relations with the white lesbian movement were characterized by power differences. Those who organized in the black, migrant, and refugee (BMR) lesbian movement were mostly women who had been born or raised in the Netherlands and had studied there, but there were also Afro-Surinamese *mati* in the movement, who had arrived after the independence of Suriname in 1975 (Wekker 2006), and *kapuchera* from the Antilles (Clemencia 1996). Mati and kapuchera are working-class African diasporic women, who have erotic relationships with men and with women, either simultaneously or consecutively, and they typically have children. The construction of their same-sex sexuality, based on West African "grammatical principles" (Mintz and Price [1976] 1992), should not be equated with Western homo- or bisexuality (Wekker 2006). Later, other groups presented themselves—more or less vocally and visibly—in the Dutch sexual landscape. Almost all these cultures, including those who have their roots in Turkey and Morocco, have hardly been studied (but see Kursun and El Kaka 2002; Hira 2011). Ghanese *supi* (short for "superior") as well, who often start their love lives with other girls at boarding school and sometimes continue them when they are married and have children, were and are with us. Supi are a Ghanaian variation of what Judith Gay (1986) has described as "mummies and babies" in the context of southern Africa, where boarding-school girls with an age difference between them have loving and flirting relationships with each other. Supi are mostly located in the southeast of Amsterdam,[11] and I understand them and their sexual practices as thoroughly related to Afro-Surinamese mati (Wekker 2006).

The history of these other lesbians in the Dutch landscape remains largely unwritten.[12] A remarkable difference from the white women's movement, from my perspective as an Afro-Surinamese lesbian activist who came of age in that movement, was that the divisions that were so characteristic there—no men, that is, no boys above the age of twelve allowed—were largely absent in the BMR-lesbian movement. Indeed, the presence of men was often a bone of contention within the women's movement at large, with BMR women wanting men present, as fellow warriors against racism. The joint analysis of our situation that BMR women undertook, a fledgling intersectional analysis, was done by women of various sexual stripes, since the distinction homo/hetero was not as significant as in the white women's movement. Many BMR lesbians found the unproblematized normativity of the white lesbian position, with its accompanying patterns, untenable to participate in, because those dynamics diverged from the ways in which we wanted to shape our desires to be with women. Among those patterns were, first, the lack of consciousness in many white women about their own, dominant racialized position and the "unearned privileges" that whiteness carried (McIntosh 1992; Frankenberg 1990). Second, the prescribed scenario of coming out of the closet rubbed many BMR women (and men) the wrong way, because it did not conform to our cultural behavioral understandings. And third, the other prescription to operate separately—socially, politically, and erotically—from men did not find many adherents either.

Inclusive descriptions and analyses of the gay male movement are also sorely lacking. According to one of my black gay informants, there was a sizeable community of male and female mati couples in southeastern Amsterdam, a.k.a. de Bijlmer, from 1975 on. At some moment, he estimates, there were around five hundred black gays, whose number was decimated by HIV/AIDS. Because black gays were discriminated against in the discos in the center of Amsterdam—where only well-known black gay men like the writer Edgar Cairo and radio journalist Robert Wijdenbosch were welcome—they had set up their own traveling circuit of living-room meeting spaces in the Bijlmer.

An important part of the dominant narrative about homosexuality that circulates is that everything was fine with gay and lesbian liberation until Islamic people turned up and made everything go downhill. They caused a rupture in the triumphant march of progress. This representation is possi-

ble only when a homogeneous and Eurocentric us-versus-them schema is in place, whereby everything that is progressive is attributed to us—that is, we accept the emancipation of women and homosexuality, the litmus test for modernity—while everything that is negative is ascribed to them, the backward barbarians, who got stuck in religious tradition.

Just Being Gay (2007–2011)

In 2007 the government released a gay emancipation policy paper, *Gewoon Homo Zijn* (Just being gay), which covered the period until 2011, followed in the next period by a Policy Note on Emancipation (2013–2016). Since 2007, the emancipation of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people falls under general emancipation policy, located in the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, together with women's emancipation. I will make a critical analysis of the former policy paper, since it most clearly expresses the problems inherent in the conceptualization of homosexuality by the government and since these problems have not been addressed in the later policy note. Given the continuity of policies, I feel justified in assuming that these ideas are still present.

The main policy aim of *Just Being Gay* is to stimulate the social acceptance of homosexuality among the Dutch population (Ministerie van OC&W, 2007, 5) and there are five operational goals:

1. To stimulate conversation on homosexuality in different population groups
2. To counteract violence and intimidation against gays
3. To stimulate national and local alliances
4. To make an effort to produce gay-friendly environments at school, in the workplace, and in sports
5. To play an active international and European role in the acceptance of homosexuality

Let us stick with the main goal for a moment. The main goal, to stimulate the social acceptance of homosexuality among the Dutch population, has quickly morphed into one of the operational subgoals, that is, to stimulate conversation about homosexuality in different population groups. Fairly soon, this aim was completed by the following sleight of hand: The government wants to make homosexuality a topic of conversation among

ethnic minority groups, among youth, and in religious circles (Ministerie van OC&W, 2007, 7). The Dutch population at large has thus effectively been cut down to three problematic categories. The main instrument is to stimulate a dialogue. All kinds of activities and subsidies have been set aside to facilitate this dialogue. Who could possibly be against a dialogue to discuss homosexuality from religious, cultural, and philosophy-of-life perspectives? It seems so self-evident and necessary that it is, to use a time-honored Dutch expression, like cursing in church to be critical toward this policy aim. However, I have two remarks to question the foundational assumption that speaking about one's sexuality is only natural and thus good for everyone. Underlying this assumption is the difference between speaking about homosexual acts and performing those acts, without necessarily claiming a homosexual identity (Wekker 2006). My second, and related, overarching remark refers to the lack of attention to differences within and between categories of gays and lesbians.

First, why is it unproblematically assumed that homosexuality is something that should be talked about? Foucault's ([1976] 1990) study of the history of sexuality is the history of sexuality in the West, and he meticulously shows how "a proliferation of discourses" about sexuality came into being through institutions like the church, medicine, and later therapies. Sexuality has become an object about which we need to talk and confess incessantly. What is striking about *Just Being Gay* is that no attention whatsoever is paid to the fact that the dominant manifestation of homosexuality in the Netherlands is a very specific historically and socioculturally anchored form. Ironically, homosexuality is presented as a homogeneous, natural way of being, while a multiplicity of forms of homosexuality present in society is obfuscated, as well as the status of the dominant form as one specific, albeit powerful social construction. Different cultures shape hetero- but also homosexuality differently. In a multiracial/-ethnic and multireligious society, we should think and speak about homosexuality in the plural: homosexualities. When it is desirable that different sections of society engage in dialogue, there should also be a deep consciousness of the dissimilarity and the different forms of various sexual cultures. Such consciousness is sorely missing, both in the policy paper and in society at large. Neither is there any analysis of the power relations between the different forms in which homosexuality manifests in Dutch society. The reality that is constructed is that there is only one model, and that hap-

pens to be the dominant model, which foregrounds speaking about homosexuality. This model is both desirable and self-evident. The dominant scenario, when one experiences feelings of attraction to someone of the same sex, entails "being in psychic distress—coming to terms with it oneself." Telling family and friends about one's sexuality, that is, coming out of the closet, is implicitly and explicitly represented as the natural, the desirable, the only correct and thus the normative way of acting. Underlying this scenario is a specific conceptualization of sexual identity as lodged in one's inner self, authentic and unchangeable (Foucault 1990). By coming out of the closet, that authentic, inner sexual self is brought to the outside, which is the symbolic act of emancipation of the high modern (neo)liberal individual. Dudink notes that for some the homosexual in the twenty-first century, through publicly displaying (especially) his pain and pleasure in coming out, has become the modern subject par excellence (Dudink 2011). The privileging of speaking on the individual level is continued on the social and institutional levels. That is to say that on the individual level, not only is it desirable to speak out, it is decidedly taken as a negative characteristic if a person does not do so. In the binary speaking/acting, silence about one's homosexuality carries connotations of tradition, of secretiveness, of being sly and untrustworthy, of being in denial, of leading a double life, and, in teleological/imperialist fashion, "not as advanced, evolved as we yet." This habitus does not deserve much appreciation from a dominant perspective. On a collective level, the dominant model finds expression, for instance, in the preposterous expectation that homosexual asylum seekers speak out, in their first interview by the IND, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, on their homosexuality.[13] If they fail to do so, they might as well forget their request to stay in the Netherlands. This model is so well entrenched that it has become virtually impossible to recognize alternative ways of imagining desiring modern subjects within a secular sociopolitical order (Ewing 2008). The entrenchment also speaks from the proliferation of popular TV shows in which young gay people are supported and coached to come out of the closet to their family and friends. We are confronted here with the deep-seated assumptions underlying the supposed opposition between secularism/modernity and religion/traditionalism, whose full weight these days is brought to bear on Muslims, although other others do not escape it either. Joan Scott has insightfully pointed out, "The most frequent assumption is that secularism encourages the free expression of sex-

uality and that it thereby ends the oppression of women because it removes transcendence as the foundation for social norms and treats people as autonomous individuals, agents capable of crafting their own destiny. . . . We are told, secularism broke the hold of traditionalism and ushered in the (democratic) modern age. However varied may be the definitions of modernity, they typically include individualism, which in some accounts . . . is equated with sexual liberation" (2009, 9).

This is not the only scenario that is possible within a multiracial society, however. In my research on Afro-Surinamese working-class women in Suriname and in the Netherlands, and the ways in which they construct and give expression to their sexual subjectivity, it was clear that speaking about one's sexual subjectivity is not the way to deal with the sexual self (Wekker 2006). As different informants have told me, "My mother has eyes to see." In the working class, in which different sexual repertoires circulate without a heavy social stigma attached to them, sexuality is mainly something one does, not necessarily something to talk about, to deeply identify with or come to terms with. The Afro-Surinamese working-class sexual self is not conceptualized as unchangeable and authentic, but as multiplicitous and dynamic, and same-sex sexual acts are associated with particular spiritual beings who carry that person. We are talking here, in Bourdieu's terms, about a difference in habitus, into which people in different cultures are socialized: In the West, the verbal is the sign of modernity, emancipation, and sexual liberation, versus the Afro-Surinamese performative, that does not have to claim an inner, fixed sexual being. In Dutch society the latter habitus is not appreciated nor taken seriously. The mati work, the sexual practices and understandings that mati engage in, is often associated with tradition, with "days gone by," and only lesbianism represents secular modernity, the pinnacle of civilization. The often explicit assumption is that if one spends enough time in the Netherlands, one will automatically become a bona fide lesbian.

In the policy paper *Just Being Gay*, speaking is the privileged form of dealing with homosexuality, while the power relationship to other forms is neither mentioned nor reflected upon. The minister responsible for emancipation, Dr. Jet Bussemaker, spoke implicitly yet in no uncertain terms about that power relationship in her Mosse lecture on October 2, 2013. She said, on the one hand, that the government has a role to play in the emancipation of women and gays, "to hold up norms, to protect the minority

against the changeable sentiments of the majority, to influence behavior in the desired direction, but not to prescribe feelings" (Bussemaker 2013, 52, 53). On the other, the government also expects something from LGBT people themselves: "that you also ask from lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transgenders themselves to adjust to the Dutch secular norm that it is good 'to come out of the closet' and to show who you 'really' are" (54, my translation). The status she assigns to "not speaking" about homosexuality becomes clear when she talks about the complacency that might inflict itself upon us, if we take the emancipation of women and gays for granted. The biggest danger of our success is that we sit back and do not even notice, say around 2030, that equal treatment is actually not practiced: "So that we would hardly see it if homosexuals would simply 'choose' not to come out of the closet, not to get married, not demand their equal rights" (56).

While I had initially thought that these were mere possibilities, choices between different alternatives, it turns out that these options have transformed into normative expectations for the behavior of LGBT people. They need to conform to what the government conceptualizes as appropriate behavior. This stance is in line with another notable feature in her presentation: "the privileging of equality above diversity and other values: no matter one's ideas and lifestyle, equal rights and equal treatment of people go above diversity" (Bussemaker 2013, 53). This statement only makes sense from a historical background of pillarization, in which equality was deemed to be more important than all other considerations. When equality is given the same status in current, multiracial society, racializing processes are set in motion. Thus, if I understand her statement correctly, the minister defends the untenable position that equality, conceived as pertaining to women in relation to men and of LGBT people in relation to straight people, all the while taking whiteness as the unstated default position, trumps any notion of diversity. Diversity thus pertains to the other, to women and gays of color, whose cultural and racialized positionings are bracketed, formally declared to be of no account. This is not the practice of intersectionality and is all the more deplorable since the minister used to be a gender studies specialist herself.

My second remark is that there is hardly any differentiation in the categories under discussion: There are only a few times in the policy paper that I was able to ascertain that there are also lesbians in the world; that is, lesbians hardly are mentioned. It is stated that they have other prob-

lems, so the implicit subject of the policy paper, those who are centrally important, are gay men. Research shows, for instance, that lesbians are more inclined to internalize their problems, drinking and smoking too much, while gay men externalize them (Bos and Ehrhardt 2010). *Just Being Gay* explicitly states that it is important to pay attention to youths, but here again it seems that it is boys who experience problems; girls are nowhere to be seen. The dominant gendered position of masculinity is silently and self-evidently made central. When we pivot our gaze to race/ethnicity, the different positionings are not treated equally either. Again, the dominant racial positioning is not named nor interrogated, but silently installed as the normal, the normative positioning. This is evident, for instance, from the often-repeated injunction to have a dialogue between "gays and Muslims." Not only are sexual and religious positioning juxtaposed here, but simultaneously it is apparently deemed superfluous to name a racial/ethnic positioning for whites and a sexual one for Muslims. This creates the impression that on the one hand there are gays (read, white gays), and on the other Muslims, who evidently are all straight. This exclusionary and binary way of naming and categorizing, a zero-sum game, goes against the stated aim of stimulating discussion between groups.

At this point, I want to draw some conclusions. First, it is clear that policy in the domain of LGBT emancipation, as underwritten by the minister, lacks an intersectional analysis; equality is perceived as a more important value than diversity, foregrounding the privileged positions of white men. Against that stance and second, it is important to realize that homosexuality does not look the same in all cultures and that there are plural homosexualities circulating in Dutch society. Third, there is a power relationship between those different sexual cultures and also between the forms and conceptualizations shaping homosexuality. Fourth, our positionings at simultaneous different axes of signification necessitate a more complex analysis than has thus far been the case. When the dominant pole of a particular axis, such as masculinity, is allowed to stand without explicitly naming it or reflecting on it, a supposedly general policy note is only about men, not about women; when white gays are not named as such, relations of power toward other homosexual positionings are inadvertently kept intact. Fifth, and finally, a thorough and robust gay emancipation policy must be based on more fundamental research into the different sexual cultures present in the Netherlands. Research about sex is often policy oriented,

with a central problem that needs to be solved, from the battle against HIV/AIDS to gay bashing and harassment.[14] Not so remarkably, these are often problems confronting white gay men. Research should not be driven only by the (justified) need to combat HIV/AIDS, but by an integral understanding of the cultural worlds different groups inhabit, and the understandings and categories that they use in the sexual domain.

Homosexuality and (Post)Coloniality

Delving into the homosexuality-(post)coloniality nexus, which, as I argue, is based on and fueled by a racist cultural archive, I am struck by the pivotal position of Pim Fortuyn, the gay politician, who was a trailblazer for Wilders's political party, PVV. Fortuyn was murdered on May 6, 2002, by activist Volkert van der G., just days before the national elections, in which Fortuyn promised to win a landslide victory, which in fact was twenty-four seats in parliament.

While much has by now been written about the man Fortuyn, the significance of his ascendancy in the political landscape, his murder, and the supposed loss of innocence of Dutch multicultural society at that juncture (Mak 2005; Buruma 2006; Scheffer 2007), I am intrigued by Fortuyn's entanglement in a racialized, gendered, and sexualized order, which thus far has not been made central to an analysis of his significance.[15] My interest in him is thus less as the victim of "the first political murder in centuries" than in the political economy of desire that he was bringing to the table and that he was embedded in. Analysis of this configuration will, as I argue, tell us something meaningful about the Dutch cultural archive. Fortuyn is pivotal in at least two senses: first, that he was the first politician to speak so openly about the incompatibility of a sexually liberated country, which had gone through two major revolutionary movements (i.e., the women's and the gay liberation movements), and a backward, sexually repressive Islam. While other politicians before him, such as VVD's Frits Bolkestein, had spoken in comparable terms, in the 1990s, the starkness and the accessibility with which Fortuyn approached the issue was new. In a much-publicized interview in *De Volkskrant* on February 9, 2002, he indicated his deep disgust with Muslims, who with "their backward culture are forcing us to redo women's and gay liberation one more time," which he absolutely refused

(Poorthuis en Wansink 2002). He compared Muslims to *Gereformeerden*, Christian Reformed people, a rather strict part of the Protestant Church, claiming they also always lie, because the demands of their religion are so fierce, unattainable, and not humanly possible. Aware that legally he could not make it work, he was in favor of the borders being closed: zero immigration, especially to Muslims. But for those who are here already, "onze rot Marokkanen" (our own rotten Moroccans), he said they are entitled to their rights, but should shape up and not import their brides from backward home regions anymore. He also said he did not appreciate when highly educated Muslim girls wore a veil, saying this was symptomatic that they were not showing any backbone in enforcing their emancipation from their fathers and brothers. Moreover, he claimed Muslim women do not help their sisters and mothers emancipate, as their (white) feminist predecessors had done with their mothers. Here, again we find the familiar trope in discourses about Muslims that agency is withheld from women, and they cannot possibly be imagined to make their own choice to wear a veil. The most objectionable statement in the interview was, "I am just going to say it, sir, Islam is backward, a backward culture," after which he was ousted from his party, Leefbaar Nederland, and started his own highly successful LPF, Lijst Pim Fortuyn.

The second sense in which Fortuyn is pivotal for my project is that he embodies a most glaring paradox and contradiction in the simultaneous disgust and desire that he displayed toward male Muslims. He had a long history of giving interviews about himself, in which he was not shy about his sexuality. In an early interview in the daily *Trouw* in April 1999, before he had begun his political journey, he seemed somewhat at a loss about what to do next in his life. He was asked to comment on what the Ten Commandments meant to him, as a man who was raised as a Catholic. He answered, about the commandment "Thou shall not commit indecency":

> It is absolutely not my intention to speak blasphemy, but I have to tell you that I find the atmosphere of the Catholic liturgy back in certain acts in the dark room of such a gentlemen's club. The dark room that I frequent in Rotterdam is not totally blacked out: just like in an old cathedral, the light comes in filtered. In such circumstances, making love has a religious aspect to it. Religiosity and merging—that you sometimes have in sex—can be two sides of the same coin. And the beautiful

thing about a dark room is that you find the whole range of emotions there that also exists within a relationship: from blowing your nose to the most intimate form of being together. (Visser 1999, 4)

This poetic sequence forms rich material and insight into Fortuyn's conflation of religion with homosexuality, perhaps playing into his desire for (supposedly religious) young Muslim men (Buruma 2006). For someone bathing in secularism, there is a remarkable degree and density of religiosity present, again pointing to the falseness of the posited dichotomy.

In an earlier interview, in the Amsterdam newspaper *Het Parool* of February 15, 1997, he laid out his experiences with having sex with male Muslims: "There is a remarkable extra weight attached to doing homosexuality, without naming it and with the connotation: 'Of course, we are really hetero.' There is something narrow-minded about it. I do not have sex with Muslim men anymore. Because their suppressed feelings make for a really strange kind of sex: very focused on fucking, without intimacy, a quick climax, no kissing. I hate that." This statement is intriguing because it alludes to understandings of both equality and inequality in sexual encounters and how Fortuyn skillfully positions himself in both discourses. Against the background of the highly valued norm of equality in society at large, including in gay and lesbian circles, inegalitarian sexual encounters cannot count on much appreciation. Thus Fortuyn, in a strategic move, distances himself from such inegalitarianism. One of the forms, however, in which gay male sex took shape in upper- and middle-class circles well into the 1950s was inegalitarianism: sex with a working-class boy or man; nowadays Muslims evidently embody what a working-class sex partner did before. Muslim boys are not former colonial subjects; they are less inscribed in the Dutch cultural archive, and thus they are extra different, extra unequal. While ostensibly Fortuyn says that he has had it with inegalitarian sex with Muslim men, and thus that he evidently now prefers egalitarian sex, the effect of the statement is that he can embody and be in command of both kinds of sexual encounters.

Fortuyn was an icon for many white gay men, with his eloquence and his flamboyance, with his Daimler automobile, with a driver, and his two King Charles cocker spaniels, Carla and Kenneth. He lived in his Palazzo di Pietro in Rotterdam and he had a villa in Italy. He represented freedom, luxury, the good gay life—the longed-for, desired, but never materialized

acceptance by straight society. As the possibly prospective new prime minister, he embodied the promise that "we," gays, could come out of that closet and be taken seriously by society at large. He openly displayed a gay style in debates with straight and straitlaced politicians, who often did not have a satisfactory answer to his gay antics. He showed them up for being at least boring or, worse, falling short of his eloquence. The figure of Fortuyn is noteworthy because he held significant appeal not only for white gay men, who saw him as a symbol of their acceptance into straight society (Mepschen, Duyvendak, and Tonkens 2010), but also to a much wider cross-class audience, men and women alike, who, in embracing him, could feel part of the modern mainstream, which set "us," white moderns, apart from "them," backward Muslim barbarians.

How to make sense of his simultaneous disgust toward and attraction to young Muslim men, whether it was a thing of the past or not? I, at least, find it a remarkable combination, and I also find it remarkable and telling that no one, so far, in the Dutch context has found this deep contradiction worthy of analysis or even remark. One way in which innocence in the sexual domain can be maintained is by not delving deeper into the colonial antecedents of this peculiar combination. In informal conversations with white gay men, the common lazy and self-flattering conclusion one hears is that Fortuyn clearly could not have been a racist, since he fucked Moroccan Dutch boys. As far as I am aware, only Joan Scott has remarked upon Fortuyn's sexual preference: "Pim Fortuyn's comment about liking to fuck young Moroccan boys without interference from backward imams stands as a call for tolerance (of homosexuality), while its emphasis on the availability of brown bodies articulated in the language of colonial orientalism is normalized in the process" (2012, 17). I argue precisely that in order to make sense of this glaring paradox, we should inspect the Dutch cultural archive, in the deeper layers of which, both men and women perceived as others, like blacks, Arabs, and Asians, are always already sexualized, projected to be sexually available and pleasurable, wild and excessive, possessing a greater freedom in their bodies than whites, and thus maddeningly and deeply attractive. Earlier in chapter 3, I pointed out how in the early twentieth century the cure for the waning European life force, libido, was projected onto blacks and various racial others. But this combination must have been installed even earlier. Fortuyn's "idiosyncrasy" is highly reminis-

cent of sexuality between the master class and the subordinated in colonial times, when the volatile mixture of disgust and desire was installed.

Frankly, Fortuyn is in many respects reminiscent of Thomas Thistlewood, a British overseer on the Egypt plantation in Jamaica who later set himself up as an independent planter. He arrived there in 1750, at the age of twenty-nine, and died at sixty-five in 1786 (Beckles 1999). Thistlewood kept a diary during his thirty-six years in Jamaica (amounting to over 10,000 pages), in which he kept a record of his managerial duties, perhaps aware of the momentous nature of his work and in search of a West Indian fortune, but also and importantly, tracking his sexual exploits with enslaved women.[16] He had an ongoing relationship with the enslaved woman Phibbah for the full thirty-six years of his stay, setting her up as his wife, mother of his child, confidant, servant, but always slave (Beckles 1999, 41). Meanwhile, he was constantly seeking access to other enslaved women, even when he was plagued by venereal disease, which frequently infected the entire plantation, making slavery for women into what Hillary Beckles calls "a gendered form of tyranny." Thistlewood kept meticulous records of his sexual exploits on a daily basis, where and how he had sex, describing the women, their ages, their African origins, and the degree of his satisfaction. Over the course of a decade, he had sex with almost all twenty-seven women on the plantation and with fifteen of their daughters, with many of them repeatedly. Beckles provides overviews of his sexual encounters, for instance, between 1751 and 1754: 265 times (45). As Thistlewood grew older, he seemed to prefer young girls (48). Beckles describes him: "Thistlewood celebrated himself as a sexually promiscuous colonist. By his own record, he was a sexual sadist and a rapist. His sexual exploitation of enslaved black women was not peculiar but typical of the permissiveness that was endemic to the social culture of white slave owning males. He was confident in his violent masculinity" (40).

I know of no other material that gives us such direct and, frankly, sickening insight into colonial masculinity, with the sexual and power cards stacked entirely in favor of white men. Thanks to the elaborate record Thistlewood kept, and his frank admission that it was he himself who sought the women out, not invoking the widespread myth that it was black women who by their excessive sexuality seduced him, it is possible to get insights into what seems to be driving this attraction. First, Thistlewood makes it clear that he is not the only male colonist driven by this colonial economy of

desire, by describing the life and sexual histories of the two white men closest to him: John Hartnole, a nineteen-year-old driver, and William Crookshank, his assistant overseer (Beckles 1999, 44). It is not that white women are scarce or absent. These men are sometimes married to white women (or in any case are exposed to their companionship), but their preference is for "enslaved sexuality" (41).

Second, there is the intoxication of the unfettered ownership of enslaved women (and men). The mere ownership of enslaved people, as Saidiya Hartman has insightfully shown, confers pleasure: "The fungibility of the commodity makes the captive body an abstract and empty vessel vulnerable to the projection of others' feelings, ideas, desires, and values: and, as property, the dispossessed body of the enslaved is the surrogate for the master's body since it guarantees his disembodied universality and acts as the sign of his power and dominion" (1997, 21). Black peoples were envisioned fundamentally as vehicles for white enjoyment, and the extraction of sexual pleasure from enslaved women fit seamlessly into this vision, while excessive enjoyment of the sexual act was imputed to them. As we saw in chapter 2, "the white man's burden became his sexuality and its control, and it is this which is transferred into the need to control the sexuality of the other" (Gilman 1985, 256). As subjects, the enslaved were socially dead, not entitled to bear witness against any white person who harmed them. Hartman's main point is that white people were invested in disavowing the cruelty of the system by attributing enjoyment and pleasure to blacks. The enslaved were confronted with absolute power of all whites over them, including "the imputation of lasciviousness that dissimulated and condoned the sexual violation of the enslaved" (25). Men like Thistlewood were able to convince themselves that the enslaved women voluntarily consented to having sexual relations with them. He sees them as free sexual agents, which granted them an agency in this respect they, in truth, did not possess.

Third, the racial power differential in itself seemed to act like an aphrodisiac for Thistlewood. In *Imperial Leather*, Anne McClintock (1995) has brilliantly described the fascination of a Victorian gentleman in the late nineteenth-century imperial metropolis, the barrister Arthur J. Munby, for Hannah Cullwick, a working-class charwoman, with red, roughened hands. The racialized class differential seemed the driving force for both of them. More specifically, it was the "peculiarly Victorian and peculiarly

neurotic association between work and sexuality" (McClintock 1995, 77) that eroticized and racialized working-class women to Munby, whereby traditional gender relations also were undermined. McClintock points out the importance of working-class women in middle-class households, often those who took care of children, pampering, smacking, caressing, disciplining, punishing, and sexually arousing them (85). While the role of nannies and nurses has been displaced out of psychoanalysis and the holy trinity of the modern family, it is this formative attraction to working-class women that forms the bridge between work and sexuality. In parallel fashion, I suggest that under slavery, racial difference must have eroticized relations with enslaved women for white men in the colonies, because of the impossibility of black women refusing them. Thistlewood himself might very well have been raised in a home with a nanny or nurse, and certainly white men, born in the colonies, had black nannies and wet nurses. In addition, the work regime for black women was not gendered, making them to white men, in comparison with domesticated white women, probably somewhat androgynous, vital, powerful, and strong. The white masculinity that is on display here, "backed by the cannons of empire" (Beckles 1999, 41), is emotionally highly detached. On the same day that Thistlewood has sex with one or more of the women, he may have them whipped one hundred lashes for minor transgressions.

Before I expand my investigation into this male economy of desire to Suriname, it is important to, however briefly, pay attention to the compromised perspective of Phibbah. She was a respected woman on the Egypt plantation, even before Thomas Thistlewood showed up. She was aware of and endured his transgressions all of her life, in hopes of being set free. The relationship is one prolonged quarrel. She occasionally protests and sometimes manages to turn things to her advantage, by playing her owner against Thistlewood. Upon his death, she is manumitted, set free.

But it is not only in Jamaica that we find this colonial masculinity. Its contours can also be discerned in *De Plakkatenboeken* (The placard books of Suriname), where between the years 1761 and 1816 the colonial government tried to regulate the behavior of the colonizers and the colonized (Schiltkamp and de Smidt 1973). Among the regulations that are constantly repeated is an injunction to colonizers to abstain from carnal conversation with the enslaved women and the "Indianinnen" (the native female population). In the sheer repetitiveness over the centuries, one can read the depth

in male colonizers of the drive to sexually possess their female enslaved. The wanton use of the black female body is memorialized in a song made during slavery and to this day transmitted to younger generations, called "Basia fon" (Overseer, whip her).[17] I learned the song from my grandfather. The song is still sung at parties in Afro-Surinamese circles, both in Suriname and the Netherlands, and the merry lightness of the music, a waltz, is in stark contrast to the cruelty of the text. The main speaking voice is that of Jaba, an enslaved woman, who has, for whatever reason, angered her white lover and has been abandoned by him; the other voice, in the refrain, is that of the master, enjoining the overseer to keep on whipping her:[18]

Basia fon (Overseer whip her)[19]
Meneri, meneri, da pikin, pardon.
Memre wan ten, memre wan tron,
Fa yu ben lobi mi so te
En fa mi lobi yu ete.

Basia fon! Basia fon!
A wentje mek' mi ati bron!

Te na kondre yu kon skrifiman,
Mi no ben sabi san no wan man;
Fa yu ben lobi mi so te,
En fa mi lobi yu ete.

Mi ben de kari yu mooi skrifiman,
Yu puru mi na nenne Anan;
Fa yu ben lobi mi so te,
En fa mi lobi yu ete.

Te yu ben bosi yu Jaba,
Mi ben taki: kaba, kaba!
Da falsi lobi, yu no ke,
Ho fassi yu du so tidey?[20]

Pardon Meneri! Pardon! Pardon!
Yu ben lobi da skin wan tron.
Mi begi yu! Mi begi: ke!
Meneri a no nofo ete?

Meneri, meneri, memre na pikin,
da sori yu mi lobi krin.
Mi begi yu, mi begi: ke!
Basia a no nofo ete?

Hoe fassi? Mi taki fon!
A wentje mek mi ati bron!
Mi taki fon! Fon en so te,
Al wassi a fadon dede.

[Master, master, forgiveness, the child,

Think of the time, think of the time,
How you loved me then
And how I love you still.

Overseer whip her, overseer whip her,
The wench fills my heart with ire.

When you came to this land to keep the books
I had not yet been near a man
How you loved me then.
And how I love you still.

My handsome bookkeeper I called you,
didn't you snatch me from my mother's breast;
How you loved me then,
And how I love you still.

When you kissed your Jaba,
Lay off, I cried!
This love is false, you don't care,
Why this behavior today?

Forgiveness, my Lord! forgiveness please!
You loved this body once
I pray! Oh I pray to thee!
Master, isn't it enough?

Master, master, please think of the child,
It shows you that my love is pure.

I pray, Oh I pray to thee.
Overseer, isn't it enough?

What? Whip her, I say!
The wench fills my heart with ire!
Whip her, I say! Whip her so hard,
Till down she drops dead on the ground.]

The last four-line verse is the voice of the master. Apparently after Jaba has asked the overseer if it isn't enough yet, the basia has slowed down his whipping and is now called to task by the master to resume in a more forceful fashion. The song is heartbreaking in its simplicity.

Although what I have described so far takes place in a heterosexual context, there is no reason to assume that homosexual encounters were exempt from the colonial sexual dynamic of omnipotence, hubris, cruelty, and distance.[21] In my earlier work, I argued that same-sex and opposite-sex sexualities within one particular sexual system diverge as to the gendered objects of desire, but that they resemble each other in many other respects. They share a worldview and practices (Wekker 2006). One might look upon a sexual system as a network, sharing and exchanging ideas, values, practices, and sometimes people, irrespective of the gender of one's object of passion.

Finally, let us return to the here and now of gay life, while I continue to construct a map of a complex, colonial sexual inheritance. I offer some miscellaneous observations from interviews with black gay men, with black women, and from a novel. In the course of the past years, I have, whenever a chance presented itself, interviewed black men and women in the Netherlands about their sexual experiences. This is not a finished project, nor do I claim representativeness for its findings, but a number of interesting patterns have come to the fore. Many gay black Dutch men have had relationships with men of various colors, but they actually often prefer white partners. Some black men from abroad observe that they are surprised by the number of black-white couples, while all-black couples are rare. Whenever they enter a bar, the black men do not make eye contact with them. Black men report that they often were the less economically vital partner in those mixed relationships, and they thought that their attraction for their white partners consisted precisely of their skin color, their vitality, and their supposed sexual endowments.

This same colonial economy of desire for the racial/ethnic other can be found in a heterosexual context. Young black women speak of their experiences with young white men in bars and at dances, who see a sexual experience with a black woman as a rite of passage, a manner of coming of age. These black women, in contrast, are usually not who they would consider for a steady relationship, however. It is many a white man's ultimate dream to be with an intelligent black woman, who has the sexual capital of wildness and abandon at her disposal that has traditionally been associated with black women (Bijnaar 2007).

This is also the dream that the protagonist of the wildly popular and awarded debut novel *Alleen maar nette mensen* (Only decent people) entertains. Published in 2008 by author Robert Vuijsje, it was made into a film in 2010. The novel reaped extraordinary critical praise from juries, which distinguished it as a breath of fresh air. The sexual part of the cultural archive is on abundant display in the novel. The protagonist, David, a twenty-one-year-old Jewish man from upscale South Amsterdam, looks like a Moroccan and is sexually obsessed with big black women from the southeastern part of the city. When David says to his friend that he would like a black woman with at least a 95 F cup in bra size (in United States' terms 42DDD/E) and with brains for a steady girlfriend, the friend is annoyed and aghast. In no uncertain terms, he makes it clear that black women are "lower in the hierarchy. We can all get them" (Vuijsje 2008, 91). Black women are for temporary sexual pleasure only, not for starting a serious relationship with or bringing home to introduce to your family.

In "Eating the Other," bell hooks (1992a, 24) maintains that there is continuity in the fact that the body of the other, both in colonial times and now, is seen instrumentally as only having raison d'être to satisfy the sexual desire of white men. It is not so much about possessing the other as about having a transgressive experience. After all, that other body is terra incognita, a symbolic border that is fertile ground for constructing a new masculine norm, to position oneself as a transgressive, desiring subject—a rite of passage in which sex with an ethnic/racial other is seen as more exciting, more vital, and more sensual. With the coat of color-blindness, these are not issues we are frequently concerned with in the Netherlands. A benevolent and widespread reading of such a long-term connection with a black woman or man is that it proves one's credentials in the realm of antiracism, beyond the shadow of a doubt.

I certainly do not claim representativeness for the different insights and artifacts that I have accessed for this chapter, especially the volatile mixture of disgust and desire toward young Muslim and black men. While the expression of disgust towards Muslim men is widely socially accepted in the current political climate, desire is taken to be part of one's most intimate, private sphere of life. Interracial preferences, however often they occur, aren't part of a public discussion or reflection; they are bracketed. Fortuyn's verbal transgressions, in which he clearly took great delight, were exceptional and inadvertently allow a glance into the racialized building blocks of white Dutch self-image. I see the frequency of interracial attractions as a present-day, only partially repressed expression of the unexamined Dutch cultural archive, in which race is deeply informed by gendered and sexualized patterns.

I have been arguing that the affective economies toward racialized/ethnicized others, based on almost four centuries of empire, have produced a sexual map with typical sensibilities, responses, and structures of feeling and thought. These patterns have silently been transmitted to us in the twenty-first century and continue to structure white sexual responses whenever a racialized/ethnicized other, whether Muslim or black, comes into play. The place of Muslims and other others on this map will require more study than is possible here.

As opposed to the usual, self-flattering gay reading of Fortuyn's statements as undercutting racism—how can he be a racist when he is fucking Moroccan men?—I propose a different, postcolonial reading that considers tenacious continuities in the cultural archive. Part of this complex sexual inheritance is also present in the case study of the three white women who claimed to possess Hottentot nymphae (chapter 3). By claiming a particular gendered and sexual positioning through the grammar of race, they showed the depth of race in the cultural archive and how race enabled them, through projection and displacement, to create an unorthodox female subjectivity for themselves. The complex sexual map, embedded in the cultural archive and conjugated through race, represents black people and other others by foregrounding a construction of their sexuality as one that needs to be controlled. Black people and Muslims are often still attributed more sexual aliveness, vitality, and libido than white partners. Cross-racial sexual partnerships are imagined as affording huge power differences, which enhance eroticism. An emotional detachment, in which

the aim is not to possess the other but to experience a rite of sexual passage, and the combination of disgust and attraction that characterized interracial sexual relationships in colonial times may also be part of the sexual codes that have been transmitted. Some of the same motifs that played out in a colonial context are still present in a context that claims innocence.

Lecture IX

SECULAR AFFECTS AND DIASPORIC (EMBODIED) COUNTERPOLITICS

Diasporic subjectivities are formed through gendered aesthetic practices and performances, which can take on and signify religious, cultural, political meanings, which are in turn constantly negotiated, hybridised and re-fashioned across bodies, times and spaces. Colonial, post-colonial and neo-colonial formations have all obsessed with hair and head covers as signifiers of modernity, backwardness, authenticity. Debates around the extent to which secularism (or laicite') can accommodate religious identities are racialised and gendered and more recently assumed nationalist contours. This week we critically scrutinise the "secular" and its underpinnings. We look at the secular as political practice and discourse, but also as embodied and affective site of production of particular types of sensibilities. We consider scholarship that theorises the secular as intertwined with the religious sphere, inspired by the tradition of Talal Asad and see what counterpolitics diasporic subjects enact to respond to the disciplining or exclusionary logics of secular normativities.

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The Ties That Bind: Multiculturalism and Secularism Reconsidered

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The article examines contemporary controversies over the rights of Muslim women to wear various forms of the veil, in both France and the United Kingdom and argues that despite their apparent differences as political ideologies, both multiculturalism and secularism are deployed as techniques to govern difference. It traces a common philosophical lineage of these two ideologies, and their shared genealogical relationship to the subject of Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment thought. Drawing on Marx and Hegel, it argues that at the core of secularism and multiculturalism there lies the germ of a subject and law formed through a concept of culture that was to a great degree indivisible from religion. While secularism ostensibly decouples culture from religion to produce a common political culture, and multiculturalism purports to accommodate a diverse range of cultural and religious practices, both fail to accommodate difference that stretches the bounds of a citizen-subject defined according to Anglo-European norms of culture, which implicitly includes Christianity.

I. INTRODUCTION

The campaign [by the Vatican to define the Christian tradition as critical to the very constitution of Europe] plays upon the sense of a traditional Christian territorial unity threatened by a growing Islamic minority and secular depreciation of the spiritual dimension of culture.[1]

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 1 W.E. Connolly, *Capitalism and Christianity, American Style* (2008) 29.

On 28 July 2008, the latest instalment of the legal contest between the rights of young women to manifest their religious faith through their dress (in this case, a five millimetre-thick metal bangle, called a *kara* in Punjabi) and the ability of the state to prohibit such expression was settled. Mr. Justice Silber of the High Court found that Sarika Watkins-Singh had suffered indirect discrimination on the grounds of race when Aberdare Girls' School in Wales first segregated Sarika from the other students, and then suspended her from school for refusing to remove her *kara*, one of the five symbols of faith observed by Sikhs. In the eyes of the school authorities, her refusal to remove her *kara* violated the school's no-jewellery policy.[2]

The five millimetre-thick *kara* was deemed to be a reasonable expression of religious and racial difference. As we will see, other expressions of religious difference such as the *jilbab*, or *hijab* have created political tempests on both sides of the English Channel (among other places), and have been found by state authorities to be an unreasonable, unacceptable expression of difference. Under English and Welsh law, Sikhs are considered to be a racial group, unlike Muslim communities.[3] The legal distinction between race and religion and the process by which communities come to be perceived as racial versus religious ones are interesting inventions, but not the main focus of this article. The relatively recent recognition in the United Kingdom of religion as a ground upon which discrimination claims can be made, and the definition of Muslim communities as *religious* rather than *racial* communities arguably sets them apart from other minority, racialized subjects (such as Jews or Sikhs), with regards to how they have been legally interpellated. Along with this, the current climate of Islamophobia has seemingly produced new assemblages of race, religion, and culture that present challenges to both Muslim minority communities and the dominant political subjectivity of the nation state.

Yet – are these new assemblages? The conflicts over the ability of Muslim girls and women to freely veil themselves in different forms can be (and has been) articulated in various idioms that recall long-standing political questions over how the nation state ought to manage racial and religious difference: as a conflict of individual religious rights versus the interests of the broader community or nation state; as an expression of difference that breaches the limit of tolerance of minority practices; or alternately, as the violation of an ethos (or state principle) of secularism. Some scholars have characterized the 'politics of the veil' as an instance of the rigid application

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2 *Watkins-Singh, R (on the application of)* v. *The Governing Body of Aberdare Girls' High School & Rhondda Cynon Taf Unitary Authority* [2008] EWHC 1865 (Admin) (29 July 2008).

3 Sikhs are considered to be a racial group under British law, as established in the judgment *Mandla* v. *Dowell Lee* [1983] 2 A.C. 548. In *Watkins-Singh,* the judge accepted the claim that Watkins-Singh had suffered discrimination as a Sikh on both religious and racial grounds (paras. 35 and 36).

of binary distinctions between religious and political, sacred and secular, or public and private domains.

Vakulenko, for instance, argues that the European Court of Human Rights has failed to recognize the intersectional nature of the phenomenon of veiling (as a practice that encapsulates expressions of gender and religious identity) on the basis that the Court asserts that religion must be separated from the public sphere in order to protect sex equality.[4] A rigid division of public/private is enforced, with the headscarf being relegated to the private sphere of religious faith. In the cases she analyses, Vakulenko rightly points to the assumption of the Court that the headscarf is a purely religious symbol, thereby failing to allow any of the social, structural or familial dimensions of veiling to enter the legal framework. Motha argues that the conflict over the rights of women to veil in various ways reflects the positing of a distinction between autonomy and heteronomy[5] (borrowing Nancy's articulation of this problematic), or piety and polity. Motha critiques this distinction and argues that the '*affect* of community' is at the basis of the tension between religion and democracy; in other words, the allegedly autonomous subject of politics is shaped, motivated, and sustained by her affective attachments to heteronomous contingencies of religion, class, race, and culture.[6] As Nancy puts it:

> [the] general idea … of the State as a place of tolerance remains inferior or even foreign to what is rightfully expected of the political: namely, the taking up of a force of affect inherent in being-with.[7]

This article is a modest contribution to this ongoing critique of the putative opposition between the secular and the sacred, or in the idiom employed here, political and religious consciousness. What is at stake here is the 'force of affect' deployed in the effort to shore up a unitary political subjectivity of the nation state, at the expense of ways of being that are perceived as threatening this unity. The desire to protect the political values of the nation state, including secularism and more ambivalently, the tolerance for multicultural difference, relies upon and re-enforces a false opposition between political (culture) and religious faith. In this article, I explore how both secularism and multiculturalism rely on a political subjectivity for which culture (and here I mean political culture) and religious faith are imbricated with one another.

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4 A. Vakulenko, '"Islamic Headscarves" and the European Convention on Human Rights: An Intersectional Perspective' (2007) 16(2) *Social and Legal Studies* 183–99, at 191.

5 Nancy writes: 'So either politics is conceived as the effectivity of autonomy (personal as well as collective), or politics and religion together are represented as heteronomous, and autonomy consists in freeing oneself from them': J.-L. Nancy, 'Church, State, Resistance' in (2007) 34 *J. of Law and Society*, 3–13, at 7.

6 S. Motha, 'Veiled Women and the *Affect* of Religion on Democracy' (2007) 34 *J. of Law and Society* 139–62, at 154.

7 Nancy, op. cit., n. 5, p. 10

However, it is not only the tension between political culture and religious faith that is of interest to me, but the tension between the doctrines of multiculturalism and secularism. The controversies over the rights of Muslim women to wear the veil in both France and the United Kingdom have brought into stark relief the principle of *laïcité* and the ethos of multiculturalism, the two prevailing doctrines governing the political landscapes of these nation states respectively. Of course, *laïcité* holds the status of a prime constitutional principle in France, whereas multiculturalism has suffered a much more contested and partial adoption as a political ethos and social policy in the United Kingdom. While in France, the presence of this sign of Muslim feminine difference was perceived as a threat to secularism, it was multiculturalism in the United Kingdom that was seen as having allowed the tolerance of difference to go too far. Secularism needed to be defended in the face of what looked like the threat of an American-style multiculturalism, and this need to defend the dominant and historical values of the nation state bore a striking resemblance to the criticisms of multiculturalism in the context of the United Kingdom. Despite their apparent differences, secularism and multiculturalism were both challenged by the visible presence of a Muslim feminine difference during the headscarf debates in France, and the spate of legal cases involving the rights of British Muslim women to wear various forms of the veil in the school classroom.[8]

What these debates reveal is how, despite the very different appearances of multiculturalism and secularism, they perform the same labour; that is, I argue that both reproduce and hold in place a unitary, sovereign political subjectivity. Despite their ostensible differences as political ideologies, both multiculturalism and secularism are deployed as techniques to govern difference. This difference is at once cultural, religious, gendered, and mired in the history of colonial encounters that shaped the emergent political consciousness of the subject of Enlightenment Europe. Differences that challenge the boundaries of the sovereign political subject are perceived as a threat to be contained and managed.

These claims are not novel;[9] critiques have been rendered of the totalizing and 'always-already' quality of the recognition of cultural and religious

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8 See discussion of *R (on the Application of Begum)* v. *Head Teacher and Governors of Denbigh High School* [2006] 2 All E.R. 487 and *Mrs. Azmi* v. *Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council* UKEAT/0009/07/MA) below.

9 Indeed, Asad argues that 'the idea that a successful modern nation-state rests on a dominant culture that encodes shared values is now commonplace.' T. Asad, 'Trying to Understand French Secularism' in *Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-Secular World*, eds. H. De Vries and L.E. Sullivan (2006) at 495. This very formulation and an enquiry into the genealogy of this concept of 'culture' is the focus of this article.

difference that occurs under the banner of multiculturalism.[10] And recently, a growing body of work on political theology has critiqued the formations of secularism and explored the legacies of the Christian character of the development of secularism as a political ideology and doctrine.[11] Critiques of contemporary forms of both secularism and multiculturalism point to the ways in which they presuppose a particular kind of political subjectivity: the autonomous, rational, individual sovereign subject who, in the case of multiculturalism, is tempered by her inclusion in a cultural or linguistic community necessary to her psychic survival. Despite this important qualification, critics of multiculturalism have pointed to the ways in which the positive emphasis on difference within a politics of multiculturalism has many limits; specifically, the limit of tolerating any difference that is viewed as challenging the Anglo-European cultural and racial norms of political sovereignty. Based on the critiques rendered of both secularism and multiculturalism we can surmise that they act in similar ways; as I explore below, they work to capture difference that is 'other' to the dominant culture and religion, and sublimate it within the larger whole, the dominant national identity.

In this article, I explore how multiculturalism and secularism share a common philosophical lineage. Secularism emerges as a political doctrine in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and multiculturalism is a twentieth-century derivation of the early nineteenth-century political philosophy of

10 The 'always-already' quality of multicultural recognition refers to the idea that the only racial, cultural, or religious difference that is cognizable within a multicultural framework is that which is always already circumscribed by a unitary sovereign subjectivity. For instance, critiquing multicultural policies and practices in the United Kingdom, Nira Yuval-Davis problematizes both the production of ethnic categorizations within racist discourses, and the related and prevailing tendency to judge the cultural practices of 'Other' communities according to Anglo-European norms. N. Yuval-Davis, 'Ethnicity, Gender Relations and Multiculturalism' in *Debating Cultural Hybridity*, eds. P. Werbner and T. Modood (1997) 193–209. Other critiques of multiculturalism emphasize the commodifying tendencies of multiculturalism; see A.Y. Davis, 'Gender, Class and Multiculturalism: Rethinking "Race" Politics' in *Mapping Multiculturalism*, eds. A.F. Gordon and C. Newfield (1996); and P. Gilroy, 'Joined-up Politics and Postcolonial Melancholia' in *Recognition and Difference: Politics, Identity, Multiculture*, eds. S. Lash and M. Featherstone (2002). Bannerji critiques the absence of any accounting for relations of power and argues that politics, identity, and history 'lead to or accompany the technological development and deployment' of multiculturalism as a technique of governance of the state apparatus. H. Bannerji, *The Dark Side of the Nation: Essays on Multiculturalism, Nationalism and Gender* (2000).

11 Taylor illuminates the emergence of secularism out of 'Latin Christendom' or the 'West'; he gives a philosophical account of the historical development of secularism as it emerges out of Christian systems of belief and western philosophical precepts (C. Taylor, *The Age of Secularism* (2007). For a critical account of how secular liberal democracy retains structures and forms embedded in Christian belief, see T. Asad, *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam* (1993).

Hegel.[12] The tie that binds these contemporary political doctrines to each other is their genealogical relationship to the subject of Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment thought. Secularism, which is explored through Marx's critique of the transition from feudalism to secular liberal democracy, retains a concept of subjectivity that is coloured by a (Christian) religious consciousness. Multiculturalism, derived from Hegel's political philosophy of recognition, similarly remains tethered to a subject whose consciousness is formed in relation to a Universal (or *Spirit*, for Hegel), one of the hallmarks of Christian belief.[13]

By looking to late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century philosophy, in this case, the work of Hegel, we can begin to see how at the core of secularism and multiculturalism there lies the germ of a subject and law formed through a concept of culture that was to a great degree indivisible from religion. While secularism ostensibly decouples culture from religion to produce a common *political* culture (based on language, shared values, and the like), the subject at its core cannot so easily shed its inheritance. Multiculturalism purports to accommodate a diverse range of cultural and religious practices and traditions. However, it cannot accommodate difference that stretches the bounds of the fundamental contours (or structure) of the citizen-subject, defined according to Anglo-European norms of culture,

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12 In Britain, the roots of contemporary forms of tolerance of religious, cultural, and racial difference could also be understood to derive from a Lockean conception of tolerance (or toleration). Locke's seventeenth-century doctrine of toleration, a response to religious wars between Catholic and Protestants (among other Christian sects) and strife between Jews and Christians, emphasized the need for respect of private religious belief as a matter of individual conscience (J. Locke, *Essays: including Four Letters on Toleration, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, and The Value of Money* (1883) 4–20). His concept of tolerance was firmly (and explicitly) based on Christian precepts, and privileged the 'moral autonomy of the individual [who sits] at the heart of liberal tolerance discourse' (W. Brown, *Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire* (2006) 31–8). Unlike contemporary doctrines of multiculturalism, which emphasize the importance of public and political recognition of the value of religious, cultural, or other beliefs and community attachments, the liberal doctrine of tolerance insists on a strict divide between the private sphere of religious belief and the juridical-political sphere which ought to be completely bereft of religiously prescribed laws. Contemporary practices of multiculturalism are thus considered in this paper as deriving from the communitarian philosophy of Charles Taylor, based on Hegel's philosophy of recognition. While consideration of whether the 'retreat of multiculturalism' (A. Phillips, *Multiculturalism without Culture* (2007)) signals a return to tolerance as a more primary disciplinary strategy (Brown, id.) in the governance of difference is a very valuable line of enquiry, it is not pursued in this article.

13 For the purposes of the present analysis, generalizations are made about Christianity despite its heterogeneity. For instance, the tensions and differences between a Protestant adherence to an immanent deity, and Catholicism's loyalty to a supranational religious structure are significant in the development of the nation state. For a nuanced account of the differences between various forms of Christian belief and practice in the context of the emergence of secularism, see Taylor, op. cit., n. 11.

which implicitly includes Christianity, as well as a racial norm of whiteness.[14]

The unitary sovereign subjectivity produced by both discourses finds contemporary expression in the 'people' of the nation state. The recent emphasis on Britishness and British values illustrates the desire to cement a unified, and unitary national subject, which is intended to supercede all other differences in 'identity'.[15] The sovereign people of the nation, or the *Volk*, to draw on language from the era of German Romanticism, lies at the heart of secularism and multiculturalism; both are formed through a theological 'logic' that mediates differences in order to preserve a transcendent ideal, although, with the emergence of modernity, this is no longer a divine transcendent, but the immanent sovereign subject of a universal humanity. The critique of the putative 'universality' of this sovereign subject is by now well-worn, and will not be repeated here. Rather, the article will reveal how multiculturalism and secularism share the same conceit. Despite their attempts to create 'shared' values and common ideas in pluralistic societies, multiculturalism and secularism (the latter being a value that is supposed to be a 'shared' value itself) fail to disrupt a unitary sovereign subjectivity and continually reproduce a particular kind of political and legal subject. Forms of religious and cultural expression that do not comport with this vision of political subjectivity are received as a threatening force, which must be contained or banned in the defence of the sovereign subject.

The common philosophical lineage of the two concepts also helps to explain why and how these seemingly very different approaches to the constitution of a liberal democratic polity are in conversation with each other and, further, seem to slip into one another fairly easily. For instance, we can examine the ways in which the discourse of secularism has been utilized within the current debates in the United Kingdom over the desirability of multiculturalism as a set of government policies and more broadly, as a political ethos. In other words, contestations over the 'tolerance' of religious-cultural difference (tolerance that is understood as the result of multicultural policies) has at times been articulated through the discourse of secularism. The wearing of the veil by Muslim women, for instance, has been framed as a practice to be banned or limited in certain public spaces on the basis that

14 The racial norm of 'whiteness' is complicated by the long history of anti-Semitism in the United Kingdom. For a rich analysis of the construction of Jewish identity in English case law, see D. Herman, 'An Unfortunate Coincidence: Jews and Jewishness in Twentieth-century English Judicial Discourse' (2006) 33 *J. of Law and Society* 277–301. Herman analyses the ways in which the representation of Jewish litigants in judicial discourse is bound up with the construction of Englishness. In this article, I focus on the relationship between culture and religion and the subjectivities they produce, but do not discuss the racial dimension of these formations.

15 For instance, see the Green Paper, *The Governance of Britain* (2007; Cm. 7170) paras. 194–7, at <www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm71/7170/7170.pdf>.

tolerance of this religious difference has 'gone too far', violating a secular political ethos that seeks to contain some expressions of religious difference to a private sphere.[16] It is only very recently that journalists, politicians, and others have proclaimed the United Kingdom as an explicitly Christian nation with a Christian heritage in the context of these debates.[17]

In the context of French secularism, multiculturalism and the image of uncontainable religious-cultural difference spilling into the public sphere has posited multiculturalism as a danger to be avoided at any cost. Multiculturalism in this context plays the role of secularism's opposing force, something that further defines the uniqueness of *laïcité* in distinction from other democratic polities. In both cases, multiculturalism and secularism operate in tandem, providing each other with an opposing force that holds the relation between the two in precarious tension with each other.

Multiculturalism attempts to intervene in a liberal conception of the subject as autonomous and atomistic, emphasizing the communitarian dimensions of identity and being.[18] However, despite its fascination with plurality and difference, I argue that secularism and multiculturalism broadly share the same political and philosophical logic, and this accounts, to some degree, for the reinscription of the notion of the unitary, sovereign subject of

16 For a fascinating study of the concept of tolerance see Brown, op. cit., n. 12, p. 84. Brown presents a genealogy of the concept, illuminating how tolerance, as a technique of governmentality, is deployed in response to contemporary deficits in the legitimacy of states and, in particular, the state's diminished capacity to embody universal representation.

17 See, for instance, the parliamentary debate held on 5 December 2007, on the future of Christianity in Britain. Many MPs spoke of the need to celebrate and protect the Christian heritage of Britain, see <www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200708/cmhansrd/cm071205/halltext/71205h0002.htm>.

18 Multiculturalism, as a political ideal and a set of practices, has developed differently in different jurisdictions, and has changed tenor at different historical moments. Despite these differences, the main issues of concern remain consistent: what is the best political and normative framework for dealing with differences in cultural and religious beliefs between a plurality of communities? How is balance to be achieved between the integration and the assimilation of minority communities into dominant juridical, political, and social institutions? Evidently, these concerns assume the existence, legitimacy, and relevance of categories of race, ethnicity, culture, and religious belief to the quality of citizenship enjoyed by individuals and communities. (As noted in n. 7, these aspects of multiculturalism have been the subject of much critique.) In the United Kingdom context, scholars have taken various positions in relation to the value and operability of multiculturalism; for instance, Anne Phillips argues for a multiculturalism that resists reified or fixed concepts of culture in order to retain the ability to judge particular practices on normative grounds, and to retain a feminist commitment to equality (Phillips, op. cit., n. 12). The approach taken to multiculturalism in this article is rooted entirely in the work of Charles Taylor, who elaborated the concept of multiculturalism as a way of achieving the political recognition of cultural difference, a social, political and moral good that in his view, is vital for liberal, pluralist democracies (Taylor, op. cit., n. 11), see discussion at pp. 319–20.

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a modern, universal humanity within discourses of multiculturalism and secularism. The similarities in both of these political doctrines will be explored below by an examination of the headscarf debates in the United Kingdom and France. The referent points that define what is tolerable within secular or multicultural spaces lie in the lineaments of a concept of culture thoroughly imbricated with Christian belief, which is explored in Part III of the article.

II. CONTEXTS: *LA VOILE*, THE VEIL, AND POLITICAL CONFLICT

In 2006, Jack Straw expressed the discomfort that he experiences when meeting with his Muslim female constituents who wear the veil (with their faces covered), and stated that he was in the habit of asking women to remove their veils in his office.[19] He further stated that women should not wear veils that cover their face. Characterizing the veil as 'a visible statement of separation and of difference', he said that, above all, his discomfort lay in the fact that the veil, in his view, prevented him from having a truly 'face-to-face' encounter with his constituent.[20] Prefiguring *The Governance of Britain*, published in July 2007,[21] Jack Straw's comments reflected anxiety about the issue of social cohesion and the perceived need for common British values.

Jack Straw's comments, however, comprised only one piece of a growing scene of discontent about the tolerance of difference having gone too far. Legal challenges involving the right of Muslim girls and women to wear various forms of the veil in education contexts, government and non-governmental policy statements, and media accounts of political and social contestations over cultural and religious difference were also emerging at this time. As explored below, the legal contestations over the rights of individual girls and women to wear (various forms of) the veil have invariably been articulated as a contest between the religious freedom of individuals, and the objectives of social cohesion, security, equality, tolerance, and multiculturalism. The aim of the analysis of the cases discussed is not to provide an exhaustive overview of this area of the law but, rather, to illustrate how the assertion of particular manifestations of Muslim, feminine religious difference have been rearticulated by the courts as an unreasonable demand that oversteps the bounds of what is tolerable, acceptable, and permissible in the educational context.

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19 He first made the comments in his weekly column in a newspaper in his Blackburn constituency, which was followed by radio interviews in which he reiterated his comments, see <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/5413470.stm>.
20 id.
21 Green Paper, op. cit., n. 15.

In two legal cases, *Begum* v. *Denbigh High School* and *R (X) by her Father and Litigation Friend* v. *Y. School*,[22] the rights to veil (in the first case, by wearing the *jilbab*, and in the latter case, the *niqab*) were proscribed by school policies. In *Begum* and *X.* v. *Y.*, the claimants argued that the school authorities had unjustifiably limited their rights under Article 9 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (the 'Convention') and had excluded them from school. Begum alleged that her right had been interfered with because the school had not allowed her to attend school if she wore a *jilbab*, as it violated the school's uniform policy. Affirming Lord Nicholls's judgment in *R (Williamson)* v. *Secretary of State for Education and Employment*, Lord Bingham found that while the Article 9 right is of fundamental importance in a pluralistic, multicultural society, the right to manifest religious belief is a qualified right.[23] The threshold for establishing interference with the Article 9 right is not that accommodation of the right need be 'impossible' for an infringement to be made out. However, in this case, Begum had the option of attending two other schools in the area (although it was argued these were more distant than Denbigh High School), and the school has gone to great lengths to inform parents of its uniform policy,[24] and thus, the majority found that no interference had occurred.

While Lords Bingham, Hoffman, and Scott found that her right had not been infringed, Lord Nicholls[25] and Baroness Hale found that her right had been interfered with but that this interference was justifiable under Article 9(2). The majority did consider whether, if there had been an infringement, it was justifiable. Relying on the Grand Chamber of the Strasbourg Court's judgment in *Sahin*, Lord Bingham recognized:

> [T]he need in some situations to restrict freedom to manifest religious belief; the value of religious harmony and tolerance between opposing or competing groups and of pluralism and broadmindedness; the need for compromise and balance; the role of the state in deciding what is necessary to protect the rights and freedoms of others; the variation of practice and tradition among member states; and the permissibility in some contexts of restricting the wearing of religious dress.[26]

22 *Begum* v. *Denbigh High School* [2006] 2 All E.R. 487; *R (X) by her Father and Litigation Friend* v. *Y School* [2007] E.L.R. 278; a third case, *Mrs. Azmi* v. *Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council* (UKEAT/0009/07/MAA), an employment case involving the right of the claimant to wear the *niqab,* is discussed in n. 44 below.

23 *R (Williamson)* v. *Secretary of State for Education and Employment* [2005] All E.R. 1, cited in *Begum,* id., para. 20.

24 *Begum,* id., paras. 24–5.

25 *Sahin* v. *Turkey* (2005) 19 BHRC 590. Lord Nicholls was not entirely convinced that the inconvenience of attending another school was so *de minimus* as to not infringe Begum's Article 9 right; however, he felt that even if there was an infringement of her right, it was justifiable.

26 *Begum*, op. cit., n. 22, para. 32.

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The restriction on Begum's right to wear the *jilbab* was viewed by Lord Bingham as acceptable because the Article 9 right is not only non-absolute, but because such restrictions are necessary in order to preserve pluralism and broadmindedness, among other things. The objective of social cohesion in a pluralistic environment became a cogent reason for restricting Begum's right to express her religious difference, because the mode of her expression (the *jilbab*) was seen to exceed what is reasonable, or moderate. Denbigh High School had a high proportion of Muslim students, about 79 per cent at the time of the appeal.[27] At stake was not the protection of religious harmony and social cohesion between Muslim students and non-Muslim students (as we might expect), but cohesion within the Muslim student population. Thus moderate, mainstream, and reasonable Muslim behaviour needed to be protected from what was perceived as the threat of Muslim extremism – represented by the desire of one fourteen-year-old girl to wear the *jilbab*.

A similar conclusion was reached by the court in *X* v. *Y*, where 'social pressure' on other girls to wear the *niqab*, if the claimant were to have been successful, was one of the primary reasons for justifying an interference with the claimant's Article 9 right.[28] Counsel for the claimant argued that there was 'no evidence that any group was pressurised to follow [the] example' of the claimant's three elder sisters who had worn the *niqab* between 1995 and 2004 at the same school. However, Justice Silber found that there is a difference between a situation in a school where the *niqab* is worn by a couple of individuals and there is no explicit policy regarding it, and the situation where 'it is expressly stated that *niqab* can be worn' which would have been the case if the claimant had been successful.[29] He found that the headteacher's fears of girls feeling pressured to wear the *niqab* if an explicit policy were in place were well founded, and that with the smallest margin of appreciation it would be, drawing on the words of Lord Bingham in *Begum*, 'irresponsible of any court lacking the experience, background and detailed knowledge of the head teacher' to overrule him or her on this issue.[30]

In the judgments of Lord Bingham and Lord Hoffman in *Begum*, the binary between the rational autonomous agent versus the unreasonable or irrational religious subject makes an appearance. Throughout the majority judgments in *Begum*, the Court points to the many attempts at accommodation that the school made to ensure its uniform policy satisfied the requirement of modest dress for Muslim girls, and emphasizes that the head teacher, who is also Muslim, had consulted the appropriate – that is, moderate and mainstream – Muslim authorities.[31] In considering whether the respondent was excluded from the school, Lord Bingham reiterates the

27 id., para. 3.
28 *X* v. *Y,* op. cit., n. 22*,* para. 70.
29 id.*,* para. 91.
30 id., paras. 33–4.
31 *Begum,* op. cit., n. 22, paras. 7, 13, 15, 18, 33, and 34.

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words of the trial judge (with whose decision he ultimately agrees) who found that:

> [the] Respondent had a *choice*, either of returning to school wearing the school uniform or of refusing to wear the school uniform *knowing that if she did so refuse the school was unlikely to allow her to attend*.[32]

Lord Hoffman, in considering whether her right was infringed, finds that it was not, because 'there was nothing to stop her from going to a school where her religion did not require a *jilbab* or where she was allowed to wear one'.[33] Here, Begum is understood as a rational agent who had the power or agency to choose the school uniform that was based on a rational policy, or the ability to simply attend another school. The notion that Begum's decision to wear the veil may have derived from a desire that could not easily be categorized within the confines of a rational choice versus irrational, affective behaviour dichotomy meant that her desire fell outside of the bounds of legal intelligibility and thus, recognition.

Baroness Hale's minority judgment was quite distinct from the above analysis. She concurred with Lord Nicholls that Shabina Begum's Article 9 right was infringed, and that the infringement was justified. She held that the uniform policy had the legitimate aim of protecting the rights and freedoms of others, and that it was proportionate to this objective on the following bases: that choices made by adolescents cannot be assumed to be 'the product of a fully developed individual autonomy';[34] and the task of social cohesion that a school is charged with necessitates the adoption of a uniform dress code.[35]

Baroness Hale accepts the figure of the autonomous, rational agent who in 'freely choosing to adopt a way of life for herself' ought not to be criticized or prevented from exercising her choice.[36] She explicitly rejects the 'western feminists' who see the veil as a symbol of gender oppression.[37] However, unlike the rational choice made by a woman to veil or wear the *jilbab*, Baroness Hale finds that she cannot assume Begum's choice was made with a fully developed individual autonomy because of her age.[38] This emphasis on the particular position of adolescents is also related to the specific context of the school, which Baroness Hale distinguishes from the broader context of society in general. In schools, the objectives of community and social cohesion are assisted by a uniform dress code, which can 'smooth over ethnic, religious, and social divisions'.[39] In this case, Baroness Hale con-

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32 id., para. 37, my emphasis.
33 id., para. 50.
34 id., para. 93.
35 id., para. 97.
36 id., para. 96.
37 id.
38 id., para. 93.
39 id., para. 97.

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cluded that the school had reached an appropriate balance between allowing for cultural and religious diversity (by allowing students to wear the *shalwar kameez*, for instance), and social cohesion.

The objective of maintaining social cohesion was also of prime importance in *X* v. *Y*. The court largely adopted the reasoning of Baroness Hale in *Begum* on this point. Along with social cohesion and equality amongst students, Justice Silber also cited security risks as a legitimate objective of the school's policy to not allow the claimant to wear the *niqab*. The *niqab* can be justifiably prohibited on the basis that it might be used as vehicle for terror. Justice Silber stated that the claimant, X, had presented a case that:

> assumed that conditions in the world had stood still, while the evidence of the head teacher showed that matters had moved on, with a greater number of Muslim girls at the school and increased concern for security.[40]

Silber J. refused to accept the submission by counsel for the claimant that the actual risk of someone disguising themselves in a *niqab* was minimal, deferring instead to the head teacher who 'knows what the risks are in her town and in her school and above all at the present time why matters might be different from what they were a few years ago'.[41]

The security risk that the *niqab* poses was discussed as a part of the justification analysis under Article 9(2). However, before embarking on the analysis of Article 9(2), Justice Silber found that X's right under Article 9(1) had not been infringed, largely on the same basis as Lords Bingham, Hoffman, and Scott in *Begum*; that the claimant had the ability and choice to simply go to another school if she wanted to wear the *niqab*.[42] As discussed above, the right under Article 9 is not an absolute right, and the rational actor has the right to exercise this right, just not wherever they please.

Without taking issue with the definition and parameters of the Article 9 right as it has been developed by the European Court of Human Rights, the Grand Chamber, and the English and Welsh courts, I do want to underline how the approach taken in *Begum* and *X* v. *Y* appears to sidestep the question of pluralism and diversity. Rather than contemplating how expressions of religious, cultural difference such as the *jilbab* or *niqab* might indeed enhance pluralism and diversity, they find these particular manifestations of religious difference to be *too* different, or perhaps, as Justice Silber states in *Watkins-Singh*, 'extremely visible and very ostentatious'.[43] In order to preserve pluralism, this visible difference must be contained. The pluralism being defended is shaped more by its cohesiveness – its presupposed unity – than by a plasticity that would allow for religious, cultural difference to

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40 *X v. Y,* para. 8.
41 id., para. 98.
42 id., para. 38.
43 *Watkins-Singh* v. *Governing Body of Aberdare Girls' High School* [2008] E.L.R. 561, para. 7.

thrive. The most pointed contrast is Justice Silber's judgment in *Watkins-Singh*, where the religious symbol of the *kara* is distinguished from the *niqab* and *jilbab* on the basis that it is a much less visible sign of difference. The bounds of what is acceptable religious-cultural expression appear to be based on visible difference.[44]

In my view, these cases, along with the Green Paper and Jack Straw's comments discussed above, reflect anxiety about the bounds of tolerance being stretched too far. In these cases, there is an explicit desire to protect social harmony and pluralism from religious extremism, which the *jilbab* and *niqab* have come to represent in the social imaginary. Culture, race, and religion are all at play here, but the United Kingdom is seen as a defender of difference for those 'reasonable' Muslims who fit within the limits of British tolerance. Shabina Begum and X's assertions of a right to manifest their religious belief are constructed as unreasonable demands, a threat that represents something much larger (Muslim extremism), that needs to be guarded against.[45] This boundary of tolerance and the equation of some

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44 In *X* v. *Y*, the Court goes on at length to stress the importance of face to face contact in the educational context. The possibility that the significance of the visibility of the face to communication might be culturally specific or at least culturally determined does not seem to enter the framework of analysis at all; despite the fact that the three elder sisters of X all gave witness statements stating that they had suffered no impairment at all by covering their faces, and had all done well at school (*X.* v. *Y,* op. cit., n. 22, para. 86). A related case, that of *Azmi*, entailed the rejection of Mrs. Azmi's claim of direct discrimination, and in the alternative, indirection discrimination, by the Employment Appeals Tribunal. Azmi, a teaching assistant for children aged 10–13, was prohibited from wearing the *niqab* in the classroom when teaching. She did not object to removing the covering from her face in front of pupils, but did not want to remove it in the presence of male teachers. The EAT held that there was no direct discrimination because anyone would have been asked to remove the face covering, regardless of their reason for wearing it in the first instance. There was no indirect discrimination because the objective of the restriction imposed on Mrs. Azmi – the most optimum (clear and effective) communication with students – was legitimate and the imposition proportionate to that objective (*Azmi,* op. cit., n. 22, para. 74). It is interesting that very shortly after the release of the EAT's ruling, the Department for Education and Skills released guidelines making it clear that schools have the right to limit the right of a student to 'manifest one's religion or beliefs' so long as the interference with the right is justified on the grounds specified under the Human Rights Act 1998. In the Appendix, the Guidelines specifically state that appropriate dress for young Muslim women does not necessitate the wearing of the *niqab* (Department for Education and Skills, 'Guidance to Schools on School Uniform Related Policies', 20 March 2007, s. 1.7. See: <www.dcsf.gov.uk/consultations/index.cfm?action=conResults&consultationId=1468&external=no&menu=3>.

45 On the argument about claims for basic civil and political rights as being seen by majoritarian communities as unreasonable, see J. Goldberg-Hiller, ' "Subjectivity is a Citizen": Representation, Recognition, and the Deconstruction of Civil Rights' in *Studies in Law, Politics and Society Vol. 28*, eds. A. Sarat and P. Ewick (2003), and T. Modood, A. Triandafyllidou, and R. Zapata-Barrero, *Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship: a European Approach* (2006). It is interesting that Jonathan Goldberg-Hiller has made this argument in the context of lesbian and gay struggles for the right

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practices with religious extremism reached a climax with a lecture delivered by the Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, on 7 February 2008. For several days, mainstream news coverage on the stoning of women in Saudi Arabia, and other gruesome punishments meted out elsewhere, lent steam to the hysteria that the recognition of any type of Sharia law would signal a victory for Muslim religious extremism embodied by the likes of al-Qaeda. In fact, the Archbishop had advocated the importance of recognizing religious law in a predominantly 'secular social environment'.[46]

In the United Kingdom, the boundaries of tolerance of cultural, religious, and racial difference reflect and define the character of British nationalism. The controversies over the rights of girls and women to wear various forms of the veil in educational contexts, along with the proposed recognition of limited Sharia arbitration tribunals, sparked a renewed desire to define common British values. The anxiety and fear that created a general equivalence between any expressions of a Muslim identity and terrorism and religious extremism led to a tightening of the limit of acceptable difference; difference was tolerable only in so far as it was palatable to the majoritarian British sensibility. This sensibility, of course, is underwritten by racial, religious, and gendered formations that emerged with a modernity deeply rooted in the colonial encounter. Difference is fine, as long it exists as a *differentiated unity*, with the unitary whole being disciplined into shape by a sovereign juridical order which itself emerges out of a Christian political heritage.

While the United Kingdom was desperately trying to reinscribe the limits of its tolerance for cultural and religious difference, debates over the rights of young women and girls to wear a headscarf in public schools were in full bloom across the Channel. On 15 March 2004, the French government passed a law banning students from wearing 'conspicuous signs' of religious affiliation in public schools.[47] Joan Scott argues that this law was directed at Muslim girls wearing headscarves, as the inclusion of Jewish boys in skullcaps and Sikh boys in turbans[48] was merely intended to pre-empt claims of discrimination.

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to same-sex marriage in Hawaii, and Tariq Modood has pointed out how in Europe there is a widespread perception that Muslim communities are making 'politically exceptional, culturally unreasonable or theologically alien demands' upon their states.

46 <www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/1575>.

47 The definition of 'conspicuous' reads as follows (in J. Scott, *The Politics of the Veil* (2007) 1):

The clothing and religious signs prohibited are conspicuous signs such as a large cross, a veil, or a skullcap. Not regarded as signs indicating religious affiliation are discreet signs, which can be, for example, medallions, small crosses, stars of David, hands of Fatima, or small Korans.

48 For a deeply insightful analysis of the application made by French Sikhs to exempt themselves from the ban on the basis that the turban was a cultural rather than a religious sign, a claim that was ultimately rejected by the National Assembly, see Asad, op. cit., n. 9, p. 501.

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The decision taken by the government in 2004 was the conclusion to debates about the headscarf (or *foulard* in French, *hijab* in Arabic, which as Scott discusses, was quickly transmuted into a debate that employed the more ambiguous term the 'veil', or *la voile*), which had emerged in three separate surges in 1989, 1994, and 2003.[49] It is not my intention to cover this recent history here, but rather, to point to certain aspects of how the contest was framed and articulated. The rights of a very small minority of Muslim girls to wear the *hijab* were pitted against the sacrosanct principle of secularism. Similar to the situation in the United Kingdom, the *hijab* came to represent a threat from which the nation state had to be defended. The *hijab* in this context, however, did not only represent the threat of Muslim religious extremism, but within the imaginary of French secularism, represented a specifically Muslim threat of contamination of the public sphere with religion, thereby undermining one of the fundamental principles of French nationalism. Bowen notes that by 2004, the threat to *laïcité* had been identified as a specifically Muslim one, in the media and in public opinion.[50] The tone in newspaper editorials, for instance, had shifted to one of 'regret over missed opportunities plus alarm at rising dangers'; only five years previously, major historians of *laïcité* had agreed that the principle had prevailed and that the remaining challenge was integration of France's Arab minorities.[51]

Unlike in the United Kingdom, the debate over the rights of Muslim girls to wear the veil did not reveal any prevarication about where the line of tolerance of religious-cultural difference ought to be drawn, leading to the perceived need to embark on a quest to reinvent common national values. In France, the doctrine of secularism was posited as fundamental to the unitary identity of the nation state and constitutes, in part, its very sovereignty. However, the fervour with which the headscarf debates unfolded in France gives the impression that *laïcité* has been an incontestable part of French republicanism for centuries. While McGoldrick points out that the term *laïcité* was used as early as 1871 in the context of debates on the religious neutrality of public schools, it is only with the 1905 Law that secularism, as the separation of the church and state, became enshrined in law.[52] While the process of secularization began with the Revolution, the principle of *laïcité* was ratified by the Assembly in 1905 (even though the word itself does not appear in that text).[53] Bowen points out that the principle of French secularism is an ongoing project, with the headscarf debates the most recent

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49 Scott, op. cit, n. 47, p. 22.
50 J.R. Bowen, *Why the French Don't Like Headscarves: Islam, the state and public space* (2007) 31.
51 id.
52 D. McGoldrick, *Human Rights and Religion: The Islamic Headscarf Debate in Europe* (2006) 36.
53 Bowen, op. cit., n. 50, p. 28.

episode in its development and defence. The political ethos or spirit underlying *laïcité* can be better understood as a more contemporary manifestation of French Republicanism that reflects an emphasis on the coming together of individuals whose social bonds are based on the notion of the individual citizen who has 'abstracted him/herself' from particular cultural traditions.[54]

In her book, *Politics of the Veil*, Joan W. Scott poses the question of how this small article of clothing, worn by a vast minority of Muslim girls and women, could incite such a furore in France. She traces the *affaires des foulards* through the lineaments of French colonialism in Algeria, implicating the racial and gender formations of this era in her contemporary understanding of the controversy. The legacy of colonialism and the persistence of racism towards French Arabs and Arab immigrants in France, along with the particular ways in which sexuality and gender were configured through this colonial encounter, converge in the debates over the veil. What is at stake, then, in the veil controversy is the defence of a particular political subjectivity – the French citizen – that was shaped and formed through a violent colonial encounter with Arabs (and Arab Muslims) in Algeria and beyond.[55]

> Beyond the equation of veils with terrorism was the refusal to acknowledge that, for some of these girls at least, there was a different notion of personhood being articulated, one they had chosen themselves. In the end the law insisted that only one notion was possible – the unencumbered, autonomous individual; another model was inconceivable. Indeed, only such individuals were thought to be capable of exercising choice ... Banning headscarves in public schools made the point clearly that only one notion of personhood was possible if Muslims were to be accepted as fully French.[56]

With a recent remaking of *laïcité* to include sex equality,[57] the veil became the symbol of gender oppression that reflected an inherent patriarchy of the Muslim community and was something that needed to be stamped out as it violated the secular norms of the French polity. Here we see the underlying racism of the headscarf controversy masked by the overarching concern regarding secularism. The ways in which race, gender, and sexuality were imbricated in the desire of the majority to ban the headscarf reveal the contours of the proper, acceptable subject of citizenship. As noted in the above quotation from Scott, this national identity was a unitary one, with no space for practices of the self that stretched the bounds of the autonomous individual encumbered by 'culture', 'race', or for that matter, a sexuality that

54 id., pp. 14–15.
55 For a discussion of the socio-economic and political status of Muslim communities in France see McGoldrick, op. cit., n. 52, pp. 47–61.
56 Scott, op. cit., n. 47, p. 135.
57 id., pp. 109, 117.

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could not fit itself within the confines of a French conception of femininity.[58]

For present purposes, this article emphasizes the unitary nature of this national sovereignty. Scott, along with others, have pointed out that France as a constitutionally 'indivisible, secular, democratic and social republic' is, of course, rife with contradictions.[59] The unitary or indivisible secular nation state is thoroughly embedded in compromises with the Catholic faith. But the contradictions in the actual operation of *laïcité* are not my main concern. Rather, it is the composition of this indivisible, unitary sovereignty: this unitary sovereign subject that sees itself as neutral, but emerges out of a Christian political and moral ethos of love and tolerance; this unitary sovereign subject that sees itself as opposing pluralism.

Many scholars have revealed the Christian origins of secularism as a political doctrine, and it is not my intention to restate that critique.[60] The aim here is to locate secularism and multiculturalism as emerging out of this same political and philosophical lineage, in order to demonstrate how, despite multiculturalism's fascination with difference, it, like secularism, continually reinscribes a concept of the sovereign subject that is not only autonomous, independent, and rational, but is encumbered by a cultural-religious identity that is revealed in moments of being challenged by other, non-Christian modes of being. The implications for our understanding of multiculturalism and secularism are as follows: whereas multiculturalism aims to recognize cultural and religious 'difference', and secularism purports

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58 id., pp. 151–74. Judith Butler, in *Undoing Gender* (2004), has explored how the proscription of the right of gay and lesbian couples to adopt children, one aspect of the 'pacts of civil solidarity' by which same-sex relationships were granted legal recognition by the French state, reflected the desire to shore up a unified political subjectivity of the nation state that re-entrenched cultural norms of 'racial purity and domination'. She writes:

> [O]ne can see a conversion between the arguments in France that rail against the threat to 'culture' posed by the prospect of legally allied gay people having children … and those arguments concerning issues of immigration, of what Europe is. This last concern raises the question, implicitly and explicitly, of what is truly French, the basis of its culture, which becomes, through an imperial logic, the basis of culture itself, its universal and invariable conditions. The debates center not only on the questions of what culture is and who should be admitted but also on how the subjects of culture should be reproduced (p. 110).

59 The most obvious being state support for religious schools, in place since 1958, along with the state observance of Christian holidays but not Muslim or Jewish ones. Scott writes, in relation to a minister's opposition to the proposed inclusion of other holidays in the school calendar: 'For him, the Christian holidays don't violate the principle of secularism – proof to critics of "laïcité" that it is not universal at all but is, rather, intimately bound up with the dominant Catholic religious culture of the nation' (Scott, op. cit., n. 47, pp. 100–1).

60 On this point, see T. Asad, *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity* (2003); Taylor, op. cit., n. 12; and S. Mahmood, 'Secularism, Hermeneutics, Empire: The Politics of Islamic Reformation' (2006) 18 *Public Culture* 323–47.

to decouple religion from the public sphere, both are held hostage to a concept of subjectivity that is prefigured by a Christian cultural-religious heritage that determines what is acceptable difference and, in the latter case, which exceptions to the norms of *laïcité* are tolerable. This power to decide on the tolerable exceptions to the dominant cultural-religious norms is 'a measure of sovereign power'.[61] Wendy Brown argues that tolerance is deployed 'as a technique for re-legitimating liberal universalism and restoring the notion of the culturally unified nation at a moment when both are faltering'.[62] The notion of tolerance (among others, such as love or passion[63]) performs the labour of determining the bounds of the sovereign subjectivity in both cases, particularly in moments when the unitary sovereign nation is perceived as being in jeopardy.

III. THE COMMON LINEAGE OF THE SECULAR AND MULTICULTURAL SUBJECT OF LAW AND POLITICS

Charles Taylor's theory of multiculturalism is informed by a particular account of the modern self.[64] The modern self emerges in the transition from a feudal order, in which recognition was based on social hierarchies and class status, to a social and political order based on the equality of every human being. The contemporary concept of secularism emerges in the nineteenth century as a means of mediating the transition from a hierarchical, feudal society that also incorporated notions of a divine source of authority, to a universal and transcendent ideal of humanity through which citizenship could be defined.[65] Secularism is the transcendent mediation that deals with *difference*; differences of class, race, gender, and significantly, religion in

61 Asad, id., p. 505.
62 Brown, op. cit., n. 12, p. 94.
63 Asad explains how secular passion, posited as the 'public expression of "objective principle" rather than "subjective belief"' fits the criterion of Positivist philosophy, as opposed to passion as an element of religious affect which is seen as disturbing, 'the cause of much instability, intolerance, and unhappiness' (Asad, op. cit, n. 9, p. 515).
64 Taylor's work focuses mainly on recognition in the public sphere and the recognition that occurs between communities: C. Taylor, *Philosophical Arguments* (1995). Taylor takes the dialectic of mutual recognition from Hegel and transposes it into contemporary political and social struggles in the Canadian context, most notably the struggle of the Quebecois for self-determination. Taylor's seminal essay on the issue of recognition and identity formation, 'The Politics of Recognition' (p. 223) emphasizes the centrality of the recognition of identity – as cultural and linguistic distinctiveness – to freedom from oppression and social harms. The mutual recognition of identities by equals is the means of allowing individuals and cultural (linguistic) communities to attain full selfhood, equality, and dignity.
65 Asad, op. cit., n. 60. Asad also notes elsewhere that the separation of the religious and the political does not emerge with modernity but was recognized in medieval Christendom, albeit in a very different form than contemporary concepts of secularism (Asad, op. cit., n. 9, p. 498).

order to have a unified identity. Secularism posits the sovereign, autonomous self in opposition to a self that is constrained by religious belief. And so, freedom in an emergent modernity comes to mean the protection of this sovereign autonomous self opposed to the subject whose source lies in the divine, or whose fate is determined by god or superstition.[66] In this sense, a sovereign state and individual sovereignty are to be protected and defended through the doctrine of secularism.[67]

Freedom is realized through the division between a public realm free of religious faith and a private sphere where individual belief is contained and free from the authority of the state. Contemporary forms of secularism can be understood as one aspect of an emergent modernity in the nineteenth century that relies on and entrenches binary oppositions between public/private, secular/religious, modern/traditional, civilized/uncivilized, or progressive/backward. Another important binary that emerges is the distinction between justified violence and unjustified violence. And this is perhaps the most illuminating aspect of Talal Asad's critique of secularism and the secular. He highlights the fact that political liberalism has a high stake in the notion of the secular, and that the secular, and in general, the 'enlightened' space of liberalism is protected through violence. Violence was essential to the cultivation of enlightenment; this happened historically through colonial and imperial endeavours, and continues in the rhetoric and ideological justifications of the 'war on terror'. Here we can recall Walter Benjamin's critique of the 'spectral mixture' of law-preserving and law-founding violence, both objects of the law's monopoly of violence in a liberal state.[68] In the context of the modern liberal democracy, violence becomes something that is either justifiable as a means to preserving a unitary, sovereign people with their human rights, liberties, and freedoms, or something to be condemned as the product of illiberal, un-democratic regimes and communities.

Of course, a critique of secularism and its function in liberal democracies originates much earlier, in Marx's critique of the recognition of the rights of Jews in Prussia and France. Marx's acute critique of the political theology that lies at the basis of liberal democracy exposes the essentially religious nature of the consciousness of its citizen-subject. Further, his critique of the religious and specifically Christian nature of the liberal democratic state focuses on how the abstract sovereign individual becomes a fundamentally *depoliticized* subjectivity with the abolition of civil society and the end of feudalism, and the transition to liberal democracy in which politicized relations between individuals and classes become diffuse and common to all.[69] But, crucially, it is within this post-feudal, revolutionary political

66 Asad, id. (2003), p. 134.
67 id.
68 W. Benjamin, *One-Way Street and Other Writings* (2000) 140–1.
69 K. Marx, 'On the Jewish Question' in *Early Texts,* tr. D. McLellan (1972) 85–114.

democracy that the *political* character of the individual sovereign person's relationship to the state becomes constituted through notions of freedom and human rights to which materialism and a religious consciousness remain central.[70]

Marx's critique of the materialism to which the universal ideal of the sovereign individual is attached, is very significant in considering the particular subjectivity produced by both multiculturalism and secularism. In today's context, this ideal sovereign, autonomous subject is the consumer-subject who desires to live a lifestyle that comports with free-market economic principles. Critics have pointed to the commodifying tendencies of multiculturalism – that is, that the unitary subject remains in place, slightly modified by his or her capacity to consume multiculture. Cultural practices and traditions, festivals, dance, music, food, and clothing have all been embraced within a multiculturalism that not only tolerates difference but celebrates it in the form of commodification and consumption.[71] And increasingly, some, but not many scholars have also pointed out the commodifying tendencies of the subject produced through secularism. Alain Badiou for instance, writing on the headscarf ban in public schools in France, says:

> We maintain the following quite curious thing: that the law on the headscarf is a pure capitalist law. It prescribes that femininity be *exhibited*. In other words, that the circulation of the feminine body be *exhibited*, that the circulation of the feminine body necessarily comply with the market paradigm.[72]

So we can see a similarity here in the type of subject being produced by both multiculturalism and secularism as the *consumer* citizen-subject who desires a lifestyle consistent with capitalist and free-market ideology.

These insights into the capitalist dimensions of the essentially religious and theological nature of political democracy and its prime subject are, of course, indebted to Marx in no small way. Marx critiqued the nature of political relations that emerged with post-revolutionary liberal democracies, and illuminated how the subject of the liberal, capitalist democracy is one with an essentially religious consciousness. Private property and a capitalist materialism become sacred in the post-feudal world, held in place by liberal rights that posit the protection of private property and religious belief as central to human 'freedom'. With Marx's critique, the most basic premise of secularism, that religious consciousness is and can be kept separate from a public and political sphere, becomes untenable.

In many ways, Marx's critique of the abstract citizenship that idealizes an egoistic, sovereign man is a response to the political theology of Hegel. In

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70 id. For the contemporary instantiations of this phenomenon, particularly in the American context, see Connolly, op. cit., n. 1.
71 See text of n. 10 above.
72 A. Badiou, *Polemics* (2006) 103.

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Hegel's thought, the tension between religious faith and political culture is an inescapable relation that is primary to the emergence of human consciousness. Religious consciousness and cultural modes of being are inevitably bound to one another in this philosophy of being. Hegel's philosophy of the state and man's relationship to and within the state is very much wrapped up with his notion of revealed religion. The ethical life of the political state unfolds through a dialectical logic with which the revealed religion is thoroughly imbricated. The emergence of self-consciousness is embedded within this familial, political, religious, cultural matrix. However, what I find most interesting about Hegel's theological politics is that Hegel himself troubled the neat and tidy distinctions between religious beliefs and rational thought posited by Enlightenment thinkers.

Hegel troubles the distinctions that secularism comes to rely upon, in a way that foreshadows what some contemporary critics of secularism endeavour to point out. For instance, in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel questions the strict separation of religious (and superstitious) belief and Enlightenment precepts. Characteristic of his dialectical logic, he points out that the split between human and divine law produces a fragmented consciousness who eventually learns 'through its own act the contradiction of those powers [the human and divine laws] into which the substance divided itself and their mutual downfall'.[73] This state of consciousness is much like the fragmented and disjointed state that unhappy consciousness finds itself mired in earlier on in the *Phenomenology*. Here, mediation between the particularities of human law and the divine substance takes place through the figure of Christ. It is through the Christian doctrine of reconciliation that the particularities of the individual are reconciled with the Substance (S*pirit)* that is common to all. This is identical to the mediating function that secularism comes to perform. Secularism mediates fragmented differences in order to shore up and cement a unitary sovereign nation state. This is the theological 'reality' that underpins the fantasy of secularism.

Hegel's thought remains within an occidental logic that aspires towards a reconciled universal *Spirit* with the immanent emergence of self-consciousness, and sees *Christ* as being the mediating function between each particular self-consciousness and universal Spirit. Throughout the unfolding of his philosophical system, Hegel sought to expose how types of thought and knowledge that are posited as essentially religious on the one hand, and essentially philosophical on the other, are in fact imbricated within one another. Hegel's fusion of Christianity and theories of subjectivity, nation state, and culture comprises a vision of politics that is thoroughly and explicitly theological in nature, what critics such as Asad illuminate in relation to the realities of how secularism operates. In a sense, Hegel's

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73 G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, tr. A.V. Miller (1977) para. 445.

theologically inspired philosophy is what *secularism* comes to be, although it purports to be something very different. Hegel points to some of the contradictions inherent in the binary logic that secularism will come to rely upon; however, he does this in support of his own political theology. In this way, Hegel's critique of certain elements of Enlightenment thought prefigures the critiques of secularism that follow much later, albeit in order to lay bare his theory of the religious consciousness that lies at the heart of the ethical life of the political state.

Hegel's thought also illuminates the relationship between religion and culture that lies at the foundation of multiculturalism as a theory of politics and governance. We may currently understand religion and culture as having been treated as analytically and discursively separate within a liberal paradigm. However, the 'culture' of Hegel's phenomenology from which Taylor's theory of multiculturalism is derived is a horizon of becoming that remains firmly entangled with Christian religious belief. What I am interested in exploring here is the way in which the concept of culture as a mode of thought (of the Enlightenment) exists with Christian faith or belief as two aspects of self-consciousness. Whereas multiculturalism has posited culture and cultural difference as its primary objects of concern, the concept of culture from which it derives is firmly tethered to a notion of consciousness for which religious faith is essential. And this religious faith and its reconciliation with the culture of European Enlightenment thought is, of course, as explored below, Christian in its form and content. This has implications for the legal and political subject of multiculturalism: the contemporary limits of acceptance and tolerance in relation to cultural and religious difference are, in my view, being drawn in reference and relation to this philosophical legacy.

In Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the concepts of culture and religion evolve along with self-consciousness's own journey towards absolute truth. At the beginning of the second part of the *Phenomenology*, entitled 'Spirit', religion does not yet appear within the world of culture as it ultimately will, in and for itself.[74] Up until this moment, faith has appeared in the forms of a divine law (in the realm of the family) or in Unhappy Consciousness 'as a shape of the insubstantial process of consciousness', that are overcome and subsumed by, in the first instance, the universal form of legal right, and in the latter, self-consciousness that eventually reconciles itself to its being through the mediation of a third being, becoming aware of its unity with the universal.[75] The main point to emphasize is that religion at this moment, in relation to culture, is alienated from actuality but proceeds to go through a process of being reconciled to the world of actuality, and the world of culture, through various stages of alienation and realization.

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74 id., para. 528.
75 id., paras. 230–1.

Also at this moment, the concept of culture within the understanding of consciousness (the form of consciousness Hegel is dealing with in this part of the *Phenomenology*) denotes a world that believes itself to be opposed to religious faith. Hegel engages with the Enlightenment and its relation to religious faith as a means of unfolding his philosophy of the subject for whom faith or belief (*Glaube*) is as important to the emergence of the ethical, spiritual being as reasonable, rational thought. Faith and 'insight' (or reason – pure insight that posits itself as opposed to faith) are two aspects of consciousness that cannot be denied nor can they deny each other.[76] These two aspects of pure consciousness share the same ground, although they are initially and mistakenly opposed to each other.

Enlightenment reason and religious faith both employ similar principles in their attacks on each other. Whereas Enlightenment thought misrepresents religious faith as something it is not, faith sees Enlightenment as consisting of empty platitudes, divorced from the reality of faith, and its status as an essential aspect of consciousness itself.[77] Eventually, self-consciousness overcomes this false division between the abstraction of pure self-consciousness (or pure insight, the reason of Enlightenment culture) and faith. The movement of thought (of consciousness) overcomes this antithesis and moves ever closer to the becoming of *Spirit*.[78]

Any attempt to discuss one part of the *Phenomenology* in isolation from the entire text will always seem quite inadequate; and in the section discussed above, religion and culture appear in two very specific forms. Culture denotes the Enlightenment culture that privileged reasoned insight and thought at the expense of blind religious faith. Religion in this moment is not the revealed religion through which *Spirit* finally and ultimately emerges, but religious piety or belief. The main objective of the discussion above is to consider the ways in which the progenitor of the contemporary subject of multiculturalism is a being for whom culture (the Enlightenment culture of reason) and religious faith (of the pious individual) are inextricably intertwined.

Thus, while religion and culture have been kept analytically distinct within a liberal paradigm, in which religious belief and the expression of religious belief are understood as being distinct from cultural practices and linguistic differences,[79] I argue that the concept of multiculturalism is premised on a concept of 'culture' that is very much related to religious *belief*. In the *Begum* and *Azmi* cases explored above, contestations over the acceptability of symbols of religious difference invoke anxiety about the constitution of national British identity, values, and culture. The current conflation of religious and cultural identity is perhaps more a recovery of an

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76 id., paras. 538, 549, 563.
77 id., para. 550.
78 id., para. 596.
79 See discussion at pp. 319–20 above; see, also, Phillips, op. cit., n. 12, pp. 58–9.

older understanding of 'culture' and the relationship between religious belief and cultural belonging than something new. Second, the insights gleaned from enquiring into the philosophical lineage of the concept of 'culture' means that contemporary discourses of multiculturalism that focus so heavily on cultural difference cannot in fact escape the same 'theological' quality attributed to secularism by its critics.

Culture, within a Hegelian schema, is a part of a totalizing project that involves religious faith and belief. Culture is not conceived of as discrete sets of practices that vary from collective to collective but, rather, is an embodiment of a way of life and being. Culture, travelling down to us via Taylor, from Hegel, finds its roots in a totalizing and normalizing project beginning in the nineteenth century in industrial liberal societies.[80] Again, pointing to the connection between this aspect of modernity in the nineteenth century, we can turn our attention to the way in which culture was used as a disciplinary technique and force to further European colonial endeavours. The use of 'culture' to justify the use of violence and force on colonial populations seen as lacking in culture or possessing an inferior culture is, of course, something that follows us into contemporary political contexts. The idea, for instance, that some cultural practices of minority groups are 'in conflict' with or 'contradict' the norms and values of *British* society (a claim made by many feminists decrying the problems with multicultural tolerance) points to this older notion of culture as a whole form, a common way of life that reflects an essential and basic unity, or unitary peoples. Multiculturalism does not, in other words, reflect a syncretic, fluid set of practices of different communities that exist in relation to one another and are negotiated. Whereas multiculturalism is intended to be a mode of governance through which a range of cultural differences can be negotiated, the concept of culture from which it derives is tied to Christianity and it is this coupling that defines the sovereign subjectivity at stake in political contestations over the ability of women to express their religious, cultural differences in a variety of ways.

IV. CONCLUSION

In this article, I have explored the common roots of contemporary forms of secularism and multiculturalism. By looking to nineteenth-century philosophical critiques of Enlightenment thought through the work of Hegel and Marx, we see how the subject that emerges with nascent liberal democratic nation-state forms has a consciousness that is religious in nature. Whereas secularism purports to separate religious belief from the political domain, the sovereign subject is thoroughly imbued with a religious consciousness in a quest to conform to and preserve a unitary, sovereign nation

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80 Asad, op. cit., n. 11.

state, with its capitalist materialism that elevates the right of private property to a sacred status. In any event, Marx's critique of the post-revolutionary subject of liberal democracy reveals its essentially religious colour.

The article has also explored Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* as a text that dispels the fantasy that contemporary secularism comes to rely upon: that there is a bright-line distinction between the subject of reason, pure thought, and rationality and the affected being of religious faith. Hegel takes apart these distinctions and enfolds them into a dialectical relation of becoming. This political theology, I argue, lies at the basis of contemporary forms of multiculturalism; culture within this philosophical trajectory remains tethered to a religious consciousness as a matter of necessity for this human subject.

This path was taken in order to explore the common or shared trajectories of two political doctrines that appear to be at odds in the way they conceive of and manage difference. Despite this appearance, it is argued that in both the United Kingdom and France, conflicts over the rights of Muslim women and girls to veil in a variety of ways are ultimately in the same vein: the unreasonable demands of the Muslim minority are viewed as a threat to be contained in defence of the unitary, sovereign nation state and its people. Both secularism and multiculturalism are deployed to govern and manage difference that is perceived to violate dominant norms and values, defined in reference to the Christian cultural heritage of the nation state.

NADIA FADIL

Managing affects and sensibilities: The case of not-handshaking and not-fasting

This paper examines how a number of pious and non-practising Belgian Maghrebi women *who do not shake hands* with the opposite sex and *do not fast* manage the sensitivity and transgressive potential of these practices. Whereas all interlocutors were prone to adjust their conducts to avoid controversies, these adaptations were nevertheless assessed differently. Adopting a flexible stand in the case of not-handshaking was viewed as normal by the pious women, while the impossibility of eating in front of other Muslims was problematised by the non-practising women. I suggest that these different assessments display the *unequal* ethical importance attributed to conducts in a liberal-secular regime.

Introduction

In November 2004, a nation-wide controversy erupted in the Netherlands after Imam Ahmad Salam from the small town of Tilburg refused to shake hands with Rita Verdonk, the then Minister of Immigration and Integration. After explaining that his Islamic confession did not allow him to shake hands with women, Rita Verdonk, offended by this attitude, wondered whether she wasn't 'equal' to him and stated that this incident was food for further discussion. Verdonk's spokesman clarified her position explaining that the Minister wanted to underline the conventionality of shaking hands in the Netherlands and the importance for Imams to be familiar with Dutch customs and values.[1] A few years later, during Ramadan of September 2008, another incident erupted, in the UK this time, around the well-known and widely acclaimed British soap opera *EastEnders*. Hundreds of Muslims were infuriated after the popular TV-show featured one of its Muslim characters, Masood, secretly eating a chapatti in daytime during Ramadan. The BBC received over a hundred email complaints, angry reactions were posted on websites and blogs, and some security officials even feared the possibility of violent reactions.[2] The BBC issued a public statement, defending the episode, yet also

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1   'Verdonk boos na weigering Imam' [*Verdonk mad after Imam refusal*], in *Trouw*, 22/11/2004.
2   BBC News, 'EastEnders scene defended', 2/10/08, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/ 7647965.stm; Katie Begley, 'EastEnders fear bomb madman revenge', Daily Star, 3/10/08.

insisting that it wasn't its intention 'to insult Muslims or Islamic values' and stressing that Masood's action should rather be read as an illustration of 'his own fallibilities as a human being'.[3]

While these two events seemingly have nothing in common and occurred in different contexts, they both *transgressed* two different moral imaginaries which resulted in emotional reactions.[4] The Imam's refusal to shake hands touched upon two principles which were presented by Verdonk and her spokesman as kernels of the Dutch – and by extension: the Western-European – public. By refusing to shake hands, Imam Ahmad Salam firstly violated the primary loyalty to 'Dutch customs' that is expected from those who are considered as the object of integration: i.e. Muslim immigrants (see Hage 2000). Yet besides expressing a nationalist longing for a homogeneous cultural space, Verdonk's sensitivity was also linked with the Imam's explicit reference to gender.[5] His insistence upon sexual difference contradicts the way a 'universal' and 'abstract' subject is fostered in a liberal-secular imaginary by denying sexual (ethnic, class or other) differences rather than rendering them explicit, a position Joan Scott has also described as a *psychology of denial* in her analysis of the headscarf ban in France (Scott 2007: 170).

The controversy around the chapatti-eating Masood in *EastEnders* brings us, on the other hand, to a Muslim moral imaginary that is actively enacted and invigorated during the month of Ramadan in Islamic countries, as well as also among the 15 million Muslims that are estimated to live in Western-Europe (Hunter 2002). During this month, practising Muslims not only abstain from eating, drinking, smoking or having sexual relationships in daytime, but this month is also one of '*feasting*' – to paraphrase Marjo Buitelaar (1993). Families and friends gather for *Iftar*, Arabic satellite channels broadcast special Ramadan TV-shows and series, and festival and cultural events colour this holy month. More than only being a religious practice, Ramadan thus acts as a collective ritual which installs the affective and material contours of the Muslim moral imaginary in and outside Europe.[6] The fact that a Muslim character was featured eating in plain day during Ramadan, even if only fictional, touched upon the

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3   'EastEnders, Masood Ahmed breaking his Ramadan fast, BBC One, 11th September 2008', Response by the BBC, issued on September, 24th, 2008; http://www.bbc.co.uk/complaints/response/2008/09/080924_res_eastenders_masood_ramadan_jf.shtml.

4   The concept of transgression is understood here in a Foucaultian manner. In '*A Preface to Transgression*' (Foucault 2003 [1963]), Foucault defines transgression as an event that informs us about the limits of a particular order. Concomitant with Bataille's conceptualisation, he views transgression as a violence yet one that goes beyond particular limits while remaining within those limits, and hence confirming them (Libertson 1977: 1013). Foucault's interest in this concept is thus not primarily stirred by the subversive potential of transgressive experiences, but rather by their informative potential. He takes them as an affirmation, yet a non-positive affirmation which also allows the limits to arise, in their blank nakedness, while simultaneously being transgressed (Foucault 2002: 446–447). Rather than placing it outside a web of power, transgressive experiences are thus taken as an entrance point to examine and analyse the operation of disciplinary regimes, and more particularly the manner in which behaviours and practices are classified, normalised or individualised in specific way (see also Foucault 1998 [1976]).

5   Talal Asad notes in *Formation of the Secular* that secularism operates through the delineation and cultivation of a social sphere which seeks to transcend specific particularities such as 'class', 'gender' and 'religious identities' which are simultaneously performed throughout this (Asad 2003:45).

6   For an account of how Islamic affects are revitalized in social life see Charles Hirschkind's (2006) analysis of cassette sermons and how the latter play a key role in the dissemination and sedimentation of Muslim ethics and affects in daily life.

moral imaginary cultivated during that month. Yet besides illustrating how particular religious or secular conducts 'affect' distinctive moral imaginaries, these two cases also raise the question how these sensibilities are to affect and regulate the conduct of the concerned 'offenders' – i.e. the Imam or the BBC. How does one deal with the difficulty handshaking poses to some pious Muslims, or watching a Muslim character eat in plain day during Ramadan? And conversely: how does one relate to the sensibilities of those who take offense at the refusal to shake hands, or the request not to eat in public during Ramadan?

This paper examines the way surrounding affects structure and regulate the conduct of non-handshaking and non-fasting women of Muslim background in Belgium.[7] The women interviewed are practising and non-practising second generation Maghrebi, born from parents who emigrated to Belgium in the early sixties or seventies, and live and work in Brussels or Antwerp.[8] Whereas the Belgian context cannot simply be compared with the countries cited above, the contentious potential of some facets of their religious or non-religious orientation – i.e. not-handshaking or not-fasting – was a source of concern. They all expressed their awareness over the potentially offensive consequences of their conduct, and developed strategies to overcome them. In analysing their accounts, I seek to understand to what extent these sensibilities guide and regulate the women's conduct, and how this is assessed. My primary aim is not to offer a Goffmanian (1964) analysis of different strategies of management.[9] This paper rather inscribes itself in the recent '*affective turn*' in sociological and anthropological scholarship (Halley and Ticineto Clough 2007), which seeks to understand how emotions – framed as socio-cultural constructs[10] – co-constitute a wide array of social and cultural phenomena. A prevailing question in this regard has been to understand how (individual and collective) emotions are *generated*, *regulated* and *structured* in particular contexts, and how these in turn are linked with the sustenance, reproduction and/or contestation of a particular

7 The interviews analysed here were gathered in the framework of a fieldwork in Brussels and Antwerp between 2004 and 2006. Sixty-five interviews were conducted with practising and non-practising second-generation Maghrebi who were involved in socio-cultural or Islamic organisations. The analysis of the interviews sought to identify and unpack embodied and discursive self-techniques or self-practices implied in this process of shaping oneself into an orthodox, non-orthodox or secular Muslim.

8 Both cities harbour an important and visible Muslim community. Whereas Brussels Capital Region has the highest proportion of the Muslim community of Belgium: 39% of the Belgian Muslims are estimated to live in the capital and the total number of Muslims is estimated at around 17% of the 1,048,500 residents in Brussels, Antwerp has the second largest Muslim population which is estimated at around 9–10% of its 470,000 inhabitants. They are mostly concentrated in specific neighbourhoods in both cities, and have well developed commercial networks and organisations.

9 In *Stigma. Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity* (1986 [1963]), Erving Goffmann examines different strategies for dealing with 'spoiled' identities, taking the voluntary display of one's 'spoiled' identity as one of the possible *strategies* to 'manage' discreditable information about stigmatised identities (1986: 123). Goffman distinguishes between discredited stigmatised identities and discreditable identities. In the case where the information cannot be hidden (e.g. scars), the 'stigmatised' individuals will be engaged in strategies of tension management. In cases where the information can be covered, strategies of information management will be deployed (1963: 14, 57).

10 This scholarship distinguishes itself from the essentialist understanding of emotions, which takes them as a pre-programmed repertoire of responses to stimuli from the outside world. For a further critique see Ahmed (2004), Lutz & Abu-Lughod (1990), Hochschild (1984).

order.[11] This has explicitly been the case in the kind of scholarship which has looked at the operation of liberal and secular orders on an emotional and visceral level (see Asad 2008; Brown 2006; Butler 2002). One of the most influential works in this respect has been that of Talal Asad, whose seminal *Formation of the Secular* explores the question of 'what an anthropology of secularism might look like' (Asad 2003: 1). Secularisation is, in this perspective, not only understood as a process which describes the differentiation of religion from other social spheres (Dobbelaere 2002; Casanova 1994), but it is approached as a governmentality (Foucault) which views this differentiation between the 'religious' and 'the social' as the product of a distinct epistemological realm (a specific understanding of the religious and the social), institutional arrangements and a particular economy of pain and pleasure. The latter is particularly interesting for our purpose. Rather than simply positing that the secular opposes pain and suffering, Asad examines the kinds of sufferings that are problematised (such as religious pain) or normalised (such as the pain for civilizational purposes) in a secular context, and how the latter relates to the cultivation of a particular kind of moral subject (Asad 2003: 79–85, 101, 123; see also Goldstone 2007).

The same reasoning can also be applied to morally offending events. Rather than simply positing that a liberal and secular context authorises all kinds of moral offences, what should be examined is the kind of moral offences that are deemed problematic and the kinds of offences which are normalised. The Danish cartoon riots of February 2006 have for instance provided a fruitful ground for analysis not only of the contours of the moral injuries experienced by millions of Muslims, but also the *unintelligibility* of these injuries to many Western-Europeans (see for instance Mahmood 2009). Yet the cases analysed in this paper aren't offending images or injurious speeches, but conducts with potentially unsettling effects performed in daily interactions. The perspective that is furthermore analysed isn't that of the 'offended', but of the '*offenders*': i.e. Muslim women who do not shake hands, and non-practising women who do not fast. By analysing these two cases, I am interested in the way these women assess the marginality of their own position as well as the necessity of considering 'the other's' affects' in their conduct. The examples provided in this paper will show a difference in assessment between the two cases. A difference which is not incidental, I argue, but which reflects the *unequal* ethical importance of both conducts in the formation of an 'autonomous' and 'sovereign' self in a liberal-secular regime.

(Not)-handshaking and liberal sensibilities

Lara Deeb describes in *An Enchanted Modern* (2006) how (not)-handshaking figured as a contested practice among pious Shi'i Muslim she encountered in Beirut. While the

11   Two perspectives can be discerned in this regard. A first perspective looks at the emotional labour implied or engendered in particular professional, political or social settings – the 'feeling rules' (Hochschild 1984; see also Pupavac 2004; Flam 2004 & 2005). Whereas this first approach accords a considerable importance to the disciplinary process, it nevertheless presupposes a 'deeper' layer of emotions which exist independently. A second perspective, which departs from Foucaultian anti-humanist premises, takes these regulatory processes on the other hand to be co-constitutive for one's affective household. This implies that there is no pre-social understanding of affects, but the latter are viewed as the product of regulative powers and their reiteration (see Ahmed 2004; Butler 1993).

majority of her male interlocutors abstained from shaking hands with the opposite sex, viewing it as a sign of moral decay; this abstinence was problematised by a smaller group who stressed the necessity of being modern (2006: 110). The practice of not shaking hands with the *non-mahram* opposite sex was equally controversial among the pious Muslims I encountered during my fieldwork in Brussels and Antwerp.[12] While it by no means featured as a generalised practice, several did abide by it, and I gradually learned throughout my fieldwork to decode the reluctance to offer one's hand as a sign that one was not shaking hands.[13] Yet several also did contest it, such as Loubna, who discarded it as futile: '*I don't care at all, but I adapt myself. This means that those who don't shake hands, well I don't shake theirs. Those who give me their hands, I shake it*'.

The question of shaking hands or not shaking hands did, however, not depend only on the pious orientation of my respondents, but also on the context of its performance and the opportunity to do so. Whereas the refusal to shake hands did not lead to the same public outcry as in the Dutch case, it did engender a public incident in Belgium when in July 2005 the then head of the senate, Anne-Marie Lizin, expressed her refusal to meet with Iranian Parliamentary delegates after being informed of their desire not to shake hands with any female official. This refusal was interpreted as an intolerable violation of 'our habits', where 'men and women live in equal terms'.[14] Belgium is characterised by a very distinctive secular model, the *neutrality model*, wherein the state actively recognises and finances religious confessions and their ramifications in social life, rather than separating itself from it. This principle finds its translation in the financial support the state offers to officially recognised cults, as well as in the way the civil infrastructures (healthcare, education, syndicate, civil society) as well as political life are structured – or *pillarised* – along confessional and ideological lines (Post 1989; Laermans 1992; Hellemans & Verduyckt 1990). Yet despite this 'open' approach to religion in public life, the increasing visibility of Islam in the public sphere has in the past few years been the object of numerous controversies. Successive hijab debates have dominated the Flemish and French-speaking media since 2003 (see Fadil 2004; Longman 2003), schools and administrative bodies have increasingly adopted restrictive dress codes which ban the hijab and other 'ostentatious' religious signs, and despite Islam's official recognition as a cult since 1974, the quest for an administrative body of representatives has been at the source of numerous political tensions (Panafit 1999; Kanmaz & Zemni 2007). Practising one's Islamic faith outside one's home or mosque was therefore found by many to be a difficult and sensitive experience.

12   *Mahram* is a general Islamic category used to refer to related and unmarriable persons from the opposite sex. Considered as *Mahram* are [in the case of women]: brothers, fathers, uncles, sons and people who have not yet attained the age of puberty. This category is important within Islamic jurisprudence as it is used to delineate the application of certain gender-related rules and practices. The religious prescription of wearing the *hijab* is for instance only of application in a context where non-Mahram persons of the opposite sex are present. While the case of not shaking hands does not carry the same theological weight, several scholars like the well-known Yousouf Al-Qaradawi, do not advise it. See, for instance, http://www.islamonline.net, Question: 'Shaking hands with women: an Islamic perspective' in Fatwa-bank 24/07/2006.

13   At the start of my fieldwork, I was unfamiliar with this practice. It is only gradually that I learned to refrain from shaking hands with certain men, which I often had to implicitly deduce from their body language. Only once, at the start of my research, did one devout young man I had known for a longer period explicitly address this practice and explain that he would rather avoid shaking hands in the future.

14   My translation, Alain Lallemand "Pas de main, pas de vin, pas de Lizin", *Le Soir*, 01/07/06.

Soha, a young woman in her mid-twenties, worked as an employee for the city of Antwerp at the time of our interview. Islam was a central guideline in her life, and she tried to fulfil religious duties she considered important as diligently and accurately as possible. Abstaining from shaking hands with the opposite *non-mahram* sex was one of them:

> I try to limit this. I try to limit it. I will for instance never shake hands with someone spontaneously (…) but if someone reaches out his hand, I will take it. I, I … I won't say: 'huh, no, I won't shake hand'. But I try to do it occasionally. I generally shake hands, but sometimes I think: I could as well say that I'm not shaking hands. But its not something you can easily say to someone you don't know. You need to have a certain relationship with that person in order to say so.

In the first sentences of this quote, Soha reiterates the importance she attaches to not handshaking with the opposite sex. Yet in the further sentences, she expresses her *awareness* of the potentially transgressive nature of this conduct, and how the latter affects this practice. Soha does not simply expect others – i.e. those who shake hands – to accept this practice, but she rather tries to apply it 'occasionally', when possible. A central part of her argument is the desire not to disrupt nor transgress the dominant sensitivities, and a continuous effort to accommodate them. This appears most clearly in the distinction she draws between *acquaintances* and *strangers*. Familiarity seems to act here as an important condition, a position which also confirms handshaking in its status of 'exceptionality' that can only be negotiated when a minimum degree of trust is achieved. In the following quote, she continues explaining how she gradually started introducing this practice to her colleagues at work:

> At a certain point, I started talking about it (…) saying: 'yes actually I have some difficulties with shaking hands'… (…) actually, I would prefer not to shake hands anymore. I mean, in Islam it is not allowed and this and that. It's like the Chinese. They also don't shake hands. I don't know whether you have ever shaken hands with a Chinese, but he gives such a flabby hand because he doesn't want to. They greet by bowing. And eh (…) I told them. And since then, nobody ever shakes hands with me. They respect that. Really, my boss also, he does not shake hands with me, nor does the rest. When he bows, as a way of joking, I bow back. But it's difficult. I think you need to take it step by step. At first, I will just shake hands, also if you don't know them well. You know? But if you know the person well, you can gradually introduce it, you see?

In the first part of the argumentation, Soha refers to the importance of Islam and her pious conduct to justify why she doesn't shake hands. Yet this argument is quickly complemented by a second, more central, justification which insists on cultural variations in greeting patterns. By drawing an analogy between not handshaking and bowing, Soha domesticates the potentially disruptive effects of these practices by *neutralising* their religious character and *culturalising* them. This position reflects what Michel De Certeau (1984) described as *tactics*. In *The Practices of Everyday Life* he distinguishes *tactics* from *strategies* to underscore the different ways actors in different structural positions exercise or use power. Whereas 'strategies' refer to the use of power in a position of dominance and visibility in a particular social field, tactics are rather performed by the 'invisible' others, the 'consumers', those who do not have a clear

position in the social field (De Certeau 1984: xix). Tactics describe the way in which individuals try to enhance their agency without overturning the structural circumstances of their conditions, but by using them as an opportunity. It serves to analyse the 'poetics of consumption', the manner in which one actively reproduces an imposed order while simultaneously refashioning it (1984: 34). Downplaying the religious nature of handshaking, and altering the reason for which these practices are performed, seems to open up the possibility for Soha to cultivate a particular aspect of her orthodox pious lifestyle at work, yet without affecting the liberal sensibilities around her. Her prioritisation of a cultural framework, which is consonant with multicultural and tolerance-discourses of liberal democracies, equally restates the idea that unauthorised religious interventions are highly problematic. Rather than contesting the impossibility of not-handshaking, Soha's case hence illustrates how potentially transgressive practices are performed in a liberal-secular context by reproducing the dominant rationality and making use of it to cautiously create new spaces of articulation.

Zeina was another respondent who didn't shake hands with men. Islam was something she tried to live integrally, and to which she adapted her daily activities if necessary: interrupting meetings in order to pray on time, leaving work earlier for the taraweeh prayers during Ramadan etc. Yet like Soha, not-handshaking was conditioned by the context. The vocabulary she deploys in her argumentation shows however a complex interaction between the Islamic ethical tradition that informs her ethical agency and liberal secularism. A language which not only underlines the predominance of liberal affects, but which equally frames shaking hands as an *act of virtue*:

> For me, it is the middle-way that I am looking for, as there is such a thing as *the middle-way*. God leads us to this middle-way. (...) A silly thing: shaking hands. I mean, honestly, shaking hands is not that terrible, I mean... (...) What is important is what will bring some people to shake hands and others not to shake hands. Maybe this changes the relationship to religion, *Allahoe-A'alam.* But I, for instance, do not shake hands. And if I were to be somewhere where everybody would shake hands, and the act of refusing to shake hands would cause some sort of *fitna*, then I will shake hands. Because for me, I will understand that this refusal to shake hands will *disserve* rather than *serve*. And my prime objective is to serve, not to disserve. But I just make sure not to make a habit of it, that's all. (...) I try to put things in perspective that way.

Zeina expresses her flexibility towards this practice, yet a flexibility that is not only informed by a desire to respect liberal sensibilities – as in the case of Soha, but which is also justified through an Islamic rationale. The first argument she uses is that of the '*middle way*'. Islam is often depicted as the religion of the '*the middle way*', referring to a similar verse from the Qur'an.[15] Leaving aside this practice becomes an alternative which allows her to avoid falling into extremes, hence remaining in line with this Islamic

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15   Surat al Baqara, verse 143; translation by Muhammad Asad: 'And thus have we willed you to be a community of the middle way, so that [with your lives] you might bear witness to the truth before all mankind, and the Apostle might bear witness to it before you'. This idea of the *community of the middle way* [ummat-al-wassat] knows different significations, but is also often used by liberal and progressive Muslims to argue for Islam's tolerant nature and rejection of acts of extremism and terrorism.

principle. A second important element in Zeina's argumentation is the hierarchy she constructs between important and less-important practices. Shaking hands is presented here as 'not that terrible', hence downplaying its importance in her economy of pious bodily practices. This argument is furthermore linked with a third Islamic category that allows her to justify her flexibility. The controversy which could follow upon her refusal to shake hands is framed as *fitna*, a category that describes a general state of chaos and social discord which has a powerful and negative connotation within the Muslim tradition.[16] While a diligent application and adherence to Islamic rules generally figures as a way to avoid *fitna*, an interesting inversion appears here, where not abiding by particular religious conducts becomes a way to achieve this same Islamic virtue. Zeina's case illustrates how potentially transgressive religious practices can be regulated *without* resorting to a liberal-secular rationale. Her flexible stand is not only informed by an awareness of the marginality of this practice, or a desire to avoid offending liberal sensibilities, it is also above all grounded on a desire to cultivate a pious conduct. It thus shows how cultivating a non-liberal and non-secular ethical agency, primarily centred on the desire to serve God (Mahmood 2005; Bracke 2008), can coincide with a liberal-secular mode of governance, or to put it differently: how apparently 'docile' religious subjects are shaped through a non-secular and non-liberal rationale.

Both Soha and Ziena's cases illustrate the difficulty orthodox and pious Muslims encounter in the maintenance of certain facets of their religious conduct. Their accounts display different strategies as well as languages in managing this difficulty, which simultaneously also highlight the complex manner throughout which a liberal-secular power structure can be reproduced and negotiated by individuals whose subject position is not entirely structured along similar liberal and secular ethical grids. For both women restated the ethical value of not handshaking, tried to uphold it when possible, and developed *tactics* – as the case of Soha illustrated. Yet the performance of this practice was also conditional to the extent that it didn't *affect* liberal sensitivities. It would, however, be misleading to observe Zeina and Soha's flexible stand solely as a functional management of the liberal, non-Muslim, affects surrounding them. The cautiousness both women display also highlights, I suggest, their own intertwinement with this liberal and secular order.[17] This becomes observable in the *obviousness* they displayed towards the necessity to manage liberal sensibilities. Neither Soha nor Zeina were outraged over the little space they had to fulfil this religious prescription, and both insisted on the importance of not offending others. More than their cautiousness, it is the *self-evident nature of this cautiousness* which is revealing here. It not only highlights the complex ethical *and* affective tracks that inform Soha and Zeina's ethical agency (cf. also infra), but it also differs from the position of the women in the next section.

Muslim sensibilities and secular practices

The month of Ramadan comes with its own temporality that is strongly felt in Muslim countries where the majority of the population abides by it. Yet this rhythm doesn't pass totally unnoticed in a Western-European country like Belgium, especially in

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16   Fatima Mernissi (1975) argues that this concept of Fitna carries a sexist articulation in several Islamic theological scriptures as it is often associated with the idea of an uncontrollable and threatening female sexuality, which needs to be controlled through practices such as veiling.

17   I explore this intersection of liberal and non-liberal and non-secular traditions in the ethical agency of orthodox Muslim respondents in my dissertation (Fadil 2008).

neighbourhoods in Brussels or Antwerp which have a high proportion of Muslim residents. The relative calmness that reigns in daytime contrasts with the thriving activities shortly before and after sunset: local bakeries and groceries get crowded with customers shopping for *iftar*, mosques are packed for the evening *taraweeh* and '*isha* prayers and snackbars and cafés are filled with night-time visitors. This moral imaginary was also strongly felt by my non-practising respondents who had fasted earlier in their life, yet had come to abandon this practice, mostly during their adolescence.

Faiza was a woman in her forties, married, with a son, who worked as a legal advisor in a public office in Brussels at the time of our interview. With an Algerian mother and a Moroccan father, Faiza was nurtured in ideals of resistance, Pan-Arabism and solidarity with the Algerian liberation struggle and Palestine from early on: '*Before claiming and affirming any Muslim cultural identity, it was like: we are Arabs*'. The importance of her Arab identity also largely influenced her further trajectory, since her identity was primarily fostered around notions of Arabness rather than Islam. Yet during her childhood, she witnessed a shift in her family's religious orientation, with Islam gaining a larger prominence after the Iranian Revolution in 1979. She described how her mother gradually developed a radical Islamist discourse, which also profoundly affected her own religious trajectory and turned her off from the religious discourse. This shift from a religious to a secular self-conception was a gradual and laborious process, which took time and implied an ethical work upon herself, her senses and sensibilities.[18] In the following quote, she explains this process and how eating in front of other Muslims during Ramadan figured as a key practice in this self-transformation:

> Faiza: It was hidden, but as years passed I started affirming it, but not in my family sphere, more in my social sphere.
>
> *Nadia: With your friends?*
>
> Faiza: Yes, with my friends – which isn't obvious either.
>
> *Nadia: Muslim friends?*
>
> Faiza: yes, Muslims. So ehm, I arrived at the university and I wasn't fasting anymore by then. I had friends, who did fast, and I respected them and all, but I would take my sandwich, I didn't... For instance, [one told me] 'you could at least respect me'. I told him: 'no, it's your choice'. Voila. It was really hard for me. In fact...
>
> *Nadia: In what way?*
>
> Faiza: It was difficult to have my sandwich in front of practising Muslims. How would they judge me?
>
> *Nadia: Guilt?*
>
> Faiza: Guilt. But I also felt that I had to do it, else I wouldn't be in line with myself. Voila.

18 The notion of ethical work or self-technique is used here in a Foucaultian manner and refers to 'a certain number of operations on their bodies, on their own souls, on their own thoughts, on their own conduct, and this in a manner so as to transform themselves, modify themselves, and to attain a certain state of perfection, of happiness, of purity, of supernatural power, and so on' (Foucault 1980: 203; see also Foucault 1984: 27). For a further utilisation of this concept in the case of not/unveiling, see Fadil, N. 'On not/unveiling as a practice' in *Feminist Review*, forthcoming.

Eating during Ramadan wasn't experienced as an easy endeavour. It is rather something she had to force herself to do – '*I had to go to the end of it*' – to be coherent with the doubts and interrogations which tormented her. The 'social sphere' refers here to her Muslim friends, from whom she used to keep her secular orientation hidden. In these sentences, Faiza expresses her awareness of the transgressive potential of eating in front of others, yet we can also read a strong opposition to the secrecy she had to maintain for so long. I would like to pause briefly at two elements in her account: the significance of eating in front of other Muslims in her ethical self-formation, and the distinction she draws between friends and family. The conscious decision to eat in front of Muslim friends should not only be read as an act of subversion or resistance, I suggest, but as an intrinsic part of her self-fashioning process. Faiza explains that she '*had*' to eat in front of other Muslims in order to be '*in line with herself*'. Affirming her non-practice, i.e. the fact that she didn't fast, was central to her secular trajectory. In his essay '*About the beginning of the hermeneutics of the self*' (1993 [1980]) Michel Foucault describes the practice of discovering and telling the truth about oneself as a major *technique of the self* in liberal and Western modernity.[19] He traces it back to the Christian confessional model, which institutionalised 'introspection' and 'verbalisation' as ways to achieve salvation. In its secularised and modern versions, the teleology of confession was substituted by a positive self-foundation: expressing one's 'inner truth' became a way to live 'truthfully', and in line with who one really 'is'. The importance Faiza accords to eating in front of other fasting Muslims can be situated in the line of this modern and liberal ethical requirement wherein living in accordance with one's 'convictions' and 'beliefs' is considered to be crucial to live as a self-fulfilled subject.[20] The latter becomes even more explicit in the following quote, where she uses the term 'therapeutic' to describe this activity: '*I also drink during Ramadan (. . .). It's not provocation, for me it's really . . . it's almost therapeutic. I'm not saying that (. . .) but voila. I'm coherent with myself*.' Expressing her secular orientation is for Faiza thus not only a moral act, but also essential to her own well-being.

A second significant element in Faiza's account is the manner in which she 'manages' the disruptive effects of her conduct. To a friend who expresses the moral offence he felt by seeing her eat, Faiza replies that it is his 'choice' to fast, and he should equally respect her own choice not to do so. Religious practices like fasting are primarily framed here throughout the liberal maxim of *freedom* and *choice*.[21] This enables her to place both conducts, i.e. fasting and not-fasting, in a position of behavioural symmetry, and justify the emotionality and sensitivity her conduct might cause. Yet it is also significant to note how she makes a difference between her 'family' and 'friends'. Whereas she

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19 Foucault's oeuvre can be read as a genealogy of the *subject*, wherein he tries to situate the way subjectivity has been conceptualised, materialised and embodied against the background of distinct regimes of truth or knowledge/power axes. Whereas his early work is mostly geared at how subjectivities are formed throughout bodily techniques, institutions, scientific knowledge; he shifts his analytical focus in the last part of his work to the *practices of the self* and the various ways in which individuals turn themselves into meaningful subjects.

20 Mark Blasius (1992) has examined practices of outing among LGTB movements as an aesthetic in the ethical self-fashioning of non-heterosexual subjectivities.

21 This liberal conception of framing religion as a 'choice', Saba Mahmood notes, tends to draw on a particular semantics of religion which reduces it into matters of 'beliefs' and disregards the Aristotelian ethical model wherein pious conduct consists of a programmatic set of conducts and habits (Mahmood 2009; see also Mahmood 2005).

displays her secular conduct to her friends, it remains 'hidden' from her relatives. Erving Goffmann argues in *Stigma* that strategies of managing the information about one's identity are especially cultivated towards intimate acquaintances (1963: 71). Yet more than indicating an intensified management of 'sensitive information' vis-à-vis one's family, this observation also illustrates that Faiza's ethical self-formation as a liberal and secular subject isn't completely detached from Muslim sensibilities. The extent to which she allows this sensitivity to structure her conduct seems however to be clearly conditioned: while she authorises in the case of her family, she doesn't allow it with her friends.

The latter observation brings us to the ambiguity which characterised the accounts of many non-practising respondents. Several of them expanded on the different strategies they deployed to consider the sensibilities of their acquaintances and family towards (certain facets of) their secular identity, whether it was the fact that they didn't fast, that they drank alcohol or upheld atheist or agnostic convictions. These observations seem to be comparable with the case of not-handshaking explored above, where liberal sensibilities structured Zeina and Soha's greeting patterns. Yet once one looks beyond this similarity, a difference in *vocabulary* appears in the manner in which these ambiguities are framed. While Zeina and Soha normalised the necessity of managing the surrounding liberal affects in the specific case of not-handshaking, this was less the case regarding the impossibility of eating during Ramadan. This ambiguity was more often experienced as a tension, or even strongly condemned, as Halima's following account shows.

At the time of our interview Halima, in her forties, married with a young daughter, was working as a cosmetician in a Moroccan-owned beauty salon in Brussels. After having temporarily broken all ties with her family at the age of 22, tired of coping with a 'strict' religious education, she renewed contacts with her parents after years of absence. While she deplored their lack of understanding of her convictions and non-practice, she nevertheless opted for a strategy of concealment towards her family: '*when I returned, I told to myself: 'no, I need to change my tactic now, but without changing who I am*'. One of these changes was to keep certain facets of her secularity hidden, such as the fact that she didn't fast: '*The only thing I respect and I pretend/act [je joue la comédie], even though I swore to myself I would never do so . . . – but I saw that it was, that it would be too much for them – is Ramadan. I won't go to there [and eat] or whatever, no. I pretend I do it, even though I don't. That's all.*' As in the case of Zeina or Soha, the surrounding affects and sensibilities act as an important structuring element in her behaviour. Yet in contrast with Zeina or Soha, this secrecy is framed negatively as '*pretending*' or '*acting*', as something which contradicts the ethical requirement of living 'truthfully'. While Halima was highly sensitive to the moral offense she could cause to her parents by eating in front of them, this sensibility sat in tension with the liberal ethical grids that equally structured her subject position.

Halima furthermore not only hid her secular conviction and conduct from her parents, but also from her Muslim clientele. Yet with respect to her professional context, she was less cautious in denouncing what she experienced as an illegitimate impediment upon her freedom. Most of her customers consisted of Muslim women. In the following quotes she explains why she rarely engages in discussions with them about Islam, and keeps secular convictions and practices to herself:

> I think that . . . for instance I don't see myself ehm . . . and this is where I think
> we achieved a degree of intolerance – I don't see myself arrive in the association
> during Ramadan, and have my sandwich at lunchtime. They will ask: 'so, you
> have your periods?' I don't feel that I can practice my way of life freely. You see.
> It will lead to . . . there will be consequences to it.

The only possibility of eating during Ramadan during her work is one which follows –
and thus sustains – an Islamic rationale: i.e. not fasting when one has her monthly
periods. We can see here how she strongly condemns this impossibility: it is framed as
'intolerant', and viewed as a violation of her autonomy. Yet in contrast to Faiza, Halima
did not try to challenge the marginality of her position:

> There was a time where I would have ehm (. . .) I would have felt hypocritical, not
> to express my ideas. But with time I learned that silence can be good sometimes.
> I let them discuss amongst themselves, and they never ask about my opinion on
> things, you see (. . .). This is what I'm aware of now, because I've learned silence,
> because I've come to realise that expressing yourself doesn't lead you anywhere.

We saw earlier how coming out with one's convictions figured as a central predicament
for modern and liberal subjects. In *Sincerity and Authenticity* (1972) Lionel Trilling
argues that this principle of sincerity, epitomised by literary figures like the villain,
gradually lost its ethical prominence in the 19th and 20th centuries, to be supplanted
by the principle of authenticity. Being sincere was only valued to the extent that it
served the primacy of authenticity (i.e. being sincere towards oneself). Sincerity as a
social value, he contends, was even negatively assessed if it limited the capacity to live in
accordance with one's inner principle: 'If one is true to one's own self for the purpose of
avoiding falsehood to others, is one being truly true to one's own self?' (Trilling 1972:
9).

   Rather than discarding the principle of sincerity, Halima's account illustrates the
continuous tension between authenticity and sincerity. This tension becomes observable
in the manner in which she initially framed her conduct as '*hypocrite*', which highlights
the ethical importance that is accorded to telling the truth about oneself. Yet we can
also read how she gradually overcame this tension by acquiring a new language: that
of *silence*. Hiding the truth about herself was no longer an insincerity, it rather became
a different way to relate to herself and to others. It is a language she had to learn, for
it didn't correspond with the dominant liberal imaginary which takes the act of telling
the truth about oneself as an essential marker for one's self-fulfilment. Yet it became
a language which allowed her to cultivate her secular subjectivity, without offending
'other's' sensibilities.

Different subjectivities, different (ab)normalities

This paper has examined how second generation Maghrebi women in Belgium with
different religious profiles – orthodox Muslim and non-practising – manage and assess
the transgressiveness of certain facets of their ethical conduct. Taking the cases of
not-handshaking and not-fasting allowed us to explore this question in relation to two
distinct ethical realms: liberal sensibilities that take offence at the maintenance of sexual
difference on religious grounds, and Muslim ethical sensibilities which are actively
invigorated during the month of Ramadan. A first observation was the 'impression

management' (Goffmann 1964) deployed in both cases. While non-handshaking pious women tried to avoid offending liberal sensibilities by either abstaining themselves from doing so (Soha and Zeina), or by translating this practice into 'audible' cultural registers (Soha), the non-fasting women tried not to shock their Muslim relatives by not eating in front of them during Ramadan, although distinctions were made between friends and family.

Yet besides examining these different strategies of management, I also looked at the evaluation of this necessity to contain their conduct. A striking difference appeared with this respect: whereas Soha and Zeina didn't problematise the fact that they had to be cautious when avoiding handshaking, Faiza and Halima deplored the marginality of their position, especially towards non-relatives and friends. The incapacity to eat freely during Ramadan was viewed as an obstruction to their freedom, and Faiza consciously challenged this limited space, despite its potentially disruptive effects. In highlighting these points, my aim is not to suggest that pious Muslims adopt a more flexible stand towards their own marginality than non-practising Muslims. Nor am I trying to downplay the distinction that exists between the impossibility of not-handshaking and the impossibility of eating in public during Ramadan. Rather, I am interested in what these apparent differences tell us about the manner in which the process of secularisation implies the sedimentation of *certain* ethical conducts as a 'human entitlement' (see also Asad 2003, 1993).

One of the major insights in Foucault's disciplinary model is to show how people's conduct is regulated by differentiating between what counts as 'normal' and 'abnormal' conduct: 'the normal being precisely that which can conform to this norm, and the abnormal that which is incapable of conforming to the norm' (Foucault 1978: 57).[22] Applied to our cases, it means that certain conducts will be recast as 'normal' or essential for the development of a 'free' or 'sovereign' subject, whereas others will be marginalised or abnormalised. This is observable in the different evaluation of the impossibility of shaking hands or of not being able to eat during Ramadan. This difference reflects, I suggest, the *unequal ethical weight* attributed to both conducts in a liberal-secular regime. While the orthodox Islamic practice of not-handshaking does not conform to the liberal-secular ethos, eating during Ramadan does. These observations can however also be expanded to the way the freedom to *practice* or *not-practice* are maybe conceived as 'human rights', yet not associated with notions of bodily integrity in the same manner. Not *all* religious practices – this is especially the case for non-Christian ones – are conceived as an entitlement in the same way as non-practising is. The impossibility of declaring one's unbelief or abstaining from practising is quickly branded as a violation of one's freedom (see also Goldstone 2007), in a way that the impossibility of veiling or praying at the workplace is not. Turning religious practices into a human 'entitlement', seems rather to be the object of daily negotiations, contestations and struggle in many Western-European countries.[23]

22 In the first volume of *The history of sexuality*, Foucault offers for instance a genealogy of the modern *dispositif* of sex, which came along with a specific knowledge on what counts as 'normal' sexual behaviour and sexual deviance, a medical apparatus in treating sexual pathologies and cultivating proper sexual conduct and institutional and legislative instruments to regulate sexual conduct.

23 The opposition to the hijab-ban by Muslim and liberal groups using the liberal language of human rights can equally be read, I suggest, as a continuous effort to inscribe veiling into the set of practices that count as an individual entitlement within a liberal and secular imaginary.

A final observation I would like to pause at pertains to the susceptibility of all interlocutors to the disruptive effects of their conduct. The fact that their ethical practices could cause moral harm didn't leave *any* of my interlocutors 'unaffected' and was a source of concern for all. I suggest that the latter invites us to explore the way subjectivities, religious and secular, are traversed by multiple affective tracks which are reflective of different economies of affect. I borrow this formulation from Sara Ahmed, who uses it to clarify how 'feelings do not reside in subjects or objects, but are produced as effects of circulation' (Ahmed 2004: 8; see also Hirschkind 2006).[24] This perspective on emotions, which takes them as ingrained in knowledge and cultural representations, allows us to explore how *multiple affective layers* work upon the self, which also enables them to be affected by 'other's' moral injuries (i.e. those who are shaped by a different ethical tradition). Whereas my respondents inscribed themselves in specific ethical regimes, i.e. orthodox Islamic vs. liberal-secular, their behaviour seemed to be 'affected' by 'other' ethical realms too. Raised as Muslims, the non-practicing respondents had chosen to undo themselves from their religious upbringing. Yet their bodies remained marked by traces of their Islamic background: whether it was the incapacity to eat pork, the guilt experienced after losing one's virginity before marriage, or – as the in case of Faiza or Halima: the difficulty of eating in front of other Muslims during Ramadan. Similarly, the orthodox pious respondents couldn't be placed outside a liberal and secular imaginary either. The moral offense felt towards cases of forced veiling was equally theirs, and several expressed a discomfort at the condemnations of homosexuals or non-believers in Islamic theological scriptures. The presupposition that different economies of affect, pertaining to distinct ethical regimes, interact, can co-exist (and conflict) within one and the same subject position, opens the possibility of understanding not only how one can be touched by 'others'' moral injuries, but equally 'moved' by them.

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24 Charles Hirschkind has also noted in his compelling ethnography on pious Muslims in Egypt how religious traditions are not only co-constituted by a set of ideas or beliefs, but equally sit on 'a common substrate of embodied dispositions' (Hirschkind 2006: 88).

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State Sovereignty and the Politics of Indifference

Mayanthi L. Fernando

The politics of recognition has emerged as a common way to interpret and adjudicate the claims of nonnormative subjects (minorities). In France, the Islamic revival has largely been understood in scholarly and political circles as a demand for the recognition of, and right to, Muslim difference. As a number of scholars have argued, the recognition paradigm secures the state's sovereignty: minorities call on the state for redress via recognition, enabling the state to re-entrench its authority as sole bestower of rights and neutral arbiter of conflict. This essay asks whether that structure of state sovereignty, premised as it is on the adjudication of minority demands (for equality, for recognition), might also be the condition of possibility for the disruption of state sovereignty, and even for new political arrangements to emerge. Indeed, a number of Muslim French now reject the paradigm of difference and instead claim their right to indifference, though different thinkers mean different things by this. Some call for indifference *from* the state, other call for—and practice—an indifference *to* the state. These various trends compel us, I suggest, to ask if there is a way to achieve religious equality (and other forms of equality) without addressing the state. Or might indifference entail communal withdrawal instead, abandoning the ideal of equality and other conventional secular-liberal politics?

By "Muslim French" I mean a generation of young people, many of them the children and sometimes grandchildren of laborers recruited from the Maghreb to rebuild France after World War II. Muslim French are committed to practicing Islam as French citizens and to practicing French citizenship as observant

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Muslims. *Muslim French* captures the description I heard most often from my interlocutors in the 2000s, *citoyen français de confesson musulmane* (French citizen of Muslim faith). I use the term in part because it does not roll easily off the English-speaking tongue, paralleling the difficulty in France, and elsewhere, of conceiving of these people as simultaneously fully French and piously Muslim. Muslim French refuse to relegate what they consider a fundamental aspect of their identity—their Muslimness—to the private sphere, asserting their right to be piously and publicly Muslim. They do so—and this is what makes them distinct from both their parents' generation and more conservative trends of the Islamic revival—by defining their Muslimness as always already French.

The claims that Muslim French make to France, and the grounding of those claims in the paradigm of citizenship, were strikingly displayed during a December 2003 demonstration against the then-proposed law banning headscarves in public schools. About three or four thousand demonstrators—mostly young women, many of them clad in blue, white, and red headscarves—marched from the Place de la République to the Place de la Bastille, chanting slogans and holding placards, all in French. One sign read "School: my path. The veil: my choice. France: my right" (*Le voile, mon choix; l'école, ma voie; la France, mon droit*). A number of the young women held aloft their national identity cards and their voter registration cards, the practical tools of active citizenship. Some of the young women at the head of the demonstration had faded French flags wrapped around poles in the fashion of the revolutionary period. As we approached the Bastille, a message rippled through the crowd: the few hundred men were told to get out of the procession, as the women were going "to storm the Bastille," whereupon a number of young women climbed atop the base of the gilded column that marks the site of the former prison, the storming of which symbolically constitutes the founding moment of the Revolutionary Republic.

That gesture of inscribing Muslims into the founding moment of the republic was repeated in 2012 by the Collective against Islamophobia in France (CCIF) in its Nous Sommes Aussi La Nation (We Are Also the Nation) campaign. One of the images in a series of advertisements reimagines painter Jacques-Louis David's revolution-era *Tennis Court Oath*; the oath was a pledge signed by members of the Third Estate refusing to disband until a new constitution had been written, the first time French citizens formally stood in opposition to Louis XVI. The new image depicts the *Tennis Court Oath* in the present, with veiled women, Arab men in hoodies, and visibly Orthodox Jews, among other citizens, holding aloft French

flags and copies of the oath.[1] This image does not merely represent but also enacts the Muslim French claim to France as a right of citizenship, depicting Muslims as original, revolutionary citizens.

This Muslim French claim to France also entails a concerted effort to "Frenchify" (*franciser*, a term used by many Muslim French) the Islamic tradition institutionally, exegetically, and culturally. This effort draws on one of the major interpretive trends within modernist and reformist currents of the contemporary Islamic revival, namely, the abstraction of Islam into the site of fundamental principles and universal values—like justice, equality, and rationality—that are instantiated differently in different historical and cultural contexts. This position is best exemplified in Europe by scholar and theologian Tariq Ramadan,[2] who himself draws on a much longer interpretive tradition concerning the dynamic relationship between divine law (*shari'a*) and its human articulation in law (*fiqh*). Ramadan (1999: 93) contends that although Islam is universal, indeed, because Islam is universal, "there should be an Islam rooted in the cultural universe of Europe. . . . Islam, and its Islamic references, is *one and unique*; the methods of judicial application are, however, differentiated . . . and its concretization in a given place and a given time is by nature plural" (original emphasis). Interestingly, by making Islam the site of the universal, Ramadan also locates France as the site of the particular, of culture, thereby turning on its head the common secular-republican paradigm in which France is universal and Islam particular (as culture, religion, and/or race). According to Ramadan's framework, there exists no incompatibility between being French and being Muslim because those French values that are universal (liberty, equality, and fraternity, for example) are already encompassed by the Islamic tradition, and those that are particular (i.e., particular cultural practices and particular instantiations of universal values) are already shared by Muslims by dint of their being French.

What Ramadan and more ordinary Muslim French seek to do, then, is to normalize the practice of Islam (including its public practice) as simply one more way of being French. Note the precise nature of this reconfiguration. Muslim French do not contend that one can be both French and Muslim, that practicing Islam and

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1. It's worth noting that there are few, if any, sub-Saharan Africans in the image. The representation of the Muslim here is as an Arab.

2. Ramadan was accused in 2017 of multiple sexual assaults and formally charged with rape by French prosecutors in 2018; he is currently out on bail awaiting trial. At the time of my fieldwork, he was—and for many European Muslims remains—an intellectual touchstone.

being a French citizen are compatible.[3] Rather, they make the more radical claim that Muslim *is* French.[4]

. . . .

This claim is not easily heard in France. Through legal and police practices and in media and political discourse, Muslims, and especially observant Muslims, are increasingly cast as threats to French national identity. In the public and political imagination, Muslim means not-French. Thus Muslim French consistently face a series of dilemmas: How to act as a citizen within a political arrangement premised on abstract universalism when one is consistently reduced to one's embodied, particular difference? How to speak back as the obvious target of anti-Muslim discrimination without reinforcing one's communal belonging? And how to intervene as both a Muslim and a citizen when the particularity of the former contravenes the ostensible universalism of the latter? These dilemmas are, of course, familiar to many nonnormative minorities.[5] In *Religious Difference in a Secular Age*, for instance, Saba Mahmood (2016: 73) depicts how Copts in Egypt face a similar challenge, namely, "how to forge a political future that would level past historical inequalities without reifying their difference from the Muslim majority." This challenge emerges, as Mahmood writes, from "an irresolvable tension located at the heart of the concept of *minority*: on the one hand, a minority is supposed to be an equal partner with the majority in the building of the nation: on the other, its difference (religious, racial, ethnic) poses an incipient threat to the identity of the nation that is grounded in the religious linguistic, and cultural norms of the majority" (32, original emphasis).

One possible way to manage this irresolvable tension entails prying apart the ontological stability of *minority* as always already a form of difference. Public expressions of Muslimness, as well as Muslim activists' demands for state-funded Muslim private schools, the right to wear headscarves in public schools, and the incorporation of Muslim holy days into the national school calendar are usually

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3. This is certainly one element of the Islamic revival, central to the mission of the Union of Islamic Organizations of France (UOIF), for example. My point is that a number of Muslim French go much further than this. I would also argue that this distinction is generational. The UOIF is made up largely of men born in the Maghreb who came to France in their late twenties and thirties. The CCIF and similar associations are led by a younger generation mostly born, and all raised, in France.

4. This move is similar to that made by the Lebanese *shi'a* activists described by Lara Deeb (2006), who do not claim simply that Islam and modernity can coexist but that Islam *is* modern.

5. Joan Scott (1999: 6) calls this challenge "the paradox of difference," whereby "the terms of protest against discrimination both refuse and accept the group identities upon which discrimination has been based."

understood in scholarly and political circles, in France and elsewhere, as demands for the recognition and institutional accommodation of Muslim difference. Most French republicans believe these demands, and the public practice of Islam, are an unacceptable assertion of communalist difference that contravenes the republic's moral and political universalism. While this contingent dominates public debate in France, a number of other public intellectuals have drawn on Canadian political philosopher Charles Taylor's (1994) influential notion of the "politics of recognition" to call for a more inclusive republic less repressive of difference. This latter group sees the Islamic revival as the reiteration of Muslim difference and argues that the best political framework for dealing with Muslim minorities entails the public recognition and accommodation of that Muslim difference (see Khosrokhavar 1997; Wieviorka 1997; Touraine 2000).

Yet many of my Muslim French interlocutors rejected this framing that Muslims are asking for the recognition of their difference, none more cogently than Farid Abdelkrim, a longtime civic activist from Nantes. "Slogans like the right to difference," he once declared to me, "contribute to the idea that we are still not entirely French. We are still separate. Instead of being full citizens [*citoyens à part entière*], we are still fully separate [*entièrement à part*]. . . . I don't want the right to difference. I want the right to *indifference*! That is to say, I don't want people to pay attention to me. I want to be forgotten" (Fernando 2014: 70, emphasis in the original).

It took me a long time to understand what Abdelkrim meant by all this, but I came to realize that his concept of the right to indifference has significant implications for political theory and political action. I don't want to reduce the assimilationist position represented by most mainstream republicans to the far more inclusivist "politics of recognition" framework, but in thinking through Abdelkrim's claims, one notices how both mainstream positions continue to mark Islam as a sign or practice of difference in and from France. While certainly more open to public Muslim religiosity than assimilationist republicanism, the "right to difference" position continues to privilege a very traditional idea of France that casts Muslimness as a form of difference (or otherness) from the norm. Though seemingly opposed, then, these two political paradigms share the binary of assimilation versus difference; they diverge only in thinking about how to manage Muslim difference. The former calls for assimilation, the latter for limited recognition. In other words, even an ostensibly inclusive politics recognizing Muslim difference reproduces certain ways of being and thinking as different, leaving dominant norms and assumptions intact.

With the notion of indifference, Abdelkrim rejects both the dominant republican paradigm and the ostensibly more tolerant call to accommodate "Muslim

difference." Refusing the politics of republican integration, which demands that Muslims restrict their religiosity to the private sphere and behave as abstract, disembodied citizens in the public sphere, Abdelkrim and other Muslim French assert their right to practice Islam in private *and* publicly, such that their Muslimness infuses their private, public, and political lives. But they equally refuse a paradigm that would recognize their Muslimness as a form of difference from the nation. They call for the indifference to their Muslimness—conventionally understood as their difference—such that it is neither abstracted nor overdetermined, rendered neither invisible nor hypervisible. In other words, Muslim French demand the right to be visible, but unremarkable. Although the term *unremarkable* may seem an odd choice of word, it captures both the Muslim French desire to be unremarked on as well as their desire to be an unexceptional occurrence in French public space, their Muslimness an ordinary form of being French. In essence, Muslim French argue that they are not "different," but French. Moreover, they argue—implicitly and explicitly—that the demands they make are claims to equal citizenship and justice rather than to difference, claims made by citizens with as equal a right to France as any other citizen. Hence the symbolic accouterments of the demonstration mentioned earlier, and the CCIF's decision to restage the founding moment of republican citizenship in their ad campaign.

In making these claims to France, Muslim French attempt to reimagine France as a heterogeneous entity where nondominant ways of life might flourish without being classified as essential difference, and as a polity that could accommodate—however agonistically—not simply multiple but even incommensurable forms of ethical and political life. And, importantly, imagining the republic this way explodes it into various cross-sections of equally different differences (or identities) that fundamentally undo the existing configuration of identity (French) and difference (Muslim), center and periphery, majority and minority. Differences—perhaps better understood as identities—are conceptualized not in relation to a center (which no longer exists) but rather in relation to various other identities (or differences), such that nondominant ways of life can flourish without being classified as ontologically stable "difference." Finally, by refusing an a priori ontological majority and minority, the polity that many Muslim French envisage also refuses, almost by definition, any stable political formations or easy convergences between one's identity and one's politics. Alliances are always ad hoc. And they don't last.

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Muslim French also understand the political and ethical costs of the politics of recognition. The Collective of French Muslims (CMF), a progressive Muslim association, has long criticized not just assimilationist republicanism but also the limited political recognition the state offers through processes like the creation of the French Council on the Muslim Religion (CFCM), a state-initiated body. At the time of the CFCM's institutionalization in 2003, members of the CMF denounced it as a neocolonial enterprise intended to bring Islam under the watchful eye of the state. My friend Younès was similarly critical of the invitation extended by the Union of Islamic Organizations of France (UOIF) to Nicolas Sarkozy, then minister of the interior, to speak at their annual congress in April 2003. Younès argued that it constituted a kind of quid pro quo—he also called it "a shady deal" (*un deal malsain*)—whereby the French state accorded legitimacy to the UOIF in exchange for the UOIF's silence on many of the government's draconian policies. According to Younès,

> There was a deal for the recognition of the UOIF by the government, because an interior minister who comes to speak at your place, it means that he recognizes you, and the other side of the deal was, okay, we [i.e., the UOIF] are going to play the game. Let's say that tomorrow, the government tells us to do this, we will do it. It's a deal! . . . [Sarkozy] went there saying, "Voilà, I recognize you but now, let's talk about the headscarf."[6] And since we started talking about the headscarf, we've covered up all the other problems. We've covered up discrimination at work, in housing, the failure of education, ghettos, racism, police brutality, injustice—we've covered all that up, it's like it doesn't exist! (Fernando 2014: 92)

Younès's point was not simply that the debate about the headscarf distracted from other pressing problems, but also that recognition entails a form of silencing. He noted that the UOIF, one of the largest and most well-known Muslim lobbies in France, remained conspicuously absent in organizing against the 2004 law banning headscarves in public schools. And he excoriated the UOIF's aspiration for political recognition and what he called their "relation of submission to authority." "We don't want recognition," he exclaimed, "we don't want a seat on anything. We want justice; we want equal treatment between people. Don't give us second-class treatment like you did in Algeria!" (Fernando 2014: 93). Younès's

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6. Sarkozy's speech to the congress that year, which many saw as his response to Jean-Marie Le Pen's showing in the second round of presidential elections the previous year, catalyzed a new debate about headscarves in public schools after almost a decade of détente. That focus on Islamic veiling continues.

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critique of Sarkozy and the UOIF reflects his (and other Muslim French activists') awareness of the costs of recognition as a political framework of redress, hinting at the ruse of reciprocity—the shady deal—that underlies and is enacted by a politics of recognition.[7]

………

Why, then, does the politics of recognition remain such a common way to inter-pret and adjudicate the claims of nonnormative subjects (or minorities)? Mah-mood offers two interconnected reasons: the aspiration for equality on the part of minorities (what Lauren Berlant [2011] might call a kind of cruel optimism), and the state's investment in securing its sovereignty. As Mahmood (2016: 175) writes, "Minorities often contest the discriminatory practices of secular law through the same legal instruments that enshrine majoritarian privilege. This constant back and forth—the possibility of prejudice and equality—is highly generative in that it keeps the promise of secular neutrality alive." Such "genuine ambiguity" (in Mahmood's terms) seems integral to state sovereignty: minorities call on the state for redress via recognition and, in so doing, enable the state to underscore its neutrality and re-entrench its sovereignty. Thus sovereignty, Mahmood argues, is key to questions of minority rights and religious liberty, having "become the ineluctable condition of our political imagination" (87).

With regard to the politics of recognition in particular a number of scholars have observed how such a politics secures the recognizer's position of power and reifies the structural organization of majority and minority. The state and/or nor-mative majority bestows recognition on minorities and allows so-called difference to exist and perhaps even to flourish, all the while reaffirming its own place as the central source of authority and as the neutral arbiter of conflict (Brown 2008; Markell 2003). Indeed, as Patchen Markell (2003: 119) notes, the deeply nonre-ciprocal structure undergirding the politics of recognition echoes G.W.F. Hegel's master-slave relationship and his theory of self-certainty (or identity) through rec-ognition, which provides the basis for Taylor's seminal framework of the politics of recognition. Markell points out that for Hegel, the realization of self-certainty and the acquisition of sovereignty are premised on the subordination of another, and that "subordination [is] a persistent possibility in relations of recognition" (119). This persistent subordination is precisely what Younès identified.

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7. One of the movements that has gone furthest in refusing recognition is the Parti des Indigènes de la République (PIR), a radical antiracist and decolonial collective. See Bouteldja 2016.

At the same time, might that structure of state sovereignty, premised as it is on the adjudication of minority demands (for equality, for recognition), also be the condition of possibility for the disruption of state sovereignty, and even for a new political arrangement? Pulling a little harder at the thread of nonreciprocity woven into the politics of recognition, one begins to notice that the original intersubjectivity of Hegel's recognition relation as interpreted by Taylor (and other theorists like Axel Honneth [1995]), an intersubjectivity that was fluid and flowed between subjects, becomes fixed and unidirectional. The most common critique of Taylor's work on recognition is that he conflates the individual subject in Hegel's theory of self-consciousness with the collective concept of culture, essentializing into pure, bounded wholes what are, in fact, internally complex and hybrid (Appiah 1994; Benhabib 2002; Song 2007). But there are other moments of consolidation in Taylor's account as well. Taylor's narrative permanently fixes minority and majority, transforming an exchange of recognition into a demand for recognition from the minority and the bestowal of recognition by the majority. In Taylor's early essay, and in subsequent debates by like-minded scholars about the politics of recognition, it is always an ontological minority that demands recognition from the majority, and never the other way around. That such a structure of demand/bestowal seems so obvious underscores my earlier point that the politics of recognition is both premised on and reproduces an arrangement in which certain ontological constellations are fixed as the normative majority identity and everything else as difference. Moreover, in this arrangement, the majority's identity is stable, determined, fixed; it ostensibly does not require another subject's recognition to achieve satisfactory self-identity. That compulsion applies only to subordinate minorities.

And yet in Hegel's (1977) original story it is the master who demands recognition, not the slave. I wonder, then, whether the insistence that it is minorities who need recognition is, in some way, a displacement of another need for recognition, one that cannot be acknowledged, for to do so would—as with Hegel's master—undermine the self-certainty and sovereignty of the second (in fact, original) asker, that is, the self-certainty of the dominant majority and the sovereignty of the state. What I mean is that if the state secures its sovereignty and its power by recognizing subordinate minorities, it also depends in some way on that mode of redress. It depends on minorities' recognition of *it* in order to fully secure its sovereignty. Might we then understand Abdelkrim's demand for the right to indifference in another way, not only as indifference *from* the state but also as indifference *to* the state?

What might indifference to the state look like for Muslim French, and for other minorities there and elsewhere?[8] Might it look like the somewhat utopian political vision I sketched earlier of a heterogeneous, agonistic entity of cross-cutting differences? Is there a way to achieve religious and racial equality (and other forms of equality) without engaging the state? And might the political vision offered by Muslim French like Abdelkrim map onto the possibilities for religious equality without state sovereignty that Mahmood (2016: 211) gestures toward at the end of *Religious Difference in a Secular Age*, where she distinguishes between, on the one hand, religious equality "as a mandate of the modern state" and, on the other, as an aspiration in everyday life for communities like the Copts and Bahais in Egypt. Mahmood ends her book by asking whether "the idea of interfaith equality might require not the bracketing of religious differences but their ethical thematization as a necessary risk when the conceptual and political resources of the state have proved inadequate to the challenge this ideal sets before us" (213). It is not entirely clear what she means by ethical thematization—the concept isn't further elaborated—but might she be calling for modes of intercommunal life that bypass the legal and political architecture—and tentacles—of the state, modes of intercommunal life that neither bracket ethico-religious norms in public nor call on a neutral arbiter (such as the secular state) to adjudicate conflict?

Or, might indifference to the state entail abandoning the very ideal of religious equality—or any form of democratic equality—accompanied by a withdrawal into communal life and a refusal to engage in conventional secular-liberal politics, not just its practical entailments (i.e., engagement with the state) but its ideals as well? Two instances of this approach in France come to mind. The first is the Parti des Indigènes de la République (PIR), a radical decolonial collective that emerged in 2005 with a manifesto titled "We Are the 'Natives' of the Republic" ("Nous sommes les indigènes de la République") and whose "identitarian" politics are anathema to most across the political spectrum, including the far Left.[9] The group recently hosted a conference called "Bandung du Nord" ("Bandung of the North"), referencing the 1955 conference that spawned the global Non-Aligned Movement. Held not in Paris but in Saint-Denis, one of the city's northern immigrant suburbs (the north invoked in the conference title), the event opened with a

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8. Audra Simpson's *Mohawk Interruptus* (2014), which tracks various Kahnawà:ke modes of refusing to recognize the sovereignty of the US and Canadian states—for instance, by traveling with Kahnawà:ke passports—offers one possibility.

9. The term *indigènes* (which has been translated in the group's communiqués as "indigenous") refers to the internally excluded subcitizens of France and invokes the colonial-era *Code de l'indigénat*, French legal codes establishing the inferior status of "natives."

keynote by Angela Davis and featured multiple speakers inspired by decolonial and Black radical thought and politics. In her closing remarks, Houria Bouteldja (2018), the PIR's spokesperson, called on her *indigène* cocitizens to "make the audacious gamble made by the nonaligned movement . . . of finding our own way." She meant that activists need to bypass existing political structures of Right and Left that have no purchase for nonwhites. To make this point, she quoted Tunisian scholar-activist Sadri Khiari: "Imagining a decolonial border strategy means breaking with the concept of a singular and homogenous political arena. Forged in the history of struggles between progressives and conservatives, working class and bourgeoisie, this conception of political space-time is the fruit of colonization." A decolonial approach would forgo the classic progressivism of the Left, which "cannot manage to break with its cold materialism, which prevents it from understanding the need for history, for identity, for spirituality, and for dignity." Indeed, Boutedja attributes this need for identity and dignity not only to *indigènes* but to poor whites as well, and she sees the way forward not by allying with the progressive Left, nor by partaking in conventional nation-state politics. Rather, she seeks to build a North-South decolonial internationalism unbound to state and unbounded by nation that—unlike its Left counterpart, which seeks to transcend particular differences in the name of a universalism that is, in fact, quite particular to White experience and desire—embraces "cultures, chants, regional languages, and traditions" and "attachment to family and community" (Bouteldja 2016: 138).

The second example of indifference to the state comes from Aïssam Aït-Yahya, a Muslim intellectual in France.[10] According to Aït-Yahya, secularism is not neutral; rather, it has a distinct Christian history, and it both relies on and reproduces a particular politico-ontological subject. He is therefore critical of democracy, and he has counseled Muslims in Europe to abstain from voting and participating in the political process. According to Nadia Fadil (n.d.), he sees voting not as a civic action with no consequences on one's faith, but as an embodied practice that, when repeated, sediments into an affective, subjective orientation. "Aït-Yahya's central aim," explains Fadil, "is to challenge the widely shared assumption (amongst Muslims [in Europe]) that secularism can be considered a universal principle that is adaptable to any social reality or religious tradition" (n.d.: 8). In other words, unlike Abdelkrim, Aït-Yayha sees no political future for Muslims in Europe, at least not through participation in any existing political systems. And what is particularly striking is that he arrives at this conclusion via an understanding of

10. My description of Aït-Yahya and his work is taken from Nadia Fadil's unpublished paper on him (Fadil, n.d.). See also Aït-Yahya (2013a, 2013b).

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secular Europe familiar to many scholars, one that underscores "the fundamental centrality of Christian norms, values, and sensibilities . . . to European conceptions of what it means to be secular" (Mahmood 2016: 8; see also Asad 2003 and Fernando 2014). What are non-Christian minorities to do in such a situation? Is Aït-Yahya right? Or are there ways to work toward justice (though not necessarily equality) for minorities that bypass the structural constraints of secularism, perhaps via the audacious gamble that Bouteldja advocates, of discarding the political arena as we know it and finding our own way?

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